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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade the preparation of this book has 
absorbed a considerable portion of my academic energy and most of my 
free time. As I look back over this period I can indeed remember 
numerous occasions when I was excited by and enthusiastic about the 
project; conversely, I can also vividly recall feelings of frustration and 
inadequacy when it seemed that the task I had set myself was simply too 
great. I was frequently compelled to ask what I was trying to achieve, 
what could realistically be done with the available sources, and whether, 
in the end, it would all be worthwhile. Any resolution of this latter ques-
tion must await the passage of time and the judgment of others, but at 
this stage it may be useful to explain the reasons behind my selection of 
subject, the nature of the material I used, the considerations that influ-
enced my interpretation, and the rationale underlying the book's struc-
ture. 
When I began my research my aim was to produce a study of long-
term developments in a specific area of the Indonesian archipelago. 
Because so many sources for the premodern period are unexplored, I 
remain convinced that the provision of case studies is a major priority in 
the reconstruction of Southeast Asian history. Until we can speak with 
some confidence about a wider range of separate localities, any general-
ized comments about the region must be made with caution. Too often, 
for instance, there is a tendency to speak of "change" without recogniz-
ing that its nature, rate, and extent differed from one area to another 
and in many instances came so slowly that the effects are only percepti-
ble when a community is examined over an extended period. 
In view of my previous research experience, the choice of J ambi and 
Palembang as an area for closer study was a logical one. Historians of 
the Malay world have long regarded southeast Sumatra with particular 
interest because of the links between this region and Malay cultural tra-
ditions. Furthermore, I knew that the Dutch East India Company 
(Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie [VOC]) had established posts in 
both Jambi and Palembang, I was familiar with the nature of Dutch 
material, and I felt (incredibly, it now seems) that this new project 
would not pose challenges very different from those I had encountered 
during my earlier work. I was soon disillusioned, for I had simply not 
appreciated the extent to which the ostensibly "Malay" states that 
developed on the Sumatran side of the Melaka Straits differed from 
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their neighbors on the peninsula. Consequently, a whole world opened 
up for me as I began my research, since I knew almost nothing about 
the numerous groups who inhabit the interior of southeast Sumatra. 
With certain notable exceptions, modern anthropologists have not been 
drawn to work on this area; without detailed ethnographic studies, 
some time elapsed before I felt even moderately confident in my under-
standing of upstream societies. Still, in spite of all my efforts, the 
sources accessible to me have meant that some communities within the 
contemporary provinces ofJambi and Sumatera Selatan (South Suma-
tra, formerly Palembang) have not received as much attention as oth-
ers. I can only hope that future researchers will rectify my inadequacies. 
Having chosen southeast Sumatra as a focus for study, I was then 
faced with the question of an appropriate time frame. Believing that the 
European arrival helped introduce a period of considerable change, I 
initially planned to begin research in the early sixteenth century. How-
ever, my hopes in this regard were thwarted, for relevant Portuguese 
material proved to be extremely thin. Only from 1615, when the Dutch 
and English East India Companies arrived in southeast Sumatra, did 
the sources begin to expand.! Even so, they are not spread equally 
between Palembang and Jambi, and I saw in them no shared climax or 
clear denouement around which a "history" could be structured. Infor-
mation regarding Palembang in the early seventeenth century, for 
example, is far less complete than that relating to Jambi, but after 1662 
vac representatives in Palembang maintained a continuous corre-
spondence with Batavia until the Company's demise in 1799. By con-
trast, the Dutch departure from J ambi in 1770 precludes even the 
apparently simple task of constructing a reliable royal chronology for 
the latter part of the eighteenth century. Local memories obviously did 
not disappear, but they are not recorded in a manner that makes them 
readily accessible. Thus, though about 1600 could stand as a defensible 
starting point for a joint history, it was less easy to establish where I 
should end. The problem could have been resolved had the study been 
limited to either Jambi or Palembang, and for a time I toyed with this 
notion. I nonetheless resisted the temptation because their history is 
so intimately connected, because their personification as "brothers" 
occurs so frequently in the sources, and because I felt that developments 
in the one helped to explain the pattern of events in the other. Finally, I 
decided to conclude the book at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
at the juncture when European penetration into the area became more 
intense and the nature of change rather different from that of the pre-
vious two hundred years. 
The available information has influenced this interpretation of J ambi 
and Palembang history in other ways. Unlike the relatively sparse docu-
mentation provided by the English East India Company, the vac 
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material is rich in detail relating to political and economic consider-
ations. It is obviously not all-inclusive, for the Dutch were concerned 
primarily with their own commercial interests, and their focus was 
therefore on the court, where they saw power residing. Large areas of 
the local economy fell outside their interests, and geographically distant 
places were discussed sporadically and often imprecisely. Nonetheless, 
the extent and continuity ofVOC sources make them an invaluable tool 
that will continue to serve historians of Indonesia well. Records from 
the colonial period were also extremely helpful in explaining or expand-
ing earlier information, particularly in regard to Palembang, but I have 
been constantly aware of the need for caution in applying the "regres-
sive method." Customs confidently described as "traditional" in 1850, 
for instance, may have changed markedly from practices a century or so 
earlier. 
The indigenous sources most readily available are manuscripts 
emanating from the courts-chronicles, literary romances, religious 
texts-with Palembang again being more favored than Jambi. Any his-
torian will be aware that these must be approached with care, since vir-
tually all extant texts were composed or copied in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and the degree of editing in their record of earlier times is 
unknown. Less accessible and more problematic, however, is the amor-
phous and shifting material transmitted orally. The difficulties involved 
in using such accounts for historical reconstruction are formidable and 
are compounded by the fact that many versions have been preserved 
only because they were committed to paper by Europeans or their local 
assistants. Although grateful for the industry of early collectors, most 
scholars recognize that any attempt to tap written oral traditions is 
fraught with methodological problems, especially when they have been 
translated or edited for publication. 2 Nor is it immediately apparent 
how this material can be used in conjunction with Company records, 
for its favored subjects-the activities of legendary rulers, the wander-
ings of ancestral heroes, the doings of the animal kingdom, the love 
affairs of courtiers-seem far removed from the concerns reflected in 
European archives. Yet indigenous sources have been basic to the for-
mulation of this study, despite historiographical uncertainties, for I saw 
them as conveying what Jan Vansinahas termed "cultural messages" of 
enduring importance. 3 In thinking about the variety oflegends, chroni-
cles, and stories I had both read and heard, it appeared to me that cer-
tain themes did recur and that they were primarily engaged with three 
matters: the ineluctable and yet ambiguous association between up-
stream (uiu) and downstream (iiir); kinship as a determinant of human 
action; and the tensions inherent in the ruler-subject relationship. 
None of these themes is unique to southeast Sumatra, and all can be 
readily identified in historical studies from other areas of the archipel-
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ago. What attracted my attention in the Jambi and Palembang case was 
the vigor with which they were articulated in local accounts. Further, 
when I approached the archival records in terms of these "messages," I 
did not feel I had entered an alien world; indeed, it seemed that the pre-
occupations I had discerned in indigenous sources were also being 
expressed here, albeit in a different idiom. But although European and 
local voices often spoke in unison, they equally bore witness to the cul-
tural disjunctions that were exposed as Dutch and English involvement 
in J ambi and Palembang deepened. One way of exploring this interac-
tion, it seemed to me, was to view it against the background of a more 
general process by which western Europeans in the seventeenth century 
began "to define themselves as different in significant aspects from the 
rest of the world."4 As Europe's mercantile interests reached out further 
into the non-European environment, it was commonly in the market-
place and the audience hall that a sense of these differences was keenest. 
Jambi and Palembang, like so much of the premodern world, were typi-
fied by communities in which economic and political dealings were 
conceptualized in terms of kinship relations and where orality was the 
cultural lodestone. The Europeans with whom they dealt, however, 
represented societies in which commerce and government were becom-
ing steadily more commoditized and more depersonalized, a transition 
in which the internalization of literacy and numeracy and the changing 
attitudes thereby engendered were critical. 5 
With these considerations in mind, I attempted to write a book that 
traces and contrasts developments in Jambi and Palembang, the 
"brothers" of the title, over two centuries. Although proceeding chron-
ologically, it also uses aspects of the oral-literate interplay as departure 
points for discussing wider implications of southeast Sumatra's political 
and economic history. The first chapter thus starts with the description 
of a Portuguese map, selected because it graphically demonstrates the 
growing textual orientation among early modern Europeans, an orien-
tation often unsympathetic to the entrenched orality of the societies they 
met in Jambi and Palembang. Nonetheless, by moving beween indige-
nous story and European documentation I tried to show how the themes 
that permeate legend and folklore can still be identified in archival 
material and that in many respects they indeed intermesh. 
Chapter 2, which relates these themes to events in southeast Sumatra 
during the first half of the seventeenth century, focuses on the role of 
kinship in economic activities and the implications of royal genealogies. 
In England and the Netherlands written documents recording the 
descent of rulers and nobles were already being detached from mythical 
origins to become simply statements of blood claims to authority. But in 
Jambi and Palembang, as elsewhere in the archipelago, genealogies also 
continued to invoke the relevant family alliances that could facilitate the 
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formation of economic relationships. By the nineteenth century Jambi's 
commerce was moribund, and memories of its once widespread trading 
links, no longer in keeping with the contemporary scene, had slipped 
away from the kingly pedigree. Archival records, however, show that 
two hundred years earlier the pepper trade had brought Jambi a wealth 
surpassing that of Palembang, with Chinese and even Portuguese trad-
ers successfully incorporated as the ruler's kindred. Although the arrival 
of the Dutch and English made the idea of this economic family more 
difficult to sustain, the prosperity that came to Jambi allowed its rulers 
both to emulate the "civilized" Javanese court of Mataram and to 
renounce vassal status. Following the defeat of Palembang by the VOC 
in 1659, J ambi's future as the elder relative seemed assured. 
Chapter 3 employs the image of European account books to invoke 
the notion of indigenous "balance sheets" by which human memories 
were constantly recalculating the mutual obligations incurred through 
interaction with other individuals or communities. By the 1660s Palem-
bang, like Jambi, had also developed as a major pepper producer, but 
beneath the apparently untrammelled prosperity were indications of 
growing strains. In both places trading practices introduced by Europe-
ans made it increasingly difficult to balance a cultural ledger that tallied 
the relationship between upstream growers and downstream buyers in 
terms of services rendered and received. In a climate of growing com-
mercial suspicion, the idealized notion of the king as a caring kinsman 
was progressively undermined by his physical intrusion as an unrelent-
ing creditor and demanding overlord. The rivalry inherent in the 
Jambi-Palembang association also grew more antagonistic as they com-
peted for control over people and territory. When open warfare broke 
out the Dutch intervened to restore peace, but Jambi's economy had 
been seriously affected by years of conflict and the decline of the pepper 
market. In the subsequent agreement the Dutch therefore favored the 
more economically attractive Palembang, and a generation after the 
defeat of 1659 it had reasserted its position as the older brother. 
The comments about time that begin the fourth chapter serve to com-
pare popular evaluations of the kings who ruled J ambi and Palembang 
during the late seventeenth century. Concepts of inflexible time periods, 
an outgrowth of a widening stress on exactness and precision, were 
intrinsic to the European commercial ethos. Such concepts, however, 
were often at variance with values encountered in societies where access 
to standardized measures such as calendars was limited. One of the few 
ways by which different communities could could share a referent to the 
past was by invoking the "time" associated with a particular ruler who 
was acknowledged, however vaguely, as a common overlord. In this 
regard memories associated with contemporary rulers of J ambi and 
Palembang differ markedly. By 1690 Jambi's upstream and down-
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stream had fallen apart, and as the years passed the ulu became pro-
gressively more distanced from the Dutch-supported ilir rulers. Among 
the upstream groups, especially the Minangkabau, there was a wide-
spread call for a restoration of the old order. The mid-seventeenth cen-
tury was now commonly seen as a kind of golden age from which 
"time" the Jambi condition had steadily deteriorated. In Palembang, 
by contrast, a flourishing economy and a peaceful rule meant the 
present was establishing standards of prosperity and wise government 
that drew upstream and downstream together and by which later peri-
ods would be judged. 
Chapter 5 explores this contrast in greater detail in relation to J ambi 
by tracing the ways in which vac officials hoped to use written docu-
ments like the contract to set in place an administration that would 
restore local trade. Vlu and ilir leaders placed a similar faith in the 
powers of the Dutch treaty, not so much because of any specific terms it 
contained but because it symbolized a relationship associated with the 
halcyon times of dead kings. The solemnity surrounding the conclusion 
of "the contract" was charged with such potency that many saw in the 
resulting document a tool by which the past could be recreated. But the 
perceived failings of ilir rulers and their role as effective agents of the 
commercially demanding vac militated against economic revival and 
a restoration of the former upstream-downstream association. The 
flood of Minangkabau settlers simply served to widen the gap, and ulti-
mately the Jambi king, his own standing perilous, turned against the 
Dutch. In 1770, after an association of a hundred and fifty years, the 
vac closed itsJambi factory. 
Palembang too was bound to the Dutch by a contract that theoreti-
cally at least accorded the vac a monopoly over all pepper produced; 
in 1722 this was enlarged to include tin as well. But Palembang did not 
suffer the same economic decline as J ambi, and the status of its kings 
was if anything enhanced. In examining the implications of the career 
of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin (1724-1757), chapter 6 takes up the 
notion of the heroic ruler, the outsize figure who helps anchor history in 
strongly oral communities. Although similar attitudes could still be dis-
cerned in Europe, the conception of the prince as epic hero, imbued 
with extraordinary powers, was being increasingly relegated to a distant 
past. In Palembang, by contrast, the emergence of a leader who seemed 
cast in the same mold as the heroes of popular folklore was critical in 
elevating the downstream court into a largely accepted focus for 
upstream loyalties. 
In Europe the concomitant of a weakening oral imperative was the 
educated view of writing as the proper destination for the worthy 
thought or noble experience. As chapter 7 suggests, this view was amply 
demonstrated in the eighteenth century by the florescence of "scien-
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tific" publications. Many of these publications deal with non-European 
societies, a reflection of an expanding interest in lesser-known areas of 
the world. Interest, however, rarely engendered admiration and in fact 
often reinforced a sense of cultural superiority. Confident that their 
"methodical" observations provided a key to understanding the local 
scene, Europeans in the Indonesian archipelago were thus ready to 
characterize kingdoms like J ambi and Palembang as being in a state of 
"decay." In view of how traditional political-cultural-economic unities 
were formed, however, it is probably more appropriate to think of this 
period as one that exposed the essential fragility of the kinship-ordered 
society. In Palembang this is particularly evident on the seas, where 
Europeans, Bugis, Chinese, Arabs, and Ilanun raiders all contended 
for access to Bangka's tin. In the interior, however, ilir rulers were able 
to maintain their standing despite widespread demographic movement. 
Through a period of considerable change, the upstream-downstream 
relationship, though ill understood by Europeans, proved remarkably 
resilient; and where Dutch and English observers saw inefficiency and 
even disorder, local traditions recall peace and prosperity. 
Like the introduction, the conclusion also begins with a map, that 
drawn by William Marsden for inclusion in his History of Sumatra (1811). 
Very different from the Portuguese work that opens this book, Mars-
den's geographical accuracy and attention to detail provides graphic 
testimony to the knowledge Europeans had acquired about Jambi and 
Palembang in the intervening three hundred years. This period had 
also seen considerable change in the region, for the wealth that J ambi 
had once enjoyed was long gone, and even Palembang was on the verge 
of losing its sovereignty. Certain features nonetheless endured; up-
stream and downstream remained inevitably linked and yet potentially 
separate; kinship continued to stand as the woof and warp of economic 
and political relations; rulers still had the potential to emerge as heroic 
leaders who could take their place among the great ancestors; and the 
memories of the old relationship linking J ambi and Palembang had not 
been erased. 
As this study nears completion I am very much aware that the analy-
sis I have presented reflects not just the kind of material to which I had 
access but the personal interpretation I have placed upon it. Other his-
torians would certainly have approached the data in a different way and 
possibly reached different conclusions. I make no claim for the unique-
ness of southeast Sumatra, and much that has been included here will 
probably strike a familiar chord to colleagues who have worked else-
where. Yet I also believe that the past in Jambi and Palembang retains a 
character of its own, and in offering this contribution toward a greater 
understanding of one area of modern Indonesia I have tried to convey 
something of that character. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Writing and Speaking: 
Approaching the History of 
Southeast Sumatra 
Among the treasures of the National Library of France 
is a Portuguese atlas dating from the early sixteenth century, probably 
intended as a gift for the French king. After nearly five hundred years 
its illustrations still convey a sense of the excitement of Portugal's 
explorers as they moved out beyond the borders of their known world, 
an excitement vividly captured by the artist's depiction of the Malay 
Peninsula and Sumatra. Sprightly galleons crest curling ocean waves, 
parakeets swoop around the towers of medieval castles, and scarlet ban-
ners proclaim exotic names of towns like "Malaqua," the Malay port 
conquered by Portugal in 1511. Nearby sprawls the leaf-shaped mass of 
Sumatra or "Taprobana Insula" (Further Ceylon), ringed by a profu-
sion of multicolored islets as yet untouched by Portuguese victories. But 
the cartographer, clearly feeling that pictorial techniques alone had not 
adequately conveyed the extent of these unexplored regions, has found 
it necessary to append a written explanatory note. "Taprobana" he 
states confidently, "is surrounded by many islands which are said to 
number one thousand three hundred and seventy eight."l 
This delightful product of the mapmaker's art serves as a useful 
departure point for the present study of southeast Sumatra during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its imaginative representation 
helps us recall that when it was drawn Europeans knew very little of 
what is one of the world's largest islands, where they were to be the 
agents of such extensive change. Although the Portuguese had become 
more familiar with the spice-producing areas of the eastern archipelago 
following the establishment of their Ternate fort in 1522, challenges 
from the newly emergent state of Aceh meant that efforts to achieve a 
similar position in the pepper lands of northern Sumatra were unsuc-
cessful. Because there were no Portuguese posts here after 1524 and 
because missionary activity was limited, the information collected about 
Sumatra remained comparatively meager. In the mid-sixteenth century 
the chronicler Joao de Barros, synthesising the material then available 
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to him, reminded his readers that the island "is very large, with many 
princes and lords in the interior about which we have no knowledge." 
While he could write in some detail about the northern parts, he knew 
relatively little about the southern coasts except that they were difficult 
of access, being "full of islands and shallows."2 
Yet even as Barros wrote, European interest in southeast Sumatra, 
particularly the area known as Jambi, was beginning to expand. For a 
considerable period J ambi had played only a minor role in regional 
commerce, being overshadowed by Palembang, its larger and more 
populous neighbor. With the development of pepper as a cash crop dur-
ing the sixteenth century, however, J ambi assumed greater importance 
in international trade and it was here that the Dutch and English East 
India Companies eventually set up posts in 1615. In subsequent years 
they had ample opportunity to observe the close ties between J ambi 
and Palembang and to note that their ruling families were essentially 
one clan whose bonds of blood were repeatedly strengthened by inter-
marriage. 
Naturally enough, Europeans at the time were unaware that the 
interaction of these two areas had been a feature of southeast Sumatra 
for perhaps a thousand years. Local inscriptions and Chinese sources 
indicate that at least from the seventh century centers of authority situ-
ated on the lower reaches of Sumatra's longest rivers, the Batang Hari 
and the Musi, had vied for dominance. Although probably fostered by 
competition for commercial supremacy in the Melaka Straits, the 
rivalry historians have identified may well represent only one side of a 
relationship in which alliance and antagonism were inextricably mixed, 
reflecting a very old pattern of "hostile friendship" between paired 
tribes in early Southeast Asia. When the Dutch and English arrived at 
the beginning of the seventeenth century the Palembang and J ambi 
courts were still intimately connected. This connection did not mean 
that they lived in undisturbed harmony, for blood links and geographi-
cal proximity were often causes of dissension. Nonetheless, there was an 
underlying assumption that the bonds of kindred, however strained, 
could never be undone. Europeans were assured that "Jambi and 
Palembang, have always, until the present time, been friends and lived 
as brothers"; it is noteworthy that local legends, while remembering 
ancient rivalries, remained equally concerned with tracing long-stand-
ing family links. One such account, for example, records that Demang 
Lebar Daun, the founder of Palembang, had two daughters. The elder 
married the ruler of Bukit Si Guntang, a sacred hill (bukit) that stood 
nearby, and the younger the ruler of Tanjung Jabung on the Jambi 
coast. Their descendants, the inhabitants of these areas, were thus kins-
folk. 3 
The Dutch, who by the 1680s had ousted other Europeans from 
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4 Writing and Speaking 
southeast Sumatra, believed they could exploit the kinship idiom to fos-
ter amicable relations between Palembang and J ambi and so create a 
favorable trading environment. But although they were certain their 
intervention could allay any hostilities, the evidence suggests that from 
the early seventeenth century a more intrusive European presence had 
intensified intrinsic antagonisms. The kind of trading practices that the 
Dutch in particular introduced encouraged Palembang and J ambi to 
compete more aggressively for prestige and for control over resources, 
piling up communal resentments not easily countered by memories of 
ancestral ties. Furthermore, while quite ready to act as mediators in dis-
putes, the Dutch consistently worked to discourage marriage alliances 
between Palembang and Jambi, since any such union was regarded as 
potentially harmful to the Company's interests. They failed to realize 
that without this public statement of affinity any friendship was devoid 
of substance. 
The belief that the relationship between J ambi and Palembang could 
be somehow reshaped to serve the vac's commercial objectives arose 
not only from basic misunderstandings, but from an entrenched view of 
Europe's cultural superiority. In southeast Sumatra as elsewhere such 
convictions were frequently reinforced by the negotiations and activities 
associated with trade, when it was often plain that European attitudes 
were very different from those of local communities. As an explanation 
of some of these differences the Portuguese atlas described above has a 
specific relevance. The maps it contains could indeed be informative at 
a purely visual level; however, there is an implicit assumption that 
viewers will be able to read and will thus appreciate the precisely 
assured details of the cartographer's notations. 
This assumption reflects the fact that when the Portuguese and Span-
ish first sailed into the Indonesian archipelago in the sixteenth century 
they were coming from a Europe where the slow ascendancy of literacy 
over oral and pictorial media had already begun. Although popular cul-
ture in European societies was still rooted in orality, there was a general 
acceptance of the view that education necessarily entailed the ability to 
read and write. Such views were especially apparent in western Europe, 
where Protestantism constantly stressed the written word as a source of 
both practical information and moral guidance. Indeed, the Nether-
lands was commonly regarded as the most literate nation in the world, 
and as early as 1525 Erasmus had remarked that "nowhere does one 
find a greater number of people of average education."4 The subse-
quent evolution of a print culture in Europe meant that the process of 
devaluing knowledge not acquired from books or specialists in book 
learning was soon well in train. It was in keeping with this trend that 
Dutch scholars at the end of the sixteenth century began to criticize 
existing histories of the Netherlands, claiming they were founded on 
folklore and fables. Historical reconstruction should aim for truth and 
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accuracy, and these could be obtained only by using "authentic" textual 
material and empirical research. Equally important, they insisted, was 
chronological precision in the writing of history and coordination of 
dates as a means of studying the interrelationships among events. 
The increasing concern with quantitative measurement, exact chro-
nology, and the collection and collation of documents was intimately 
bound up with the spirit of inquiry and skepticism that fostered the sci-
entific, technological, and philosophical advances in Europe during the 
seventeenth century. Historians have been at pains to point out that the 
life of the average person was little affected by the expansion of knowl-
edge and that education did not by itself mean the rejection of existing 
beliefs and attitudes. Most intellectuals, for instance, accepted the real-
ity of witchcraft, and thus a VOC employee in Jambi could still sol-
emnly inform his superiors of an apparition that had appeared in his 
lodge, the Devil himself "dressed like a human being but very tall with 
velvet clothes."5 Nonetheless, it is widely agreed that by about 1700 the 
intellectual bases for the evolution of modern European culture had 
been laid down. No matter how long they had spent in Asia, the Euro-
peans who came to Palembang and J ambi had been touched by this 
slow but irreversible current. Men who worked with an hourglass 
beside them, who had been brought up in the Protestant tradition that 
time was a precious commodity needing to be "saved," had little 
patience with societies like those they encountered in Sumatra, where 
the purchase of even a small amount of pepper could take an entire day. 
Officials trained to keep regular dated records and to file away infor-
mation for ready reference saw documentation as indispensable to an 
efficient administration, for increasingly nonliteracy was becoming 
equated with primitive peoples. In 1684 the English writer Richard 
Steele went so far as to declare that anyone unable to read and write 
"was scarce to be reckoned among rational creatures."6 A system of 
government like that in Palembang and J ambi where the ruling elite 
knew "nothing of archives" and where kings could "neither read 
nor write" was thus in European eyes fundamentally flawed. People 
believed to have no "printed books, written works (apart from the 
Koran), year books, or memoirs" and who seemed to rely on "memory 
and tradition" to record even "weighty matters and memorable occa-
sions" were readily seen as untruthful, avaricious, cowardly, vengeful, 
proud, deceitful. By the same token their histories, transmitted not by 
writing but through oral recitation, were "mere trifles ... which 
deserve not the slightest notice."7 
Orality and the Reconstruction of History 
In their dismissal of the people of Palembang and J ambi as essentially 
illiterate, European observers were only partially correct. Individual 
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kings and most of their subjects might be unable to read and write, but 
the region itself had been exposed to writing for centuries. In 671 C.E., 
when the Chinese pilgrim Yijing arrived in Srivijaya (commonly 
accepted as referring to Palembang), he commented on the numbers of 
learned scholars he found there; it was presumably such people whom 
local rulers charged with responsibility for producing stone inscriptions. 
Several from the seventh century have been found in southeast Sumatra 
and on the island of Bangka, composed in an early form of Malay, using 
an Indic script and dated in the Saka era. In subsequent years the influ-
ence of Islamic culture in coastal areas encouraged the adoption of a 
modified form of Arabic (Jawi) for writing Malay, although Java's over-
lordship meant that in the courts, Javanese was normally used to record 
royal orders. From the sixteenth century, kings also employed scribes 
who knew Portuguese and who had mastered the romanized script so 
they could send letters to the Europeans. 
In addition, a variety of media was available. By the time of the 
European arrival the use of stone on which to inscribe kingly commands 
(piagem) had given way to engraved copper and silver plates; paper, now 
more widely available, was considered most appropriate for commercial 
matters, especially when they concerned Europeans. In both Jambi and 
Palembang, rulers may well have encouraged the compilation of texts 
like royal genealogies, although none has survived from this period. A 
relatively large number of manuscripts, however, do date from Palem-
bang in the late eighteenth century, suggesting the development of a 
court collection. Nor was writing simply a preserve of coastal ports, for 
some interior groups had developed their own chirographic forms, vari-
ants of the ka-ga-nga syllabary found throughout much of south Suma-
tra. Among these societies writing, usually on beaten bark, bamboo, 
rattan, or buffalo horns, was normally reserved for preserving legends 
sacred to the community or for esoteric formulae used in magic ritual. It 
could also be used for more mundane purposes such as simple corre-
spondence, and growing contact with trade centers meant letters from 
interior headmen could well be written on paper. 
Nonetheless, the use of "documents" in whatever form by no means 
superseded orality, and one of the revealing differences between Euro-
pean and local societies was the continuing prominence the latter gave 
to the spoken word even when written material was available. This is 
not surprising if one considers that in oral-aural cultures words have far 
more power than in literate ones and that the enunciation of words by 
an expert practitioner can invoke powers normally beyond human con-
trol. It is similarly useful to remember that in most Indonesian societies 
the mouth and activities associated with it were accorded a particular 
significance. The ceremonial consumption of sacrificial food, notably 
flesh or blood, created a special relationship between those involved, 
while the most binding oaths were always those in which participants 
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drank the water in which their weapons had been dipped. The most 
famous Malay epic, the Sejarah Melayu, dating at least from 1612, 
describes how the divine being who installs the first Malay king on 
Bukit Si Guntang in Palembang emerges from the vomit of a sacred 
bull. Saliva was likewise believed to contain within it the essence of 
"soul stuff," and in this context the human voice can be seen as simply 
the most potent mouth-force. 
The great status of the spoken word was also due to the simple fact 
that (apart from magical imprecations) it could be understood by all. 
Written documents, on the other hand, although admittedly remark-
able, were regarded warily by nonliterates, unable personally to 
"know" their contents. Letters to a ruler, for instance, were usually 
read out publicly. It was not just that silent reading is a skill slowly 
acquired; in a community where most people were unable to read, the 
full meaning of the written word could be understood only when it was 
transmuted into sound. Even among those more familiar with docu-
ments, oral communication was always the preferred medium, for in 
the preparation of any written matter there was always the possibility of 
a serious but undetected error that might impede its potency. Elegance 
of speech and proficiency oflanguage, by contrast, could be appreciated 
by even the most humble, and could be shaped and molded as circum-
stances required. This attitude was succinctly summed up by the ruler 
of Palembang when he wrote to the governor of Macao in 1644: "My 
compliments to you are better spoken by mouth than by letter." 8 
The persistence of the oral environment meant that for most of the 
period with which this work is concerned there was no dominating 
impulse toward the compilation of written material about the "history" 
of the society. Texts of various forms were certainly present in villages as 
well as in courts, but they were regarded as sacred and magical objects, 
like krises, spears, ancient cloth, bezoar stones. Stored with the regalia 
or with the community's power-charged palladia (sacral items to which 
popular belief attributed supernatural protection), they were generally 
venerated rather than consulted. The vast body of custom regulating 
social relations was retained in the communal memory in the form of 
rhymed proverbs, metered aphorisms, and inherited traditions in turn 
justifed by reference to the authority of some long-dead ancestor. It was 
thus not a documentary record that provided the key to the past as 
much as the chanted legend and the sung poem. As one Dutch observer 
in the early nineteenth century remarked, "Everything they know is 
from stories," and the oral imperative can still be seen in court writing 
from the same period. A chronicle compiled in Palembang, although 
obtained in part "from the writings of former times," is given its 
authority because the writer "heard it through the accounts of old 
people."9 
Among educated Europeans in the seventeenth century, "fable-
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based" history was coming under increasing intellectual attack. How 
could it be, skeptics asked, "that men were attracted to tales so mani-
festly absurd?"IO But at a time when Europe had begun to question the 
wisdom of the ancients, myths and legends in most of the non-European 
world were regarded as embodying the received knowledge of former 
generations. InJambi and Palembang, as elsewhere, the ever-mutating 
stories handed down from the past were perceived as unchanging. The 
legends, myths, and tales told by the elders were not, after all, the crea-
tion of one individual alone. Participation and acceptance by the 
audience were essential parts of the oral performance and the pro-
cess of transmittal to the next generation. With the community's 
implicit agreement, details extraneous to the present slipped away 
from legend to be replaced by newly relevant elements that were 
incorporated as ancestral lore, thus rendering the past continually 
meaningful. 
This awe-inspiring past in which the present was so deeply embedded 
was above all the domain of the great heroes, outsize figures around 
whom a people's memories were organized and on whom the burden of 
history was placed. The role of the heroic personality as an anchor for 
information and conceptualization has been seen as vital to the continu-
ance of many oral societies. Such comments are especially applicable to 
Sumatra, where the proliferation of small but culturally distinct group-
ings stands in marked contrast to neighboring Java and the Malay Pen-
insula. Each of these groups explained its origins in terms of its descent 
from some distant hero, an ancestor or poyang who had been accorded 
special powers. From this ancestor all members of the community were 
ultimately descended, providing a cohesion that linked every individual 
to his or her wider clan. The recitation of ancestral deeds, occurring in a 
timeless past, was thus far more than simple entertainment. In a form 
all could understand, these epics embodied the society's collective expe-
riences, garnering up its "history" as encapsulated in the actions of the 
poyang. The details of the lives of the heroes and ancestors, ever adjust-
ing to the present, provided the origins and validation for relationships, 
attitudes, law, and custom. In countless small communities the social 
order was legitimized by the activities of some heroic ancestor. The 
sense of unity and participation that the recitation of these legends could 
induce is vividly captured by an American traveller in the Ogan area of 
Palembang in the mid-nineteenth century: 
The minstrel pitched his voice to harsh or plaintive tone, as he read oflove 
and war; he rocked his body, he waved his hand; and men and women, 
youths and coolies, slid off their mats, and drawing near with swaying 
heads, and moving hands, kept pace with limb and sympathetic look to the 
songs of theirland, the sagas of Sumatra. 11 
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The recitation of the poyang's life and the subsequent fortunes of the 
lineage was an important means of recalling the community's signifi-
cant past. It could also serve to establish claims to specific stretches of 
territory, for the boundaries between neighboring domains had been 
traced out in distant times by successive poyang and bequeathed by 
them to their descendants. By reliving the peregrinations of their ances-
tors a kinship group reiterated its rights to fish in certain rivers, to hunt 
the animals and collect forest products in a particular area, and to clear 
the jungle for swidden agriculture. It was in these terms in the early 
twentieth century that the orang kubu, the jungle dwellers of the J ambi-
Palembang border, traced the origins of their possession of large tracts 
ofland in the Lalang district. Kubu in adjoining domains could then see 
themselves as linked through the kinship of their ancestors, who had 
also laid down the territorial boundaries within which each group could 
freel y move. 12 
The retelling of ancestral deeds also provided largely nonliterate 
societies like those in Palembang and J ambi with satisfactory and adap-
tive explanations of the world around them. Why, for instance, did 
these orang kubu make their habitat in the depths of the forests? One 
story collected in the nineteenth century furnished a satisfactory 
answer. The forebears of the kubu had once been sword bearers for the 
great hero Iskandar Zulkarnain, Alexander the Great, but because of 
their involvement in a shameful incident they had fled into the jungle 
and had there remained. 13 In the same manner, the activities of the 
community's poyang, expanded when necessary, provided a ready 
understanding of the natural environment. A strange outcrop of rocks, 
a hidden cave, an unusually shaped hill could each be explained by call-
ing on the heroic paraphernalia. Mountains, islands, rivers were all 
linked to an elaborate folk etymology that, because it was tied to the life 
of a hero, could not be forgotten. Tun Talanai (after whom the modern 
capital of Jambi is named), for example, journeyed downriver with his 
bride, stopping at various places to rest. Muara Tebo is where Tun 
Talanai "arrived" (tiba); at Peninjauan he climbed a hill to gain a better 
view (tinjau); and the Tabir River is so called because curtains (tabir) 
were hung along its banks to prevent Tun Talanai from committing the 
unpardonable act of watching his betrothed bathe. 
In a sense, therefore, the landscape became a "social encyclopaedia," 
an ever-present mnemonic device providing an index to the communi-
ty's heroic past. H As the names of people and places slid between myth 
and the everyday world, they served as a fulcrum for the organization of 
thought patterns and could even provide a stimulus for the story. 
"Once," a Palembang legend begins, "Palembang had no name."15 
The word "jambi" means areca nut (pinang), which was prepared for 
chewing with betel leaf, gambier, and lime, and was traditionally one of 
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the gifts associated with a marriage proposal. The origins of Jambi are 
still explained by association with the legendary queen Puteri Pinang 
Masak (Princess Prepared Betel) and her suitors. In the same manner, 
the former name of the capital, Tanah Pilih (the chosen land), helps 
recall a traditional account of its founding, "chosen" by geese belong-
ing to the great hero Orang Kaya Hitam. The retention of minute 
details in a society that could not refresh the memory by reference to 
written documents was also facilitated by characteristic patterns of 
speech such as rhythm, repetition, rhyme, and verbal cliche. Another 
aid to memory was the use of formulaic numbers such as nine, which is 
regarded throughout the archipelago as one of the important and "for-
tunate" numbers, symbolizing a kind of totality. A Portuguese expedi-
tion arrived with "nine" ships; a kris is made with metal from "nine" 
places; and Jambi and Palembang were persistently conceived as com-
prising "nine" rivers even though a Western observer might see only 
seven. What gave authority to these formula was the fact that they could 
easily be matched by reality. For example, the list of the "nine rivers" of 
Palembang (Banyu Asin, Sungsang, Upang, Salih, Perugian, Pedato, 
Tulang Bawang, Patih, and Nibung) changed over time as a reflection 
of Palembang's strength. 16 And when Palembang extended its control 
into Bangka in the seventeenth century, the ruler did indeed appoint 
nine headmen as his representatives. 
The profusion of heroic personalities who populate the southeast 
Sumatran landscape points up yet another feature of local society-its 
intense localization. Indeed, one Dutch scholar in the nineteenth cen-
tury saw this localization as a real barrier to historical inquiry. "Their 
legends are too separate and lack sufficient commonality," he com-
plained, "to be of any assistance in constructing the history of the entire 
people."17 Yet at the same time the fragmented societies of this region 
did share a common mythological world in which the great heroes could 
provide important points of communication between even ethnically 
distinct groups. Episodes in the life of one ancestor were frequently 
found in stories about another, while the poyang of one group might 
appear in the legends of a neighboring community as a lesser but none-
theless well-known personage. Occasionally figures familiar from else-
where in Asia, like Alexander the Great (Iskandar Zulkarnain), stride 
across the Sumatran stage. Believed to be buried on Bukit Si Guntang, 
he was regarded as the epitome of the conquering king, providing the 
standards against which lesser beings could be measured. A J ambi 
prince, stressing his peaceful inclinations, thus told the Dutch that 
"even ifI had the might of Alexander I would not take the throne." 18 In 
the same mode the individual known as Aria Dilah or Damar became 
firmly established in Palembang's heroic iconography via the legendary 
world of Java and Bali. According to Palembang traditions, Aria 
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Damar was a son of Brawijaya (ruler of the Javanese kingdom of Maja-
pahit) and the daughter of a giant (raksasa) whom the king had met in 
the jungle when he was out hunting. Aria Damar was brought up in the 
forest but was eventually taken to the Majapahit court, where his super-
natural abilities attracted royal attention. Although by this time Brawi-
jaya had another son, he acknowledged that he was Aria Damar's father 
and sent him to Palembang to become king. After numerous adventures 
in Palembang, Aria Damar finally married a local princess, the descen-
dant of an interior lord, and gained possession of the country's magic 
spear and kris. He in turn became king of Pal em bang, which prospered 
under his rule. However, Aria Damar's half-brother, now king of Maja-
pahit, feared he would be attacked. Knowing Aria Damar had vowed 
he would never take another man's wife, the Majapahit ruler tricked 
him by sending him a beautiful woman who was already married to a 
dalang, a shadow-play puppeteer. When Aria Damar discovered that he 
had inadvertently broken his oath, he killed himself. According to some 
accounts he was buried in Ceribon, but in others his grave is said to be 
somewhere in Palembang. 19 
By the early nineteenth century the name of Aria Damar, reputedly 
the ancestor of the Palembang royal family, had been incorporated into 
the legends of numerous interior groups to help explain their relations 
with the downstream court. 20 But even more important in upland mem-
ories were those ancestors who had emerged from the surrounding envi-
ronment and whose lives were inextricably caught up with the pasts of 
many different communities. Among the most prominent of these, epit-
omizing in his very name the strength of the oral tradition, is Si Pahit 
Lidah, he of the bitter and powerful tongue, who is one of the great poy-
ang of the Pasemah people. It would be impossible to reduce the array 
of stories attached to Si Pahit Lidah to one version, but they are linked 
by threads of commonality confirming his supernatural birth and his 
acquisition of magic powers. Long ago, it is said, an ancestral couple 
who had no children prayed for a child at a sacred place. Suddenly a 
boy, Si Runting, sprang up between them. He was raised as their son, 
and when he grew up he married the sister of a certain Aria Tebing. 
This brother-in-law became jealous of Si Runting, and quarrels broke 
out between them. Aria Tebing was eventually victorious because he 
was able to persuade his sister to betray her husband. Thirsting for 
revenge, Si Runting appealed to the powerful king (or in some 
accounts, a holy man) who lived on the slopes of Bukit Si Guntang. The 
king spat into Si Runting's mouth, giving him supernatural powers 
(sakti) that enabled him to turn people into stone by touching them with 
his tongue. Known by his new name, Si Pahit Lidah now embarked on 
a series of adventures that took him all over southeast Sumatra, wreak-
ing vengeance on any who caused him harm. When he finally met his 
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death in combat with a giant, his body turned to stone. The pieces were 
divided among his descendants, who buried them in different places. Si 
Pahit Lidah thus has many graves, and throughout the area rocks inex-
plicably found beside a river or down the sides of mountains bear silent 
witness to his formidable powers. 21 
While Si Pahit Lidah is particularly associated with the Pasemah 
region, legends collected in the early nineteenth century from the down-
stream areas of both Palembang and J ambi mention him as one of the 
original tribal leaders. Another interior ancestor whose life is even more 
closely involved with the lowland districts is Puteri Pinang Masak, a 
beautiful Minangkabau princess whose fame came to the attention of 
Tun Talanai, who ruled at Muara Sebak before there was any mention 
of Jambi. Tun Talanai travelled upstream and asked Puteri Pinang 
Masak to marry him. Again there are numerous stories regarding their 
relationship, but there is general agreement that Tun Talanai was 
required to win his bride by performing a superhuman task. In one 
well-known account a reluctant Puteri Pinang Masak agreed to the 
marriage on the condition her suitor build her a palace in a single night, 
before the cocks crowed. Tun Talanai, himself a great poyang, would 
have succeeded had his prospective bride not hung a lamp near the 
cocks while it was still dark, and so awakened them. Accepting his 
defeat with good grace, Tun Talanai agreed to acknowledge her as a 
daughter. Puteri Pinang Masak later became queen with her capital at 
Tanjung Jabung, while several of her brothers settled along upstream 
rivers. The king of Majapahit called her "in his language" RajaJambe 
or "pinang," and soJambi received its name. 22 
Puteri Pinang Masak eventually chose as her consort a Turkish 
prince, Datuk Berhala, and from this union came one daughter and 
four sons, including Jambi's greatest ancestor, Orang Kaya Hitam. 
When he succeeded to the J ambi throne he refused to give the custom-
ary tribute to Majapahit despite the urging of his brothers because, he 
said, they were grandchildren of the raja of Pagaruyung in Minangka-
bau. Advised by an astrologer that Orang Kaya Hitam could be put to 
death only with a specially forged kris, the Majapahit ruler enticed him 
to come to Java with the promise of a daughter in marriage. After a 
series of adventures Orang Kaya Hitam discovered the Javanese plan. 
He then killed the smith and obtained possession of the sacred kris Si 
Genjai, made of iron from nine places. Taking this as evidence of 
Orang Kaya Hitam's supernatural powers, the ruler of Majapahit gave 
the J ambi prince a daughter in marriage and agreed that J ambi would 
no longer have to pay tribute to Java. Subsequently Orang Kaya Hitam 
returned toJambi with his Javanese bride and the kris Si Genjai, as well 
as a sacred spear and cannon, which then became part of the Jambi 
regalia. The couple established the dynasty that came to rule in Jambi, 
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and today Orang Kaya Hitam's grave at Simpang on the lower Batang 
Hari remains an honored place of pilgrimage. 23 
Impressive individuals like Si Pahit Lidah, Puteri Pinang Masak, 
Aria Damar, and Orang Kaya Hitam represent simply the phalanx of a 
great army of supernatural beings, mythical ancestors, legendary rul-
ers, invincible warriors, beautiful maidens that had spread itself across 
the terrain of southeast Sumatra's communal memory. Certainly the 
surviving stories about them represent only a fraction of a vast corpus of 
oral material that, constantly mutating, was once transmitted from gen-
eration to generation. The historian of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries must also acknowledge that most of these were collected or 
written down only after 1800. But although legends and folklore must 
have undergone some reshaping over time, those who told them and 
those who listened perceived them to be unchanging. One Dutchman, 
for example, was told that a version of the Sejarah Melayu he found in 
Palembang in 1840 was "three hundred years old." A tale recorded in 
the Pasemah area around 1927 is said to have come "from the time of 
Poyang Sangbute Turu, who already existed before the earth was 
made."24 And while details and even whole episodes may have been 
added, adapted, or discarded, certain concerns continue to be evident, 
retained in oral traditions because they remained of enduring relevance 
to the society. Furthermore, when European archival sources from the 
premodern period are explored, they throw up repeated instances of 
preoccupations that match those in the indigenous material collected in 
later times. 
Upstream and Downstream 
One of the most pervasive of such preoccupations is the relationship 
between the ilir and the ulu. A common motif in folklore concerns the 
hero who, travelling upriver, finds burned twigs or a comb with a wom-
an's hair, indicating that there is a settlement upstream; other stories 
recount the adventures of the ancestors as they come down from the 
interior to prove themelves before the coastal king. This juxtaposition of 
upstream and downstream is a significant one. At the very simplest 
level the sense of where ulu and ilir lay was the basic means by which 
ordinary individuals oriented themselves to their environment. Western 
observers in the nineteenth century were struck by the fact that "people 
say upstream and downstream even when there is no water to be seen" 
and that "[they indicate] the situation of places by a simple reference to 
the ascent and descent of the river."25 In a broader sense, however, an 
understanding of the ulu-ilir distinction is important because the ilir's 
domination over the ulu was never seen as inevitable, and the separate 
identity of the interior was consistently articulated by people at the 
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time. As an eighteenth-century Rejang man proudly put it, "I am not a 
Malay; I am a true upstream person" (Malayo tidah; orang ulu betul 
sayo). 26 
The ulu sense of being different from the coast can be traced in part 
to a long history of separate development. Archaeological and linguistic 
evidence suggests that the interior of both Palembang and J ambi was 
peopled by groups who evolved independently from those along the 
coast. One prehistorian has depicted favorable highland lake areas, like 
those around Danau Ranau and Kerinci, as being actively settled by 
early Austronesians and subjected to agricultural clearance from about 
2000 B.C.E. onwards. The seventh-century inscriptions from Palem-
bang mention relations with powerful interior leaders, and dates of 500 
C.E. have been ascribed to some of the great megalithic monuments of 
the Pasemah region. The lack of any typically highland words in coastal 
Palembang Malay has led a linguist to argue that it developed from a 
Malay dialect at a stage when highland Malay was already distinct. 27 
The contrasts between ulu and ilir were heightened by the different 
ways in which they were touched by the outside world. Along the coast 
of J ambi and Palembang the basic culture was Malay, but geographical 
proximity had meant varying degrees of Javanese influence. The chro-
nology of Java's expansion in southeast Sumatra remains uncertain, 
but from at least the late fifteenth century the region was subject to the 
northcoast port of Demak, and in the seventeenth the central Javanese 
kingdom of Mataram was the acknowledged overlord. However, 
although in 1512 Tome Pires had remarked that the people of J ambi 
were "more like Palembangers and Javanese than Malays," they 
remained much closer to the Malay cultural center of MelakalJ ohor. 28 
Inland, the original inhabitants may have been the wandering forest 
dwellers, the kubu, and in Jambi the oldest settled communities are 
commonly termed the "batin" groups, batin being a title associated with 
the leaders of non-Muslim jungle and sea peoples. The character of 
these batin groups was considerably modified by the penetration of 
Minangkabau influence, personified in the Puteri Pinang Masak leg-
end. Movement downstream from the Minangkabau highlands may 
have been occurring from early times; by the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury the upper reaches of the Batang Hari were firmly established as an 
area for Minangkabau migration (rantau). 29 In subsequent decades the 
Minangkabau flow gained further momentum, with the Kerinci high-
lands in central J ambi providing a secondary route for the downstream 
movement. Although Minangkabau settlers intermarried with locals, in 
certain areas their cultural and linguistic domination was so marked 
that nineteenth-century Dutch observers described J ambi's population 
in terms of two broad divisions, the batin and the penghulu, the latter a 
Minangkabau title given to lineage heads and denoting those groups in 
which Minangkabau influence was more apparent. 30 
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In Palembang the picture was even more complex. In the lowland 
capital cultural and political connections with Java remained much 
stronger than in Jambi, and at the end of the eighteenth century the lan-
guage of the court was still Javanese. Even today the Javanese heritage 
is clearly discernible in the Palembang dialect. The prestige accorded to 
Java could also be observed farther afield, and as the Dutch moved into 
the interior in the early nineteenth century they found the name of 
Majapahit was constantly invoked as the source of laws and govern-
ment. But on leaving the Musi River with its numerous dialects oflow-
land Malay, like those associated with the Rupit and Rawas tributaries, 
Europeans encountered a veritable patchwork of interior peoples. 
Broad categories like "Middle Malay" employed by Dutch academics 
in fact incorporated "congeries of ethnolinguistic kindred groups" that 
reached across the central highlands, encompassing Pasemah and sur-
rounding areas such as Semendo, Lematang, Empat Lawang, Kisam, 
Enim, Kikim, Ogan, Makakau, and Serawai. On the fringes of this 
complex Malay dialect region were other cultural clusters that also 
claimed their own identity, although their languages were closely related 
to Malay. To the southeast people living along the Komering River and 
its tributaries spoke variants of Lampung languages; northwest of Pase-
mah were the Rejang, whose speech, while akin to Malay, was nonethe-
less quite distinct. 31 
The linguistic differences that identified an individual as belonging to 
a specific community and a recognized area were thus especially pro-
nounced in the interior; virtually every village along the Komering, for 
instance, is still said to have its own accent. But the ulu was also distin-
guished from the ilir by the persistence of clan-based groupings. By the 
seventeenth century in the downstream capitals of J ambi and Palem-
bang the concept of a suku as a lineage group associated with a particu-
lar territory had virtually disappeared as a result of centuries of admix-
ture with other maritime societies. There were, of course, some for 
whom suku boundaries remained clear. Prime among these were the 
orang laut, the peoples who inhabited the tidal marshes and offshore 
islands and whose small family communities were called after the island 
or river regarded as their domain. Although they spoke versions of 
Malay and were essential in the local economy, the orang laut stood 
somewhat outside Malay culture because they had not accepted Islam. 
At the other end of the spectrum was Jambi's royal clan, which was 
divided into three suku. Only the palace suku (suku kraton), however, 
could furnish an heir to the throne. The suku perban (suku of the 
adopted) and the suku raja empat puluh (suku of the forty princes) were 
regarded as being of lesser stock because of the low status of their moth-
ers or their descent from royal progeny expelled from the suku kraton 
for adultery or treason. 32 
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In the ulu regions, territorial lineages were much more obviously the 
basis of social organization, whether groups resided in fortified villages 
like the Minangkabau-descended Tujuh and Sembilan Kota (seven and 
nine settlements) on the upper Batang Hari or were scattered over a 
wide area like the suku pindah (the moving clans) on the Jambi-Palem-
bang border. The names attached to such lineage groups vary; an eigh-
teenth-century piagem refers to a marga, the term commonly employed 
in much of the Palembang-J ambi region; in Pasemah it was sumbai, and 
in the Lampung and Komering areas, buwei. But regardless of the word 
used, the concept of a larger family descended from a common ancestor 
and linked with a certain area was similar. Asked in the early nineteenth 
century to explain what a "marga" was, a Palembang man replied that 
it was "one road, people of one inclination, one relationship and the 
same origin." It was understandably rare for interior societies to absorb 
members from outside their marga, but this separation of ulu and ilir 
received additional reinforcement in Palembang, where from at least 
the mid-eighteenth century rulers prohibited downstream inhabitants 
from settling in interior villages. 33 
In the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Sumatran world, differ-
ences in language and customs thus extended the connotations of "ulu" 
so that it referred not just to the upper reaches of the river systems but 
to a society and lifestyle quite distinct from that in the ilir. To a consid-
erable extent these differences could be attributed to contrasting physi-
cal and economic environments. Most of the coastal plain that extends 
down the east side of Sumatra was then covered with thick swamp forest 
or rawa, which in Jambi and Palembang could reach more than a hun-
dred kilometers inland. Although the trees of the swamp forest often 
grew to sixty meters or more, they subsisted not on rich soils but on 
extensive waterlogged peat deposits formed by plant debris carried 
down from the interior. In places no more than a meter above sea level, 
the swamp forest was subject to inundation during high tides, and the 
whole area was transversed by tidal creeks left as the water receded. 
Upstream from the settlements ofJambi and Palembang the land began 
to rise slightly, the mangroves and nip a palm associated with the coastal 
marshes slowly giving way to vegetation more typical of the tropical 
rain forest. But though levees of more fertile soil were built up along the 
river banks, patches of lowlying backswamps remained behind them. 
Toward the coast these areas, flooded during the wet season and some-
times for much of the year, gradually merged with the permanent 
swamp forest. Despite the dense cover of trees and vines, the marshy 
coastal plains were generally unsuitable for agriculture and therefore 
could not support a large number of people. The economic base of the 
lowlands was fishing, the collection of swamp and ocean produce, and 
the maintenance of centers for regional trade, which were on higher 
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ground like that around MuaraJambi and Tanah Pilih and in the vicin-
ity of modern Palembang. 
The situation was somewhat otherwise in the interior. The same riv-
ers that brought plant debris to the ilir also carried volcanic mud 
washed down from the Barisan ("line of hills"), the high mountain 
range that extends down the spine of Sumatra. This richer soil was 
deposited in tongues along the upper and middle reaches of the major 
river systems, notably the Tembesi and Batang Hari in J ambi and the 
Komering, Lematang, Ogan, and Musi in Palembang. The ulu was 
thus more conducive than was the ilir to human habitation, for swidden 
agriculture was possible in forest clearings, and crops could be planted 
along fertile valley floors carved out by tributary rivers in the rugged 
terrain of the great Barisan and its foothills. Some of the richest soils 
could be found in the Pasemah highlands, and before the development 
of pepper growing, rice production was apparently sufficiently exten-
sive in some districts to allow for commercial sale. At the beginning of 
the sixteenth century, for example, both husked and unhusked rice were 
listed as products of Palembang; a hundred years later, when the 
Javanese ruler of Mataram closed its trade to Batavia, the Dutch turned 
to Palembang to obtain rice supplies. 
One of the more obvious results of the higher fertility of the interior 
was its greater population. Nonetheless, the seventeenth-century Dutch 
perception of the ulu as "rich in people" (volkrUk) must be kept in per-
spective. Even the most fertile soils of Sumatra cannot compare with 
those of central Java, and the leaching of cleared land by the heavier 
Sumatran rainfall deprived the ground of many basic nutrients. For the 
most part dry rather than wet rice was cultivated, a factor that in turn 
helped influence the rate of population growth, for while dry rice 
requires less labor, it also produces less grain. In the ulu, as in the ilir, 
the size of the population was delicately balanced with the ecological 
environment. It is noteworthy that even in our own times what villagers 
in the Komering area of Palembang remember about society in the past 
is its smallness. 34 
There seems little doubt, however, that in the early seventeenth cen-
tury there were many more people living in the ulu districts than in the 
ilir. By this period, too, the interior had developed a localized economy 
in which the distribution network mirrored the higher proportion of 
population centers. While in the marshy downstream area the capital 
was the primary focus of commercial activity, the ulu was characterized 
by a number of exchange points that had developed at the junction of 
important rivers, like Muara Tebo in Jambi. These centers were linked 
by overland paths to Minangkabau and the west coast, an important 
factor because the secondary ulu rivers, although numerous, were fre-
quently shallow, blocked by rapids and large stones and unsuitable for 
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long-distance trade. For many interior people, well-worn jungle tracks, 
often with small huts for the traveller to rest, were the prime means of 
communication between various exchange centers. The latter were vital 
to the interior economy because in the dry season the water in the lower 
reaches of the major rivers fell, and it was simply not possible to bring 
cargoes downstream. Until the rains came, trade between the ulu and 
ilir almost ceased, and the interior could be virtually isolated from the 
coast. Dangerous rips and shallows made the trip downstream hazard-
ous even when the water was high, and there had to be real induce-
ments before people would consider making the journey. The ulu was 
equally unfamiliar to most ilir dwellers, for travel upriver whether by 
boat or raft or on foot was extremely tiring and not lightly undertaken. 
Thus, while the great river systems of Sumatra did indeed originate 
in the interior and flow to the coast, they did not necessarily tie upland 
and lowland closely together. Geographical separation contributed to an 
attitude of mutual wariness rooted in linguistic and cultural differences. 
The keynote in the relationship was ambiguity. On the one hand, the 
upstream could be frightening in the extreme to people living in the flat 
coastal plains. In the ilir districts the "terrible movement" of earth 
tremors could occasionally be felt, sometimes for days at a time, and the 
river could change color with dead fish floating in its waters, but at least 
the people here were spared the uprooting of trees, the devastation of 
crops, and the destruction of dwellings that the interior experienced 
during volanic eruption or earthquake. In the nineteenth century some 
ulu residents still reported hearing the sounds of music from villages 
that had disappeared into the earth following one of these terrifying epi-
sodes. 35 
There were other reasons for downstream inhabitants to regard the 
ulu as a domain of danger. Several groups, especially in Lampung, 
were still headhunters; in 1687, for instance, a party of Komering peo-
ple appeared at the Palembang court with two heads, said to be those of 
the king's enemies whom they had encountered in the jungle. The phys-
ical distortions of wens or goiter caused by lack of salt may have helped 
fuel other legends of grotesque monsters who roamed the interior. Pop-
ular beliefs affirmed the existence of the orang bunian, forest creatures 
who could vanish at will, and of fantastic apelike figures covered with 
long hair, the orang gugu. The Sumai River in ulu J ambi, on which the 
majestic Bukit Si Guntang stands, is named for the werewolves believed 
to haunt the jungle fastness, and still in contemporary times Bengkulen 
people along Sumatra's west coast called the Rejang of the interior 
ReJang berekor (the tailed Rejang). 36 
Coastal dwellers also feared the ulu as a place of disease, possibly 
because the jungle clearings were a breeding ground for mosquitoes. 
Expeditions sent upstream by the Dutch frequently returned with "hot 
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fevers, colic and dizziness." Combined with geographic distance, the 
possibility of falling victim to some illness made the ulu a convenient 
place for a king to rid himself of rivals; many a hunting or fishing excur-
sion to the interior led to the mysterious death of some high-ranking 
participant. Belida, an unusually "dry and infertile" ulu district in 
Palembang, even became an established place of exile for those who had 
offended against the king. Yet at the same time the interior was the 
domain of great spirits and ancestors who could be called on for assis-
tance. Pilgrimages to holy graves in the ulu are occasionally mentioned 
in the sources, and it was to the upstream region that a Palembang king 
sick of a "native disease" went to be cured. It was also a source of relax-
ation, for here in the forest clearings deer and wild buffalo could be 
hunted, and in the smaller tributaries and river meanders, fish could be 
had for the taking. 37 
The attitude of the ulu people to the coast was equally ambiguous, for 
the ilir was imbued with supernatural and potentially dangerous pow-
ers. Echoes of what are probably very old perceptions have survived in 
the cosmology of an isolated kubu group in J ambi studied by a modern 
anthropologist. For them, upstream deities are benign, associated with 
dry rice fields, elephants, high mountains, and the sky; the downstream 
ones, called orang Melayu (Malays), are linked with rice, disease, trade, 
and religion and are regarded as malevolent with the ability to cause 
great suffering. A parallel is found in folklore from ulu Palembang, 
where the destructive monsters who thrust their way into the interior 
almost invariably originate from the coast. For any hero to leave the 
familiarity of the ulu and travel downstream necessitates the acquisition 
of special skills and magic objects, not only to endure the rigors of the 
journey but to survive the traps and tests the cunning ilir people will 
delight in setting for him.38 From the standpoint of the upstream com-
munities, the gaining of honors from the coast was as much a symbol of 
the extraordinary gifts of the recipient as it was of the prestige of the 
downstream king. 
Distanced by geography, language, and customs, upstream and 
downstream were nonetheless drawn together by an economy in which 
the prosperity of the coastal center depended largely on its ability to 
offer foreign traders the produce of the interior. The attempts by down-
stream kings to bring those upstream under their overlordship and the 
continuing efforts of ulu dwellers to shape this relationship to their 
advantage dominate the history of J ambi and Palembang in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries. The ambiguities and potentialities of 
the ulu-ilir association are a preoccupation of many Sumatran folktales, 
but as archival sources suggest, it is a preoccupation that grew out of the 
realities of the local environment. 
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Children and Parents 
A second theme that emerges in both indigenous material from south-
east Sumatra and European documents concerns the importance of the 
family and the absolute necessity for its survival. Perhaps this is most 
clearly expressed in the recurring articulation of a fear that hung over 
all mature adults-the fear of childlessness and the possible demise of 
the family line. As the eighteenth-century observer William Marsden 
perceptively remarked, "Everyone has a regard to his race; and the 
probability of its being extinct is esteemed a great unhappiness. This is 
what they call tungguan putus [broken lineage]."39 Conception was never 
seen as the inevitable result of wedlock, and innumerable stories 
describe the lucky find of a baby by a childless couple or the travels of 
some hero in search of the elixir that will cure his ruler's barrenness. 
The great poyang themselves were not exempt; Tun Talanai's son was 
only conceived by the use of powerful medicines, and Orang Kaya 
Hitam himself died childless. To continue the line the people of Jambi 
had to seek out one of his brothers who had settled in Java. An English 
account of an expedition to the Palembang interior mentions that a sin-
gle man encountered in an ulu village had even been provided with a 
family by the community, for he was said to be married to a fairy wife 
and by her had fathered a number of invisible fairy children. 40 
One of the reasons childlessness was a genuine possibility for any 
individual was the low birth rate. We have already pointed to the fact 
that the indigenous economy, depending on shifting agriculture and the 
collection of sea and jungle produce, could support only a small popula-
tion. What helped maintain the delicate ecological balance between 
environment and demography was local marriage customs, which 
encouraged late unions and militated against large families. In the nine-
teenth century the Dutch found that in Palembang the varied types of 
marriage fell into three broad categories. The first and least common 
was semindo or free marriage, which entailed no payment or service from 
the groom or his relatives; in the second, termedjujur, a payment was 
made to the bride's family; in ambit anak, the husband was adopted by 
his wife's parents in lieu of bride price. In both the latter cases marriage 
tended to be later and the number of children fewer than was the case in 
Java. 41 
Another reason behind the fear of tungguan putus was the relatively 
high death rate among small children. There are naturally no figures on 
infant mortality, but it was obviously a matter for anxiety among expec-
tant parents. An old Lampung ketika (divination table) said to date from 
the seventeenth century thus provides couples with guidance for inter-
course with the view to producing a healthy baby. The third, ninth, and 
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sixteenth days of the month are listed as unfavorable, being almost cer-
tain to result in a dead or retarded child. 42 Children were also especially 
vulnerable to disease and epidemic. In the eighteenth century Marsden 
commented that smallpox (ketumbuhan) was regarded as "a kind of 
plague," from which not even the mightiest were safe; in the late eigh-
teenth century a king of Palembang lost fourteen of his children in one 
outbreak alone. In the highlands, where limited coastal contact meant a 
lack of genetic resistance, thousands of people could fall victim in a mat-
ter of months. When one storyteller from Lampung related how Si 
Pahit Lidah himself had six brothers and sisters, all of whom died with-
out leaving children, it would have been a situation with which his audi-
ence could readily identify. 43 
In this environment, the birth of a healthy child regardless of sex was 
an occasion for celebration. Daughters were of particular value because 
their marriage could mean the receipt of a blide price or, through ambil 
anak, could bring another son into the family. The wedding of a daugh-
ter could thus mean a man was himself released from the debts he had 
incurred by his own marriage. There were other reasons for placing a 
high value on the birth of a female child. Women played an essential 
part in the maintenance of the lineage, and in Kerinci they were even 
responsible for guarding the ancient buffalo horns that symbolized 
agreements reached by the ancestors concerning territorial boundaries. 
And it was not only in areas subject to Minangkabau influence that lin-
eage and inheritance passed through the female line. In the Semendo 
districts of ulu Palembang the eldest daughter, as well as being heir, was 
also responsible for supervising ceremonies connected with the graves of 
forebears. 44 Daughters, who would care for their parents or parents-in-
law in their old age, could be even more desired than sons, a mark of 
special favor from the ancestors. In the early nineteenth century a 
Dutchman came across a Palembang noble going to the burial site of a 
past king to ask for a daughter. This wish was later granted, "and when 
she was six weeks old I went to the grave with my family, made an offer-
ing and showed the child." Similarly, a story collected early this century 
describes how a man from Serampas inJambi makes a pilgrimage to the 
grave of Orang Kaya Hitam at Simpang. "In times past," he said, "I 
had no child and I made a vow to kill a goat on Orang Kaya Hitam's 
grave if! had a child. I had a daughter, and she is now big, but I have 
not yet fulfilled my VOW."45 
Even when a child grew to adulthood, however, survival could not be 
taken for granted. Travellers on the oceans were in particular danger, 
for the sea was the domain of the spirits of the sea, the hantu taut, which 
could cause shipwrecks and disaster. A trader on a voyage might be 
taken by pirates, or wrecked, or despite a safe arrival, be detained by 
some unknown king. A Malay tale popular in the seventeenth century 
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presents a merchant's wife as begging to accompany her husband on a 
sea voyage because of her fears he will not return. Daily existence at 
home could also be fraught with danger, and the fenced hamlets typical 
of the interior were a witness to the ever-present dread of unforeseen 
raids from hostile neighbors or depredations by wild animals. In 1773, 
for example, the Rawas area was said to be virtually depopulated 
because the people were so fearful of attacks by tigers. 46 Sudden death 
could occur even in the apparent safety of the marketplace, where an 
unsuspecting passerby could fall victim to the explosive force of an 
amok. 
For a community in which life was precarious and unpredictable, the 
support of relatives was vital. Perhaps the greatest assistance could 
come from the long-dead ancestors, who possessed supernatural powers 
and yet remained personally interested in the welfare of their kinfolk; 
stories often tell of ancestors who appear to give advice or help. Living 
relatives could equally be a source of solace, especially since tradition 
demanded that they extract vengeance for any wrong a person might 
suffer. Accordingly, the larger the family, the more secure an individual 
would be. A nineteenth-century traveller in the Pasemah highlands thus 
perceptively remarked that certain customs following a village wedding 
were deliberately intended "to make brothers [of] all the inhabitants." 
By contrast, a lack of kinsfolk could only arouse feelings of anxiety. Peo-
ple in one interior Palembang district told a Dutch official they had 
been so desolate when fire forced a neighboring village to be relocated 
that they too had moved in order to be closer to their relatives. Yet there 
was always the possibility of finding members of one's family even 
among apparent strangers, because each poyang had brothers and sis-
ters who could produce their own lines of descent and thus give rise to 
distant relatives, albeit as yet unmet. A person might never know all the 
people in his or her wider family but should nonetheless be ever ready to 
claim potential kin. A Palembang shadow play or wayang story describes 
a hero whose mother, a white garuda (mythological creature, half 
human, half bird), gives him as a gift a fruit that will vanquish any kind 
of danger as he goes on his travels. Only his relatives will remain 
unhurt, and he will thus be able to recognize them. 47 
Relatives meant security, because they could be trusted; as a corol-
lary, those outside the magic circle of kinship were regarded as poten-
tially threatening, a belief that experience frequently supported. Added 
to stories of pirates, headhunters, slave raiders, and monsters was the 
recurring incidence of interclan rivalry for control of the same resources 
and for the flat river valleys and accessible areas of rain forest. Individu-
als inadvertently found hunting or fishing outside their clan's domain 
could incur harsh punishment if discovered by those with whom they 
could claim no kin relationship. During his travels even Si Pahit Lidah 
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encountered hostility from strangers who refused to give him food, and 
the perception of distant unrelated communities as the realm of thieves 
and poisoners persists today. As one folk story puts it, "We do not know 
their origins (asa!) or where they come from."48 
But once a common family link could be established, however 
remote, the danger was gone. The stronger this relationship, the greater 
was the obligation to both give and receive help. The dependence on 
close relatives and the trust placed in them was both a function of and 
reinforced by the economic environment. In the swidden agriculture 
typical of the region, the basic working unit was not so much the lineage 
as a whole but the small family group of parents and children. Little in 
this economy required the degree of large-scale cooperation necessary 
in the wet rice villages of Java. A Jambi man thus takes his wife and 
children with him to Inderagiri to cut rattans; another keeps guard 
"with his wife and children"; a fisherman "has his wife and children 
along"; and the family could even be brought on a trading expedition. 49 
On such occasions every member had specific tasks as part of the fam-
ily-based economy, an interaction reinforced by the tendency to regard 
parents and children as a single entity. Just as a family collectively par-
ticipated in pleasure or celebrations, so did they share in shame or pun-
ishment. In 1641, for example, the wife and children ofa man who had 
run amok were sold into slavery with him "according to their [Jambi] 
custom."50 
Men did, of course, often leave their families when involved in a 
trading voyage or a military expedition, but it was viewed as a great 
misfortune to be parted from relatives for any great length of time. 
Envoys who did not wish to undertake an expensive journey to Java or a 
trip upstream could satisfactorily excuse themselves by saying that they 
did not want "to go so far from wife and family" or could insist on tak-
ing them along. To a far greater extent than men, women spent their 
entire lives surrounded by close relatives, a major exception being those 
who were gifted to the royal household from village families. When a 
woman of high birth from some distant place married a prince from 
Jambi or Palembang, it was common for her to be accompanied by a 
group of kinsfolk, like the Makassar princess who became queen of 
J ambi in the late seventeenth century or the Siantan wife of a Palem-
bang king twenty years later. The desire to be close to one's relatives 
was quite understandable in a culture that saw those separated from 
their family as deprived of essential support. It was this sense of depri-
vation that a J ambi ruler in 1689, exiled in Batavia, tried to convey to 
the governor general: "I do not have a father, mother or brothers, 
therefore I need your help."51 
Within the family unit the great human values such as romantic love 
between husband and wife were ideally established. It was considered 
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appropriate for a husband to be stricken with grief when his wife died, 
to spend long periods weeping by her grave, and for a dead wife to 
appear to her husband in dreams with words of warning or advice. In 
1678 when the king of Jambi (then in Palembang) received news of 
Johorese attacks on his capital, it was thus appropriate that he ascribed 
his precipitate return not to any need to protect his self-interest but to 
the fact that his wife, Ratu Ibu, was ill. By the same token, the spouse of 
aJambi prince made it clear that it was her duty to accompany her hus-
band into exile "to live and die" with him. 52 The figure of the loyal wife 
is most clearly exemplified in Sita, the bride of Rama and heroine of the 
Ramayana stories, but it was a model reinforced by Islamic teachings. 
Though a manuscript from Banten describes Palembang as "kajir" 
(infidel) in the late sixteenth century, European sources suggest that the 
Muslim faith was soon well established in the coastal courts. Indeed, 
part of the very appeal of Islam may have lain in its emphasis on family 
relationships, inheritance, and the regulations of sexual behavior. The 
words of a heroine of a seventeenth-century Malay text simply reaf-
firmed an accepted ideal of wifely behavior: "We women believers 
[should] be devoted to our husbands in the hope that we shall obtain the 
mercy of God the Exalted in the hereafter. 0 you my sisters! Emulate 
what is described in this story."53 
As strong as the links between husband and wife were those between 
parent and child, and the tenacity of these blood ties emerges repeatedly 
in the records. In some areas, like Tembesi in Jambi, the midwife cus-
tomarily called out the father's name during a birth, for he was obliged 
to maintain and provide for his children. It was in keeping with this cul-
tural attitude that the famous Raja Kecil, a Minangkabau adventurer 
in the early eighteenth century, should send to Palembang for his 
daughter, born of a commoner woman when he himself was a "lowly 
person." During his flight to the interior in 1722 an ousted ruler of 
Palembang took with him two sons, a son-in-law, a concubine, and a 
small daughter; he was subsequently joined by another daughter who 
left the court "and fled to her father in the ulu." At the same time a 
father's duty was to give wise advice and administer stern justice, even 
to the extent of physical punishment. The superior standing of a father 
was beyond question for, as a king of Majapahit reputedly said, "It is 
not right that a child should teach his father."54 
In return, the greatest duty a child owed its father was obedience. "A 
son," aJambi prince reminded the Dutch, "is to his father as a slave is 
to his master." The return of Orang Kaya Hitam from Java is accord-
ingly explained not as political ambition but as concern over the illness 
of his aging father, who now needed his help. A child's obligations to its 
father supersede all others, although this may demand such self-denial 
that even the ancestors can be found wanting. A sorcerer in a Palem-
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bang shadow play thus chastizes the princely hero: "Your father, your 
royal uncle and your other uncles are locked up in a glass jar. What is 
the point of being their relative as well as being a descendant of the gods 
if you do not wish to free your father?"55 As we shall see, the perceived 
derhaka (disloyalty) of a Jambi ruler toward his father was considered in 
the late seventeenth century to be a heinous crime. 
A mother is the softer side of the parent relationship, more prone to 
accede to the demands of the child, more willing to intervene with the 
father in the child's favor. The mother in one folktale who takes the part 
of a daughter pregnant out of wedlock was simply being presented 
according to a maternal stereotype. Thus in 1717 a Palembang prince 
attributed Dutch favor toward him not to any decisions by the council of 
the Indies in Batavia, but to the intervention of the wife of the governor 
general. To express his gratitude he sent gifts and a letter addressed to 
his "mother" from her "grandchildren."56 A child's indebtedness to its 
mother could never be fully repaid because for nine months she had 
been the source oflife itself, and from her came nourishment after birth. 
A Palembang wayang story describes how the great prince Arjuna, 
angry on discovering his father had deserted his mother, determines to 
gain revenge because he remembers "the debt for the milk that he 
drank from her breasts." Those who failed to recognize their obligations 
were deserving of the most terrible punishments, like the man in one 
folktale who rejects his mother and is finally turned into stone. Some-
thing of the deep relationship that bound a child to its mother comes 
through in a letter to Batavia from the ruler of J ambi describing the 
sorry state of the country: "It's as if the whole land of Jambi and my 
mother the queen have simply become booty."57 
The great feature of these cultures was their ability to progressively 
enlarge their circle of close kin, an ability reflected in kinship terminol-
ogy that can be readily applied to near relatives, distant relatives, and 
nonrelatives alike as a mark of respect or affection. Relations between 
family members could also be blurred because of the close bonding 
resulting from the common custom of adoption. The niece of a king of 
J ambi preferred to stay with him rather than go to her own father 
"because she had been raised by him since she was small"; a ruler of 
Palembang who had adopted his nephew felt toward him "as if he 
sprang from my own body."58 Adoption could thus hold at bay the 
dread of tungguan putus, and a legend from the Komering region of 
Palembang describes how one of the original founders of an area in 
Pasemah, himself childless, adopted fbur sons who continued his lin-
eage and in turn became poyang. 59 
In ideal terms, the relationship ~ost approximating equals was that 
between siblings, particularly brothers. Although there was still a hier-
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archy of older and younger, the formula of a group of brothers-three, 
five, seven, or nine-who not only share adventures but support each 
other in trouble appears repeatedly in legends. It was the ties of "broth-
erhood" that were most frequently invoked between friends who were 
bound together by long association and common interests rather than 
by blood ties. In the absence of kin, such relationships could provide the 
assistance one would normally obtain from relatives. However, without 
longstanding family links this kind of brotherhood could be maintained 
only if mutual obligations were scrupulously observed. The tenacity of 
this message is apparent in a modern version of the Si Pahit Lidah leg-
end written for children: "If you don't have a true brother (saudara kan-
dung) and you conduct yourself properly, other people can become your 
brothers."6o 
Yet through the motif of brotherhood that legend so often depicts as 
one of the sureties in human relations runs a darker thread, one dealing 
not with affection and support but with jealousy, hatred, and fratricide. 
Aria Damar's brother, the king of Java, conspires to kill him; Si Pahit 
Lidah, betrayed by his own wife, is irrevocably alienated from his 
brother-in-law. Equally, the ties between child and parent could be 
strained to breaking point; Tun Talanai, the legendary ruler of J ambi, 
had his own son locked in a chest and cast out to sea because of fears 
that the child might one day seize the throne. In ordinary life the same 
emotions played out in the lives of the ancestors could also tear apart the 
fabric of peaceful family relations. Brothers frequently quarrelled. 
Fathers and sons could be rivals. Mothers might favor one child over 
another. The loyalty of women was often torn between their husbands 
and their own kin. During quarrels between the Jambi ruler and 
Makassarese migrants in 1679 a Makassarese princess caused great 
affront to her relatives when she fled to a sister wedded to a J ambi 
prince rather than to her brother, the Makassarese leader. Behind the 
perception of kinship relations as the template for social interaction was 
thus the realization that they were always subject to disruption. 
Because condemnations of impropriety could be so wide ranging and 
the repercussions so far reaching, sexual misconduct was perhaps the 
deepest threat to communal harmony. Spying on women bathing, for 
instance, was considered a great affront of which Europeans were fre-
quently accused; it could be an offense to grasp a woman by the arm, to 
lurk outside her house, to secretly watch the provocative movements of 
her body as she stamped rice, even to sit down near her. It was not sim-
ply that the tarnishing of a woman's honor meant an insult to her fam-
ily, for which her male relatives were bound to seek vengeance; it was 
also believed that the flouting of sexual mores was a challenge to the 
very cosmos. A modern scholar has even detected in the earliest forms 
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of the Indonesian language indications of a belief that such acts, 
together with murder, would mean the offender would be struck by the 
lightning god and turned to stone. 61 
The conviction that the consequences of sexual crimes such as adul-
tery and incest could be calamitous helps explain the severity of the 
punishments imposed. In the thirteenth century a Chinese description 
of Palembang commented that adultery was the only crime that merited 
death, comments still echoed four hundred years later. Customary law 
in J ambi allowed for burial alive as a test of innocence and banishment 
or death for the guilty. Even if this was commuted to a heavy fine, it was 
an effective condemnation to a lifetime of indebtedness. In the nine-
teenth century a common reason advanced to explain the shyness of the 
kubu was that their ancestors had taken refuge in the forest, ostracized 
because of some long-ago incest. When such relationships were discov-
ered within a village, special ceremonies had to be carried out to purge 
the contamination, for if the community failed to take action all its 
members could suffer; tiger attacks, for example, were frequently 
attributed to some violation of sexual codes. A centuries-old Pasemah 
statue of copulating tigers, said to have been erected by the ancestors, 
has been interpreted by at least one storyteller as a warning to succeed-
ing generations to hunt down those guilty of immoral behavior. 62 
Fundamental to these cultural attitudes was the assumption that all 
members of the society, from the lowest to the highest born, should be 
mindful of the dangers inherent in male-female relations. Occasionally, 
the heroic ancestors displayed their awesome powers by flouting moral 
strictures with impunity. A story from Jambi, for instance, tells how the 
great poyang Orang Kaya Hitam asks his sister to massage his leg, 
uncaring of the punishment this sexually evocative act could incur. 
More often, however, the legends attached to the great figures of the 
past helped establish the standards for kingly behavior by showing that 
great ones too suffered retribution for their immoral acts. Thus Tun 
Talanai, who cast aside his own son, receives his due punishment when 
the youth returns with a Siamese army to destroy J ambi; Aria Damar 
kills himself for dishonoring another man's wife; Perpatih nan Seba-
tang, the Minangkabau hero who plays a prominent role in many leg-
ends from the J ambi interior, flees in shame when he discovers he has 
unwittingly slept with his long-lost sister, Puteri Pinang Masak. 63 In a 
culture that could condemn even a princess to death for adultery, talk of 
flagrant royal immorality was far more than titillating scandal. Such 
rumors betrayed not merely dissatisfaction with a ruler's conduct but a 
deep-seated fear oflooming disaster for the entire community. 
The view that the standards governing the lives of ordinary men and 
women should similarly apply to rulers had important repercussions for 
interstate relations. Marriages between high-ranking families were 
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always the basis on which diplomacy rested, and any perceived neglect 
of the obligations dictated by kinship could precipitate a crisis between 
kingdoms by alienating an entire royal lineage. 64 In 1616, for example, 
the courts of J ambi and Inderagiri were on poor terms because the ruler 
of Jambi had set aside his Inderagiri wife. Repeatedly in the years that 
followed, VOC sources throw up examples of ill will between one state 
and another because of some humiliation, almost always involving a 
woman. One emotion-ridden instance concerned the refusal of the 
J ambi heir to end his liaison with a former Bugis slave girl following his 
betrothal to the daughter of the Palembang king. Years later memories 
of this humiliation surfaced in the Palembang sultan's oath that he 
would "root out" allJambi's royal clan. 65 
The obligation for kings to honor their family commitments meant 
that shifts in kinship relations between royal houses were highly signifi-
cant diplomatic events. Europeans soon realized that reports of marital 
infidelity, an unpaid dowry, a neglected princess were not to be 
regarded simply as trifling gossip, for they could herald major changes 
in regional alliances. In 1686 a king of Jambi warned the vac that 
Palembang intended to ally with its Javanese overlord Mataram and 
war against the Dutch. The sure proof of this, he said, was that the 
Palembang king "had already sent a son or daughter." A key indicator 
of the attitudes of one ruler to another was the kinship terms employed. 
If a king addressed another as "father" he was saying something funda-
mentally different from what would have been implied had he used the 
word "son." Similarly, when the kings of Jambi and Palembang called 
each other "brothers" it was much more than just an accepted term of 
politeness; it conveyed a perception of near equality. After periods of 
hostility between Palembang and Jambi it was thus through the rein-
statement of "the old customs and observances of brothers, without 
ever offending against this" that reconciliation was urged. The implicit 
understanding that brotherhood drew J ambi and Palembang together is 
clearly evident in a statement made by the ruler of Mataram in 1671. 
Declaring Jambi to be guilty of piracy, Susuhunan Amangkurat I (r. 
1646-1677) announced that he intended to punish Palembang as well 
"seeing they are from olden times kinsfolk."66 Ironically, however, this 
comment was made at a time when the underlying rivalry in the Jambi-
Palembang "brotherly friendship" was reemerging with a greater 
intensity than ever before. 
Kings and Subjects 
A third theme that can be traced in both archival records and local tra-
ditions is the ambiguous attitude toward kingship. On the one hand the 
ruler is a person of extensive wealth, a source of sakti, capable of great 
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generosity; on the other, he can be greedy, vengeful, and unjust. Leg-
ends and European documentation combine to show that despite the 
special powers attributed to them the actual authority of the down-
stream rulers was often minimal, especially in the ulu. In the early sev-
enteenth century the settlements at Tanah Pilih in J ambi and Palem-
bang on the Musi each contained a "king" with the title of pangeran, a 
crown prince (usually called pangeran anum or pangeran muda, meaning 
"the young lord"), and a collection of royal relatives, nobles, and 
retainers. But while these kings were willing to sign treaties, receive and 
distribute gifts, and issue orders, the effectiveness of royal commands 
seemed to Europeans extremely limited; in Jambi the resident, the head 
of the vac post, complained in frustration that there were "as many 
kings as there were nobles."67 
Although the downstream ruler claimed a vague overlordship over 
the interior, he only rarely impinged on the lives of his "subjects" geo-
graphically so distant from him. In the ulu greater influence was often 
wielded by individuals who were distant members of the royal lineage 
and whose forebears had chosen to reside along the rivers they had been 
assigned as appanages. They and their descendants came to be 
regarded not as representatives of the king as much as rulers in their 
own right. But in terms of "government" even these figures were of 
only minor importance. The typical mode of regulating relations within 
and between groups was through a confederation of elders representing 
clan groupings, like the lampit empat (the four mats) of Pasemah or the 
pemuncak tiga kaum (the alliance of three communities) in the Sungai 
Manau region of J ambi. That this type of clan division might once have 
been found through the entire region is suggested by legends from 
Palembang recalling that when Aria Damar arrived the ilir too was gov-
erned by four "kings" located at Bukit Si Guntang, Gunung Meru, 
Lebar Daun on the Musi, and in the Padang River area. 68 
The key element in the exercise of authority in such communities was 
not force or even the threat of force but the weight of tradition and com-
munity attitudes that assumed compliance with the wishes of older rela-
tives. It has been argued, indeed, that in early Austronesian society dis-
respect toward the elders, like incest and adultery, was also thought to 
incur supernatural punishment. Behind such beliefs lay the fact that 
authority was represented by, and shared among, the oldest generation 
in the community. According to one legend, when the people of Pase-
mah obtained their laws from the Palembang king, each of the elders 
received a mat with special markings of blue-black. Those who sat on 
these had the task of governing. 69 The significant feature is that the 
mats, although marking off a sacral space, did not physically elevate an 
elder above his kinsfolk. As kingship evolved in the downstream regions 
the heritage of this earlier form of government remained, and in the 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fine mats were still a symbol of 
royalty in the courts of J ambi and Palembang, an appropriate gift for a 
ruler to make even to the Dutch governor general. 
The perception of leadership as residing with the senior kinfolk was 
also reflected in the terms used to address those in authority. The only 
title accorded the heads of Bangka in a treaty made between them and 
the Dutch in 1668 is pak (father) or abang (elder brother), while a docu-
ment drawn up in Palembang in the early eighteenth century refers to 
the syahbandar (the chief port official) as the "father and mother of the 
merchants." A leader commonly described his followers as his "chil-
dren," and a letter from a Palembang prince to a Jambi ruler in 1719 
calls him "the father of his people according to the genealogy." In the 
same vein a J ambi story describing the selection of the great Orang 
Kaya Hitam as ruler refers to him as Pak (Father) Hitam. 70 
The view of the king as a lineage head writ large had significant 
effects on assumptions concerning the relationship between ruler and 
subject. A J ambi saying makes clear the expectation that royal author-
ity functioned essentially as did that of the family head (tengganai), for 
"the world has a king ... the house has its tengganai."71 As far as his 
subjects were concerned, the king's primary task was to act, like a par-
ent and like a village head, as a source of advice and particularly as a 
mediator in disputes. In the kampung (village) such quarrels might range 
from serious issues like adultery to more mundane matters such as 
where padi could be spread in the sun to dry away from a neighbor's 
roaming chickens. Similarly, a king was also expected to provide the 
calm wisdom that would bring quarrelling parties together. Traditions 
in both Jambi and Palembang see his involvement as appropriate only 
when local authorities had failed to reach a solution. In many areas 
there were specific locations, often near the sites of ancestral graves, 
where quarrels were settled and oaths of reconciliation sworn. On occa-
sion, however, it was impossible to reach a compromise, and in these 
cases it was necessary to have recourse to a higher authority. A familiar 
theme in legends throughout the area is thus the appeal to some distant 
ruler at a time of anarchy and discord, for the purpose of kings was to 
provide wise counsel when necessary and dispense judgments all would 
observe. 
European sources from J ambi and Palembang bear out indigenous 
perceptions of the center's mediating role. On numerous occasions the 
Dutch mention the departure of the ruler or a representative upstream 
to settle disputes in the interior, and in Jambi it was said that should 
somebody be killed in intervillage quarrels, the body could not be 
buried until the matter had been fully investigated by the ruler. Appeals 
to such an authority could be crucial in resolving disputes because of the 
deep-rooted conviction that any wrong suffered demanded adequate 
32 Writing and Speaking 
compensation. Theoretically, for instance, any killing required that the 
perpetrator's relatives surrender a family member as a substitute, but 
the ruler could order that compensation in money or kind-wang bangun 
-be paid instead. In the execution of his decisions, however, the king 
should use persuasion and consultation, never compulsion. Royal 
authority, like that of the clan elder, should rely not on physical punish-
ment but on reciprocity and mutual obligation. Ideally the king should 
treat his people like kinsfolk. As one Jambi text remembers, "The king 
married a woman from the Tujuh Kota lands, and he spoke kindly to 
the people of marga Tujuh Kota, and they came under his authority 
and did whatever he wanted." 72 
The councils of elders, which were the foundation of village govern-
ment, could on occasion be dominated by single individuals, notably in 
times of crisis. To achieve and maintain this position such persons 
clearly needed to possess extraordinary abilities that commanded obedi-
ence from their fellows. The innumerable stories telling of the emer-
gence of some heroic leader point to the range of ways by which this spe-
cial standing could be demonstrated: success in warfare could furnish a 
reputation for invulnerability; alternatively, a prospective hero might be 
able to play chess expertly with the left hand or communicate with ani-
mals; he or she could have found some power-charged (keramat) object 
like a bezoar stone or possess a unique copy of the Koran in which the 
letter "wau" had a particularly long tail. A tale collected in modern 
times from ulu J ambi describes how candidates for the position of leader 
had to be able to withstand fire, cannonades, submersion under water, 
and pressing beneath an iron mangle. Nobody from the Minangkabau 
federations of Kota Tujuh (seven towns), Kota Sembilan (nine towns), 
or Kota Duabelas (twelve towns) could pass the tests, but finally a hero 
from Keling (India) successfully survived all the trials through the aid of 
a magic ring and was duly installed as leader. It was from this hero, 
runs the story, that Orang Kaya Hitam and the nineteenth-century 
ruler Sultan Taha were descended. 73 
The concept that even people of humble origins could possess super-
natural powers, in time themselves becoming poyang, meant that estab-
lished authority was never solidly entrenched and that transition to the 
next generation was always a fragile process. It was quite possible for a 
villager who had claimed to receive divine revelation in a dream, who 
was deemed invulnerable, or who was in receipt of a magic talisman to 
supplant existing district and village heads. Succession to the position of 
king in the downstream courts was even more open to challenge, for 
although father-son succession may have been preferred, it was cer-
tainly not automatic. Invariably a number of individuals across the 
royal family were more than eager to stake their claims. All the sons of a 
previous ruler were potential kings, even those by lesser wives, as were 
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the numerous uncles and cousins; the influence of royal women could 
be a further complicating factor. A number of Indonesian groups, 
including Jambi and Palembang, attempted to resolve the potential 
threat of fragmentation by appointing an "older" and a "younger" 
king (often, but not always, father and son) with power gradually mov-
ing to the junior ruler. In time the senior king would adopt a prestigious 
title such as panembahan or susuhunan, signifying that he intended to 
release his hold over state affairs and assume the role of adviser. Soon 
after the Dutch and English arrived in Jambi, for instance, they found 
that the old king, the panembahan, had given control of government 
over to the pangeran muda, his son. 
By itself this kind of transference of power did not necessarily provide 
a guarantee of stability, for although ruling families downstream had 
been exposed to the notion of hereditary kingship for generations, royal 
leadership remained personalized and any hold on power tenuous. Each 
king was engaged in a continuous dialogue with his subjects during 
which his authority was constantly subject to question. Since there were 
many potential contenders for high office it was not so much lineage as 
his ability to demonstrate possession of the special qualities entitling 
him to be placed above his fellows that determined whether his claims 
were accepted. The motif of the individual recognized as ruler because 
he alone can wear the magical headwear recurs frequently in folklore; in 
the words of a sixteenth-century Chinese description of Palembang, 
"When the throne becomes vacant all the king's sons are assembled. 
The cap is handed to them and he who is able to bear its weight suc-
ceeds."74 
Ideally the process by which kingship passed to the most qualified 
member of the royal clan should take place without conflict. A Jambi 
tradition regarding the installation of Orang Kaya Hitam as ruler thus 
recalls how his sister and each of his brothers willingly relinquished 
their claims and acknowledged their new overlord. "In the evening 
Orang Kaya Hitam's brother, Orang Kaya Pingai took his kopiah (cap) 
from his head and put it on the head of Orang Kaya Hitam, saying, 
'Younger brother, you are king.' " Numerous stories from Palembang 
similarly relate how a prince's special qualities made him the obvious 
choice as ruler, while according to legend one king left the country 
rather than do battle with his brother for the throne. 75 In practice, how-
ever, a ruler had to continually display his superiority over other claim-
ants. He could, for example, demonstrate his ability to withstand sick-
ness or sorcery by sheer longevity. A Palembang king, said to be 123 
years old, who had never suffered a major illness, was considered to 
possess great "luck." "It appears," commented the VOC resident, "the 
old susuhunan will not die." In marshalling the ammunition by which 
he could assert his position, a king might also invoke the authority and 
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assistance of his powerful ancestors. As the ruler of J ambi said in 1706, 
"I am sustained by my subjects and by the lawgivers, both those 
already dead and those still living." The frequent visits made to royal 
graveyards were thus a significant political statement. 
The ruler could equally draw strength from his association with other 
power-filled places like sacred mountains, for in the flat, marshy 
swamplands of coastal Sumatra even the smallest hill symbolized the 
enormous energy inherent in the earth. When the Dutch envoy Rijklof 
van Goens had an audience with the ruler of J ambi in Java in 1651, he 
described how the king received him "sitting on a small hill of earth," a 
status reserved only for kings. Palembang rulers, residing in the down-
stream capital, were seen as possessing special power because of the 
proximity of the small hill known as Bukit Si Guntang, which was sanc-
tified by its association with the progenitor of all Malay kings. It was the 
sacral authority attached to this place which was invoked by the benda-
ham (chief minister) of Johar in 1693: "the friendship between Johor 
and Palembang was decreed by God on the hill of Si Guntang Maha-
meru and has endured until the present time." 76 
In addition, a king could lay claim to an array of items-bezoar 
stones, rings, and special clothing-believed to embody supernatural 
qualities. Weapons were always held in particular veneration, and those 
rulers themselves able to make such items were viewed, like smiths, as 
people of considerable power. In Jambi the kris Si Genjai came to be 
regarded as the symbol of the kingdom, so that he who held it would be 
ruler; Palembang legend similarly tells how one of its first kings gained 
ascendancy when he forcibly acquired a sacred spear that could cause 
rain or drought. Even people from the interior made the long journey 
down to the ilir to ask for water in which the spear had been dipped, 
believing that a sprinkling would ensure a rich harvest as well as cure 
the sick. 77 So supernaturally charged were these lances, arrows, spears, 
and daggers that solemn oaths were made on them and the water in 
which they had been submerged, when drunk, bound the participants 
together. Written documents linked with kings likewise acquired such 
importance that the royal seal was considered part of the regalia; its sur-
render meant that the king had relinquished his authority. 
Perhaps a ruler's most powerful possessions were his women, who 
publicly symbolized his virility, itself a mark of heroes, while at the same 
time openly displaying the extent of his kinship network. Among the 
women who surrounded the king some were regarded with particular 
honor because of their high descent and because of their close associa-
tion with the kingdom's sacred items, its palladia. Stories of the evolu-
tion of coastal kingship in Palembang speak of wars between the rulers 
of Gunung Meru, Lebar Daun, and Bukit Si Guntang, with the king of 
Gunung Meru finally gaining ascendancy through his marriage to the 
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daughter of a local holy man from whom he also obtains the sacred 
spear. InJambi, it has been suggested, the figure of Orang Kaya Hitam 
holding the kris Si Genjai personifies the "earth phratry" of the royal 
clan, while his wife, a Javanese princess who carries the lance and 
umbrella, symbolizes the "sky phratry." Together the couple, termed in 
one pantun (rhymed quatrain) the "two candles, the two torches," repre-
sent the unity of the country. 78 
Access to many women was also important because it was through 
them that the ruler could enlarge his family, a potent political statement 
in a land of endemically low population. It was no accident that the 
queen mother of Jambi, "allegedly 120 years old," greeted a Dutch 
envoy in a formal audience "with all the children and grandchildren 
who have spring from her loins and there are many of them" or that at a 
time when relations with the Dutch were strained, the sultan of Palem-
bang came to visit the Dutch resident with "a great crowd of children," 
said to number more than seventy. Since the ability to call on kindred 
for support could guarantee a ruler's hold on power, the loss of any 
member of the royal clan was a matter of great concern. Following a 
death, no royal business was conducted, alms were distributed, and 
kings mourned publicly by the grave, sometimes for weeks. At the same 
time, losses could be compensated by constantly expanding the king's 
family through marriage and by incorporating new "sons" and 
"daughters." When a Jambi prince was killed in fighting with Johor 
forces, the ruler ofJambi thus insisted that he be given "another person 
of royal descent" from Johor instead. 79 There were other means, too, 
by which the ruler's lineage was enlarged. The custom of giving royal 
children to a wet nurse created a special bond between foster mothers 
and the child's family, by which numbers of "milk relatives" (saudara 
susuan) could also be incorporated into the royal clan. In 1673 after a 
Jambi ruler heard that some women who had suckled and reared his 
children were prisoners in Melaka, he immediately sent envoys to ran-
som them. 80 
The ultimate measure of a king's success was the numbers of his fol-
lowers, for as the Dutch themselves remarked, "The people are 
attracted toward the person with the most power, the one favored by 
fortune." In this area of chronically low population, human resources 
were always the scarcest and most valuable. As a Palembang ruler 
pointed out, "It is easier for a subject to find a lord than for a lord to 
find-much less keep-a subject." Without followers, a king had nei-
ther prestige nor power. "If there are no subjects," asks a Malay story 
or hikayat, "who will render homage to the king?"81 The heroic leader of 
legend is always distinguished by his ability to maintain a large follow-
ing, and stories recall that Aria Damar brought three hundred people 
with him when he came from Java, while "many followers" accompa-
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nied Puteri Pinang Masak on her journey downstream. Some ancestors 
even have the capacity to miraculously create their own subjects. In one 
account Tun Talanai produces people "no one knows from where," 
while another Jambi legend tells of a ruler who, in his journey down-
stream, stopped at Muara Tebo. Here he ordered his servants to make a 
hundred models of human figures. These were filled with rice and then 
"made alive (hayatkan) by the ruler himself" to be led down to the new 
capital at Tanah Pilih. 82 
Buttressed by an array of ancestors, sacral items, relatives, and fol-
lowers, in many ways the position ofiIir rulers in Jambi and Palembang 
appeared formidable. Regicide, which had so struck Portuguese observ-
ers in northern Sumatra when they first reached the region, was almost 
unknown; in Jambi the Dutch remarked that the people would not even 
use force against a king, much less be involved in any act of violence 
against him. "They would rather distrust Muhammad than disbelieve 
in the power of their rulers."83 Europeans also found that the ability to 
call on the paternalistic judgment of a mediating overlord was com-
monly regarded as an indication of ordered government, and in 1631 
the king of Pal em bang said he was "ashamed" to hear that there was no 
king in Jambi. Indeed, the English did not fail to exploit the apparent 
"kinglessness" of the newly established Dutch republic in the early sev-
enteenth century, claiming that the Netherlanders were "a dirty people 
with no king." As the Dutch themselves acknowledged, this was a tell-
ing accusation because in J ambi they had found that the possession of a 
king was "the point on which their compass turns."84 
Presented with repeated evidence of the special status of the royal 
clan, the Dutch and English tended to see the rulers of J ambi and 
Palembang as less effective versions of monarchies in Europe. They 
never fully grasped the implications of the fact that downstream kings in 
southeast Sumatra lacked the coercive powers of their European coun-
terparts. These rulers simply could not sustain their standing in the ulu 
solely or even primarily through force. Although the advantages of suc-
cessful cooperation between upstream and downstream were far-reach-
ing, the ties that developed were by no means inevitable. Interior com-
munities always saw acceptance of the distant coastal king as 
conditional, and they became "subjects" only insofar as they agreed to 
regard him as their overlord. Once they had done so, however, his 
transmutation into a senior kinsman could begin. In the constant retell-
ing and recasting of the shifting ancestral past, some forgotten mar-
riage, an adopted child, a long-lost brother could be located within the 
convolutions of a poyang's descendants, linking an upstream group 
with the ruler's forebears. However faint or attenuated, the lines of 
family relationships revealed by the discovery or incorporation of a 
shared ancestor could now be acknowledged. It was then possible to 
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"imagine" the larger economic and political relationships into which 
upstream inhabitants were drawn as a magnification of their own kin-
infused communities. 85 
Although this process was continuing through the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, there were nonetheless repeated instances of the 
fragility of a "state" where conceptions offamily relations remained the 
cultural mortar even as more complex interactions developed. With for-
eign traders seeking to gain royal favor and thus expanded access to the 
pepper trade, the rewards of kingship grew greater; increasingly it 
became a prize over which princes and their followers were willing to do 
battle. At the same time kings sought to strengthen their position by 
tightening their hold over the riches of the ulu and the people who lived 
there, always the major asset. In consequence, the view of the ruler as a 
wise mediator and fatherly protector was subject to considerable strain. 
Those who lived in the interior might see some rewards in a closer asso-
ciation with the downstream kings, but there were also distinct disad-
vantages. 
The European men whose descriptions provide much of the informa-
tion that supports this study were products of an age in which the ability 
to read and write was considered essential for advancement. For them 
the world was already shrinking, and their confident belief that by 
"reading" maps, geographical distance could be conquered is symbol-
ized in engravings of the period showing a well-known navigator or car-
tographer holding a miniature globe in the palm of his hand. The 
expansion of literacy-related skills that characterizes the period in 
Europe also fostered certain values frequently alien to societies like 
those in southeast Sumatra, where the voice rather than the pen was the 
vehicle for preserving and expressing cultural concerns. European 
sources not surprisingly often display the exasperation and even con-
tempt their writers felt toward a people regarded as inferior because 
"they can neither read nor write." Nonetheless, within these potentially 
unsympathetic records evidence of local preoccupations can still be dis-
cerned, preoccupations that are echoed in the stories and legends col-
lected from the area in later times. But the persistence of particular 
themes in J ambi and Palembang should not hide the fact that from the 
seventeenth century, change began to occur on a hitherto unprece-
dented scale. Geographically and culturally fragmented societies, where 
leadership was personalized and fragile and where the most significant 
bonds were created through kinship, now felt as never before the expan-
sion of the European mercantile world. As a result, the "brotherly 
friendship" between Jambi and Palembang was to be fundamentally 
affected. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Families and Exchanges: 
The Seventeenth -Century 
Pepper Trade 
In the early nineteenth century, Europeans in Sumatra 
were struck by the importance accorded genealogies in local societies. 
In Palembang, commented one, "most of the district heads in the inte-
rior can trace their descent for twelve or fourteen generations," and in 
the capital the nobles too could have "very old genealogies." As another 
traveler remarked, "The names of their ancestors are held in the high-
est regard .... They suppose them to take concern in the welfare of 
their posterity, over whom they are always watchful." A successful and 
influential individual must, by implication, have powerful and solici-
tous forebears. It was in this mode that a ruler of Palembang wrote in 
1816 to the newly installed king of the Netherlands, addressing him as a 
ruler "descended from one of the foremost lineages ofEurope."1 
In their dealings with Palembang and Jambi, the Dutch and English 
could well understand the status accruing to an individual who pos-
sessed a prestigious genealogy. On innumerable occasions in European 
diplomacy, some contentious issue had been decided by reference to 
aristocratic or royal pedigrees, decisions in which documents laying out 
affinities of blood and marriage were regarded as reliable guides to past 
events. Europeans were therefore fully prepared to accept the written 
genealogies (silsilah) of rulers and poyang as important historical 
sources. It soon became apparent, however, that the examples they 
found, whether in downstream court or upstream village, comprised 
only a fraction of the region's great lineages, for the majority were pre-
served not in texts that few could read but in the chants and recitations 
of the elders. Accessible and palpable through the spoken word, the sig-
nificant silsilah were always at the forefront of communal conscious-
ness. On ritual occasions, before some group enterprise, or for simple 
entertainment, the names of the ancestors were invoked and their deeds 
retold. Unfettered by dates and unconfined by writing, their lives were 
constantly mutating, their travels, their marriages, their kin ties ever 
responsive to the community's needs. 
Europeans who had initially regarded indigenous genealogies as 
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"true" records of chronological descent soon despaired of locating 
"real" personalities in this floating mythical world. Modern research, 
however, has suggested that the impressive figures of legend are best 
interpreted not as specific individuals, but as representatives of some-
thing larger-chiefdoms, ethnic groups, whole societies-and as vehi-
cles for conveying meaningful messages about relevant relationships. 
For cultures in which the exploits of a famed forebear were often more 
easily remembered than those of a person's own grandparent, this per-
sonification of history could be particularly significant in shaping inter-
action with other groups. By ,recalling associations between ancestral 
relatives it was possible for the peoples of the archipelago to perceive 
far-flung and unfamiliar places as linked to their own societies through 
enduring familial ties. Descendants of such distant but acknowledged 
alliances could then be made welcome and the ancient bonds reaffirmed 
by new marriages and adoptions. 2 
Genealogies and Descendants 
For economic activities the process of creating and maintaining kinship 
connections was crucial because trade could not operate successfully 
without trust, and real trust existed only between relatives. In the vil-
lage market the serpentine coils of relationships created by blood, mar-
riage, and adoption encircled buyers and sellers, binding them together 
as a family and transforming commercial transactions into exchanges 
among kin. In the coastal ports, however, traders were faced on all sides 
by strangers with whom no reciprocal ties had yet been established, and 
they had to be constantly on their guard against possible trickery from 
adulterated products, false weights, bastardized coinage, and unfair 
prices. The tensions infusing any negotiation between strangers meant 
there was always a preference for dealing in a familiar place where fam-
ily connections were well established. 3 There traders could expect the 
fairness, honesty, and helpfulness that should govern all business deal-
ings between kin and that are subsumed in the words tolong-menolong 
("helping one another"). In indigenous terms this phrase, commonly 
used in Malay translations of Dutch contracts, still connotes far more 
than the European concept of simple assistance between friends. A 
modern anthropologist working among the Rejang has remarked that 
"a resolute hardheaded commercialism is considered praiseworthy in 
dealings with Chinese, Minangkabau and Europeans," but it is despi-
cable among people who are brothers and who should tolong-menolong 
or "help one another." It was the obligations inherent in the tolong-
menolong concept that a Jambi prince therefore invoked in negotiations 
with the Dutch: "As long as we have traded together," he said, "we 
have been brothers."4 
Evidence of the importance of kinship links in regional commerce is 
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not difficult to locate. In the fourteenth century a Chinese description 
noted that Indian traders in the Malay Peninsula were given local 
daughters in marriage "and thus did not go away." These Indians were 
the vanguard of innumerable others in later times who built up their 
trade through the relatives of their wives, like the man in a Perak chron-
icle who has "one wife in Perak and one in India." Marriage and the 
kinsfolk it brought guaranteed a welcome, shelter, food, and an entree 
to local trading circles. Those who failed to establish these connections 
were at a distinct disadvantage. A trader from Java in a Palembang folk 
story neatly encapsulates the mental set of "kinship economics:" 
"Being a newcomer, how can I get close to people? I will marry one of 
their daughters." Nor did the extension of the kinship network stop at 
marriage, for as part of a reciprocal exchange of gifts and favors it was 
possible to be accepted into a family as a son. A Bugis sailor while in 
Jambi, for instance, lived with a woman "whom he called mother."5 
Although an individual's own web of relatives could be extensive, 
however, it could not be all encompassing. By casting the net of the 
great silsilah, almost forgotten details could be dredged up to explain 
and justify a community's connections with people who came of a differ-
ent race and culture. In Jambi and Palembang, as elsewhere in the 
archipelago, an Indian prince, a Javanese lord, a Chinese envoy, an 
Arab teacher, a Cham princess could be attached to the preeminent 
genealogies, transforming them into ancestors and their trading "de-
scendants" into distant kin. Generations could go by, but memories of 
past connections could still be invoked to initiate or maintain economic 
ties. In 1712 a ruler in Borneo thus sent envoys to the Palembang king 
requesting "free trade for his subjects" since he could himself claim 
Palembang antecedents and was therefore a kinsman. The same idiom 
was used by a raja of Inderagiri who wrote to the Dutch asking them to 
establish commercial links with him as they had done in Jambi 
"because the king ofJambi is my son, since his father and my wife were 
sister and brother."6 Since a vac official had been adopted by the 
Jambi pangeran as a son, the Dutch could now be regarded as relatives 
of the Inderagiri ruler. 
In J ambi and Palembang Europeans thus encountered societies in 
which the prestigious lineages indeed acted to assert legitimacy and pro-
claim superior descent. More important, however, their recitation acted 
not only as a reminder of a community's progenitors but of the shadowy 
concourse of ancestral heroes whose members could be enlisted as 
shared forebears. The potentialities of such attitudes were particularly 
apparent in the economic sphere, for reference to real or perceived fam-
ily connections provided a conceptual framework that could facilitate 
wider cooperation among individuals and groups. 7 Communities might 
be far removed from each other culturally and geographically, but links 
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between their ancestors could always be discovered in the important 
silsilah. A trader could then move into such places with the confidence 
that kinship ties, however remote, would ensure him a hospitable recep-
tion and that those with whom he did business would treat him as they 
would a relative. 
Ifviewed in this light, the apparently fabulous accounts of kingly ori-
gins and alliances from Jambi and Palembang contain some intriguing 
differences. The most obvious is the more international cast of the royal 
Palembang silsilah, particularly the honored place accorded links with 
China. Stories of early kings tell of Sang Sapurba, a descendant of Sul-
tan Iskandar Zulkarnain, who appears magically on the hill of Si Gun-
tang and marries the daughter of a local chief. Their daughter in turn 
weds the emperor of China, and from this union come many children. 
While Sang Sapurba's line lives on in China "to the present day," the 
two hundred youths and maidens included in the imperial marriage 
gifts remain in Palembang to be incorporated into local society. Another 
daughter, adopted by Sang Sapurba when he found her in the river 
foam, weds the son of the Chinese envoy. Their elder son becomes ruler 
in Palembang, while the younger is made raja in the ulu. 8 
The legendary connections between the kings of Palembang and 
China subsumed in the royal genealogy were not merely grandiose 
claims but reflected an enduring economic reality. Only twenty sailing 
days from China, Palembang had long been a major port of call for Chi-
nese trading vessels. Whereas Jambi is hardly noted in Chinese 
accounts from the early fifteenth century, one of the principal nautical 
compendiums clearly lays out the sailing route from Kwangtung to 
Palembang. Here, it is recorded, a man from Canton had established 
himself as head of a Chinese community consisting of several thousand 
people. In 1407 the emperor appointed another Chinese to "rule over" 
Palembang; he was succeeded by his daughter, on whom all "rewards, 
punishments, degradations, and promotions" depended. 9 
In Palembang memories of links to the imperial court of China did 
not fade, despite the disruption that must have accompanied attacks by 
the Javanese kingdom of Majapahit in the thirteenth century and the 
later subjection by the north coast port of Demak. Writing in the early 
sixteenth century, Tome Pires noted that "governors" had replaced 
kings in Jambi and Palembang, but following Demak's decline about 
1550, new leaders apparently came to power. The background of J am-
bi's kings remains unclear, but in Palembang a combination of sources 
indicates that the dynasty established there was of Javanese origin with 
connections to Surabaya. Subsequent Palembang rulers were proud of 
their Javanese antecedents, but they also incorporated into their geneal-
ogy heroic figures from the local scene like the great Sang Sapurba and 
his string of Chinese relatives. 10 
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The retention in Palembang's royal lineages of fabled marriages 
between the ruler's ancestors and emperors of China can be explained 
in part because the Chinese remained so prominent in local trade. Their 
intermarriage with local women and appointment to key commercial 
positions such as syahbandar reflected the importance of the economic 
association with China. Because of its access to products such as resins, 
timber, wax, and rattans and its reputation as a distribution center for 
goods from overseas, Palembang's reputation among Chinese traders 
remained high. Although Palembang had allegedly been destroyed by 
Portuguese forces after assisting J apara to attack Melaka in 1512, Pires 
still considered it to be "the best thing that Raden Patih [of Demak] 
has, better than his own country." 11 
The long and uninterrupted Chinese connection, which was to be 
crucial in Palembang's economic development, is not found to the same 
extent in Jambi. The toponym "Chan-pei" appears intermittently in 
Chinese records from the ninth century, when it was apparently 
regarded as a place of some consequence. The "Melayu" that seems to 
have replaced Palembang as the dominant center in the area about the 
eleventh century has also been taken to refer to J ambi. In subsequent 
years, however, Chinese interest in Jambi/Melayu clearly declined, 
perhaps as a result of the disruption caused by Javanese raids in the late 
fourteenth century. Palembang once more asserted its predominance. 
In the words of the Ming Annals, "Chan-p(e)i ... has changed its old 
capital for Kukang [Palembang]; formerly it was a rich country but 
since the conquest by Java it has gradually become poorer and few trad-
ing vessels go there."12 
For a relatively short period in the late sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries Jambi once more became of interest to the Chinese, but 
they were driven away by the decline of its trade and the establishment 
of European monopolies. Jambi's retreat from an international to a 
more parochial market casts some light on stories about the descent of 
the royal house collected by the Dutch during the nineteenth century. 
There is no mention of interaction with China, and the economic ties 
with places like Makassar and Banten that had been sealed by royal 
marriages had simply dropped away from the collective memory. The 
ancestors of the rulers of Jambi are depicted as originating from Java 
and Minangkabau rather than the world beyond. 13 
In a society for which economic activity was a function of social rela-
tionships, elements of the past were retained only if they remained rele-
vant. In Palembang, accounts of ancient links with India, Turkey, 
Melaka, China, and elsewhere survived because this port remained a 
cosmopolitan center, a magnet to regional and international trade. By 
contrast, Jambi in the early 1800s was almost entirely "Malayan" and 
so poor it would have been hard to believe that Europeans and Chinese 
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alike had once vied for dominance there. The dynastic histories copied 
for the Dutch in Palembang and J ambi thus mirror not the seventeenth 
but the nineteenth-century environment. Yet in 1616 an observer had 
remarked that although Palembang ran a close second, "the richest of 
all these kings [along Sumatra's east coast] is that ofJambi."14 Jambi's 
brief day of glory as the senior brother in the Palembang-J ambi rela-
tionship, recorded for historians in the balance sheets of European trad-
ing companies but sloughed off by local memory, is only explained by 
understanding its emergence as a producer of black pepper. 
The Origins of the Pepper Trade 
Uncultivated wild peppers from Sumatra and Java had been sold on the 
international market long before the arrival of the Europeans in the six-
teenth century. One type, cubeb pepper, first mentioned as an export 
from the Palembang-J ambi region in the eighth century, continued to 
find sales in China and throughout the archipelago both for flavoring 
food and as an aphrodisiac that could "stimulate the nature to Venus." 
When the Italian Varthema arrived in northern Sumatra in 1505 he 
noted that another local kind, long pepper, "different from that which 
was sold in Europe," was being loaded onto ships bound for China. 15 
Black pepper (piper nigrum), however, is not a native of the Indonesian 
archipelago, but of southwest India. Thus, unlike other varieties, it did 
not occur naturally in the region but had to be deliberately cultivated. 
We can only guess at when Indonesians first realized the potentiali-
ties of black pepper and began to develop gardens, but the earliest date 
for its cultivation in Sumatra is probably the fifteenth century. Accord-
ing to Pires, the principal Sumatran producers were the Minangkabau, 
and traders from this area may have been been introduced to pepper by 
Indians they met in Melaka. But because it is a slow-maturing plant, 
there had to be real incentives to render it more attractive than annual 
crops such as cotton. One of these incentives was that piper nigrum, 
requiring not so much fertile soil as warm temperatures and more than 
2,500 millimeters of rain per annum, was ideally suited to the climate of 
the Sumatran interior. More important, many ulu inhabitants during 
the sixteenth century were encouraged to shift to pepper growing 
because of the realization that piper nigrum was preferred among for-
eign traders and that the latter were willing to pay good prices to ob-
tain it. 
The first area of market expansion was China. Until Sung times 
(1127-1279) "foreignjagara" or black pepper imported from India was 
too rare and too expensive for popular use, but during this period an 
elite bureaucratic class developed. They began to promote a cuisine in 
which pepper was an important condiment. At the same time, expan-
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sion of trade meant that larger amounts began reaching China at prices 
ordinary people could afford. The marked growth in the use of black 
pepper in China can also be explained by its therapeutic use; piper 
nigrum, like other peppers, was valued for its medicinal properties and 
for its powers of rejuvenation-its ability to prolong youth, restore sex-
ual prowess, and maintain glossy black hair. At a more pragmatic level, 
black pepper gained a mass market in China because of its use in the 
preparation of food and the preservation of meat through the winter. In 
the fifteenth century pepper was even being paid to soldiers as part of 
their salary, and two hundred years later China may have been import-
ing between ten and twelve thousand piculs of pepper annually. 16 
The response to this almost insatiable Chinese demand was soon 
apparent in the Indonesian archipelago. Pepper growing in northern 
Sumatra expanded as Aceh rose to prominence in the wake of Melaka's 
fall to the Portuguese in 1511, while farther south Minangkabau settlers 
gradually began to introduce pepper gardens in rantau areas like those 
at the headwaters of the Batang Hari. It was not long before Sumatra 
surpassed India as China's major supplier. Despite edicts against sea-
going trade, the major carriers of this pepper were the Chinese them-
selves, particularly those from Fukien; it was they, indeed, who 
responded most readily when the ill-enforced restrictions on overseas 
commerce were finally lifted in 1567. But the Chinese always preferred 
to carry out trade in a recognized entrepot where they could dispose of a 
large cargo and buy up goods from all over the archipelago. This prefer-
ence helps explain why Jambi was not initially frequented by Chinese 
junks, even though it was known for its pepper at least by the mid-six-
teenth century. Growers from the upstream districts of J ambi brought 
their pepper downstream, from whence local traders carried it to larger 
ports. One of these would have been Palembang; another was Banten in 
westJava; a third was Patani, on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula; 
and to these were added the ports of north coast Java such as GresikY 
For sixty years or more most of the pepper Jambi produced was sold 
not in the downstream port itself, but in places more popular among 
Chinese traders. Consequently, Palembang's commerce still far sur-
passed that of J ambi; in 1589 the imperial court approved four licenses 
for junks to trade to Palembang, the same as for the well-known port of 
Banten and only one less than for Siam. is It says much for the attraction 
of Palembang that junks still continued to find their way there despite 
the difficulty of negotiating the treacherous Bangka Straits. What 
finally helped propel Jambi into greater prominence was not so much its 
indirect connections with China but the expansion of the second great 
arm of the pepper trade, that which stretched deep into Europe. 
In the fifteenth century European pepper imports had risen consider-
ably; by 1500 they had reached about twelve hundred tonnes annually, 
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about as much as all other spices combined. The goal of dominating an 
assured and growing market was a major stimulus behind Portuguese 
expansion into Asia. Although for the greater part of the sixteenth cen-
tury Portugal's main source of piper nigrum was southwest India, the 
capture of Melaka in 1511 brought its traders close to the pepper-grow-
ing areas of northern Sumatra and western Java. Through their control 
of Melaka, the institution of a Crown monopoly, and their policy of 
deliberately keeping supplies below demand, the Portuguese were able 
to dominate the European market. However, they quickly realized Chi-
na's great potential, and the aim of supplying both Europe and China 
prompted attempts to gain more direct access to sources of black pep-
per. 19 In 1509, even before the taking of Melaka, they had made over-
tures to the Sumatran pepper ports of Pedir and neighboring Pasai, set-
ting up a padriio, a marble cross bearing the coat of arms of the 
Portuguese crown, to show discovery and possession. But this promis-
ing entry into the pepper trade ended with the Portuguese expulsion 
from China in 1522 and the Acehnese capture of Portuguese posts in 
Pasai and Pedir two years later. The Portuguese were still at odds with 
Aceh when the Chinese eventually readmitted them in 1554. They 
therefore had to depend more on Jambi pepper available in Patani, 
where they had established relations about 1517, and on supplies from 
Sunda, where a small Portuguese community had grown up. 20 
Through the sixteenth century Portuguese monopoly policies helped 
to keep pepper prices high in Europe, and by 1592 it cost about 14 per-
cent more than it had a century earlier. Pepper was thus rarely used in 
food preparation, where it faced competition from cheaper spices, espe-
cially ginger. As in China, however, pepperish plants remained an 
essential item in medicinal preparations, and of all the available varie-
ties apothecaries came to favor piper nigrum. It became a key ingredi-
ent in the potion diatrion pipereon, a medicine regarded as something of a 
panacea, for it "breaketh grosse winde, digesteth meat, provoketh 
appetite, resolveth crude humours ... restoreth memory, cleareth the 
voice, putteth backe grey heares, remedieth the goute which commeth 
of a colde cause" and "whosover aged doth use much of this medicine 
he shall not need any other help to preserve his health." With this kind 
of endorsement it is not surprising that an increasing number of urban 
dwellers in Europe habitually used pepper; by 1570 upwards of two 
thousand tonnes were being imported. 21 
During this period the reputation of Sumatran pepper began to rise, 
prompting an English writer to remark, "Who is it hath not hearde of 
the isles of Molucca and Samatra, where the Portingales gette the greate 
plentye of rich drugges and fine spices?" Jambi itself had been known to 
the Portuguese as a source of pepper at least since 1545, and in 1568 
Lisbon made special mention of this area in instructions for new initia-
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tives to increase Portuguese access to pepper supplies. But direct trade 
with Jambi took some time to develop, possibly because of doubts about 
the extent of its pepper harvest. 22 In the latter part of the sixteenth cen-
tury, however, more serious thought was given to J ambi as hostility to 
Christians made the commercial environment of Banten less hospitable. 
The combination of a need for greater pepper supplies and anxiety 
about the extent of existing sources encouraged local Portuguese 
authorities to examine more closely the possibility of direct trade with 
Jambi, one of the few places not controlled by either Aceh or Banten. 
By the turn of the century, therefore, Portuguese traders from Melaka 
were visitingJambi more frequently. 
Having decided to foster direct links with southeast Sumatra, the 
Portuguese were determined to keep their knowledge from reaching 
other Europeans, and in this ambition they found a ready ally in the 
local environment. The southern Melaka Straits became a graveyard 
for European vessels, and Jambi's coastline was particularly deceptive. 
Unlike Palembang, it lacked a natural landmark such as Bangka's 
Menumbin mountain, the only guide to sailors being the uninhabited 
offshore island of Berhala. No villages broke the monotony of the 
swamp forest, and the entrance to the main river, the Batang Hari, was 
difficult to locate because it divided into a number of tributaries as it 
wound through the marshy delta. Only two of these arms, Sungai Nior 
and Sungai Berbak, permitted the entry oflarge ships, and careful navi-
gation was necessary to avoid the sandbanks lying just below water 
level. 23 By river the J ambi capital lay more than a hundred and twenty 
kilometers from the coast, and strong tides and hidden snags made the 
upstream voyage difficult. When currents lessened between May and 
mid-August it could be made in about eight days, but during the rainy 
season from September to February the downriver flow was so strong 
that cables made of rattan and specially hired porters were needed to 
drag ships up. Even then it might take three weeks to reach the capital, 
and in 1615 one exasperated Englishman complained that he could 
have sailed to Europe in the time he took to go up the J ambi river. 24 
The Portuguese and the other Europeans who followed them soon 
realized that along these coasts maps and instruments were of far less 
value than a local guide. It was their knowledge of the surrounding 
waters that gave the orang laut, the river and sea people who frequented 
the islands and coasts of Sumatra, such special status; skilled pilots were 
regarded with great veneration, being deemed to have a mastery of eso-
teric knowledge. 25 In J ambi the most important orang laut settlement 
was Simpang, about thirty kilometers from the sea at the junction of the 
Nior and Berbak. It was ideally located to guard the entry to the main 
river and was also conveniently situated near a channel deep enough for 
larger ships to anchor and unload. The small orang laut perahu met 
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incoming trading vessels and led departing ships safely out to sea, while 
the people also acted as rowers for the king's boats and conveyed letters, 
gifts, and information to the main settlement upriver. 
In most respects Jambi's environment was not so different from that 
of Palembang, where the meanderings of the Musi River were as delu-
sive as those of the Batang Hari and where the skills of orang laut pilots 
had long been essential to successful trade. Palembang, however, had 
never lost its attraction to overseas traders, whereas Jambi had for 
many years been little frequented except by native shipping. Yet by the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, Jambi's reputation had equalled 
or even exceeded that of its neighbor, and Chinese junks were coming 
regularly to J ambi in April and May, some directly from China and 
some via Patani. With the accompanying stimulus to the pepper trade, 
Portuguese efforts to exclude other Europeans were doomed to failure. 
In 1596 the first Dutch vessels had reached Sunda, sighting as they 
rounded southern Sumatra and western Java their first Indonesian pep-
per plants, "climbing like hops on high thick canes .... Growing in 
rows like juniper-berries."26 Shortly afterwards the English arrived, and 
the stage was set for direct conflict. Several Portuguese fleets left Lisbon 
for Asia, and there was even talk that Portugal might move to assume 
control over all Sumatra in order to lock the Dutch and English out of 
the lucrative pepper trade. But the Portuguese did not have the 
resources to achieve such a goal. More than a third of the ships that left 
Lisbon between 1604 and 1608 were wrecked, captured, or burned in 
enemy attacks. 27 Furthermore, because the Portuguese and Spanish 
crowns had been joined in 1580, the truce between the Netherlands and 
Spain in 1609 guaranteed the newly formed Dutch Vereenigde Oost-
Indische Compagnie access to the Iberian market. The position of the 
English was also strengthened when their East India Company gained a 
monopoly of pepper entering England, thus acquiring a secure home 
base from which it could reexport to other countries. When these factors 
were combined with superior commercial organization and greater cap-
ital resources, domination of the European spice market by the Dutch 
and English seemed assured. The Portuguese could counter this domi-
nation only by keeping their knowledge of the less accessible pepper 
areas, so painfully acquired over nearly a century, to themselves. Sev-
eral Portuguese maps from this period therefore deliberately place 
Palembang, Jambi's neighbor, in Java. In this endeavor they were 
aided by the ruler of Banten who, disillusioned with the Dutch and 
English, actively discouraged anyone from guiding them to J ambi. 
The effort to control access to J ambi proved a fruitless exercise. The 
almost inevitable move of the northern Europeans into Sumatra 
received impetus from the energy of Jan Pietersz Coen, who became 
director of the VOC's Banten lodge in 1613. His desire to be indepen-
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dent of the Chinese Banten merchants prompted a move to Batavia; the 
same goal of bypassing competitors like the English led him to look to 
Jambi, where there was said to be "as much pepper as in Banten." In 
September 1615, having recruited the assistance of a Chinese merchant 
in Banten as a guide, Coen sent a ship to Jambi carrying a VOC repre-
sentative. In October a second Dutchman, Andries Soury, arrived, 
bearing instructions to gauge the river's suitability for shipping and to 
continue negotiations regarding access to the pepper trade. He was also 
to avoid making any move that might antagonize the people of Palem-
bang, since they might in the future be useful trading partners. Accord-
ingly, messages of friendship and gifts were sent to the pangeran of 
Palembang, but although the Dutch did note reports of "much pepper" 
there, they decided to establish their post in Jambi. Here they had 
received a friendly welcome due to their letter of introduction from the 
king ofJohor, a son-in-law of the panembahan, the senior Jambi ruler. 
Their hopes of edging out the English were nonetheless disappointed, 
for despite Dutch protests their rivals had been well received at court 
when they too reached the capital in October. 28 
PartiCipants in the Pepper Trade 
Although the Dutch and English had been trading in the archipelago for 
well over a decade, they still found problems in adapting to Jambi's 
commercial environment. At a very basic level was sheer physical sur-
vival. Jambi's main settlement, like that of Palembang, consisted of 
houses of nipa palm built out over the water, with many people living 
on the river itself in homes constructed on floating rafts. The heat and 
humidity of the surrounding swamp forest proved a breeding ground 
for infection, and Jambi, where the life span of a European was reck-
oned at about three years, was soon condemned as the "most unhealthy 
place in all India."29 Racked by recurring illness, the small group of 
Dutch and Englishmen nonetheless bent their energies toward their 
goal of direct access to pepper supplies. They found this too was no easy 
task, for pepper was not cultivated downstream. The major producers 
were the Minangkabau living along the upper reaches of the Batang 
Hari, notably in the two districts known as Tanjung and Kuamang, the 
federations of Kota Tujuh and Kota Sembilan. 30 Although about sixty 
small boats went upstream to collect pepper twice annually, the difficult 
journey took six to eight weeks, and the bulk of the pepper was brought 
down by the growers themselves. More than a hundred rafts and 
perahu loaded with gold as well as pepper arrived each year, their first 
appearance between the end of March and the beginning of April fol-
lowing the wet season and after the gathering of the pikul agung, the 
great harvest, which took place from October on. A smaller harvest 
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occurred between April and September, and the upstream growers 
again appeared in Jambi with their cargoes of pepper around Novem-
ber and December. Each raft could carry about 150 piculs, and it was 
estimated that about forty to fifty thousand bags of pepper were annu-
ally taken from the J ambi highlands down to the coast or out through 
the rivers ofInderagiri. 31 
Although this was the normal pattern, deliveries of pepper could fre-
quently be disrupted because of difficulties in geographical access 
between ulu and ilir. In both J ambi and Palembang delays could often 
run into months since the rafts on which pepper was transported down-
stream could navigate the dangerous reaches of the river only when the 
water was high. In J ambi the Batang Hari meanders down from areas 
less elevated than those in Palembang; when the river was low, traffic 
from upstream could not proceed beyond Muara Tembesi. Disruptions 
also occurred because of frequent quarrels among the various Minang-
kabau groups, attributed by the Dutch to their "wild or popular govern-
ment" and ranging from minor differences to raids seeking vengeance 
for the killing of a kinsman. When the English and Dutch arrived in 
Jambi, for example, the upstream Minangkabau were at loggerheads 
"over a buffalo." Although the vac agent considered this "a trifle, 
which doesn't even warrant being related," it had meant that no 
Minangkabau had come downstream for two years, and acccording to 
reports it was forty years since there had been so little pepper. The situ-
ation did not begin to improve until 1619, when the quarrels were set-
tled and the Minangkabau appeared once more. 32 
A further feature of Jambi's economic environment was the lack of 
direct market competition between buyers and the personal relation-
ships they commonly developed with individuals from whom they pur-
chased pepper. The Portuguese probably understood this situation bet-
ter than their Dutch and English rivals, for they were often of mixed 
blood, born from marriages between Portuguese men and local women 
encouraged by Lisbon in order to develop a population ofloyal overseas 
subjects. "Black Christians" had been trading in Jambi for more than 
two generations, accepting the periodic rises and falls in pepper prices 
and making no attempt to introduce a "contract" to formalize commer-
cial dealings. Whenever a ship was available in Melaka it was sent to 
buy pepper in Jambi, where there was a small Portuguese kampung but 
no official factor. If supplies were unavailable the captain would pur-
chase other local products, like the famous dye-yielding rattan jernang 
(Daemonorhops draco), better known as dragon's blood. The Portuguese 
traders were thus not very different from others in the region, compet-
ing on the same terms as the Chinese, the Malays, and the Javanese. 
They were also valued as interpreters, envoys, and scribes because Por-
tuguese was used as a medium of communication with Europeans, and 
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their standing was further enhanced by their reputed knowledge of mili-
tary technology. The Palembang syahbandar in 1640, for example, was 
a Portuguese mestizo whose brother-in-law lived in Melaka, while a 
royal ambassador to Batavia was another man of mixed parentage 
named Pasqual Rodrigo. 33 
The Dutch and English soon discovered that they were operating at 
something of a disadvantage because in this society business dealings 
were customarily conducted within the framework of a real or putative 
family. One of the first VOC factors in Jambi in fact complained that he 
was unable to break the hold of Malays and Javanese on the pepper 
trade "because they are all saudara [brothers]."34 With their long experi-
ence in Asian seas, the Portuguese appreciated and could, if they chose, 
exploit the kinship idiom; when seeking to consolidate Portugal's posi-
tion in Jambi, the captain of Melaka thus sent his own son as an envoy. 
Until the arrival of other Europeans, however, they had seen no need to 
claim all Jambi's pepper as their own. As a result, trading conflicts had 
been minimal, and when the Dutch and English reached Jambi they 
described the Portuguese as "much-Ioved."35 But when faced by Euro-
pean competition, Portuguese attitudes began to change. At the same 
time the Jambi market had to contend with the intense rivalry between 
the English and Dutch, who were each determined to dominate the 
trade from which Portugal drew such profits. 
The hostility between the newcomers obviously puzzled the ruler of 
J ambi, whose personal name is not known but who was always referred 
to as "the panembahan," to which was posthumously added the honori-
fic Kota Baru ("new town," probably in reference to Tanah Pilih).36 In 
the traditions he had inherited and understood, the king should prop-
erly act as the father and protector of all comers, so that beneath his 
patronage the trading community functioned as a larger economic fam-
ily. The Portuguese, for instance, were "sometimes called his oldest 
children," and the panembahan's son used similar terms in trying to 
persuade the Dutch to live in amity with the other European traders. 
"The English," he said, "are our children, and the Portuguese our 
brothers." He wished Jambi and Batavia to treat each other as "man 
and wife."37 
It was soon clear, however, that such an approach was not compatible 
with the commercial rivalry that accompanied the arrival of the Dutch 
and English. Increasingly the Europeans demonstrated that they were 
not willing to respond to the mediation of their "father" and did not 
appreciate his efforts to distribute his favors evenly among his "chil-
dren." Hostile exchanges grew more intense. The English king and the 
Prince of Orange, said the Portuguese, were "stableboys" of the ruler 
of Portugal, while according to the English the Dutch were pirates, a 
kingless people who would seize control of J ambi as they were doing in 
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Banda. The Dutch retaliated by describing the English as "rude, 
ungoverned, drunken and abusers of women." Before long, verbal acri-
mony erupted into violence. In 1617 a Portuguese fleet came upriver, 
intent on recruiting Jambi support for an attack on the Dutch lodge. 
When the panembahan refused, they set fire to some houses and took 
about sixty people, mostly women and children, back to Melaka. Two 
years later an Englishman was killed in one of the many armed alterca-
tions that occurred between the Dutch and English and even among 
their slaves. 38 
When diplomacy in Europe brought England and the Netherlands 
closer together, the directors of the East India Companies instructed 
their subordinates to work toward greater collaboration. In J ambi, the 
Dutch and English factors signed agreements to prevent untoward rises 
in pepper prices "which injure us both," and in 1620 and 1621 they 
attempted to reach an arrangement by which the pepper trade would be 
divided between them, with the price fixed at eight rials the picul. Pri-
vate commercial deals would not be made without consultation, and if 
one party's purchases exceeded the other's, the difference would be 
shared. 
Although violence between the Dutch and English was restricted to 
some extent, the rivalry between them remained, "our love from the 
teeth outward only," as one Englishman put it. In J ambi the captains of 
the two lodges attempted to improve their respective positions by outdo-
ing each other in declarations of affection toward the ruler. At this stage 
the greatest display of friendship had to be a willingness to offer protec-
tion against a threatened attack by the aggressive ruler of Aceh, Iskan-
dar Muda (r. 1607-1636). Aceh had been a feared power for almost a 
hundred years, but now Iskandar Muda had announced his intention of 
dominating all the pepper-growing areas and of forcing any who wished 
to buy pepper to "take it from his hand."39 From 1618 he had embarked 
on a series of raids of the pepper- and tin-producing areas of the Malay 
Peninsula that resulted in wholesale destruction and the deportation of 
thousands of people. With these examples, the fears in Jambi of an 
impending invasion seemed amply justified, especially as the pane mba-
han was father-in-law to the sultan ofJohor, a sworn enemy ofIskandar 
Muda. The panembahan had further aroused Acehnese ire by refusing 
to give up his widowed daughter, the former queen of Johor, when she 
fled home to her family in 1623. 
Despite this defiance, J ambi survived the Acehnese threat unscathed. 
The panembahan had been successful in arranging a marriage between 
another of his daughters and the son of the Palembang ruler, who then 
dispatched to Jambi an army offour thousand men and fifty large ships. 
Furthermore, he could invoke the support of the Europeans, all anxious 
to obtain additional trading benefits and dissuade the panembahan 
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from moving his capital to Muara Tebo, more than a hundred fifty kilo-
meters upstream. When the English promised assistance the Dutch 
could do no less, and in 1625 they sent a small fleet to Jambi to deter the 
expected attack. 40 In the end, however, it was not the English or the 
Dutch but the Portuguese who routed Iskandar Muda's forces, defeat-
ing them in a great sea battle in 1629. Don Aleve de Botelho, the gover-
nor of Goa, then decided to push Portugal's advantage, and the follow-
ing year he personally led a fleet of more than thirty vessels to Jambi. 
The panembahan was offered protection against Aceh on condition that 
the other Europeans were driven out, but if this demand were not met 
Jambi would be attacked "with fire and sword" and would suffer the 
same fate as the king of Aceh. Obviously angered by threats from a peo-
ple he had regarded as his kinsfolk, the panembahan stood his ground. 
He was responsible for the safety of the Dutch and English, he said, 
who had placed themselves under his fatherly protection. Should he sur-
render them it would make his name" odious to the world and infamous 
among kings." Half the Portuguese fleet then sailed upriver, but met 
Dutch resistance. In the ensuing battle Don Botelho was killed and his 
remaining ships retreated in confusion. 41 
In 1627 further opportunities came for the Dutch and English to vie 
for the panembahan's favor because of quarrels with Palembang. Years 
of intermarriage between the royal houses meant that J ambi princes 
could lay claim to the Palembang throne, and vice versa, but on this 
occasion the Palembang nobles refused to accept the panembahan's 
grandson as their king. Greatly insulted, he asked both the Dutch and 
English for assistance, saying he intended to attack his neighbor. As an 
inducement, he promised toll-free trade for ten years to any who would 
help him, and with an eye on each other's efforts, the Dutch and the 
English each sent three ships. Hostilities were averted, however, 
through the mediation of the Dutch and the death of the leading play-
ers, including the panembahan, in 1629 and 1630. With the installation 
of a new Palembang ruler, hostilities were laid to rest, and the harmony 
that ideally typified brotherly relations at least outwardly restored. 42 
The position of the Dutch and English in J ambi was strengthened by 
the support they had offered against Aceh and Palembang and by the 
exclusion of the Portuguese. For the next forty years they worked side 
by side, albeit resentfully, this cooperation itself attesting the impor-
tance of the pepper trade. Slowly, nonetheless, the VOC appeared to be 
gaining ascendancy. In 1641 Melaka was captured from the Portu-
guese, and the following year an agreement was signed with Palembang 
promising the Dutch a monopoly of pepper exports. The other Europe-
ans did not easily relinquish their hard-won interests, however, and in 
1643 the governor of Macao also negotiated an alliance, which allowed 
for continuing Portuguese trade with Palembang. In J ambi, where the 
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Dutch faced continued competition from the English, old animosities 
were rekindled during the Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-1654. The English 
even claimed that in a short time ships would arrive to take both Melaka 
and Batavia, and they greeted any reports of military successes against 
the Dutch with public rejoicing. Relations in Jambi deteriorated so 
greatly that one Dutchman privately confided his fears of a "second 
Amboina." 43 
One issue on which Dutch and English were united was their opposi-
tion toward Chinese participation in Jambi's pepper trade. In 1615 
Coen estimated that every year two or three large junks reached J ambi, 
buying about 5,500 piculs of pepper and bringing in exchange items 
ranging from silk cloth and buttons to pottery and medicines, often spe-
cially selected for the J ambi market. A core of Chinese settlers was 
already beginning to put down roots, partly as a result of developments 
in China from whence migration had escalated during the late sixteenth 
century. The effects of this movement were particularly marked in the 
European-controlled settlements of Manila and Batavia. In 1619 the 
latter's Chinese population was between three and four hundred, but by 
1627 it had increased to 3,500.44 Some of these new arrivals moved out 
to places like J ambi, where they became integrated into the small but 
growing Chinese community. 
In Jambi, as in Palembang, a primary reason for the acceptance of 
the Chinese was their liaisons with local women, often presented to 
them from the ruler. Such unions were encouraged by local courts 
because they drew Chinese into the circle of kindred and because 
according to custom a local marriage transformed any foreigner into the 
king's subject. Chinese traders entered willingly into these relation-
ships, mainly because female assistance was essential in a society in 
which marketing and hawking were primarily in the hands of women. 
"When [the Chinese] come from China," commented one observer in 
Banten, "they buy wives .... They have several wives, whom they 
employ."45 In Jambi too these wives may have been bought, but they 
served their Chinese husbands faithfully, accompanying them to the 
interior to purchase pepper, guarding their stalls and houseboats down-
stream, and selling their cloth in the market. Should a Chinese mer-
chant be suddenly summoned to appear before the ruler or need to 
attend to business matters in some other port, he could rely on his wife 
to take charge of his affairs. 
A second factor contributing to the position of Chinese traders was 
their adoption ofIslam. Some who arrived in Jambi may already have 
been Muslim, for the offspring of Sino-Arab marriages in ports such as 
Chuan Chau (Zayton) in Fukien took the lead in trading with the south-
ern seas. Chinese Muslim communities are known to have been estab-
lished alongJava's north coast in the early fifteenth century, and it is not 
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difficult to accept traditions that they were part of a network stretching 
along trading routes from Palembang to Champa. 46 Now, however, this 
older Muslim Chinese element was augmented by new arrivals who 
elected to adopt Islam, demonstrating their conversion by taking on an 
Islamic name, submitting to circumcision, and shaving the head. This 
latter custom, popularly regarded as a sign of piety, clearly differenti-
ated converts, or what the Dutch called the geschoren Chinees (shaven 
Chinese), from their non-Muslim countrymen. 
Married to local women, speaking a Chinese dialect, Malay, and 
often Portuguese as well as a regional language, the "shaven Chinese" 
and more particularly their peranakan (mixed-blood) children were well 
equipped to fill important commercial positions. In the downstream 
port it was customary for at least one syahbandar to be Chinese, while 
another Chinese merchant, termed by the Dutch "syahbandar of the 
uplands," seems to have held a similar position in the interior. Such 
men were also linked with other regional centers via their own family 
ties; in consequence, the Chinese connection could range through the 
archipelago and back to China itself. The interpreter in J ambi, for 
instance, born of a union between a Chinese man and a local woman, 
was brother to the syahbandar of J apara and through him was related to 
the first Chinese captain appointed at Batavia. 47 
There can be no doubt that the Chinese valued kinship ties in com-
mercial relationships. As an English observer remarked in 1804, "It 
rarely happens that [the Chinese 1 will trust each other with property 
when no family connection exists."48 Yet while such links remained the 
basis of business activities, it could also be argued that in important 
ways the Chinese, like the Europeans, had already begun to break out 
of an economic system that conceived of trade as an extension of 
exchanges between kindred. The Chinese who came to Southeast Asia, 
although usually poor and uneducated, were accustomed to the concept 
of a written contract drawn up to regulate relations between those who 
could not rely on ties of blood or adoption to ensure fair dealings. 
Studies of Chinese commerce in the eighteenth century also suggest that 
while many traders would have been unable to read a book, they were 
sufficiently literate to write a business letter and maintain commercial 
accounts. 49 The economic activities of Indonesians, of course, show that 
it is quite possible to carryon extensive and far-reaching business deal-
ings relying basically on memory; however, it is undeniable that the 
range and variety of transactions are vastly increased once the practice 
of maintaining lists and records is introduced. The keeping of such 
accounts was apparently common among Chinese traders, since the 
first action taken by the Dutch after the death of one of their Chinese 
subjects was always to inspect his papers to ascertain if any debts were 
owed by or to him. 
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The strong commercial position of the Chinese in J ambi meant that 
they were well situated to challenge the Europeans, especially since they 
were not included in the Dutch-English agreement that had aimed to 
keep pepper prices low. In 1617 Jambi pepper had been available at 
thirteen rials for ten sacks, but the next season Chinese willingness to 
pay more drove prices up to 3 or 3.5 rials per sack. The Chinese were 
also ready to match offers made by Europeans for additional benefits in 
return for trading advantages. The Chinese interpreter, for instance, 
attempted to negotiate an arrangement by which his countrymen would 
assist in the casting of weapons in return for allowing six or seven junks 
annually to buy toll-free pepper. 50 
The Dutch and English, determined to put an end to this competi-
tion, now drove off ships from China and Siam as they approached 
J ambi. The vac ordered its representatives to be particularly vigilant 
because its main settlement of Batavia, founded in 1619, was envisaged 
as a center for the redirected junk trade. The Jambi ruler objected 
strongly to this unprecedented intrusion into local commerce. "When 
the Dutch first came here," he said, "they said my place would be rich, 
but now they are trying to shut out the Chinese who give the most 
trade."51 For some years Chinese junks tried to enter Jambi despite 
opposition, but by the middle of the century efforts to divert them away 
from the Bangka Straits were successful. Until the eighteenth century 
direct junk traffic between China and southeast Sumatra virtually dis-
appeared. 
The Chinese who remained in J ambi nonetheless found that their 
skills were in high demand. Buyers did go upstream to purchase pepper, 
but it was more common for the interior people to bring their supplies 
downriver themselves. The Europeans, however, were impatient with 
the restraints this practice imposed on commercial activities and with 
the relatively small amounts traded. In Soury's words: 
Last April eight or nine perahu came down and I saw that they were the 
poorest people that God has made. They will haggle over a gantang-what 
am I saying?-even ten grams! How can such people be merchants? 
When they want to sell something, they come and make a great noise 
regarding what is available for purchase in the lodge. I have to bring out a 
thousand guilders of cloth and when it is all out they sit for half the day fill-
ing their bellies with betel and tobacco to buy two or three pieces. Six to 
eight is for them a great amount. 52 
Despite their suspicion of the Chinese, both Dutch and English now 
found it quicker and more convenient to "trust out" money and cloth to 
Chinese who then went upstream and bought pepper on their behalf. 
Rather than having monies owed by some pepper grower far in the inte-
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rior, it was easier for Europeans to have debts incurred by "their" Chi-
nese who lived near the Company lodges and who were more likely to 
comply with demands for repayment. It was not long before J ambi 
nobles began to follow the European example, buying cloth on credit 
from the Dutch or English and then sending Chinese to the interior. By 
the mid-1630s the Minangkabau had become so accustomed to having 
Chinese go upriver with goods to advance for pepper that "it was 
unlikely that they will come downstream again as they used to do in the 
past." 53 
As well as acting as agents the Chinese also traded on their own 
account. A number had taken up residence in the pepper-growing areas 
of Kuamang and Tembesi and were therefore well placed to benefit 
from the kinship relations that linked them both with their own race and 
Jambi society. Using trading methods eminently suited to the local 
scene, they were essentially small peddlers, being willing to sell by piece 
rather than lot and offering the buyer a selection of assorted cloth rather 
than requiring purchase of a twenty-piece pack or corge. Although they 
displayed a keen sense of changing tastes, the Chinese understood that 
the interior growers were more influenced by the size of the cloth and its 
price, rather than its quality. By reducing the price appropriately, the 
Chinese were thus able sell rough or even damaged pieces. Their slim 
profit margins were obtained from buying up pepper by volume (using 
a container called a kulak) and delivering it by weight calculated accord-
ing to another measure of capacity, the gantang. 
The success of the Chinese as peddlers was also due to their willing-
ness to carry debts for years before pressing for payment. Meanwhile, 
they were ever ready to issue more credit, while at the same time repay-
ing their debts to the Dutch and English from their own resources. This 
attitude was in marked contrast to that of the Company accountants, 
who had been instructed to balance their accounts annually and who 
could face demotion for "untidy" bookkeeping. To ensure rapid re-
payment of amounts due them, European officials sometimes posted 
people to watch for indebted pepper growers as they arrived down-
stream the following season so that any pepper owed could be forcibly 
seized. 
Although Chinese played such a key role in the J ambi pepper trade, 
few individuals would have had the capital to finance buying on a large 
scale. In 1636, for instance, fifteen Chinese in Jambi together sent back 
to China a total amount of only 1,257 rials. A certain "Bingou" was 
able to remit 700 rials, but most could spare only 50 rials or less and 
were already indebted to a richer patron. 54 With the Portuguese defeat 
in 1630 and the decline of the junk trade, the English and Dutch were 
therefore able to dominate bulk pepper purchases. 
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Women and the Gift Economy 
The Europeans who had now established a near-monopoly over Jambi's 
pepper trade were fully aware that it was necessary to offer gifts as a 
sign of goodwill and as a preliminary to any commercial negotiations. 
They were not prepared, however, for the unending nature of gift giv-
ing, for the "perpetual cycle of exchanges" that involved the whole soci-
ety but was particularly significant in regard to the marketplace. 55 In an 
environment that established trade itself as enhanced reciprocity, the 
ruler and the women attached to the court could playa critical role in 
the acceptance of strangers as trusted merchants. Through the presen-
tation of a wife, emblematic figures from foreign trading groups could 
be recruited as royal "kindred" and in the process a whole community 
caught up in the embrace of the larger economic family. This had been a 
key element in the success of Chinese traders and to some extent had 
facilitated the acceptance of the Portuguese. In the case of the English 
and the Dutch, however, exchanges of womenfolk occurred only in a 
diminished form. This was not because the newcomers were oblivious 
to the importance of kinship links. In 1614, indeed, the English direc-
tors in London seriously considered the suggestion of "a gentleman of 
noble parentage" that his daughter, skilled in music, needlework, and 
conversational skills, be given as a wife to "the king of Sumatra" 
because this would "advantage" the Company. One of the first VOC 
representatives in J ambi, similarly aware of the economic benefits to be 
derived from family associations, told the court that all the Company 
ships now arriving actually belonged to his father. The J ambi ruler 
responded in the time-honored way by dispatching one of his court 
women as a gift. But the incoming factor, Andries Soury, was appalled 
at this apparently licentious behavior and soon afterward informed the 
panembahan that all the claims made by his predecessor were false. In a 
display of moral indignation, Soury sent the woman back to the ruler. 56 
This incident, which receives only passing mention in Dutch records, 
deserves attention because it points up very basic cultural differences 
regarding the creation and maintenance of commercial relationships. 
The exchange of females, with its capacity to transform strangers into 
relatives, was an essential component in the smooth functioning of 
trade. Men who had slept with the same woman or were related 
through her were bound to each other by ties that laid the basis for the 
mutually beneficial association subsumed in the tolong-menolong con-
cept. The "whoredom" that men like Soury saw as "so common" in 
J ambi was in many cases a manifestation of the sexual reciprocity 
deeply embedded in indigenous economics. The European tendency to 
regard the gifting of females as further evidence of native "lechery" 
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thus gave rise to bewilderment and often outright hostility. For local 
society, refusal to enter into the kinship relationship was an indication of 
dislike, 'perhaps even hatred. This attitude was made patently evident 
one morning in 1657 when the VOC resident in Jambi heard the firing 
of cannon and looked out from his lodge to see "a collection of armed 
people outside" threatening to attack "merely because we had refused 
to give the king a free Christian woman."57 
Exchanges of a kind did, of course, occur. When the English in Jambi 
allowed the pangeran anum, the royal heir, access to the women whom 
they maintained in their lodge and with whom they themselves had 
"carnal knowledge" (vleeselijk conversatie), they obtained what the Dutch 
deemed "unfair" trading advantages. But those European officials who 
accepted the slave girls and concubines sent as royal gifts had little 
understanding of the mutual obligations that to local societies were 
implicit in the ties now apparently established. Thus, although Jambi 
kings willingly permitted female subjects to cross the river to spend the 
night in the European lodges as long as the court was informed, such 
individuals were usually treated by the Dutch and English as simple 
prostitutes. And since both soon acquired a notoriety for their cavalier 
attitude to women, the resulting liaisons tended to engender animosity 
rather than harmony. 
Because Europeans were generally ignorant of the cultural norms 
regarding appropriate behavior between the sexes, they did not find it 
easy to recruit agents in the local marketplace, where the small peddling 
trade was largely the preserve of women, some of whom even made 
their own trips upstream to sell their goods and buy pepper. Probably 
the uncertainty of these dealings provided another reason for European 
preference for Chinese as middlemen. But notwithstanding their often 
crass treatment of ordinary females, the Europeans were forced to tread 
more carefully when it came to their interaction with wealthy court 
ladies, some of whom were important pepper purchasers in their own 
right. 
Although the English and Dutch came to understand that it was cru-
cial to retain the favor of senior court women, it is unlikely that they 
realized just how influential such females could be. Throughout most of 
the archipelago a major role of women, and particularly senior ones, 
was to act as mediators in human relations. They were used in all situa-
tions wherein the potentiality for shame to males (and thus the threat to 
community harmony) was high, whether it concerned the collection of 
debts or the restoration of honor in cases of adultery. On one occasion in 
Jambi, for example, the pangeran dipati's consort and his mother 
arranged a tea party for the wife of the Dutch resident in order to settle 
between them the question of the pangeran's longstanding debts to the 
vac. In relations between kingdoms the role of females could be criti-
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cal, as in 1710 when a Jambi prince seeking help sent "two of his 
trusted female retainers" to Johor with symbolic gifts indicating his 
willingness to become a vassal. 58 
Court women also exerted considerable political influence because 
they were present on most state occasions and served the ruler privately 
as well. Those who received the pangeran's particular favor could be 
chosen to stand beside him and hold his betel box and were thus party to 
many private discussions. Indeed, some years later a maidservant in the 
J ambi court "who always gave the king pinang [betelnut]" came secretly 
to the Dutch lodge to warn of a plot against the vac representatives. 59 
Because of their access to the ruler, the potential influence court women 
could exert, both at a private level and in public, was considerable; the 
wife of the Jambi panembahan, for instance, was the prime advocate of 
the court's pro-Portuguese attitude in the early seventeenth century. 
They were similarly important in interstate diplomacy, since their opin-
ions could be decisive in the selection of royal brides. Thus in 1659 
three Banten women, wives of a high-ranking noble, arrived in Jambi 
to inspect the ruler's daughter and assess her suitability as a wife for the 
younger brother of the Banten sultan. 60 Perhaps because of the influ-
ence of matrilineal Minangkabau, the standing of women was particu-
larly pronounced in J ambi, where lineal proximity to royal females 
could be a significant factor in claims for power. In 1627 and again in 
1636, the Jambi court argued that its pangeran anum should succeed to 
the throne of Palembang because his mother, Ratu Mas, was from 
Palembang and because he had married a Palembang princess, the only 
daughter of the previous ruler. 
The value of maintaining favor with royal women became very 
apparent in J ambi following the death of both the panembahan and his 
son the pangeran in 1630. The pangeran's widow, Ratu Mas, was a 
Palembang princess, and for a number of years while her sons were 
young she acted as regent. She continued to receive her husband's share 
of the tolls as well as drawing an income from several appanages, 
including the rich pepper-growing district of Tembesi, which had 
formed part of her dowry. This wealth made her a principal figure in the 
pepper trade, and in 1642 she bought 3,160 rials worth of cloth from the 
Dutch, more than twice as much as any other Jambi noble. The Dutch 
and English in fact each borrowed from her heavily. Furthermore, her 
goodwill was essential because of the influence she wielded in the affairs 
of both J ambi and Palembang as the daughter of a king of Palembang 
and the widow of a ruler of J ambi. Although she was unsuccessful in 
engineering the succession of one of her sons in Palembang, being 
opposed by her own uncles and brothers, she continued to be a formida-
ble figure in local affairs until her death in June 1665. 61 
For societies in which marriage relations and family bonds operated 
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as a kind oflanguage, the public exchange of noble ladies like Ratu Mas 
and her European counterparts should have confirmed the economic 
association between local kings and the new Dutch and English lords in 
Batavia and Banten. Liaisons with lower-class women were a pale sub-
stitute for the formalized marriage ritual that should have bound not 
merely individuals but a whole clan and its descendants irrevocably 
together. Unable to carry their relationship to its logical point by estab-
lishing true kinship ties, the kings of Jambi and later Palembang 
resorted to "adopting" Europeans as sons. A formal ceremony was 
held, and new names, clothing, and symbols of high office were 
bestowed. In 1640 the vac factor in Jambi was given a pike and a 
gilded silk cloth woven by the wife of the pangeran anum and was told 
to address the ruler "no longer as king but as father." This was not sim-
ply a political gesture, for the status of" son" was accorded only selected 
Europeans and from the indigenous viewpoint established a unique 
bond. One Jambi resident, Pieter de Goyer, was adopted by the 
pangeran but was interred near the Dutch lodge when he died. Some 
time later the king discovered that the grave had been neglected. 
Expressing his dismay that de Goyer had been buried "like an animal" 
without even a fence to mark his resting place, the pangeran asked per-
mission to erect a sepulcher to honor his "son." "Strange words from a 
heathen king," de Goyer's successor remarked, but he humored the 
request by setting up a gravestone that, he assured his superiors, had 
cost only ten rials. 62 
Dutch and English "sons," however, usually displayed a disappoint-
ing lack of regard for filial obligations, while their "kindred" in Batavia 
and Banten rarely fulfilled the expectations of their newly acquired rela-
tives in Jambi (and subsequently Palembang). Since the economic 
interaction with these Europeans was not supported by the ties of kin-
ship so integral to the functioning of local commerce, the courts of 
southeast Sumatra accorded added weight to other exchanges. The 
offering and acceptance of gifts had always been indispensable for the 
conduct of trade; now public presentations between kings and Europe-
ans became crucial in manifesting and nurturing their relationship. Let-
ters to and from prominent Europeans like the vac governor general 
were consequently vital in establishing an atmosphere appropriate for 
commerce, even though the rulers of Jambi and Palembang might be 
personally unable to read and write. For them, the exchange of letters 
was not just a means of communication but a substantiation of a per-
sonal commitment. Great attention was therefore given to the language 
employed, which represented far more than mere courtesies. A decision 
to address the governor general as "father" rather than "brother," for 
instance, was a signal that some favor might be solicited. Similarly, any 
correspondence received from Europeans, read aloud in a public audi-
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ence, was carefully perused for the symbolic messages it might contain. 
A misplaced seal, unfortunate phrasing, or long lapses between letters 
could cause consternation and bewilderment. 
Critical in the exchange process was the bearer of the letter, the 
envoy, whose task was to act as the ruler's spokesperson and to elucidate 
or expand on the written document. A high-ranking envoy was a mark 
of respect, while any honors he received reflected the regard in which 
his master was held. The J ambi ruler thus explained to Batavia that the 
presentation of a title, a pike, a betel box, and a rattan mat to one resi-
dent was not just a reward for his knowledge of local language and cus-
toms; it would also serve to bring Batavia and Jambi closer together. In 
1616 his predecessor had expressed intense humiliation when a Palem-
bang representative coming to greet Andries Soury was arrested at sea 
by a vac captain, for it was commonly accepted that "envoys are a 
token of brotherhood." 63 
Above all, the envoy's task was to supervise the exchange of gifts 
which, in the absence of family links, stood as the most visible demon-
stration of the bonds between the ruler and powerful Europeans. Fre-
quently the highest value was placed on rarity rather than on monetary 
worth, and it was in this vein that aJambi noble presented the governor 
general with "a beautiful plumed bird." An item with personal associa-
tions could be a sign of special friendship; on the same occasion the 
J ambi ruler sent a ring that only he had worn and that gave protection 
"against all venomous bites or poison."64 Gifts could also embody sig-
nificant messages. In the eighteenth century, for example, a Palembang 
prince despatched to Batavia a golden box filled with earth and some of 
his own hair, indicating his willingness to submit himself to Batavia's 
overlordship. By contrast, a poor gift could stand as a deliberate insult, 
as when the ruler of Johor sent the Dutch resident in Jambi a single 
piece of old cloth and a small amount of dirty wax. 
Seventeenth-century Europeans had largely grown away from the 
medieval notion that commercial exchange should occur "orally, be-
tween men face to face, and within the framework of the gift."65 Apart 
from gauging their monetary value, the Dutch and English gave little 
thought to the presents they sent to local rulers; Batavia for one contin-
ued to instruct its representatives to be "thrifty" (zuinig) in selecting 
gifts, an attitude that sometimes gave rise to a sense of grievance in 
societies unaccustomed to the idea of thriftiness as commendable. Euro-
pean hopes of controlling the amounts expended on presents were none-
theless encouraged because initially the rulers ofJambi, like their neigh-
bors in Palembang, had been satisfied with modest offerings, and a 
Chinese description from about 1618 noted that it was enough to give 
the ruler fruit and silk "in a fixed quantity." A decade later the Dutch 
even tried to reach an agreement with the English whereby neither 
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party would present gifts to the king or his women, since this would 
prejudice the interests of the other. 66 
However, in the competitive climate of the seventeenth century, a 
trend that saw growing expenditure on the ruba-ruba (gifts offered to the 
ruler by incoming traders) was difficult to reverse. When the Dutch and 
English first arrived, mirrors, spectacles, pictures of Amsterdam, mus-
kets, and small amounts of cloth had been considered appropriate 
presents; a generation later Europeans anxious to attract court favor 
had to be prepared to offer cannon, precious stones, fine porcelain, jew-
elry, luxurious cloth, and exotic animals such as sheep. The necessity to 
obtain royal approval transformed every court ceremony-a royal 
birth, a marriage, even a death-into an opportunity to acquire com-
mercial advantages. For the Europeans it was not a favored wife or a 
beloved grandchild who helped press their case as much as an unusual 
and expensive gift that had caught the ruler's fancy. Thus in 1637 the 
English offered splendid presents to the Palembang ruler on the occa-
sion of his son's circumcision and in so doing were able to persuade him 
that the Dutch were "great enemies." As the panembahan of Jambi 
remarked, "J ambi is open to the Dutch and the English. The one who 
gives the most will get the pepper." Royal exploitation of European 
rivalry grew so extreme that access to pepper was denied on some occa-
sions when presents failed to please. Batavia therefore responded read-
ily when informed that "more than the Jews their Messiah the king 
wants a Persian horse with black feet and a red body, or all black, or 
black and white on which he can receive letters from Batavia." One 
VOC resident in fact complained that although the pangeran was 
always expressing his goodwill, "his principal aim is to obtain rare 
cloth, velvet, braid and lace."67 
European amenability to such requests reflected the fact that the 
worldwide demand for pepper had brought J ambi to the attention of 
international commerce to an unprecedented extent. Yet until the early 
seventeenth century the trading environment in the downstream port 
was not so very different from that of a large village market. Business 
dealings remained highly personalized, with the ruler in his role as 
mediating" father" presiding over the activities of his "children," from 
whom he received gifts and to whom he offered in return his protection. 
As foreign merchants arrived in greater numbers they too had been 
drawn into this circle of kindred, primarily through unions with local 
women. The presence of Chinese and "black Portuguese" thus pre-
sented no challenge to the way in which trade had customarily operated. 
From the establishment of Dutch and English posts in 1615 this situa-
tion had begun to change. For the first time foreign traders attempted to 
arrogate commerce in a specific item (i.e., pepper) to themselves and 
were prepared to use violence to drive out their competitors. The ideal 
notion of the king as father-head of a harmonious trading family was far 
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more difficult to sustain, especially since these newcomers were less 
willing than previous groups to enter into the marriage relationships so 
crucial in the functioning of the indigenous economy. The new commer-
cial associations were thus proclaimed not by wives and children but by 
the display of exotic European gifts. The pangeran of Jambi who suc-
ceeded in 1630 might not be linked to the Europeans through marriage, 
but when he held an audience to hear the reading of their letters his 
entry could well be announced by a "black Portuguese" trumpeter; he 
might be wearing European spectacles, especially ordered to assist his 
failing sight; his horses had European saddles; his ladies were dressed in 
clolh of European make; his children played with novelties of German 
porcelain. In one letter he asked specifically for a ship "like the council-
lors in the council of the Indies use." Humble though they might be, the 
Dutch and English lodges set standards for residences that he tried to 
emulate, even asking for "chimney tiles" painted with flowers. Tools 
from Batavia such as screwdrivers and files furthered his reputation as a 
craftsman, particularly in the making of ammunition. Already known 
for his carving, the J ambi ruler also asked for a lathe to fashion ivory, a 
soldering tool to manufacture jewelry, and craftsmen to assist him in his 
work. 68 
Nonetheless, the European tendency to see such gifts as a means of 
purchasing commercial favors meant they rarely considered the obliga-
tions or expectations that acceptance or bestowal implied. The Dutch 
and English believed the crucial factor in obtaining the king's approval 
was the financial worth of the items they offered rather than their rarity 
or personal association, a belief fostered by royal demands for increased 
evidence of European affection. Having complied with royal wishes, the 
Dutch and English were thus puzzled and annoyed by additional 
requests for personal items, such as a ring or a hatband. It is also 
unlikely that the vac governor general put much store on the "model 
perahu" sent him by the Jambi pangeran and "made with his own 
hands."69 Certainly, after two generations of Dutch and English compe-
tition, the rich and luxurious possessions that had accumulated in the 
Jambi court were a visible statement of its wealth and claims to rival the 
hitherto more prosperous Palembang. But while Jambi kings also saw 
this storehouse of gifts as a potent reminder of the relationship with 
their European relatives, to English and Dutch merchants the plumed 
birds, the magic rings, the charmed daggers with which they were pre-
sented remained merely things, commodities to be exchanged for 
money or given away to some other ruler. 
Jambi Becomes the Elder Brother 
Although the Dutch mentioned a time not long before their arrival in 
J ambi when the king had been poor and when the nobles too were pov-
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erty stricken, by the 1630s any such memories had disappeared. Pepper 
growing had spread up along the Tembesi and down the Batang Hari as 
far as Muara Ketalo, but the increase in revenue was more obvious in 
the downstream court than among the upstream growers. As interna-
tional demand expanded, the group of individuals who controlled the 
rich pepper-producing districts had prospered considerably. The Dutch 
and English had initially assumed that the pangeran directly ruled over 
the pepper growers. It soon became apparent that this was not the case. 
"The nobles here are as much master as the king and they do what they 
want," Soury observed. "Each one can be a master."70 Prominent 
among this elite were Chinese who had been granted virtual monopolies 
over certain interior areas as a mark of special favor or who had 
flourished in their role as agents for the European companies. One 
noted "shaven" Chinese pepper trader, for instance, had several vil-
lages under him, owned a hundred slaves, and lived in a large house. 
His title of Orang Kaya Setia Utama had been announced throughout 
the town "by beat of drum," and he was "just like aJambinese."71 
The court women comprised another important group who shared in 
the riches flowing to the center. This was made apparent on ceremonial 
occasions when royal widows, wives, and concubines appeared decked 
with precious jewels and arrayed in costly imported cloth, leading at 
least one resident to comment disapprovingly on the "unbridled lux-
ury" of Jambi's high-born women. Several had sufficient resources to 
carryon trade on their own account, and their taste for exotic items was 
encouraged by the wealth now available to them. In 1663 the new 
Jambi pangeran had two beautiful perahu made of "iron and gold" 
built "as playthings for his ladies," and the following year he ordered 
"a few small diamonds fashioned in the shape of a water lily, suitable for 
wearing with women's clothing."72 
A third group who gained greater benefits were those people respon-
sible for the final sales of pepper, particularly the syahbandars and their 
subordinates. The syahbandars directly profited from the increased 
amount of shipping, since they received anchorage money for every ves-
sel that docked. It was vital to seek their favor because they and their 
assistants handled all operations at the port such as the loading and 
unloading of cargo, the supervision of weighing, and the collection of 
tolls. Thus, while the ruler and his wife were given gifts of diamonds, 
the mestizo Portuguese syahbandar of Palembang received rings set 
with rubies and in Jambi the Dutch gave "pretty things" to a syahban-
dar's wife in the hope of gaining an advantage over their rivals. 73 
But by the mid-seventeenth century it was clear that of all the court 
circle it was the ruler who prospered most from the competition between 
different traders and their willingness to comply with demands for a 
greater share of the proceeds. In 1616, for example, a flat tax of 10 per-
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cent was paid on all exports with no charge on any incoming goods. By 
1628 this export toll had been raised to 12.5 percent, plus a 10 percent 
levy payable by pepper growers. The vac estimated that through 
imposts of various kinds the king made a profit of 30-35 percent on the 
pepper he sold them. Furthermore, the European presence had also 
enabled the ruler and the court to enter into the pepper market as buy-
ers. With advances of cloth and money from both Dutch and English, 
their agents could go into the countryside or collect incoming pepper 
from tollhouses set up along the rivers, paying prices well below what 
would have been given in J ambi itself. 74 
The wealth brought to J ambi by the pepper trade enabled its kings to 
maintain a lifestyle equalling or even surpassing that of their prosperous 
relatives and rivals in Palembang. However, this wealth had other less 
advantageous repercussions, for it brought southeast Sumatra to the 
attention of powerful and ambitious kings. Although Aceh's aspirations 
to extend control into this area had been checked, Javanese rulers were 
just as anxious to lay claim to overlordship. Palembang, geographically 
closer to Java, had already repelled an attack by Banten in 1596, but 
from 1625 the aggressively expansionist Sultan Agung of Mataram (r. 
1613-1646) proclaimed himselfPalembang's "protector." In 1641, fol-
lowing the arrival of a fleet of three hundred Javanese ships ostensibly 
to supervise the collection of wood, the ruler of Palembang went to 
Mataram to pay personal homage. 
To this point Jambi had managed to maintain its independence, and 
the pangeran had even declared that he would "never be subservient to 
the Mataram yoke." However, growing prosperity meant that almost 
inevitably Jambi too attracted Sultan Agung's attention. In 1642, faced 
by Javanese threats to support Palembang claims to his throne, the 
Jambi pangerang, like his neighbor, went to pay homage in Mataram. 
During the 1650s both Palembang and Jambi regularly sent tribute, 
and both rulers presented themselves at the Mataram court. 75 
There were a number of reasons for J ambi' s willingness to follow the 
Palembang example, despite treaties with the Dutch and English. The 
first was the simple fear of attack by a demographically superior state. 76 
The large Javanese armies, which could lay siege to enemy centers, 
impressed even the Dutch; in 1629 the force that unsuccessfully 
attacked Batavia was estimated at about 160,000 men. Although in 
1641 the Mataram fleet returning from Palembang had received a 
crushing defeat from vac forces, the Jambi pangeran remained 
un convinced of Dutch supremacy. He was afraid, he said, because the 
ruler of Mataram was a potentate who had" a million subjects for every 
thousand of the Dutch." He had personally seen Sultan Agung's forces 
during his visits to the Javanese court, but although he had heard of 
Dutch military might, he had never himself witnessed it. 77 
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A second factor that helps explain the anxiety of J ambi and Palem-
bang kings to retain Mataram's favor was their growing economic 
dependence on the rice trade of Java as pepper cultivation became more 
widespread. Sago, harvested in the tidal marshes, was still a staple, but 
increasingly it was becoming regarded as the food of lesser people. 
Although ubi (tubers) and other roots could also serve as a substitute in 
times of rice shortages, it was commonly believed that if rice was not 
available, starvation would result. The deep-rooted cultural importance 
of rice is suggested in a Palembang legend that includes a golden rice 
plant in the country's original regalia. To deprive oneself of rice was 
considered akin to fasting, and a prince ofJambi thus vowed he would 
eat no rice until the wrongs of his father and grandfather were 
avenged. 78 
Even in Palembang, which had previously yielded a rice surplus, the 
shift to pepper began to affect the extent of rice cultivation. By the 1630s 
it was said that very little was being produced for export, and most 
Palembang rice was consumed locally. But it was in J ambi, where so 
much interior energy had been diverted to pepper growing, that the 
dependency on outside supplies from Siam, Cambodia, and Java was 
especially apparent. In the latter part of the year ships from Java 
arrived bringing rice and salt, to be followed when the winds changed 
by those from the north. If for any reason they did not appear, and if 
crops at home failed or Javanese ports were closed, the position could be 
desperate. In 1631 the refusal of the Mataram ruler to allow any ships 
to leave for Palembang contributed to a rice shortage in the area so 
severe that the king of Jambi forbade the making of arak. The high 
returns that pepper offered in the first half of the seventeenth century 
meant attempts to encourage rice planting in J ambi were unsuccessful, 
and price rises reflect the fear generated during any lack of this staple. 
Normally rice cost fourteen to sixteen rials the koyan and twenty in a 
poor harvest, but in 1639 after a drought the price reached fifty rials. In 
this context the benefits of the Javanese connection were obvious. In 
1654, after the pangeran of J ambi had sent another mission to the 
Mataram court, Sultan Agung's son, Susuhunan Amangkurat I, 
ordered each Javanese coastal lord to send fifty lasts of rice to Jambi. 79 
A third reason for the enormous respect given to Java was its great 
prestige as a center of refinement and culture. The view that Javanese 
culture was intrinsically superior was well established among the 
Javanese-descended court of Pal em bang, and the Dutch remarked that 
Palembang people felt complimented if they were regarded as "J ava-
nese." It was the Palembang example that a wealthier Jambi now 
sought to surpass. The pangeran gede (crown prince) was heard many 
times to say that he found the Javanese language and attire the most 
attractive in the world, and an edict was even passed declaring that the 
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interior people must lay aside their Malay clothes and dress in the 
Javanese style if they appeared at court. After news arrived that the 
Mataram ruler had acquired a new prestige item, such as an Arab 
horse, the Jambi ruler was quick to emulate his example. He and his 
nobles, like their Palembang relatives, had Javanese titles, while 
amusements such as Javanese wayang, dancing, and gamelan were part 
of court life. In 1652, when the ruler of Jambi asked for a Dutch ship 
"completely equipped" to sail to Java, his hope was that he would 
thereby impress the Mataram court. 80 
Another means by which the Jambi court could display "Javanese-
ness" was by holding tourneys, public displays of horsemanship and 
combat against captured animals. These were modelled on tourneys in 
Java where all the nobles, splendidly dressed, appeared with horses and 
lances and engaged in mock battles. They did not simply provide enter-
tainment; this was an occasion when those who had met the king's favor 
could be publicly rewarded and those who were in disfavor could be 
humiliated. It could also be a time for imparting confidences or gaining 
the ruler's ear. Above all it enabled the Jambi king to make plain his 
superior status by cantering around on one of the small horses from his 
fifty-strong stable, displaying his newly acquired weapons. Tourneys 
were held every Saturday, and it was considered a great affront should 
either the Dutch or English captains fail to attend. The vac resident 
even pressed his superiors to buy him a better horse so that he could 
make a more impressive showing. 81 
Admiration for Mataram and subservience to its ruler also helps to 
explain the greater attention to Islam that Europeans now began to dis-
cern in the J ambi court. During the last years of his life Sultan Agung 
showed a growing interest in Islamic matters, and this must have been 
remarked by the vassal rulers who came to pay homage. In 1649 the 
J ambi pangeran asked Batavia for two or three "clean and unbound 
books with gold margins on which to write his new laws and daily ser-
mons," and according to the Dutch "these people are presently so reli-
gious that the ordinary man is about half, and the nobles wholly, like 
priests." Another striking example of Javanese (and possibly Muslim) 
influence concerned marriage. When the Dutch first reached the archi-
pelago, they noted that most men commonly had only one wife; and 
even though a king might be surrounded by many women, one was 
usually singled out as official spouse and queen. But in 1650 Susuhunan 
Amangkurat I told the "great ministers," the court nobles, and the vil-
lage officials to take another wife. Two years later the king ofJambi also 
gave permission to his "most powerful vassals to take two or three 
wives." In September of that year he set an example by taking a second 
wife, the daughter of the temenggung (one of the senior ministers). 82 
Jambi's ability to emulate the Mataram court was a prime element in 
68 Families and Exchanges 
its new status. Previously overshadowed by Palembang, it now enjoyed 
a reputation of being the foremost pepper producer in the region, the 
wealth of its court a byword. Although Palembang had also begun to 
produce pepper, it had not yet been able to match Jambi's reputation. 
During the 1650s the latter's superiority seemed confirmed by the dra-
matic destruction of the capital of Palembang by Dutch forces in 
November 1659. 
The VOC had sent envoys to Palembang soon after their arrival in 
Jambi, but no post had been established and trade was carried out only 
intermittently. Although a contract had been negotiated in 1642 promis-
ing the Dutch exclusive rights to Palembang's pepper, a surplus on the 
world market meant it was some time before the VOC made any effort 
to enforce this agreement. In 1655, however, a Dutch captain trading in 
Palembang invoked the 1642 contract and confiscated several junks and 
their cargoes of pepper. Subsequent negotations did not go well, and 
relations took a turn for the worse during 1658 when Cornelius Ock-
ersz, a man who had already alienated the Jambi ruler, was sent to 
Palembang to buy pepper. On at least two occasions he attempted to 
impound incoming vessels, including one belonging to a Mataram 
prince. 
Aware that the situation was explosive, the pangeran of Palembang 
sought a reconciliation in the traditional way. Ockersz was to be drawn 
into the royal family by being adopted as a son, his new status affirmed 
by the gift of a special kris and the title of temenggung. But the behavior 
of Ockersz made light of the honor bestowed on him, for according to 
the pangeran he sought to arrogate even greater privileges to himself, 
waving "a red flag" and proclaiming, "What matters the pangeran of 
Palembang?" Such public disdain for kingly affection was intolerable. 
In August 1658 a party of Pal em bang men accompanying the departing 
Ockersz downstream captured his ship. More than forty of those aboard 
were killed, including Ockersz; twenty-eight remaining Dutchmen 
were taken prisoner and reportedly forcibly circumcised. 83 
The VOC could not let such an incident go unanswered. In Novem-
ber 1658 and again in October 1659, fleets were sent to blockade the 
river, not merely to compel Palembang to release the prisoners and 
agree to observe the contract but to provide a lesson "to surrounding 
Moor princes." In mid-November 1659, the VOC fleet moved up-
stream and was soon within range of Palembang's main fortifications. 
Although local forces put up a strong defense they were eventually over-
whelmed, and by November 16 the ruler, known only by his posthu-
mous title of Seda ing Rajak, had fled, and his capital had been taken. 
Finding that most of the Dutch prisoners had been killed, the VOC 
commander decided to exact a terrible revenge. The palace was looted 
"of all its riches and a vast train of artillery"; the royal graves behind 
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the city, comprising five buildings gilded and decorated with stone stat-
ues, were destroyed; and the entire town and nearby settlements were 
put to the torch. 84 
News of this event was received with jubilation in the Jambi court 
because of a resurgence of hostility toward their Palembang relatives. 
Rivalry for control over the rich pepper areas along their common bor-
der had become more intense in recent years, and the Jambi pangeran 
said openly that despite their family ties the Palembang king had given 
offence on many occasions. Encouraged by his Dutch "son," the resi-
dent Pieter de Goyer, the J ambi ruler had actively supported the Dutch 
campaign, even supplying a diagram locating and illustrating Palem-
bang's defenses. 
The belief in J ambi that the Dutch had acted as instruments of divine 
retribution was strengthened because Palembang had popularly been 
regarded as impregnable. About 1642 a new syahbandar, a mestizo 
Portuguese from Makassar, had been appointed to supervise improve-
ments to Palembang's fortifications, and by 1659 the defenses were 
impresssive even to Europeans. Rafts loaded with flammable material 
were moored at intervals along the river, ready to be cut loose and set 
adrift among any invading fleet. Rows of stakes had been planted in the 
water near the main settlement, and a chain suspended from bank to 
bank as a further impediment. A fort had been built on the island of 
Kembira, strategically situated just downstream from the capital, and 
two others constructed on the left bank. These forts were defended on 
three sides by thick walls of durable ungling wood filled with dirt and 
plugged with hardened rice balls, making them almost impenetrable. 85 
Specially constructed apertures allowed for artillery to fire at attacking 
forces. Opposite was the settlement of Palembang itself, the river banks 
crowded with floating rafts and houses standing on piles in the water. 
The central area, however, lay behind a wall more than a kilometer 
square made up of "vast trunks of trees" surrounded by a moat around 
which were arrayed more than seventy cannon. In all, the defenses were 
such that one Dutch observer expressed disbelief that "the natives could 
construct such artillery." For the people of Palembang, further guaran-
tees of protection lay in the spiritual power of two great cannon draped 
with red cloth that stood outside the main walls. Indeed, the revered 
Muslim authorities who sprinkled incense over them while offering 
prayers for victory had stated confidently that Palembang would not 
fall. 86 
The unexpected defeat of Palembang directly benefited the Jambi 
ruler in a number of other ways. First, he gained subjects when many 
people fled to J ambi following the Dutch attack. Second, his arsenal was 
increased considerably since the Dutch acknowledged his support by 
granting his request for several Palembang guns and boats, including 
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the ruler's personal pleasure craft. Third, and most important, his 
standing as a Dutch ally enabled him to place his nominee on the 
Palembang throne. Seda ing Rajak had died shortly after the Dutch 
attack, and his young son's claims to succeed were challenged by his 
nephew, Kiai Temenggung, who was supported by the J ambi court. In 
September 1660 the Jambi pangeran arrived in Palembang with an 
escort of about a thousand men to install Kiai Temenggung as ruler, 
while marrying his own daughter to the son of the former king. 87 When 
a Dutch fleet was dispatched in 1661 to blockade the entrance to the 
Musi River, the Jambi pangeran advised his Palembang client to reach 
an agreement with the vac. The subsequent contract to which the 
new king set his seal in June 1662 permitted the Dutch to establish a 
post in Palembang and gave them a monopoly of all its pepper for 4 
rials the picul in cash and 4.5 in goods. In a situation where their 
pangeran addressed the Jambi king as "father," some Palembang 
nobles feared that they would soon become completely subservient to 
their neighbor. 88 
Evidence of Jambi's enhanced status was manifested in its ruler's 
connections with some of the leading royal families in the region. The 
pangeran's mother was from Palembang; one of his wives was a lady 
from the powerful kingdom of Makassar; an aunt was the wife of the 
king of Inderagiri; a daughter was the wife of the raja muda of Johor; 
and in 1659 had come an added honor when the younger brother of the 
sultan of Banten asked for another daughter in marriage. The Jambi 
ruler was thus part of a prestigious royal network, and his position as an 
uncle of the kings of the prominent Islamic states of Banten and Makas-
sar set him well above Palembang. These relationships and his associa-
tion with the Dutch led Batavia to again seek his services as mediator, 
this time in its quarrels with Banten. The two had been at odds for some 
time, and the sultan of Banten said he had given his oath to an ulama 
(Islamic teacher) from Mecca that he would never cease to do battle 
against the Christians. However, the pangeran ofJambi persuaded him 
that the shedding of human blood did not please God; moreover, said 
the pangeran, "Banten and Batavia are his children, the one being his 
nephew and the other his brother." As a result of these discussions, the 
VOC concluded a peace treaty with Banten in 1659. The Jambi 
pangeran's contribution was acknowledged in both Batavia and Banten 
with "great honor," his envoys returning home laden with "extraordi-
narily valuable gifts." With the presents received from Banten, his 
daughter's impending betrothal, and the prestige acquired through his 
mediation, the pangeran, said the VOC resident, appeared to be 
"drunk from prosperity."89 
This new status finally emboldened Jambi to throw off Mataram's 
overlordship. Despite the enormous respect accorded J ava, their rela-
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tionship had never approached the "brotherly friendship" to which 
Jambi aspired, because the Javanese court generally looked down on 
people from Sumatra, even those of rank. Something of this attitude 
comes through in one text of the Panji tales when a king of Malayu visit-
ing Java is asked to bring the princesses in his suite to the royal palace 
(kraton). He excuses himself, however, requesting that they might come 
later "when they are more fully Javanized, for now they are stiff."90 
Jambi resentment toward Mataram became apparent after 1661, when 
the old ruler, now entitled pangeran ratu, stepped down and allowed his 
son, Pangeran Dipati Anum, to take over. Two years later a meeting 
was arranged with the king of Palembang in an effort to persuade him 
to end the practice of sending envoys to Mataram. But Palembang 
remained uncertain, and although its new ruler refrained from sending 
the customary umbrella, the symbol of submission, he was not eager to 
be openly defiant. Conversely, Jambi's leaning toward Mataram's rival, 
the YOC, was made evident in 1663 when the Dutch resident, Evert 
Michielsz, was made "one of the king's councillors," awarded a high 
title, and presented with a pike that had previously belonged to the 
king. In May 1663 Michielsz returned to Batavia and informed the gov-
ernor general that Jambi was to sever relations with Mataram. 91 
The Jambi example served to hearten Palembang, whose ruler in 
1665 took a tentative step in the same direction by instituting Saturday 
tourneys "in the Jambi manner." By 1668 he had not paid homage to 
Mataram for three years. Perhaps encouraged by his alliance with the 
Dutch, he then attempted to reassert control over Bangka, a move that 
added to the displeasure of the Mataram susuhunan. When reports 
were received that about six hundred warships were being made ready 
in Java to attack Palembang, its pangeran moved quickly to dispatch 
envoys with tribute. But the susuhunan refused to see them, and the 
gifts sent back-a buffalo, a plough, and a rake-were a public 
reminder of Palembang's lowly status. The latter thus remained nomi-
nally subservient to Mataram until the 1680s. By contrast, emboldened 
by its connections with the YOC, the English, Makassar, Johor, and 
Banten, Jambi's Pangeran Dipati Anum proclaimed that he wished to 
reign "as a king, not as a vassal. ... Our ancestors were sovereign 
kings; why should we not be too?" Perhaps the enhanced stature arising 
from these claims to independence lay behind the inscription on the new 
pangeran's seal, with its proclamation that Jambi would survive "for-
ever." 92 
In the nineteenth century the end of vassal status was still remem-
bered as a milestone in J ambi's history, a number of accounts seeing its 
demise not as defiance but as an arrangement between two ancestral 
relatives. Through his marriage to the daughter of the sultan of 
Mataram, Jambi's great hero Orang Kaya Hitam gained possession not 
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only of the legendary kris Si Genjai but suzerainty over Jambi, which 
he would now rule jointly with his Javanese princess. 93 The ties with 
Java suggested in this legend to some extent lingered on, for Javanese 
was still spoken in the J ambi court well into the eighteenth century, and 
economic connections remained important. Politically, however, the old 
relationship was gone. The confirmation of Jambi's position came in 
1669 when the ruler of Jambi, Pangeran Anum, decided to install his 
father, then termed pangeran ratu, as Sultan Agung "with a sheet of 
written paper and a massive gold kris." The choice of an honorific used 
by the rulers of Mataram and Banten was a public declaration of Jam-
bi's status. "Never before," commented the Dutch resident, "has such 
a title been assumed by one of the kings, and no one could previously 
take it unless envoys had been to Mecca, as did Mataram, Banten, and 
Makassar." Furthermore, it was not long before Pangeran Anum began 
to make inquiries in Banten regarding the title of sultan for himself, and 
in 1676 his thirteen-year-old daughter married Sultan Agung of Ban-
ten. The latter then bestowed on Pangeran Anum the new name of Sul-
tan Muhammad Syafi'i. These honors were duly acknowledged by the 
respect accorded J ambi in the Palembang court. When Sultan Agung 
came to visit Palembang in 1677, the Palembang ruler sat on a cushion 
at his feet while villagers from the interior made the long and dangerous 
trip from the interior to pay him homage. The Dutch themselves recog-
nized Sultan Agung's standing when they asked him to help negotiate 
the 1678 treaty between Palembang and the vac. 94 
In a society for which economic exchanges were an extension of gift 
giving, the impersonal forces of supply and demand were not the pre-
dominant factor in determining the shape of commercial activities. Far 
more important in establishing the terms for trade was the extent to 
which buyer and seller could interact as part of an imagined family 
whose members extended to each other the generosity and fairness 
expected of relatives. As the "father" of his people, the ruler's geneal-
ogy and his own marriage connections helped personify a network of 
kinship relationships, offering the basis for establishing economic ties 
even between strangers. From this perspective, and in the context of the 
mid-seventeenth century, J ambi's commercial future seemed assured. 
In fact, however, these bright prospects did not eventuate. Although 
the J ambi silsilah collected in later times list the kings who reigned in 
the seventeenth century by name and in order, there is no hint of the 
status they had once enjoyed in the region, nor of the marriages that 
linked them to kingdoms such as Makassar and Banten. This attrition 
of communal memories provides telling evidence of the manner in 
which a largely oral society retains from the past only those features that 
seem relevant to the present. From the latter part of the seventeenth 
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century, J ambi's prosperity continued to decline, and two hundred 
years afterward royal connections with such prestigious places as Ban-
ten and Makassar were not only irrelevant but unimaginable. It is the 
written European sources that describe the unprecedented wealth of 
earlier Jambi kings and that show how they attempted to incorporate 
those who vied for pepper-the Chinese, Portuguese, Dutch, and 
English-into their economic family. But the same sources also show 
that although Palembang was for a time relegated to the position of sec-
ond brother, it never lost its standing as a major trading port. The kin-
ship relations between great ancestors in far-offlands, embedded in the 
genealogy of its kings, survived because they remained essential to the 
economIC process. 
Yet there was an underside to the riches the pepper trade brought, for 
it had introduced new elements into dealings between the downstream 
kings and upstream societies in bothJambi and Palembang. Even more 
fundamentally, mutual competition to control people and resources had 
infused their old rival/relative relationship with a hostility that had not 
previously existed. These concerns were to become more obvious as the 
seventeenth century advanced. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Accounts and Reckonings: 
Upstream-Downstream Tensions 
and Jambi-Palembang Rivalry 
Numeracy was as critical as literacy to Europe's com-
mercial endeavor, and European trading companies in Asia shared the 
conviction that commerce could not be properly conducted without 
written financial records. A director of the English East India Company 
even considered the knowledge of accounting, that "noble order of 
debtor and creditor," to be foremost among the qualifications necessary 
to produce "the perfect merchant of foreign trade." In the early seven-
teenth century these were not idle words. The refinement of bookkeep-
ing methods provided joint stock companies like the VOC with a system 
by which a vast range of transactions could be translated into coordi-
nated columns of figures. Regarded as one of the great commercial 
advances of the age, the technique of double-entry accounting enabled 
merchants to maintain a purview of business concerns that could now 
stretch to the other side ofthe globe. As an English poet eulogized, "By 
this ingenious pilot safely may/We trade at home, to Indies find 
a way."l 
Because regular, accurate records were vital for making informed 
economic decisions, company factors were constantly enjoined to main-
tain their ledgers systematically, and in their accompanying letters they 
were expected to supply further details to help in formulating commer-
cial policies. During the seventeenth century these balance sheets were 
largely favorable, reflecting the ascendancy of the VOC over its Euro-
pean rivals; indeed, a hundred years later officials often referred to ear-
lier figures as they bemoaned the extent to which the profits from the 
pepper trade had fallen away. On one level, therefore, the calculations 
that tracked profits and losses in terms of precise amounts of pepper 
deliveries, the exact dates on which they were received, and their equiv-
alent monetary worth stand as a chronicle of Dutch mercantile success. 
On another level, however, they can be regarded as significant cultural 
statements, for the values on which they were based, emphasizing the 
pursuit of profit even if it entailed the loss of goodwill, were to have far-
reaching effects on the conduct of trade in southeast Sumatra. 
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The European demand for pepper clearly worked to the advantage of 
ilir rulers, and the initial willingness of interior communities to become 
involved in cash cropping suggests that they too saw future benefits for 
themselves. As the seventeenth century proceeded, however, it became 
apparent that upstream expectations could not be fulfilled. Behind the 
impressive accumulation of wealth in the downstream courts and the 
profits recorded in European account books it is possible to see new 
areas of conflict that jeopardized both the delicate ulu-ilir association 
and the fragile Jambi-Palembang brotherhood. Local societies may not 
have maintained the kind of debit-credit records familiar to European 
merchants, but they did have a cultural balance sheet by which individ-
uals and communities tallied favors received and given against obliga-
tions rendered or due. In the dealings of the kings of Palembang and 
J ambi with their subjects and with each other, these unwritten ledgers 
were becoming progressively more unbalanced. On the one side, the 
changing nature of commercial demands and the desire of ilir kings to 
strengthen their hold over the rich pepper districts of the interior 
exacerbated the tensions inherent in the upstream-downstream apposi-
tion. On the other, the rivalry so integral to the J ambi-Palembang rela-
tionship became more pronounced as pepper-growing areas along the 
border were disputed and as rulers sought to extend their access to the 
human resources that provided prestige, labor, and fighters. As this 
competition became more intense, the association between Jambi 
and Palembang was increasingly measured not in terms of reciprocal 
exchanges but as a reckoning of wrongs suffered and vengeance 
obtained. Although the Dutch were able to negotiate a peace settlement 
in 1683, they deliberately did not exploit the traditional methods of res-
olution, such as royal marriages, that had previously worked to bond 
the Jambi and Palembang courts together. From the late seventeenth 
century, therefore, the links between them began to weaken. 
Strains in the Upstream-Downstream Relationship 
Before the arrival of the Europeans, economic links between ulu pro-
ducers and the ilir port had been maintained primarily through voli-
tion. Geography made enforcement of control almost impossible, and 
interior groups would come downstream to sell their goods only if they 
were convinced that they would meet fair treatment. A king might 
claim for himself power-charged humans such as dwarves and twins 
and the exotic items of the jungle and the seas, but a subject who ac-
knowledged royal prerogatives could justifiably look to some reward. 
Downstream recognition of these expectations is indicated by a piagem 
from Palembang, written on a buffalo horn and dated 1576 A.J. (1653 
C.E.), that relieves its recipient from paying tribute because he had pre-
sented his twin sons, Kalung and Tiwa, to the court. 2 
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This concession was considerable, for central to the maintenance of 
the ulu-ilir relationship was the regular appearance of upstream people 
at court, offering gifts in return for royal patronage and protection. 
Their physical presence was an important demonstration of homage, 
since the ruler's standing was manifested through the display of many 
followers. Europeans saw a relationship in which the ulu people were 
kept downstream "to waite on [the king's] base pomp yet they cannot 
tend their pepper gardens" as exploitative and as evidence that local 
rulers "would rather be a king of outward show and state than of a 
flourishing land and subjects."3 They did not understand that it could 
be more important for a ruler to have his subjects gathered around him 
as immediate and indisputable evidence of his authority than to have 
them laboring unseen in some distant place in pursuit of profits that 
might not be apparent for many years. 
Women had an important place among those who surrounded the 
king, representing perhaps the most valuable "tribute" a subject could 
offer. As we have seen, Europeans noted the presence of women in the 
Jambi and Palembang courts but only partially realized their signifi-
cance. A Dutchman might remark that "Indonesian kings show their 
greatness and power through maintaining many women in order to dis-
play their lecherous appetite," but he was unaware that this visual state-
ment of a ruler's virility was an essential component of royal legitimacy. 
Women were also necessary because they were employed in large num-
bers within the royal establishment to attend to the personal needs of the 
ruler and his family and to carry out necessary tasks like gathering fire-
wood and carrying water. When the king went to war, his women could 
perform vital services such as making the rice balls that were packed 
into a fortress wall to give added strength, as well as preparing food and 
supplies for defending forces. In 1652, when Jambi feared an attack 
from Palembang, orders were specifically sent to the ulu to bring down 
females as well as males for corvee duties. 4 
Conversely, the presentation of a female could potentially yield great 
rewards to any subject because of the possibility that she might become 
the object of the ruler's attentions. Her family would then be bound to 
the ruler in a very special way and in return for giving up a daughter 
should properly gain not merely recompense but continuing advan-
tages. This flow of women to the palace was a crucial link in upstream-
downstream relations since in J ambi and Palembang females serving in 
the court very frequently came from ulu districts, where most villages 
were found. In the world of legend one of the most pervasive themes is 
the way in which, sometime in the distant past, the sexual union 
between an upstream woman and a downstream king helped establish 
the basis for cooperation between ulu and ilir. Here the ruler is readily 
presented as a distant but senior kinsman, the obligations to him justi-
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fied by ancient bonds that make the rendering of tribute and the fulfill-
ment of labor service explicable and even proper. A king might well 
favor his "relatives," but they in their turn must be ever ready to lend 
assistance. An example of the way in which connections between the 
downstream ruler and the interior were explained was apparent in the 
Belida area of Palembang, described by Europeans as an extremely 
infertile area whence those who displeased the king were banned. A 
rotational corvee system operated by which a certain number of men 
and women were constantly at the palace gathering wood, carrying 
water, cooking, feeding animals, and so forth. However, legends col-
lected in later times justified Belida's obligations by relating how the 
original ruler of Palembang, Prasienan, was displaced by a Sultan 
Mangni, who subsequently married Prasienan's daughter. Prasienan 
fled in anger to Belida, followed by Sultan Mangni, who rewarded his 
father-in-law with a title, a spear, and a white umbrella. In return, forty 
people from Belida were sent to the downstream court to act as wood 
and water bearers. 5 
Underlying the upstream-downstream association was an implicit 
assumption that relations between village and court rested on mutual 
recognition of the rights and obligations of both parties. The people 
gave gifts, goods, and labor; the ruler rewarded and protected. In fact, 
of course, this ideal environment could only be sustained if interaction 
was rare, and by the mid-seventeenth century this was no longer the 
case. As kings of Palembang and Jambi sought to tighten their hold 
over the pepper-growing interior they were less willing to sit passively in 
the capital and await the "gifts" brought by their subjects. Increasingly, 
trips to the ulu to hunt or fish were combined with forcible collection of 
pepper supplies, tribute, and women, "the prettiest unmarried daugh-
ters."6 It is almost certain that such girls would never see their families 
again, for they now became in effect the king's property, as easily given 
to a favored Chinese as sent to the Dutch in payment for a debt. 
The ambiguity of upstream-downstream dealings is reflected in 
stories depicting the complexities of the king's relations with the ulu 
men whose women served him and even bore his children. For most 
males the seizure of a daughter or sister was as much an affront as the 
abduction of a wife, since most young women were promised or 
betrothed as children. In the village the aggrieved husband, father, 
brother, or lover would have been entitled to take due revenge, even to 
the extent of killing the offender. The standard of behavior for com-
moner and prince alike is laid out in the legend of the great Palembang 
hero Aria Damar, who vowed he would never take another man's wife. 
When he was tricked into doing so by his half-brother, the king of Maja-
pahit, he found the shame so intolerable that he killed himself. Another 
story attached to the royal Palembang genealogy tells of a ruler who 
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demanded that the bride of any of his subjects should first share his bed 
before going to her husband's. Any woman who became pregnant by 
the king was required to remain at court, and her husband was sent 
away. A man called Jeladri wished to marry a beautiful girl, but the 
king kept her in his kraton. After three days J eladri came to ask for his 
wife, offering a kris as a substitute. The ruler refused. Eight days later 
Jeladri came again, but the king paid him no attention because he was 
caponing his cocks. J eladri then took his kris and ran amok, killing the 
ruler and all the occupants of the kraton. And indeed, in 1629 Dutch 
sources record that the heir to the Palembang throne was killed by one 
of his own people whose bride he had taken. 7 Such actions by a king 
were clearly at variance with the notion that he should act as a caring 
kinsman. 
Another frequent theme found in both folklore and archival records is 
the deflection of popular animosity toward the ruler onto his representa-
tives. Royal ladies, who often accompanied court parties upstream to 
choose girls to enter the palace, are similarly a target of hostility, and the 
king's exactions or demands for extraordinary corvee duties are fre-
quently attributed to the "cruel" queen or "greedy" gundik (secondary 
wife). A Jambi chronicle, describing strains between the ulu and ilir, 
thus blames the ruler's wife, who was "very unkind to any attractive 
(village) women. She took them and made them her slaves." Dutch 
sources also suggest that the influence of such ladies was often discerned 
in royal actions. In 1642, for instance, the decision of the Palembang 
king to outfit a fleet of forty ships and three thousand men for a voyage 
to Bangka and J apara was attributed to requests from his new gundik, 
who "had encouraged him in all kinds of strange activities." Naturally, 
few of the women who entered the kraton attained this degree of influ-
ence. Most were condemned to a life of servitude in a court where the 
Javanese model created an environment quite foreign to them and 
where their own status was clearly inferior. The attitude of the Jambi 
ruler who ordered his Malay subjects to wear Javanese dress in his pres-
ence is mirrored in a Palembang wayang story from the court that 
depicts a buta (monster) from the jungle as "stupid" because he does not 
know kawi (literary Javanese) or Javanese customs. 8 
The tensions between upstream and downstream expressed by folk-
lore in terms of human relationships reflect real strains that could and 
did develop in the economic interaction ofulu and ilir. The early seven-
teenth century witnessed a vast expansion of the international pepper 
market, and the high prices of the period are testimony to the appar-
ently insatiable worldwide demand. This in turn encouraged a spread 
of pepper growing down Jambi's Batang Hari, through the Tembesi 
area to Merangin, and up into the Palembang highlands. The wide-
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spread shift to pepper, however, concealed certain factors that were not 
obvious to European commentators. First, unlike rice or cotton, pepper 
is a slow-maturing plant. It was four years before a grower could expect 
to see the first berries, and six to seven before any substantial harvest 
could be expected. Because pepper plants ceased to bear after about 
thirty years, and because the leaching of soil nutrients could cause a 
decline in production well before that, forward planning was vital. Pep-
per growers needed to be aware of the passing of seasons so they could 
layout new gardens that would be mature by the time older plots had to 
be abandoned. Second, considerable labor investment was required to 
produce a successful pepper harvest. A clearing had to be made in the 
jungle, no easy task given the size of the trees and the basic implement, 
the parang or cleaver.9 The absence of wet rice cultivation in most of the 
area also meant that pepper growing could not build on a tradition of 
communal cooperation in agriculture. As the basic economic unit, the 
nuclear family would have been placed under considerable strain by the 
high labor input required by pepper cultivation. Although men were 
responsible for clearing the forest, women and children assisted in other 
essential tasks-planting out the cengkering (prop-plants), training the 
small pepper vines around them, and keeping the roots clear of weeds. 
During the two annual harvest periods, the "great harvest" between 
April and June and the "small harvest" from September to November, 
pepper growers and their families would be particularly busy, picking, 
cleaning, drying, and bagging the berries. The sifting of one picul 
(roughly sixty kilograms) of pepper, for instance, would take a woman 
the entire day. Behind all this labor was the knowledge that a thriving 
garden of perhaps five hundred to a thousand plants could be ruined by 
the depredations of elephants, an earthquake, an unusually dry or wet 
season, or disease. Yet though the work of years could be lost in a season 
or even a few hours, the profits from the sale of pepper initially made 
the investment worthwhile. 
Because of the degree of labor and time involved, it was impossible 
for most families to grow cotton and pepper or rice and pepper simulta-
neously. In the early seventeenth century the rate of return favored pep-
per, but the long nurturing period before the plants reached maturity 
meant growers could not readily respond to shifts in prices by moving to 
alternative crops. The limitations imposed by pepper growing became a 
serious matter as the impact of increased production began to be felt in 
Europe. Pepper can be stored for several years without deteriorating, 
and by the middle of the seventeenth century, warehouses in Europe 
were filling up as sellers tried to keep the price high and as consumers 
turned to ginger as a substitute. By 1652 Europe was said to be glutted 
with pepper, the surplus sufficient to last for at least three years. The 
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Dutch even tried to persuade the pangeran of Palembang to change half 
his pepper gardens into rice, claiming that "already more pepper was 
produced than the whole world needed."lo 
Excess pepper in Europe inevitably affected the prices the Dutch and 
English were willing to pay, and by the 1640s a downward trend was 
already apparent. When the panembahan of Jambi died in 1630, the 
Dutch and English paid only six rials, with a reduction to four a few 
years later. In both Pal em bang and J ambi this trend was exacerbated 
by the entry of the ruler and the nobles into the market in an effort to 
buy up pepper cheaply and then sell to the Europeans. In consequence, 
the payment given to the growers was often far below that specified in 
the contract. Signs of producer resistance to falling profits soon became 
apparent. By 1630, just a few years after the English and Dutch had 
reached an understanding, albeit shaky, to control the pepper price in 
Jambi, Minangkabau growers were complaining about the amount 
they received and said they would destroy their gardens or plant rice 
instead if the situation did not improve. 
Behind the growing wealth of the J ambi and Palembang courts the 
question of falling prices continued to fester. In 1654 ulu villagers in 
J ambi were still threatening to pull out their pepper because they were 
receiving only two rials the picul. Often they simply refused to sell to the 
Europeans, held the harvest until a more advantageous offer was made, 
or carried it elsewhere. The growing use of slaves as laborers exacer-
bated the problem. Minangkabau heads of pepper-growing districts on 
the upper Batang Hari complained that an increase to three rials a picul 
would still yield no profit when the cost of supporting their slaves was 
taken into account. In Palembang, where slaves were also "much 
desired for the pepper gardens," other expenses were incurred when the 
levy on the sale of a slave was raised from one half to two rials, to be 
paid directly to the king. Before their attack on Palembang in 1659, the 
Dutch had thus watched with frustration as Malays, Javanese, and Chi-
nese bought up pepper at six or more rials the picul, claiming as they 
were loading that it was cotton. Although such "smuggling" was more 
difficult after the VOC post was established, pepper growers in the 
Komering region were known to be taking their harvest out to Banten 
and the west coast. In the face of this loss of income the Palembang 
ruler retaliated by establishing his own posts to collect dues from pass-
ing traffic and by requiring his people to sell to him well below the mar-
ket price. 11 
Ulu-ilir tensions were aggravated further as money became more 
common in the purchase of pepper. In the early seventeenth century the 
most common coin in Jambi and Palembang was the leadpici (from Old 
Javanese pisi, meaning coin), which had probably been introduced to 
Java by Chinese traders around 1590. With some locally struck, using 
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the more durable tin instead of lead, pici were strung together in paku of 
a thousand, providing a useful currency for the lower end of the market. 
Periodic fluctuations in exchange rates, however, made storing picis 
disadvantageous. In 1619 in Jambi 8,500 picis were equivalent to one 
rial, but by 1636 the rate had dropped to about 6,900 per rial, and it 
was sometimes as low as 3,500. Since pepper was priced in rials but 
purchased with picis, this degree of movement obviously worked 
against growers. Arbitrary decisions from downstream might also cause 
the pici to lose value. In 1640, for instance, the Jambi ruler sent 
100,000 picis into the interior to encourage their use, but two years later 
he decided to make picis heavier and to abolish the smaller ones then 
current. 12 
The growing demand for rials, constantly in short supply, gave rise to 
further problems. When the Dutch and English arrived in Jambi and 
Palembang, the silver rial had been almost unknown; less than a gener-
ation later, people who had previously been familiar only with "dirty 
picis" often refused to accept anything else. Unlike picis, which had a 
limited life, rials could be kept and stored, being frequently used for 
personal ornaments, sewn to cloth or headbands, or strung on necklaces 
and bracelets. Silver Spanish rials were often melted down to make jew-
elry or to decorate a kris, and on one occasion even a tea service for the 
Palembang ruler. Rials were also desirable because downstream kings 
increasingly demanded at least some tribute in specie. It became cus-
tomary, for example, for a ruler to be weighed against rials on the occa-
sion of his installation, a privilege sometimes extended to members of 
his family to mark some rite of passage. 13 Yet despite their high stand-
ing, rials too could be questioned. Falsification was common, and many 
were adulterated with copper; when the J ambi king began to strike his 
own rials in 1675 it proved impossible to force growers to accept them 
because so many were misshapen. For inhabitants of the interior, 
uncertainties about the value of coinage were increased further by the 
bewildering array of specie brought in by the Europeans and from other 
parts of Asia. Although Europeans attempted to persuade the bovenlan-
ders, the ulu people, to take other coins-stuivers, schillings, ducatoons 
-only rarely would they consent to a substitute for the Spanish rial. 
But because kings themselves were often paid with Dutch coinage in 
lieu of another currency, they sometimes compelled acceptance. In 
1671, for instance, the Palembang ruler took about 19,000 rijksdaalders 
with him to his upstream tollhouse to buy pepper forcibly from passing 
rafts. 14 
The expanding monetization of the economy infused another element 
of strain into upstream-downstream relations because of doubts about 
the value of coinage and the fear of many interior people that they 
might be the target ofilir subterfuge. In the transactions between agents 
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from the ilir and their customers in the ulu, another area of suspicion 
concerned the question of weights, always a sensitive matter in trade 
because there was no standardization between regions. Furthermore, 
weights could be readily adjusted, a practice particularly apparent in 
times of rice shortages, when a larger gantang could be used. As long as 
commerce rested on trust, such matters would not lead to disputes. In 
both Jambi and Palembang, for instance, native traders bought pepper 
by volume but sold it by weight. A kulak was filled with grain from one 
of the sacks on a raft, and from this a mutually acceptable estimate of 
the weight of the entire delivery was reached. But problems could 
always occur when a group began to move out beyond the small circle of 
"relatives," and the good ruler is thus commonly presented as the one 
who introduces weights and measures so that trade can be carried out 
harmoniously. The copper basin once in the possession of a Palembang 
kubu group, purportedly given them by Ratu Sinuhun, a legendary 
queen of Palembang, was probably used for measuring out important 
items such as salt when trading with nonkubu traders. 15 
Indigenous ideas of weights as adjustable according to the needs of 
the moment rather than fixed according to absolute standards was not 
acceptable to Europeans, who demanded exactness and consistency in 
commerce. With the growing use of middlemen in the J ambi and 
Palembang pepper trade, the relationship between European buyers 
and upstream sellers became less personal and suspicions about varia-
tions in weights less easy to resolve. Growers often believed that the dif-
ferences between the scales used in the Jambi court and those of the 
Europeans were due to deliberate efforts to cheat them, and in 1632 the 
ulu people were so convinced that the Dutch scales were false that they 
gave this as a reason for refusing to come downstream. 16 Their suspi-
cions were not completely ungrounded, for despite their insistence on 
accuracy, Europeans were prepared to manipulate the scales in the 
interests of profit. In 1643 the vac official going up to Kuamang was 
thus instructed to weigh the pepper with a scale five kati heavier than the 
one used in Jambi to "relieve the heavy costs involved." But as time 
passed there was some realization of how easily ulu suspicions could be 
aroused, and in 1665 the Dutch resident of Palembang went so far as to 
send a model of the old scales to Batavia, asking that the proposed new 
ones be an exact replica. The treaty of 1678 with Palembang tried to 
address some of the major problems regarding equivalences by laying 
down that a picul should be set at a hundred kati, with the syahbandar 
being responsible for making any adjustment if deliveries contained 
stones or dirt. No one but he could hold the dacing (scales), and he 
would be entitled to weigh pepper "the whole day" as long as the indi-
cating marks could be seen. 17 
Nonetheless, written contracts alone could not eliminate the growing 
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alienation between upstream producers and downstream purchasers, 
evidence of which is apparent in the deliberate adulteration of pepper. 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, when growers had sold 
directly to incoming traders, Jambi pepper had been considered re-
markably clean and free of the dirt, stones, and rubble (collectively 
called ampas, or rubbish) typical of other places, which could make up to 
6 percent difference in weight. ls By mid-century, in response to what 
was seen as unfair treatment, a variety of ingenious devices had been 
adopted to cheat the scales and so obtain a better price; such devices 
could range from increasing the weight by soaking the pepper grains in 
water to mixing them with small seeds specially blackened over a fire. 
Far from being trusted relatives, the buyers in the downstream capital 
and their agents were increasingly being viewed as wily opportunists 
and the marketplace an arena for confrontation and antagonism rather 
than trust and friendship. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the strains developing in the 
upstream-downstream relationship was the Europeans' attitude to 
debts, and their willingness to extend credit in the form of goods or 
money. In itself, this practice was probably not new, for such induce-
ments may well have been necessary to ensure delivery of forest and sea 
products, none of which was cultivated and all of which were difficult 
and time consuming to procure. But pepper, being a cash crop with pre-
dictable harvests, was eminently suited to the credit system. It was pos-
sible for a buyer to reserve the crop due the following season by issuing 
goods or money in advance on the assumption that delivery would soon 
follow. The Dutch and English entered into similar arrangements, 
allowing upstream growers to buy large amounts of goods or cloth in 
return for promises of pepper supplies. However, a bad season, sick-
ness, or simply misplaced optimism could often mean that these debts 
could not be repaid, at least in the short term. For the Protestant Dutch, 
who believed that there was "honor in having no debts," this failure to 
pay was a clear sign of imprudency or even dishonesty. A record of 
indebtedness was crucial to bookkeeping, and there were constant com-
plaints that "the Malay nation felt no shame" in incurring or appar-
ently forgetting debts. 19 
Europeans understandably did not appreciate that in this society a 
small part of a debt might be intentionally left unpaid, since it ensured 
that the bond established between giver and receiver would be a lasting 
one. 20 They were also wrong in their view that in these cultures debts 
were readily ignored. The critical difference lay in the perception of 
when and how debts should be repaid. For example, if a noble in Jambi 
committed a fault he was normally fined. The amount of the fine was 
then "written down" and placed in a box, being passed on to his chil-
dren but without any pressure for its repayment. The debtor himself 
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remained bonded to his creditor until such time as the debt was paid, 
but the passing of time was not necessarily a matter for concern. Years 
after the Dutch had given up hope of repayment, a Jambi noble thus 
appeared at the VOG lodge with three hundred piculs of pepper as par-
tial reimbursement for debts incurred by his long-dead father.21 But this 
repayment need not have been made in monetary equivalents, or even 
by the debtor himself; it could be honored by someone else who in their 
turn was beholden to him. One can do no better than to cite Firth's clas-
sic example: In the long term, the payment owed by B to A may be paid 
back by C to D when "B may be the father-in-law of A, D the son of A 
and C the brother of B. "22 
The question of debts also caused problems between the court and the 
Europeans, who did not appreciate that the debtor-creditor imbalance 
could be rectified not merely by the recompense of pepper or money but 
(for instance) by loyal service and the presentation of gifts. It was also 
understood that a rich individual should properly forgive the debts of 
someone in penury, especially a widow. The willingness of Ratu Mas 
and other nobles to lend to the Dutch and English reflected the generos-
ity expected of the wealthy and the belief that refusal of a loan subjected 
the supplicant to great humiliation. Yet at one point the VaG gave 
instructions that further credit should not be given to the J ambi ruler 
because of his record of indebtedness. When he was informed of this, 
the king was so angry that he threatened to cut the right hand off any-
one found trading in the VOG lodge. 23 By the same token, importunate 
requests for payment were also regarded as improper, for the very fabric 
of social relations was interwoven with the assumption that all debts 
would, at some time and in some form, be repaid. A person guilty of 
dunning must thus be greedy and uncaring. 
Such attitudes were not shared by the Europeans, for whom the resto-
ration of the equilibrium between profit and loss was of foremost con-
cern. Any amounts unpaid at the annual closing of the books were car-
ried over to the new balance sheet, a commercial practice that meant 
there was no question of "forgetting" debts. In 1679 the VaG resident 
was instructed to press the family of the recently deceased Sultan Agung 
for repayment of monies owed, and in 1791 the VaG was still request-
ing reimbursement for loans given out to a Palembang ruler during 
conflicts in 1722 and 1731. 24 Furthermore, the kings of Jambi and 
Palembang found that the Europeans would only accept a form of pay-
ment that could be readily translated into a monetary asset. Many of 
the traditional means of repaying debts-the bestowal of courtly titles, 
adoption as a royal son, gifts of women-were simply inadequate. 
European insistence that settlement for debts be made in money or 
goods that could be resold placed great pressure on the court elite. By 
1623 there were already complaints that the Jambi pangeran and his 
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nobles owed the vac large amounts, and in 1632 the total was listed at 
5,603 rials; twenty years later court debts to the Dutch were in excess of 
10,000 rials. The English too were concerned at the amount of money 
owed them, considering the situation "doubtful and desperate."25 
Indebtedness on this scale occurred primarily because the conduct of 
the pepper trade in the seventeenth century encouraged the wealthy and 
privileged to become creditors. Whole districts might have acquired 
goods on credit from a noble, a Chinese, or the ruler, who had in turn 
received them from the Dutch or English. Alternatively, court officials 
or members of the royal family may have agreed to stand as guarantor 
for a client trading on their account, which meant they would assume 
his debts should he be unable to pay. In such cases it was customary for 
debtors to offer themselves and their families as bondsmen and women 
to their wealthier patron. A message from a Minangkabau leader in 
1636, for example, indicates that he expected the ruler ofJambi to act as 
guarantor for any debts owed by Jambi people to Minangkabau. A gen-
eration later the Dutch commented that the Jambi ruler was "borge" 
(guarantor) for "many people."26 
Debt bondsmen and women, however, were not slaves, and they 
could not normally be sold to balance European account books. Mean-
while, pressure on the ruler for repayment was unremitting. Already in 
the 1642 treaty between the Dutch and Palembang, the pangeran had 
agreed to tell his subjects that they could not obtain cash or cloth on 
credit until their previous delivery of pepper had been loaded for ship-
ment. Anyone who owed money "could be kept prisoner and taken to 
Batavia, and the king will not stop this, regardless of whether they are 
his people, the queen's or those of his nobles." Another treaty the fol-
lowing year in Jambi provided that the king should "compel" those 
indebted to the vac to pay their debts and that he would allow the 
Dutch resident upstream to collect payment. In 1648, after "hard 
words" were exchanged, theJambi ruler finally agreed to foreclose even 
on nobles whose debts to the Dutch were outstanding.27 
Because of the pressure for repayment applied by both Dutch and 
English, Jambi and Palembang rulers as well as the court elite began to 
act more and more like debt collectors, employing intimidation or force 
to call up what they were owed. Even religious authorities could be used 
to induce pepper growers to repay debts. In J ambi a merchant origi-
nally from Pahang who had been made tuan kadi (religious judge), with 
responsibility for administering "the law of Allah" (hukum Allah), was 
charged with the collection of debts on behalf of the king and other 
nobles. In 1691 when the ruler of Palembang was upstream collecting 
debts, he was similarly accompanied by the head imam. 2B 
Well before the defeat of Palembang and the monopoly contract of 
1662 the effects of European insistence on a balanced ledger were 
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already apparent in J ambi. Royal hunting or fishing expeditions to the 
interior became an occasion for forcible collection of debts from pepper 
growers, and even the ruler's own relatives were subjected to intimida-
tion and threats. In 1652, following constant requests from the resident, 
the ruler told his mother and nobles to sell their jewelry and their slaves 
to raise money to pay their debts; some of his officials, including the 
syahbandar, would organize payments. Furthermore, Chinese would 
no longer be permitted to go upstream to purchase pepper on credit. By 
1654 the situation had only slightly improved, and the governor general 
informed the pangeran that J ambi would never be restored to Dutch 
favor as long as payments remained outstanding. This demand was the 
more humiliating since the interior headmen had been called down-
stream especially to hear the customary public reading of Batavia's let-
ter. The pangeran agreed to appoint an official to collect all debts 
according to a list drawn up by the resident and he himself demanded 
repayment from his own clients on pain of confiscation of slaves and 
goods. At the same time he reminded the resident that he was unable to 
pay for those who had defaulted to the Dutch because he in turn had 
been failed. Given this situation, he said, the governor general's ultima-
tum made it appear as if he no longer wished to continue their "broth-
erly friendship." 29 
Despite the strains developing between ulu and ilir it remained cru-
cial for both Palembang and J ambi kings to retain or extend authority 
over interior groups because the latter were essential in generating royal 
income and because they had become heavily indebted to the ruler or 
court agents. In 1655, hearing that seven villages of dissatisfied pepper 
growers were fleeing to Palembang because of the low prices they were 
offered, the Jambi pangeran went upstream with armed vessels and 
captured two hundred people. One hundred fifty of these fugitives were 
brought back to Tanah Pilih, together with a considerable portion of 
their stored rice harvest. One of the nobles was left in the uplands with a 
large force to maintain the ruler's authority. Such measures did not 
yield sufficient revenue to compensate for the court's growing debts, 
however, especially as Europeans now preferred payment in specie 
rather than the pepper that was glutting the markets of London and 
Amsterdam. By 1672 this insistance was so great that the Jambi king 
imposed a tax of five rials for every thousand pepper vines as part of a 
widespread levy intended to help pay his debts to the VOC. The case of 
one man and his family, so indebted to the J ambi ruler that he fled in 
desperation to Palembang, is certainly not unusual. But the Palembang 
pangeran made similar demands on his people, taking trips to the inte-
rior with most of his court to collect outstanding debts and to forcibly 
buy up pepper at low prices. It is not surprising that a Minangkabau 
pepper trader in an eighteenth-century Lampung story advises his son 
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to cut wood or catch fish for sale ifhe needs capital, but "don't become 
indebted to the raja or to the Company."30 
The Chinese in J ambi suffered particularly from the deepening 
upstream and downstream tensions. Sometimes an entire district could 
be indebted to a Chinese who had in turn borrowed cloth or money 
from the Dutch or English or a member of the court to purchase pepper 
on credit. A list of twenty-eight indebted nobles in Jambi, for example, 
shows that although only seven were Chinese, they owed more than all 
the rest combined. 31 In 1642 the heir to the Jambi throne, Pangeran 
Dipati, in debt to the Dutch for 770 rials, claimed that "Jockie" (Orang 
Kaya Setia Utama, a wealthy shaven Chinese) owed him a large sum. 
In an attempt to regain these debts, Pangeran Dipati abducted Jockie 
from his home in the VOC compound. The Europeans responded to 
such measures by adopting similar tactics, seizing the property and 
slaves of Chinese traders as compensation for outstanding amounts. 
Dutch and English agents followed the Chinese upstream to call up 
debts, their collection techniques including even beatings by Company 
slaves. The Chinese were also pressed by the ruler and court nobles. 
Many a Chinese wife secretly hid her husband's belongings while he lay 
on his deathbed, and some suffered shocking tortures to make them 
reveal where their spouse's alleged wealth was hidden. 32 
Squeezed for payment for the cloth or money they had received on 
credit, the Chinese in turn applied pressure to their debtors. In 1635 the 
Minangkabau said they were afraid to come downstream to trade, in 
part because they were indebted to Chinese. Desperation sometimes 
gave rise to outright violence. A number of Chinese had taken up resi-
dence in upstream Jambi, and in 1639 several local Minangkabau 
planned an attack on their settlement in Kuamang. The attack itself 
was aborted, but the question of whether or not the action was justified 
divided the community; it was only settled when the ruler and his 
mother went upriver to supervise the punishment of those who had 
robbed the Chinese. The situation worsened as Europeans compelled 
"their" Chinese to call in debts owed by interior growers, for forced col-
lection simply encouraged the tendency to adulterate pepper or pick the 
crop too early. Furthermore, the use of Chinese as agents of European 
companies meant that whatever ties of family or friendship might have 
been established were subject to unprecedented strains. Anxious to pro-
tect their investments, the VOC even allocated some of their Chinese 
one or two slaves for protection. In a vain effort to stop the Europeans 
from employing Chinese, the pangeran forbade the latter to go up-
stream, claiming that the opium they offered for sale was impure. 33 
In Jambi increased European trade also fueled ulu-ilir tensions in 
other ways. When the Dutch and English first arrived in 1615, the 
authority of the local families who controlled interior districts was so 
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great that it was necessary to obtain their permission before crossing the 
boundaries. With the spread of pepper growing, the heads of certain 
appanages could sometimes be in receipt of greater income and in con-
trol of a larger population than the pangeran himself. One such area 
was Merangin, which was situated on a river that joined the Tembesi 
and had a long history of active trade. 34 By mid-century Merangin had 
become one of the principal pepper areas; although the Dutch popula-
tion estimate of two hundred thousand is almost certainly too high, it 
does indicate that this region was perceived as a more densely populated 
area than the capital, where the inhabitants numbered about four to 
five thousand. Merangin was under a royal cousin, the pangeran 
temenggung, who came to independent arrangements with the Dutch, 
employed his own agents to buy up pepper, and maintained a lifestyle 
very similar to that of the ruler. Possessing "almost the same power as 
the king," he was naturally unwilling to accept a position of subservi-
ence to the downstream court. 35 
Almost inevitably the wealth of Merangin aroused the envy of the 
Jambi ruler, and antagonisms became more apparent from 1663, when 
Pangeran Dipanegara, the son of the temenggung, took over the region 
on his father's death, assuming the same exclusive rights and extending 
his authority even into the Kerinci districts. When the J ambi pangeran 
attempted to place his own nominee in control of Merangin, the local 
people made clear their resistance; Pangeran Dipanegara, they said, 
was their lord, "of very high descent, possibly above the pangeran." 
Even the kubu of the deep jungle were willing to accept his mediation in 
disputes, and in the words of the VaG resident, "all the heathen and 
the people have submitted to him and will have no other."36 
Pangeran Dipanegara was eventually brought under the authority of 
the downstream court, not because he had been defeated in battle but 
because he owed substantial amounts to both the ruler and the Dutch. 
Pressed for repayment, he too began to use force; as a result, many of 
his subjects fled into Palembang and up to Minangkabau. Although 
Pangeran Dipanegara was able to meet some of his obligations by sell-
ing valued items for rials and by presenting the king with gold and sil-
verwork, eighty slaves, and four hundred buffalo, he was essentially 
pauperized. He was thus in no position to challenge the downstream 
ruler, and when the latter took over his debts, Pangeran Dipanegara in 
effect became a bondsman. 37 
Ulu resentment at this type of ilir exaction increased longstanding 
strains in other areas of the upstream-downstream relationship. The 
most accessible groups living along the main river, the so-called Batin 
Duabelas (the twelve batin groups) were subject to corvee duties, being 
required to appear at the capital whenever the ruler required workers, 
bringing their own food supplies. These occasions could be as varied as 
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a royal wedding or the preparation of ships to carry envoys to Batavia, 
but demands were obviously greatest when danger threatened. In 1642, 
for example, the J ambi pangeran sent nobles upstream to bring people 
down because he feared that Mataram might order Palembang to 
attack. It appears, however, that orders for corvee workers increased 
after the Dutch and English set up permanent posts in Jambi, and fol-
lowing the VOC move into Palembang in 1662. Not only were rulers 
anxious to ensure that the Europeans did not surpass them in terms of 
defenses or housing; the requests of the Europeans themselves also 
placed added burdens on local people. Any substantial building pro-
gram in the capital involved an expedition upstream because rattans 
and bamboo were difficult to obtain along the coast and because build-
ing woods like the serviceable medang, the durable tembusu, or the long-
lasting and prized ungling were not found in the ilir's swamp forests. 38 
The size of these trees made collection complicated, since they could be 
floated downriver only after the rains fell in October and November and 
the water level rose. In 1656, when the Jambi ruler promised to deliver 
eighty logs, forty people had to be sent "a hundred [Dutch] miles" 
away; they were not expected to return for two months. 39 It is not sur-
prising that in many folk stories, release from corvee duties in return for 
some service to the king is a common theme. 
In sum, the arrival of the Europeans and the growing demands for 
pepper encouraged the rulers of Jambi and Palembang to extend their 
control into the interior. In the process they gained access to resources 
that brought them great wealth, but for their ulu subjects it meant 
recurring ilir intrusion. In 1644, for example, the king of Palembang 
said he planned to send representatives upstream "with a written docu-
ment and a seal" to compel some of his subjects who were taking pepper 
out to the west coast of Sumatra to deliver their supplies to him. It was 
unlikely that villagers could read his orders, but the king's seal was reso-
nant with sacred powers; in the early nineteenth century the seal of the 
ruler of Palembang was said to be "the mark which the sultan had made 
to destroy all European might."40 A villager who opted to disobey royal 
commands could not therefore do so lightly. Further, the association 
with the Europeans, while stimulating demands for pepper, also pro-
vided ilir kings with access to a powerful new armory, regarded as a 
potent means of extracting compliance from upstream dwellers. Euro-
pean assistance in maintaining weapons and manufacturing ammuni-
tion was requested or recruited, and in Palembang in 1659 captured 
Dutchmen were being used against "rebellions in the mountains." Two 
years later de Goyer, the Jambi resident, gave his "father" muskets and 
ammunition to use against the "rebels" of Kuamang and himself 
accompanied the ruler upstream. In subsequent years Batavia received 
further requests for ammunition and gunpowder so that the pangeran 
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could "subdue his rebellious subjects." At the same time rulers made a 
concerted effort to prevent this new weaponry reaching the ulu, and a 
request from the English to sell saltpeter, essential for making gunpow-
der, in the J ambi interior was roundly refused. 41 
One strand of popular legend in Jambi and Palembang presents the 
ulu-ilir relationship as balanced between a distant but caring kinsman 
and his grateful and supportive relatives. Another strand, however, 
depicts the same association in terms of the abduction or ill-treatment of 
upstream women. Beneath this personalization lie real tensions that 
emerged in the economic environment of the seventeenth century as ilir 
kings, aiming to dominate the pepper trade, began to push deeper into 
the ulu. The author of the Hikayat Banjar, a text from southeast Borneo 
that appears to date from this period, had no doubt that in Sumatra the 
"vapors" exuded by pepper had undermined relations between the 
ruler and his interior subjects. From the king of Banjar comes the pro-
nouncement: 
Let people nowhere in this country grow pepper, as is done in J ambi and 
Palembang. Perhaps these countries grow pepper for the sake of money, in 
order to become wealthy. There is no doubt that in the end these countries 
will go to ruin. There will be much intrigue and food will become expen-
sive, for the vapors of pepper are hot and anything else planted will not 
grow very well. The government will be thrown into disorder because the 
rural population (orang sakai) will not think highly of the townsfolk (orang 
kota). The functionaries from the capital will not be respected by the people 
in the rural areas who grow pepper. . . . Let [the rural people 1 plant some 
ten or twenty plants only, just enough for private consumption .... Let it 
not be as inJambi and Palembang. 42 
Rivalry for Labor and Resources 
It is significant that the Hikayat Bar/Jar couples Palembang and J ambi 
together, for their rulers were not concerned merely with asserting their 
position in the ulu. They maintained another set of "accounts" that was 
also subject to constant scrutiny-the tallying of the relative strength of 
their kingdoms in terms of the extent of territory and people controlled. 
The rulers of Jambi and Palembang frequently proclaimed that they 
were "one," and indeed intermarriage meant that rulers and court 
nobles alike were essentially part of the same family. Yet embedded in 
this relationship was a rivalry that, though generally contained, always 
had the potential to expand into open hostility. Despite ideal depictions, 
any association between kin was shot through with contradictions. Par-
ents could as well be unjust as affectionate; a child rebellious, not obedi-
ent; a brother treacherous rather than loyal. On one level legends and 
genealogies thus record the ties that bound J ambi and Palembang; on 
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another, stories talk of unjustified raiding, the abduction of women and 
children, even the attempts of a Jambi queen to poison the Palembang 
ruler.43 In the economic context of the later seventeenth century, this 
darker side of the Jambi-Palembang relationship was to become 
increasingly apparent. 
In the ilir struggle to assert control in the ulu, Palembang had an 
advantage over Jambi because the Lematang, Ogan, and Komering 
rivers joined the Musi not far from the capital and thus provided several 
avenues to the interior. During the 1660s and 1670s the pepper areas of 
Komering were brought under Palembang's control, and Komering 
groups, greatly feared because of their reputation as headhunters, sub-
sequently formed an important component in its armies. 44 In J ambi, by 
contrast, the pepper-growing areas in ulu Tembesi, Merangin, and on 
the upper Batang Hari were some distance from the capital, and parts 
of Tembesi were actually closer to Palembang. But the fundamental dif-
ference in the geography of the two places was that the Batang Hari, 
unlike the Musi, flowed down from areas peopled by Minangkabau. 
PALEMBANG AND 
." LAMPUNG '06' 
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The Minangkabau of the upper Batang Hari were particularly sus-
ceptible to the kinds of tensions inherent in upstream-downstream deal-
ings because their ties with the ilir were so tenuous. Should they come 
downstream to trade, for example, they moved into an alien environ-
ment where they could well find themselves the target of the "privileged 
thieves" who frequented the capital. This group, also noted in Palem-
bang, consisted of poor, unattached youths who lived by theft, looting, 
and arson. Part of their booty was delivered up to their leader, normally 
a co.urt noble, and punishment came only if they were actually appre-
hended. It was probably one of this group who in 1625 robbed and 
wounded two or three Minangkabau in the J ambi capital. When it 
appeared no effort was made to bring the guilty to justice, other 
Minangkabau simply refused to come downstream. So serious was the 
situation that the pangeran's brother was sent to the interior as media-
tor. In addition, the Minangkabau sense of being outsiders must have 
been strengthened by the pangeran's insistence that they dress in the 
Javanese way if they appeared at court. In 1663 the Minangkabau of 
Tanjung and Kuamang roundly declared that they preferred to trade in 
Inderagiri, in part because there they could deal with a "Malay" king, 
whereas in Jambi there was "aJavanese ruler."45 
The Minangkabau also objected to the high tolls the J ambi pangeran 
charged them and to his attempt to force them to come downstream by 
forbidding sales to the ulu Chinese agents of the European companies. 
In response, royal envoys were sent to the interior to persuade the 
Minangkabau to come "as of old," and a meeting was held at Kuamang 
between Jambi representatives and "the greatest king of the Minangka-
bau, called Pagaruyung." None of these measures was successful in 
guaranteeing Minangkabau patronage; when the trading environment 
in J ambi was unsatisfactory, they persisted in carrying their pepper to 
Inderagiri and even as far as Palembang. 46 
J ambi kings had to use force judiciously along the upper Batang Hari 
because the area from Muara Tebo upward could effectively act as an 
independent economic unit. The border settlement of Tanjung was only 
fifteen days from Agam in the Minangkabau heartland, and Agam was 
three days from Padang on the west coast. Jungle paths provided good 
connections to these places, and riverine and overland routes also led 
out to Inderagiri and Johor, so that the area was sometimes called "little 
Melaka" because of its close links with the Malay-Minangkabau eco-
nomic network. During the dry season, when trade with the Jambi capi-
tal was cut off by the fall in the river level, Muara Tebo acted as an 
exchange point for gold coming down from Minangkabau; pepper from 
Tanjung, Kuamang, and Sumai; and cloth purchased from English and 
Indian traders in Johor and brought overland by Malay traders. 
Indeed, the interior was said to be better provided than Jambi proper, 
and the only items needed from the coast were iron and salt. The 
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Minangkabau of Tanjung and Kuamang even established their own toll 
gates, placing a rattan across access paths and demanding payment 
from Chinese and Javanese traders.47 
A fundamental impediment to the acceptance ofJambi authority was 
the Minangkabau view of the upstream Batang Hari as lying under 
Pagaruyung's jurisdiction. An individual with the title kiai ranga had 
been named in the Jujuhan district as Jambi's representative, but in 
1642 the "great king of Minangkabau, Pagaruyung" was reported to be 
collecting tribute there. There were thus clear problems about incorpo-
rating this self-contained territory, with large numbers of people whose 
loyalites lay elsewhere, into the Jambi "state." In 1650 disputes broke 
out once more, and once more the issue was the degree of control the ilir 
ruler could exert along the upper Batang Hari. The Jambi pangeran 
appointed two heads in the border districts, but they were accused of 
bad government, the opposition being led by four Minangkabau 
regents: Yang Muhammad Besar, Yang Muhammad Kecil, Raja 
Hitam, and Baginda Ratu. Governing in the name of Pagaruyung, 
they wielded tight economic control, together dominating the trade in 
iron and salt. 48 Intermittent hostilities continued for another decade, 
and in 1662 the ruler ofJambi again made the trip upstream in an effort 
to affirm his overlordship. He also made approaches to the Minangka-
bau ruler, who eventually decided to support Jambi's authority rather 
than that of the Minangkabau regents. J ambi and Minangkabau were 
to be like "one land," and the "kaiser" of Minangkabau said he wished 
to hear no more complaints from his "son," the Jambi ruler, about the 
behavior of Minangkabau along the upper Batang Hari. If such com-
plaints did come to his notice, the golden sword that he had sent to Yang 
Muhammad Besar would surely rise up and kill him. 49 
The disputes between local Minangkabau leaders and the down-
stream kings were not concerned merely with tolls or revenues or even 
with the developing gold trade of the upper Batang Hari, over which the 
Jambi ruler attempted to establish a monopoly in 1666. A more basic 
issue was the question of authority over human resources. If he could 
assert himself here, claimed the Jambi pangeran, he would be able to 
call six to eight thousand people his subjects. When local disputes 
caused a thousand individuals to flee upstream into the Minangkabau-
controlled districts, an envoy was sent up with a letter to one of the local 
"kings," Yang Muhammad Besar, demanding that those who had left 
Jambi be returned. The accompanying message attempted to draw on 
the entire arsenal of spiritual power that lay at the command of the 
pangeran, the future Sultan Agung. If the Minangkabau head should 
read the letter, hold it, wear the clothes or look at his image in the 
accompanying mirror that had been sent as gifts, "he would certainly 
die." Two imam were left in Tanjung as royal representatives to super-
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vise affairs and to make known the J ambi demand for payment of five-
eighths rial from each family. 50 
It was precisely this kind of demand that aroused the resentment of 
Minangakabau settlers and made Jambi overlordship less tenable, 
undermining the ruler's traditional position as mediator in his subjects' 
quarrels. There was frequent fighting among the estimated three hun-
dred villages along the upper Batang Hari, but downstream interven-
tion proved ineffective in bringing the quarrelling parties together. In 
1670 the Jambi ruler made a personal trip upstream to ask the 
, Minangkabau to cease fighting so that trade could be carried out, but 
disputes again broke out in Tanjung with Yang Muhammad Kecil and 
Raja Hitam supported by other Minangkabau groups from Inderagiri. 
At this point one powerful faction in the downstream court decided to 
exert force. Against the wishes of his old father, Pangeran Dipati Anum 
(later Sultan Anum Ingalaga; in this period effective ruler of Jambi) 
went upstream under pretext of taking a pleasure trip with his wives. 
Along the way he impressed an army, so that by the time he reached 
Tanjung he had a large force. Raja Hitam was put to flight and two 
border villages set on fire. 51 In the ongoing rivalry with Palembang for 
control over the interior, the Jambi ruler appeared to have gained a 
small but significant victory. 
But extension into the ulu was not the only way of increasing 
resources. Jambi and Palembang, like other areas of Southeast Asia, 
were always concerned with the need to expand their populations, and 
vacquisition of slaves was a well-established means of enlarging access to 
a pool of people who would work and fight for the ruler and enhance his 
general prestige. Both areas, indeed, enjoyed established reputations as 
lucrative exchange centers for slaves because of their links with local 
orang laut who, as well as delivering sea products, also roamed the sur-
rounding waters as raiders. Normally -a vessel under full sail was not a 
target, but any that foundered on the rocks or was caught in the shal-
lows was considered fair game, an offering from the spirits of the sea. It 
was customary, the Dutch were assured, for such ships and their cargoes 
to be taken by the sea people and brought to shore as legitimate booty. 
Captured crews would then be presented to the ruler or sold. But 
because of their proximity to one another, neither Jambi nor Palem-
bang had a monopoly over raiding in these waters. In 1629, for exam-
ple, a group of orang laut captured a Cambodian ship near Bangka. 
Some of those aboard were taken toJambi, and some to Palembang. 52 
The potentiality for rivalry in the acquisition of slaves increased with 
the growing wealth of the J ambi and Palembang courts as rulers and 
nobles vied to display their acquisitions of "women and girls from other 
countries"-India, Bali, Java, Makassar, and Banten-who were pur-
chased with pepper. Nor were such women simply decorative orna-
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ments. As a Dutch envoy noted, when "the ruler's maidens, bejewelled 
and adorned, enacted a play and danced for us, the king was well aware 
that this entertainment would swell his purse," for guests were expected 
to present the performers with a sum of money. 53 Lower down the scale 
female slaves were equally a worthwhile investment, carrying water, 
collecting firewood, and assisting in peddling. Encouraged by the atti-
tudes of the Europeans, for whom "slavinne" (female slave) was often a 
pseudonym for whore, owners increasingly sought to gain an additional 
source of income by selling rather than gifting the sexual services of 
their attractive women. 
The demand for slaves was greatest and competition the most keen, 
however, in the pepper trade. Because local populations were frequently 
reluctant to take on the backbreaking physical work required to clear 
the jungle for new pepper gardens, rulers resorted to forced labor-
slavery-to respond to the expanding world market. By the mid-seven-
teenth century the abundance of cheap textiles reaching the interior 
made ulu growers less willing to accept cloth in exchange for their pep-
per; their preference was for rials or slaves, both male and female. The 
value of human labor in turn meant that raiders became bolder and 
their hunting grounds more extensive, and here J ambi appeared to be 
the leader as its orang laut attacked isolated settlements and small 
native ships plying the trade routes between the north coast of Java and 
the Melaka Straits. They were even making sweeps as far north as 
Ujung Salang, where the pangeran justified attacks because the people 
were not Muslim. A normal expedition undertaken by about twenty 
perahu could carry back about a hundred people, but at times the num-
ber could be much greater; in 1669 an estimated twenty-five hundred 
slaves were captured in J ambi raids. 54 These captives, usually other 
orang laut groups or coastal dwellers, supplied the unskilled labor for 
the lower end of the market, often costing only about eight rials each. 
There was a ready market for the numerous women and children 
taken in these raids, since they could perform many of the lighter tasks 
connected with pepper cultivation. The greatest demand, however, was 
for "strong young men," and it was generally agreed that the best male 
slaves came from Buton and Sulawesi, notably Mandar and the Bugisl 
Makassar areas. Extensive wars here had opened up new sources for 
slaves, with traders drawing on those captured in raids or made pris-
oner after some battle. 55 Because of its established trading links with 
Makassar, Palembang was well able to hold its own in competition with 
Jambi, and by the 1660s slaves were the main trading item brought by 
Bugis and Makassar ships. About eight vessels arrived annually from 
Makassar, each bringing approximately forty slaves to be sold in a pub-
lic market in exchange for pepper, cloth, or gold. Prices were variable, 
with children costing as little as 3.75 rials each and the cheapest adults 
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about eight. These captives were usually raided from the islands of east-
ern Indonesia such as Solor and Timor and were commonly regarded as 
unintelligent, presumably because they could not understand Malay; " 
they were also more vulnerable to disease. By contrast, the "strong 
young Bugis" who could help clear jungle tracts or carry several bags of 
pepper each weighing sixty kati (roughly 37.5 kilograms) were worth 
between thirty and forty rials. In a buoyant market a Makassar trader 
with a cargo of slaves could expect to make between 30 and 50 percent 
profit on his venture. 56 
Palembang's slave trade with Makassar was actively encouraged by V 
its pangeran, from the 1670s entitled Sultan Abdul Rahman, who sent 
missions to Buton and Makassar to buy up slaves, sometimes as many 
as two hundred at a time. At home he insisted on having first choice of 
any cargo brought by Malays and Makassar traders, and these slaves 
were then sent upstream with a few supervisers. Ultimately most would 
have been absorbed into local society; in the pepper-growing area of 
Komering, for example, they became part of a slave culture, with their 
own genealogies and their own poyang, the slave of the ancestor of the 
Komering peopleY Like Jambi, however, Palembang suffered a set-
back in its acquisition of slaves after 1669, when the Dutch assumed 
overlordship of Sulawesi. Unwilling to see a drain of manpower from 
Sulawesi and anxious to exclude Bugis and Makassarese from the 
Sumatran pepper trade, the VOC actively discouraged links between 
these areas. Although Jambi and Palembang were still visited by 
Makassar ships, the supply of human labor was far less than before. But 
Palembang depended on "slaves and stolen people" for pepper grow-
ing, and this interference by the Dutch prompted Sultan Abdul 
Rahman to write to Batavia asking for permission to purchase slaves 
freely "because he desires to see pepper growing improve." At the same /, 
time his own raiders became more aggressive, and Palembang fleets ~/ 
were reported to be raiding as far afield as Borneo. 58 
An alternative means of acquiring labor was through the extension of ;:::' 
territory, and in this regard Palembang rulers had another advantage 
over J ambi because of the proximity of several offshore islands, notably 
Bangka. Occupied by orang laut groups along the coast and "mountain "I 
people" in the interior, Bangka had been under Japara during the six- I< 
teenth century. Subsequently, both Johor and Palembang had tried to 
extend their control over the coasts adjacent to their own. But Johor's 
interest appears to have been relatively slight, and its rulers apparently 
did not object when the pangeran of Palembang asserted his suzerainty 
over the island in the early seventeenth century. When the Dutch 
arrived in Palembang in 1616 the head of Bangka, married to the 
daughter of the Palembang king, was among the royal party that 
greeted them. 59 
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Palembang's claims over Bangka were to have long-term implica-
,f tions. vac officials understood that this marriage had brought Bangka 
under Palembang's overlordship, but it is apparent that the relationship 
was fraught with tension. Although the people of Bangka lacked the 
bargaining position of the pepper- and rice-growing communities of the 
interior, they clearly resisted the intrusion of Palembang authority. 
Prominent in this opposition was the head of Bangka himself. Forced 
acquiescence in marriage alliances would have served to fuel rather 
than allay hostility, and in 1642 the heads of Bangka said that they had 
once had their own king, Urata, who had married a Palembang prin-
cess but had been put to death. 60 
In this context, Palembang's control could only be maintained by 
force. For more than thirty years periodic raids were mounted against 
f Bangka, with orang laut loyal to Palembang guiding well-armed fleets 
through the surrounding reefs. When captured, leaders of local resist-
ance met harsh punishment, and their followers were transported to 
Palembang as slaves. In desperation Bangka heads appealed to Banten, 
Johor, and Jambi for help; but in the end it was the vac that 
responded, concerned at rumors of French and British interest in the 
area. Perceiving Bangka as a potential exchange center, in July and 
August 1668 the Dutch signed treaties with the Bangka chiefs that 
promised the latter vac protection. 61 
'rl 
Despite assurances that this association would last "as long as sun 
and moon shone," Dutch interest in Bangka soon waned. The island 
remained at the mercy of Palembang slave raids, which Sultan Abdul 
Rahman said were a punishment for appeals to his old enemy Banten. 62 
Although the sultan took a daughter of the principal Bangka head as a 
wife, attacks on the offshore islands continued. Settlements on Belitung 
that refused to submit were destroyed in 1673, and two years later 
another force of two thousand men was sent there. An alliance between 
Banten and Palembang in 1677 deprived the leaders of Bangka and 
Belitung of any alternative source of support, and when the Dutch 
described the islands in 1683, the coasts were virtually depopulated. 
Most of the local inhabitants had been deported to Palembang to work 
in the pepper gardens; those who managed to escape the periodic raid-
ing parties had fled to the mountains. 63 
Jambi rulers must have been particularly conscious of Palembang's 
subjugation of Bangka and Belitlmg because it heightened the dispari-
ties in the human resources each controlled. Despite Minangkabau 
migration into the interior, Jambi had far fewer subjects than Palem-
bang, and in 1627, at a time when Aceh appeared most threatening, the 
downstream capital could apparently muster a defensive force of only 
sixty ships and about seventeen hundred men. 64 But although there 
were no large islands offJambi's coast, there were adjacent areas of eco-
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nomic importance, relatively well populated, where its kings could look 
for labor and economic resources. The most important of these was 
V'Tungkal, which adjoined J ambi 's northern boundary and which pro-
vided access to the Minangkabau areas via the Sumai and Inderagiri 
rivers. It was thus linked to the Muara Tebo exchange network that 
stretched across to the rich pepper-growing area of the Tembesi, tying 
together Johor at one end and Minangkabau at the other. 65 
v' Tungkal, however, was very different from Bangka. Any moves by 
Jambi into this strategically placed area were bound to be problematic 
because J ohor exercised a loose sovereignty here, probably dating from 
Melaka times. Legends collected in the area depict the first head of 
Tungkal as a long-lost son of the Johor ruler, his marriage to a Jambi 
princess occurring only with J ohor' s approval. Memories of the strong 
ties between Tungkal and Johor are echoed in the written records. In 
1623 Sultan Hamid ofJohor died, leaving a widow, who was a princess 
from Jambi, and a small son. This widow fled back to her family in 
J ambi, where it was widely expected that she would receive as a source 
of income either the island of Linggi or the district of Tungkal. 66 It is not 
clear whether this eventuated, but sometime before 1630 Jambi was 
said to have "taken" Tungkal. Johor's ruler, Sultan Abdul Jalil (r. 
1623-1677), demanded its return and sent a fleet of ships to enforce his 
suzerainty. Subsequently a compromise was reached whereby it was 
decided that at some future time a J ohor princess was to be married to 
the pangeran of Jambi. When such a marriage took place, she would 
take twelve villages with her as a dowry. In 1657 the Jambi pangeran 
told the Dutch that he had indeed acquired these villages through his 
Johor wife "a long time ago."67 
These arrangements did not meet with the approval of many Tungkal 
people, and a number of villages demanded that they be returned to 
their "rightful" lord, the ruler ofJohor. In 1659 an attempt was made 
to reach a solution through a royal marriage by arranging a union 
between the pangeran's daughter, "a beautiful fair Indian woman" and 
the raja muda ofJohor, whose mother was herselffromJambi. The vil-
lages in contention were to revert to Johor as a bridal gift, thus bowing 
to the wishes of local people and yet saving Jambi's honor. Soon after 
the wedding, faced by difficulties at home in Johor, the raja muda left 
Jambi, promising to return in a short time to collect his bride. Five 
years after the wedding, however, he had still not returned, and there 
was no child as evidence the marriage had even been consummated. 
Soon afterward, the raja muda was betrothed to a daughter of a power-
ful J ohor minister, the laksamana. 68 
The sense of insult in J ambi was extreme, but the ruler hesitated to 
resort to warfare. 69A meeting between the ruler of Jambi and the raja 
muda of J ohor at Lingga in 1666 was unsuccessful in resolving the dis-
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pute, however, and Dutch attempts to mediate were equally fruitless. 
As a result, from March 1667 Johor fleets began to raid up the Jambi 
River, attacking scattered settlements, burning fruit trees and houses, 
and capturing prisoners. Feelings of grievance and hostility in Jambi 
were further inflamed when the princess at the center of the dispute 
died. 70 The conviction that she had been poisoned by Johor agents gave 
rise to renewed calls for revenge. Tungkal, where control was already 
contended, was a prime target for Jambi raids. Any previous arrange-
ments reached by marriage were set at naught as hundreds of people 
were carried off from Tungkal as well as Inderagiri, to be distributed 
among the Jambi ruler and his nobles. Nonetheless, the gains Jambi 
made were ephemeral. By 1695, although Tungkal was expected to be 
neutral in disputes, it was acknowedged to be under Johor, and raids 
there by the J ambi ruler were considered an affront. 71 
Jambi's enmity with Johor ultimately contributed to the economic 
decline of the downstream port and was thus a critical factor in the 
Palembang-Jambi "balance sheet." At first, however, it appeared as if 
Jambi would triumph, primarily because of the support of loyal orang 
laut. In the nineteenth century legend still remembered that the head of 
/ the sea people had been adopted by the great hero Orang Kaya Hitam 
as a brother, entrusted with the state kris, Si Genjai, and given the right 
to raid along the Jambi-Palembang coast. Seventeenth-century Dutch 
sources support stories of the high position once accorded orang laut 
leaders, for prominent raiders were known to act as captains of royal 
trading vessels and were linked by marriage to highly placed individuals 
in the court. 72 During this period the best example of such a person is an 
1/ orang laut chief named Long Pasir, held in such esteem by Sultan 
Agung that he was given one of the royal gundik. As a renowned raider, 
he was in a position to reciprocate and reinforce the ruler's favors by 
sharing part of his booty. In one raid on Inderagiri, for example, he 
brought back to Jambi four hundred orang laut and sixty Johorese as 
prisoners; on another occasion he presented a Chinese woman he had 
captured to the royal harem. 73 
I i As Long Pasir's raids spread over an area that included the entire Melaka Straits and stretched out to Borneo, Bali, and Sulawesi, his 
booty and the share enjoyed by the ruler increased proportionately. 
Attracting a number of orang laut followers from J ohor, he even began 
to attack European vessels. A female escapee from one of his raids 
reported that he had burned "a tall kafir" alive, and from time to time 
European clothes were brought to the vac lodge as evidence of Long 
Pasir's boldness. Sultan Agung's patronage allowed him to operate 
almost with impunity; and when his men set upon two vac people 
near the lodge, the resident considered the fine imposed far too light. 
Nonetheless, it gives an idea of the kind ofresources at the disposal of a 
successful raider, for he was ordered to pay 425 rials, 385 to the 
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pangeran and 40 to the wounded men. 74 Long Pasir and his orang laut 
probably played an important role in guiding the J ambi fleet through 
the treacherous waters of the Riau archipelago in 1673. During the sub-
sequent J ambi attack, the J ohor capital on Riau was looted and burned 
in a wave of vengeance for real and imagined wrongs. More than sev-
enty ships left J ambi, with an estimated two thousand men; they 
returned with more than two hundred vessels as well as guns and booty. 
Thirty-five hundred people had been made captive, and forty slaves 
were delivered to Sultan Agung. 75 
Nonetheless, Jambi's retention of authority over its orang laut was 
always fragile. Despite their links with local courts, men like Long Pasir 
were never totally subservient and frequently acted as independent 
agents who carried on their own private war of raid and counterraid. 
Emotional and cultural ties between the sea people and a land-based 
king could be deep and lasting, yet for most orang laut leaders continu-
ing acknowledgment of overlordship was bound up with the ruler's abil- . 
ity to extend periodic rewards-gifts, titles, women-in return for the 
booty they offered him as tribute. But by the 1670s Jambi's ability to 
generate the economic benefits that could make its ruler's authority 
attractive was shrinking, largely as a result of Johor raids on its 
seaborne trade. Normally forty Javanese ships would come annually 
with salt and rice, but in 1667 only sixteen had appeared; in conse-
quence the price of rice on the J ambi market increased markedly. 76 Dur- ~. 
ing the next three years Johor orang laut had continually raided the 
J ambi River, three hundred perahu launching a particularly devastat-
ing attack in November 1670. Several hundred people were carried off, 
and houses and rice fields were destroyed. Repercussions of this raiding 
were also felt in the interior, for the threat to J ambi seemed so great that 
boys as young as twelve years old were called downstream to help con-
struct and man defenses. 77 
Since Jambi's economy was already contracting because of falling 
pepper prices and European efforts to control the imports of cloth, the 
defeat ofJohor in 1673 proved no panacea. It was not long before diffi-
culties developed in the partnership between Sultan Agung and Long 
Pasir. The J ambi king could exercise little control over the manner in 
which his "kinsman" carried out raids, and it was claimed that Long 
Pasir's crews even raped women in front of their husbands, who were 
tied up and made to watch. Although Sultan Agung, pressured by the 
Dutch, did have one offender put to death, it may have been Long 
Pasir's refusal to render the Jambi court adequate booty that ultimately 
caused him to lose favor. Captured by Johor raiders in 1674, he was 
without a patron and was condemned to a lingering and painful death. 78 
For many people, however, even revenge of this nature would not have 
expunged the bitter memories of raids carried out inJambi's name. 
With its maritime trade declining it was vital for J ambi to retain con-
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trol over the pepper areas in the interior. Almost inevitably, however, 
this involved conflict with Palembang because some of the largest pep-
per districts lay along the Tembesi River, which flowed down from the 
hills along the Jambi-Palembang border. Vlu Tembesi lay somewhat 
closer to Palembang than to Jambi, being about eight days' travel from 
the former and up to twelve from the latter. It was thus one of those 
shadow districts that could maintain links with the two downstream 
centers simultaneously. About 1623, however, J ambi had gained some 
advantage there because a number of Tembesi villages had been part of 
the dowry of the Palembang princess Ratu Mas when she had married 
Pangeran Gede ofJambi. Today Tembesi's position as part ofJambi is 
affirmed by a legendary marriage between the great Orang Kaya 
Hitam and the daughter of the raja of Tembesi, but memories of earlier 
ties with Palembang can also be traced in oral tradition. A story col-
lected forty years ago about the origin of the people in the Tembesi 
region relates how "there was once a Palembang princess called Ratu 
Ibu, and she married a Jambi prince." On their return journey to 
J ambi, people along the way learned that a Palembang princess was 
passing and came in crowds to make obeisance. When she left, many 
, / followed her to Jambi. "These people are now called the orang suku 
V pindah" (the moving clans). 79 
The implications of these shifting loyalties can be traced in the 
archival records, for by 1631 it was already apparent that the Palem-
bang pangeran had not relinquished his claims to the area. Reported to 
be sending envoys, letters, and gifts to persuade the Tembesi people to 
give their allegiance to him, he also made a veiled threat to "come and 
visit and totally ruin them" should they refuse to place themselves 
under his overlordship. Yet the evidence suggests that Jambi's efforts to 
strengthen its hold in Tembesi were even more intrusive. By the 1640s a 
number of districts were rebelling against Jambi rule, and in 1655 the 
occupants of seven villages sought protection under Palembang. 
Although several well-armed ships had been sent up to forestall such 
defections, the Jambi ruler feared the movement to Palembang could 
continue. The Dutch blockade of Palembang in 1659 saw fifteen hun-
dred people fleeing back to J ambi, but with the restoration of peace, the 
Palembang ruler once again began to assert his authority. As the 
English factor in Jambi put it, "The ulu people under the king of 
Palembang invaded the ulu people under the king of Tembesi. They 
burnt five or six dozens [villages 1 and have taken the affrighted people 
away." 80 
If war over Tembesi was to be averted, it was essential for kinship 
links between Jambi and Palembang to be restated. In 1670 Pangeran 
Adipati Anum of J ambi married a daughter of the ruler of Palembang. 
At the same time the Palembang crown prince and his brother 
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(Pangeran Dipati and Pangeran Aria) married two Jambi princesses, 
and as part of the arrangement Palembang gave J ambi a large number 
of people. However, the marriage between Pangeran Anum and his 
Palembang wife proved as unsuccessful as that between his sister and 
the raja muda of Johor, and the results were as far-reaching. Again the 
problem was neglect of a high-ranking woman. At the time of his 
betrothal in 1670, Pangeran Anum already had a concubine, a former 
Bugis slave known as To Ayo. He was so infatuated with her that he had 
sworn to "live and die" with her at his side, and during the betrothal 
ceremonies he deliberately paraded his "Bugis whore," as a later co-
wife called her, before the Palembang court. The marriage to the 
Palembang princess was duly solemnized but not consummated, and a 
year later she was still a virgin. Her father, Palembang's Sultan Abdul 
Rahman, refused to allow his daughter to leave for Jambi, insisting that 
her husband should instead come and live with her. The following year 
Pangeran Anum was finally persuaded to leave To Ayo and visit his 
wife, but he did not stay long, claiming he needed to return to Jambi 
because of the threatened J ohor attack. The real reason, said people in 
Palembang, was that "he wished to be with his beloved To Ayo." Now 
he no longer spoke to his wife except through the medium of other noble 
women, sending her instead gifts such as expensive cloth and even one 
of his bastard sons to rear. The implication that this was in effect 
"their" child was too much for his wife to bear. Angrily she sent the boy 
back, demanding that her husband come and live with her.81 
In the context of increased economic competition, the breakdown of 
this marriage precipitated a major crisis in J ambi-Palembang relations. 
The ruler ofJambi, the revered Sultan Agung, was obviously distressed 
at his son's behavior and made a special trip to Palembang, where he 
begged that the friendship between the two states be maintained, at 
least during his lifetime. With his counsel and the mediation of the 
"great women" of the court, a compromise was reached. It was 
arranged that the girl should be married off quietly to another son of 
Sultan Agung, a raden by a Chinese gundik, and that she would in 
addition receive a double dowry "so that her relatives would not be 
estranged." But while Pangeran Anum agreed to the divorce, he flatly 
refused to permit his former wife to marry his half-brother. 82 
Only the great prestige of Sultan Agung, as the senior kinsman in 
Palembang-Jambi's royal clan, prevented the outbreak of war. After all, 
Sultan Abdul Rahman was not likely to forget that in 1662 he had come 
to power primarily through Jambi support. In the wake of the marriage 
crisis, Sultan Agung stayed for some time at the Palembang court, 
instructing his nephew in the making of muskets. Their relations were 
so close it was even rumored the Palembang ruler intended to give "his 
crown and kingdom" to J ambi, and he willingly agreed to allow Sultan t/ 
104 Accounts and Reckonings 
Agung to take command of negotiations for a new treaty with the vac. 
But the old king's efforts to restore the balance between the two king-
doms were undermined by his son Pangeran Anum, whose disregard 
for the sensitivities of the Palembang court was demonstrated shortly 
afterward when he raised his Bugis wife, the former slave To Ayo, to 
royal consort with the preeminent title of ratu mas. 83 
Against this background the death of Sultan Agung and the loss of his 
mediating influence in September 1679 removed the only obstacle to 
full-scale war. The search for manpower gained a new urgency, finding 
an answer in the large numbers of Makassarese who were now fleeing 
from Sulawesi following the combined Bugis-Dutch defeat of Goa in 
1669. 84 Both Palembang and J ambi were logical places of refuge since 
southeast Sumatra had long been frequented by Sulawesi traders. Early 
in the sixteenth century Tome Pires had noted the trading connection 
between Palembang and Makassar, and more than a hundred years 
later the numbers of ships arriving annually was so great that the Dutch 
ordered much of their cloth according to Makassarese preferences. In 
1671 the ruler of Palembang was actively recruiting Bugis and Makas-
sarese, who now took a more obvious place in the Palembang court, 
serving in his guard, acting as his "pressers" (parties of men who made 
forcible recruitments), and abducting any unprotected slaves in return 
for royal recompense. 85 
Jambi's connections with Makassar were even stronger, mainly 
because their royal families were closely related. Pangeran Anum's 
mother was herself from Makassar, and in 1663 envoys had been sent to 
Goa to confirm their friendship and to request the despatch to J ambi of 
"pretty Makassar women in order to increase the number of Makas-
sarese." In addition to his beloved To Ayo, Pangeran Anum had also 
taken a Makassarese lady as an "absolute wife." Following Makassar's 
defeat by the Dutch in 1669, he thus extended a welcoming hand to the 
refugees who soon began arriving in the western archipelago. When 
Karaeng Fatimah, daughter of the deposed Makassar ruler, was 
divorced by the ruler of Banten, Pangeran Anum (now called Sultan 
Anum Ingalaga) asked for her hand. They were formally married in 
1678, and because of her prestigious parentage, Karaeng Fatimah was 
soon made Jambi's senior queen. In consequence, efforts to attract 
more Makassar settlers were increased. The pandita muda (deputy reli-
gious leader), one of Jambi's principal imams, was a Minangkabau 
from Makassar; his brother personally returned to Sulawesi to issue 
invitations to Makassarese to settle in J ambi. Any Makassarese of high 
birth was made welcome. 86 
Jambi appeared to have scored a major victory over Palembang in 
the competition for manpower when Karaeng Fatimah's brother, 
Daeng Mangika, the highest-ranking of all the refugee Makassar 
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princes, arrived in Jambi in 1679. Sultan Ingalaga welcomed his 
brother-in-law in a public meeting, and their relationship was forma-
lized by the swearing of an oath that bound them together as brothers 
"until eternity." Daeng Mangika was honored by a new name, 
Pangeran Sutadilaga, and it was arranged that he should be of the 
"same grade" as the Jambi king. They also agreed that Daeng Mangi-
ka's followers would stand outside Jambi law and be free from heavy 
corvee and exactions by the J ambi court. 87 
Jambi's apparent achievement in attracting such a prestigious prince 
and his very considerable force raised unforeseen problems. While such 
large numbers of Bugis and Makassarese migrants appeared to meet a , 
need for manpower, in many respects they were a destabilizing influ-
ence. To the increasing incidence of independent Bugis-Makassar raid-
ing'was added the question of jurisdiction, since many of these newcom-
ers had taken service under the ruler of Jambi but still had ties with 
their even more nobly born leaders. Because their allegiance was 
divided, it was difficult to absorb them into the existing political struc-
ture, and in Jambi this issue brought the growing antagonism between 
the two "brothers" to a head. Sultan Ingalaga's claim that any Makas-
sarese indebted to him was a J ambi subject was completely rejected by 
Daeng Mangika, who offered compensation instead. When Sultan 
f' 
Ingalaga refused to accept this, about 160 of his Makassarese guard 
deserted him, placing themselves under Daeng Mangika. 88 
The open rift between Sultan Ingalaga and Daeng Mangika coin-
cided with renewed hostility between Johor and Jambi, and in May and 
June 1679 three hundred Johor perahu appeared in the Jambi River. 
Although Sultan Abdul Rahman of Palembang felt obliged to help his 
relative, he sent merely a token force, which meant that Sultan Ingala-
ga's only hope of effective resistance lay in Makassarese support. In the 
event, however, Daeng Mangika and his men went over wholesale to 
the enemy. This combined force inflicted a resounding defeat on Jambi, 
in the process laying bare the vulnerability of the Jambi-Makassarese 
alliance. From the J ambi point of view, Daeng Mangika was a traitor. 
"I treated him like a brother," said Sultan Ingalaga, "but he allied with 
Johor." Daeng Mangika, for his part, wrote to tell his relatives in Bata- V 
via of how the J ambi ruler had betrayed their agreement and dealt with 
him not as a king but as a "mere governor." The loyalties of Makassar ~/ 
women were also torn, but Karaeng Fatimah remained loyal to her 
Jambinese husband. 89 The Dutch watched aghast as the invading forces 
set fire to the English post adjacent to their own and killed its captain. \I 
The Chinese section of J ambi was also burned and looted, and many V' 
wealthy homes robbed. Even orang laut women weaving kaJang (palm- ~i 
frond) mats for sale to the vac fell victim to the raiders. Trade with the 
ulu ground to a halt, and fearing for their lives, the Dutch and the 
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remaining English who had fled for safety to the VaG lodge decided to 
leave. Shortly afterward, with whatever goods they could carry, the ter-
rified Europeans put to sea and in a few days arrived in Palembang. In 
September 1679 Jan van Leene was sent to Jambi to salvage the VOG 
goods that had not been looted, to close down the lodge, and to bring 
back to Batavia any Makassarese still remaining. When he arrived he 
found that many, including Daeng Mangika, had already left of their 
own volition for nearby ports such as Palembang. 90 
Daeng Mangika's appearance in Palembang came at a critical point. 
Jambi's defeat by Johar had coincided with the death of Sultan Agung, 
who had been crucial in maintaining the fragile balance with Palem-
bang. His son's succession as Sultan Anum Ingalaga simply served to 
rekindle old resentments. Supported by his royal women, Sultan Abdul 
Rahman of Palembang openly declared his intention of attacking J ambi 
to avenge his daughter's "dishonorable" divorce. When the Jambi ruler 
committed the unpardonable crime of killing a Palembang envoy, Sul-
tan Abdul Rahman declared he could endure no more. The Dutch resi-
dent remarked that the queen in particular was "so opposed to Jambi 
that on several occasions she has advised her two sons (Pangeran Aria 
and Pangeran Dipati) to divorce their Jambi wives."91 
So great were the wrongs the royal family of Palembang had suffered 
that any equilibrium could be restored only by revenge. At a time when 
Palembang forces were clashing with J ambi along the downstream bor-
der river of Lalang and when orang laut from Johar and Jambi fleets 
were attacking Sungsang, the arrival of Daeng Mangika with a thou-
sand people appeared to supply Palembang with a ready army. Daeng 
Mangika himself had personal reasons for hostility toward Sultan Inga-
laga, for he too felt resentment at the treatment accorded him and felt 
bound to avenge the death of his uncle, who had been killed in the fight-
ing against Johor. He and Pangeran Aria (Sultan Abdul Rahman's sec-
ond son) swore an oath of brotherhood, and by October they had gath-
ered around them a further three thousand people and more than fifty 
ships. Daily more Bugis and Makassarese were reported to be arriving 
from Banten.92 In late 1680 a fleet of about eighty Palembang and 
Makassar ships under the joint command of Daeng Mangika and 
Pangeran Aria set out for Jambi. Another force led by several nobles 
left for the interior with the object of attacking from upriver and repel-
ling J ambi raids along the border. 
Facing this imminent invasion, Sultan Ingalaga solicited support 
from his old enemy, Johar, promising to accept its overlordship in 
return for assistance. The VOG stayed neutral, despite requests for aid; 
Johar honored its promise, however, and a fleet of more than fifty well-
armed vessels sailed to help the Jambi king. The arrival of another hun-
dredJtltbor ships and two thousand men in May 1681 tipped the balance 
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against the Palembang-Makassar forces. Sultan Ingalaga was able to 
stage an unexpected resistance, personally leading an assault in which 
Daeng Mangika was mortally wounded, together with a number of 
Palembang leaders and several hundred of their followers. About seven 
thousand men eventually limped back home. 93 
The degree of hostility that now prevailed in Palembang-J ambi rela-
tions far eclipsed the antagonisms of earlier disputes. Johor's alliance 
with J ambi was openly proclaimed by royal marriages bonding their 
rulers as brothers, and Johor and Jambi orang laut continued to raid ,../' 
Palembang's downstream areas, on one occasion capturing about four 
hundred people. Sultan Abdul Rahman, however, would not concede 
defeat, and while his forces laid siege to Jambi from upstream, he 
appealed to the Dutch to mediate. In April 1681 Batavia dispatched a 
small expedition under the leadership of Franc;ois Tack to negotiate a 
peace between the hostile parties. Sultan Abdul Rahman then accepted 
a contract by which he agreed to deliver up all Makassar and Bugis peo-
ple; to extend the vac monopoly to include opium and Javanese cloth 
as well as Indian textiles; and finally to relinquish to the Company juris-
diction over all foreign traders, including the Chinese. 94 
Tack's primary concern was to oversee what he termed a "brotherly j, 
peace" between Palembang and Jambi in order to see a return to profit-
able trade. The main disagreement concerned the disputed jurisdiction 
over Tembesi, where a number of villages had passed back and forth as 
part of successive marriage settlements. Invoking the notion of an ideal 
equilibrium, Tack called on the language he felt would be most persua-
sive, telling both rulers that "if two brothers quarrel, both are guilty." 
The Jambi envoys, however, argued forcibly that Palembang was not so 
much a brother but a son, for Sultan Abdul Rahman had been placed 
on his throne by his uncle, Sultan Agung. On this occasion he had pre-
sented several Tembesi villages to Jambi as a token of gratitude. 95 
In putting forward this argument the J ambi court obviously expected 
vac sympathy because of their years of association and Sultan 
Agung's previous services to his "brother," the governor general in 
Batavia. They were soon disillusioned, for Dutch interests militated 
against supporting J ambi's claims of senior status. By this time Palem-
bang's pepper-delivering capacity appeared much more promising than 
did Jambi's, and Sultan Abdul Rahman had in addition agreed to pay 
22,500 rijksdaalders toward the costs of the vac expedition. Despite 
the avowed Dutch stance of neutrality, the resulting contract of August-
September 1681 was weighted in Palembang's favor in accordance with 
the vac's aim of restoring a balance between the two. Ten disputed 
villages were to revert to Palembang; any Palembang captives taken by 
Jambi raiders were also to be returned to Palembang; and Sultan Inga-
laga was required to give the Palembang ruler some compensation. 96 
/ 
/ 
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Predictably, this new treaty increased Sultan Ingalaga's sense of 
grievance toward a relative who seemed to have unfairly ingratiated 
himself in Dutch favor. He considered, he said, that if he did not seek 
revenge against Palembang "he would no longer be worthy to bear the 
name of sultan." Early in 1682 he was already preparing his warships 
for battle and amassing supplies of ammunition obtained from Siam, 
whence he had despatched the gold and silver flowers (bunga mas dan 
perak), the traditional symbol of vassalage. In March 1683 an army of 
about two thousand men gathered to recite Jambi's grievances against 
Palembang and to swear their loyalty and determination to gain venge-
ance. 97 The following month Sultan Ingalaga personally led a fleet that 
attacked and burned the orang laut village of Sungsang at the mouth of 
the Musi River. Farther upstream other invading groups from Jambi 
captured or killed numbers of people busy planting padi along the river-
banks. Simultaneously fighting broke out in the interior as Jambi and 
Palembang both sought to confirm their position in the Rawas-Tembesi 
area. Anxious to forestall possible intervention from Arung Palakka, 
the overlord of Sulawesi, to whom Sultan Abdul Rahman had appealed 
for help, Batavia again intervened. In July 1683 it was decided to send 
troops to Sumatra in defense of the 1681 treaty, together with a negotia-
tor to bring the disputing parties together. In September, using a com-
bination of threat and persuasion, the commissioner Willem Hartsinck 
finally induced Sultan Abdul Rahman of Palembang and Sultan Inga-
laga of J ambi to sign agreements of mutual peace" on the kris and the 
Koran." One essential element, however, was missing; in the aftermath 
of the VaC-initiated treaties no marriage was concluded to mark the 
return of brotherhood, for the Dutch believed that "the familiarity and 
blood ties between these two kingdoms are not good for the honorable 
Company." 98 
The apparent resolution of the protected quarrels of the 1670s and 
1680s and the English decision to abandon J ambi encouraged Batavia 
to believe that its pepper monopoly would now be unchallenged. But 
the vac's commercial goals were based on the assumption that the ilir 
would be able to dominate the interior, an assumption that stemmed 
from a fundamental misunderstanding of the upstream-downstream 
association. Always fragile, this relationship had been subjected to fresh 
strains during the course of the seventeenth century as a result of more 
frequent ilir intrusions and the commercial demands the European 
presence had introduced. To revert to the images with which this chap-
ter opened, it was becoming increasingly difficult to view the king as a 
distant but benevolent kinsman and to balance a cultural ledger that tal-
lied the ruler-subject relationship in terms of favors extended and obli-
gations incurred. 
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Meanwhile, continuing competition between Palembang and Jambi 
was intensified as they vied to gain control over people and territory, 
especially in the lucrative pepper districts. The involvement of Johor 
coupled with the arrival of Makassar and Bugis refugees in the area 
expanded the potentialities for conflict, and when war finally broke out 
the Dutch moved in quickly as mediators, hoping to protect their eco-
nomic interests. Yet the image of an undisturbed equanimity between 
Palembang and J ambi was also a chimera. Their brotherhood was 
rooted in rivalry, and without a restatement of the ancient links that had 
drawn them into a sometimes hostile but nonetheless binding associa-
tion, the apparent balance between them was bound to be short-lived. 
As the seventeenth century drew to a close, vac efforts to discourage 
their relationship combined with other factors to shape a commercial 
environment in which the scales were permanently weighted in Palem-
bang's favor. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Rulers and Memories: 
Good and Bad Times in 
Palembang and Jambi 
Central to the commercial ethos that Europeans 
brought to Asia was the belief that time was valuable and that it should 
be "saved" where possible and "spent" in productive ways. When the 
chronicler of the first European circumnavigation of the globe, Antonio 
Pigafetta, arrived at the Cape of Good Hope in 1522, he was distressed 
to be told it was Thursday, "for it was Wednesday with us, and we could 
not see how we had made a mistake, for I had always kept well, I had set 
down every day without interruption."! But Pigafetta's concern with 
having "lost" twenty-four hours of his life did not reflect some personal 
idiosyncrasy, for throughout western Europe there was a growing preoc-
cupation with the interaction between time and human experience. The 
Dutch and English who reported on events in Palembang and J ambi, 
products of cultures where time was rapidly being commoditized, 
regarded the instruments that measured its passsage-calendars, hour-
glasses, and clocks-as indispensable tools of commerce. In deciding on 
trade policies, high-ranking Company officials needed to survey the 
past and anticipate the future, while employees at the lower levels were 
required to demonstrate that their time had been occupied usefully. By 
completing the obligatory daily journal, for instance, a vac resident 
was supplying his superiors with a dated account of his doings, often 
giving the precise hour when this or that task had been commenced and 
completed. 
In their dealings with Jambi and Palembang, the representatives of 
European trading companies encountered a society also intrigued by 
the relationship between time and human activities. Here, however, the 
great concern was the determining of astrologically auspicious moments 
that would ensure the success of an enterprise. The promulgation of 
written edicts by downstream rulers was thus linked to a specific point 
in time captured in power-charged numerals. In early times these dates 
were established by reference to the solar Saka era, but in the mid-sev-
enteenth century Mataram's influence saw the adoption of a new 
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Javanese-style court calendar combining the Saka and lunar-based 
Muslim systems. In practical terms, however, religious observances 
encouraged an increasing tendency to employ Islamic dating. In the ilir 
capitals the five prayer times helped divide the day into recognized peri-
ods, and the great festivals of the Muslim year became an essential 
calendrical gauge. 2 By the early eighteenth century the use of Islamic 
dates on coinage and commercial contracts had become accepted in 
bothJambi and Palembang, a trend that may have been fostered by the 
European desire for "legal" documentation. Initially, for example, only 
Christian dates were affIxed to VOC treaties with J ambi and Palem-
bang, but from 1681 it was customary to include the equivalent Muslim 
month, day, and year. Often, too, the precise hour was noted, for Euro-
pean clocks acquired as royal gifts were soon absorbed into the battery 
of magical resources that could help announce the favorable moment. 
Court rituals were scheduled to coincide with the chiming of these 
"striking watches," by reference to which a ruler's death could be fixed, 
the receipt of a letter acknowledged, the completion of a mosque 
recorded. Indeed, clocks became so ceremonially essential that when 
one belonging to the ruler of J ambi failed he asked if it could be repaired 
in Batavia. 3 
Exposure to several chronometric methods, however, did not make 
the peoples ofJambi and Palembang more time conscious in the Euro-
pean sense, and the Dutch frequently expressed exasperation with a 
society where "wasting" time was of no concern. Palembang courtiers, 
for instance, would have been taken aback had they known that after 
just an hour of preparatory compliments one envoy from Batavia noted 
in his journal "my patience was almost completely at an end."4 None-
theless, it is apparent that in the downstream courts, where literacy was 
expanding, greater use of dating in written documentation did nurture 
the conception of sequential time as a guide for arranging events in an 
acknowledged order. Outside the courts any trend in this regard was 
much weaker. The vast majority of people in J ambi and Palembang 
recalled key incidents in their lives by reference to indices that were per-
sonally meaningful and that had little relevance for those not directly 
involved. Although seasonal occurrences such as planting, harvesting, 
the coming of the rains, and the ripening of certain fruits could also be 
used to help remember events and to schedule important tasks, they too 
were often applicable to a limited locality. Nor did communal histories 
necessarily contribute to a common "calendar," for the ancestral hero 
of one village might be a shadowy figure or quite unknown in the folk-
lore of its neighbors, and the timeless world in which they moved was 
indifferent to dates and chronology. 
What could provide a time-referent for different groups, however, 
was the reign of a common overlord. The geographical and cultural 
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divide between upland and lowland peoples might offer little that could 
draw their pasts together, but the lives of kings whom they had all ac-
knowledged, albeit loosely, could present a means of identifying a 
shared block of time. In this manner an individual's own life could be 
reckoned "in terms of the king's activity." As the authority of down-
stream kings spread farther into the interior, the name of a particular 
ruler could be invoked to call up memories of the events, both good and 
bad, associated with his "time." His reign became the basis on which 
time was calculated; a Jambi storyteller, anxious to stress the age-old 
character of his tale, thus remarks that it occurred in a period "when 
the name of the raja is unknown."5 
The Good Time in Palembang 
By the latter part of the seventeenth century it was apparent that the 
pepper trade, initially so advantageous to the downstream kings, had 
introduced new strains in the commercial and political environment. 
These strains were to be felt far more keenly in Jambi, where ulu dis-
content became increasingly directed toward the ilir ruler. In Palem-
bang, by contrast, the tensions associated with the extension of pepper 
cultivation were gradually eclipsed by a steadily growing prosperity in 
which most people came to participate. In the nineteenth century, when 
the Dutch began collecting stories about Palembang's past, they found 
that the long reign of Sultan Abdul Rahman (popularly known as Cinde 
Balang because he was buried near a small temple [candi] of that name) 
was remembered as a culturally heavy period. It was believed that dur-
ing this time traditional custom, commonly termed the Undang-
Undang Simbur Cahaya (the Laws of the Rays of Light) was laid down, 
that Islam was firmly established, and that the boundaries between clan 
groupings were delineated. 6 Stories spoke of Sultan Cinde Balang's spe-
cial qualities, his powers of meditation, his gift of second sight, his 
prowess in war; "people say that he gained the love and respect of his 
subjects, that he was mild-tempered, wise and fair, and that under him 
the land blossomed and prospered." 7 
But Sultan Abdul Rahman was not the only figure later generations 
associated with a culturally significant time. The Dutch also discovered 
that another name, that of a queen called Ratu Sinuhun, was just as fre-
quently invoked as the epitome of all that was good in a ruler. When 
local people were questioned about her husband, the answers were 
vague; most said that she was married to Pangeran Sidang Kenayan, 
said to have ruled in the early seventeenth century, although others 
made her the partner and helpmeet of Sultan Abdul Rahman. Common 
to all stories, however, was the perception of the reign of Ratu Sinuhun 
as a period crucial in the formation of Palembang society. To her, for 
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example, was attributed settlement of the ilir, for when people commit-
ted crimes or resisted her representatives they were forcibly brought to 
the downstream capital and given a choice as to whether they wanted to 
settle there and serve her or be punished. "The present population," 
wrote one Dutch official in 1823, "say that they chose the former. . . . 
This is the reason that the people in the ilir are directly under the con-
trol of heads in the capital, and are more liable for personal service than 
are the people in the uplands." It was Ratu Sinuhun who had organized 
the ranking of nobles by distributing titles, and it was she who had pro-
vided traders with their first weights. During her reign, too, the first 
agreements were made with the people of the interior; even the forest 
dwellers, the orang kubu, said it was Ratu Sinuhun who gave them 
their first clothes, taught them how to eat rice and use salt, and made 
them her subjects. To this day her grave at Sabukingking (a district in 
the modern city of Palembang) remains a revered and holy place of pil-
grimage for those who wish to offer thanks or ask for assistance. 8 
There is no difficulty in identifying Sultan Abdul Rahman in Euro-
pean sources, which also present him as an exceptional figure who had 
been able to assume kingship in Palembang in 1662 though not the 
direct heir. Ratu Sinuhun, however, is another matter. Although some 
past Palembang queen may well have provided the basis for this ances-
tral myth, it is also possible that "Ratu Sinuhun" does not refer to a 
specific person. An anthropologist who worked in the Pasemah areas in 
the 1970s has pointed out that the royal Palembang edicts found there 
referred to the ruler not by name but by the phrase "Sinuhun Susuhu-
nan," the exalted one. He therefore suggests that Ratu Sinuhun might 
not be one individual at all but "the name for a personification of the 
order that legend held to originate in the palace and court of Palembang 
kings." Ratu Sinuhun may thus represent far more than some king's 
wife and even more than a wise and caring ruler. In a sense she symbol-
ized the heart of the political system. "In all Sumatra," a Dutch scholar 
has commented, "the kingdom is represented as a woman and the king 
as male. Through his magic power he awakens the life in the king-
dom."9 What is revealing is that by the early nineteenth century many 
Palembang people linked Ratu Sinuhun and Sultan Abdul Rahman in 
a continuum of "goodness." Their names helped recall times long 
before when the ruler, like a parent, nurtured his subjects/children and 
when the land prospered. 
From an initial reading of vac sources such memories might come 
as something of a surprise. Shortly after Sultan Abdul Rahman came to 
power there are reports of rebellions in Palembang's ulu districts, prob-
ably reflecting resentment at ilir demands for increased pepper produc-
tion at a time when growers were receiving far less than previously. 
Expanded production in Asia had led to low prices and a glut in 
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Europe, and in 1678 the vac concluded another contract with Palem-
bang, reducing the pepper price by one rijksdaalder per picul. Continu-
ing shortages of Spanish rials and other desired specie also compelled 
vac policy makers to adopt new measures to limit the amount of pep-
per they bought. Credit was made more difficult to obtain; weighing 
was carried out more strictly; inferior or adulterated pepper was 
rejected; and vac ships leaving for Batavia now loaded only fifteen or 
sixteen hundred piculs whereas before they had carried two thousand. 
But these measures provided only a partial solution to the problem of 
overproduction, and by 1686 there was simply insufficient warehouse 
space for storage of the pepper surplus. 
Meanwhile, vac attempts to control the cloth trade also gave rise to 
widespread dissatisfaction. The 1681 treaty gave the Dutch a monopoly 
of Indian textiles, with the right to confiscate "illegal" cargoes of piece 
goods brought by any other traders. But the late seventeenth century 
saw prices for Indian cloth climb, and the high profit margin required to 
balance the vac's books meant the Dutch were persistently undercut 
by native traders who brought textiles from distribution points like 
J ohor. Rising prices had also resulted in a dramatic increase in the 
imports of cheap Javanese cloth, prompting the Dutch to extend their 
monopoly to cover textiles from Java as well. These restrictions caused 
considerable resentment, especially among the palace women, and the 
ruler himself complained about the "poor rough cloth" the Company 
was offering. 10 
A further area of dispute concerned the vac's efforts to set in place 
the cornerstone of its commercial policies, the mare clausum or closed sea. 
As the Dutch gradually extended their control over key trading ports-
the spice islands, Melaka, Makassar, Banten, north coast Java-the 
measures they introduced began to affect longstanding trade routes. A 
specific ground for complaint in Palembang was the vac's refusal to 
grant passes for trade to eastern destinations such as Bima, Makassar, 
Timor, and Buton, where cloth and pepper had previously been 
exchanged for slaves. Direct trade from Palembang to Aceh had also 
been forbidden, and stricter measures were introduced to prevent free 
trade in pepper, seen by the Dutch as smuggling, with vac cruisers 
patrolling the Musi delta and the Bangka Straits. II 
Inevitably these moves aroused some popular hostility against the 
Dutch. The adulteration of pepper reached unprecedented proportions, 
and sometimes at night stones were hurled into the lodge compound. 
Sultan Abdul Rahman, however, remained untouched by this resent-
ment, and despite occasional differences he himself never sought to ter-
minate Palembang's relationship with the vac. Indeed, early in his 
reign he had proclaimed that he would "as soon eat pork as go to war 
against the Company," and this attitude had been reinforced by the 
favorable treatment he had received in the Dutch-mediated peace settle-
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mentY For its part, the vac's expectation of a lasting and economi-
cally rewarding future in Palembang is attested by the gradual expan-
sion of its lodge, situated on the Aor River opposite the royal palace. 
Here the marshy land was gradually drained, and a small community of 
vac subjects, mostly Chinese and Christians of mixed Malay-Portu-
guese birth, began to settle. So dominant did the Dutch position appear 
that Jambi's Sultan Anum Ingalaga scornfully compared Palembang 
subjects to Company slaves; his people, on the other hand, were like the 
vac's brothers. 13 
The protection offered by the Dutch in the unstable world of the late 
seventeenth century makes it possible to understand Sultan Abdul 
Rahman's decision to maintain the vac contract. Notwithstanding 
friendly gestures in 1677, Banten remained a threat, and its ambitions 
to control the pepper-growing districts along the Tulang Bawang River 
in Lampung were a constant source of dispute. InJune 1682 when news 
was received of Dutch victories in Banten, Sultan Abdul Rahman came 
to the lodge and stayed "from six to nine o'clock ... being very gay," 
and he did not respond later that year when the former Banten ruler 
attempted to rally an anti-Dutch alliance. 14 Palembang's relations with 
its former Javanese overlord were also changing. Although Susuhunan 
Amangkurat's envoys were received with honor, Sultan Abdul Rahman 
was no longer prepared to accord Mataram the subservience of former 
times. In 1685 he declined to evict the Dutch, as the susuhunan had 
requested. The climate of uncertainty was exacerbated by the continu-
ing presence of fleets of Makassarese adventurers around Bangka and 
their alliance with a refugee Minangkabau prince, a claimant to the 
Pagaruyung throne known by the high-ranking title yang dipertuan sakti 
(he who has spiritual power). 
Most serious, however, were relations with Johor and Jambi, for 
their orang laut continued to raid for slaves in Palembang waters 
despite the peace settlement of 1683. Sultan Abdul Rahman's second 
son, Pangeran Aria, retaliated by conducting his own raids, apparently 
with his father's blessing. He too attracted a following of Malays, 
Minangkabau, Makassarese, and orang laut, and the constant raid and 
counterraid meant that for several years renewed warfare was an ever-
present threat. 15 Rivalry with Jambi over the Tembesi district persisted; 
and although Palembang's population was reckoned to be ten times that 
of its neighbor, Sultan Ingalaga had powerful allies. As Sultan Abdul 
Rahman explained to the Dutch, "I only have the governor general and 
council of the Indies as my brother and friends, not like the king of 
Jambi, who has many brothers and relatives such as Johor, Minangka-
bau, and Siam."16 In this situation, the Company lodge with its small 
armed force was an open declaration that Palembang did not stand 
alone. 
The positive attitude of the Palembang ruler was undoubtedly fos-
116 Rulers and Memories 
tered by the amicable relations that developed between the court and 
individual Dutchmen. It may be no coincidence that the governor gen-
eral installed in 1678, Rijk10fvan Goens, had been raised in the Indies, 
spoke good Malay, and was familiar with local customs, having twice 
headed the J ambi post from whence he had gone to Palembang as 
envoy. His representative, Jan van Leene, who came to Palembang the 
same year to negotiate a treaty, was feted by Sultan Abdul Rahman as 
an honored guest. The first minister even gave him a kris with the 
names of both van Leene and himself engraved on the hilt "done with 
his own hand." Egbert van Swenne, who took charge of the Palembang 
lodge in 1679-1680, felt he too had good relations with the king and 
nobles; when he left, Sultan Abdul Rahman promised to protect the 
Dutch lodge and the Company personnel "like a father." 17 
Because of past cooperation, Sultan Abdul Rahman's subsequent 
complaints about problems in the pepper trade and the shortcomings of 
certain vac representatives were taken seriously. In 1691 Isaac van 
Thije was appointed to investigate the situation in Palembang and to 
oversee the conclusion of a new agreement. In many respects the result-
ing contract resembled those of previous years, but it gave particular 
attention to the causes of disputes, such as variations in weights and 
pepper adulteration. Van Thije's visit ended on a satisfactory note, 
coinciding with several other developments that contributed to the gen-
eral peace of the period. Palembang forces pursued the Minangkabau 
prince, the yang dipertuan sakti (who had fled to Komering and from 
thence to the Palembang interior), into Jambi, while the Makassarese 
who had been such a threat in the Belitung area left for east Java to join 
the Balinese rebel Surapati. 
The renewal of the vac contract in 1691 thus came during a time of 
sustained peace in Palembang, when ilir authority was generally ac-
knowledged in the upstream districts. A principal reason for this peace 
was the absence of the economically damaging civil wars that were to 
divide Jambi but that did not threaten Palembang until many years 
later. Almost invariably such wars occurred because of quarrels within 
the royal clan, usually between princes contending for kingship and its 
associated wealth and power. Despite the respect a son should give to 
his father, the potential for conflict between a ruler and his heirs was 
great, particularly regarding the sharing of revenues. In Jambi during 
the early seventeenth century, for example, disputes regarding the divi-
sion of tolls caused such enmity between the panembahan and his son 
that sometimes they did not speak to each other for weeks. 
In Palembang this kind of generational hostility was equally appar-
ent. Sultan Abdul Rahman had two sons, the elder entitled Pangeran 
Dipati and the younger Pangeran Aria, and both had at times opposed 
him. Pangeran Dipati was alienated because he had hoped his aging 
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father would step aside and install him as ruler, while Pangeran Aria 
was a notorious raider whose alliance with his "brother," Daeng 
Mangika, was reportedly aimed at seizing the Palembang throne. The 
brothers were also antagonistic toward each other, and the Dutch had 
already decided that if conflict broke out they would support Pangeran 
Dipati. Not only was he well disposed to the VOC, but he was allied 
with Pangeran Dipakusuma, the son of the previous ruler of Palembang 
(Sultan Abdul Rahman's uncle), who was very popular in the ulu. In 
October 1691, however, the situation was completely altered by the 
death of Pangeran Dipati while on a trip upstream. As a result 
Pangeran Aria, Sultan Abdul Rahman's errant but only remaining son, 
became the sole object of his father's affection. Pangeran Aria was in 
fact already displaying some leadership ability, and the year before had 
been appointed to head a force of two thousand Palembang men and a 
hundred ships sent to assist Jambi's pangeran ratu against upstream 
rebellions in Rawas. On this occasion Pangeran Aria performed well, 
and in accounts recorded more than a century later his heroic deeds 
during the J ambi wars identify him as a fitting heir to his father. IS 
The succession to the Palembang throne now appeared clarified. In 
1692 Sultan Abdul Rahman began building a new palace for himself, 
the implication being that he might soon step aside and allow Pangeran 
Aria to govern. He also married Pangeran Aria to Pangeran Dipati's 
widow, Ratu Mas, a Jambi princess who was daughter to the famed 
Sultan Agung. The next year Pangeran Aria was made effective ruler of 
Palembang. The "time of Sultan Abdul Rahman" thus incorporates 
two kings. Although Sultan Abdul Rahman did not die until 1706, 
Pangeran Aria ruled from 1694, and in 1700 his father accorded him 
the title of pangeran ratu, indicating that he had been raised above all 
other princes. Twelve months later he was installed as Sultan Ratu 
Senapati Ingalaga, while the old sultan ratu, Abdul Rahman, took the 
name and title of Susuhunan Pangeran Samijaya. When Pangeran Aria 
succeeded in 1706 as Sultan Muhammad Mansur, he had been actually 
governing Palembang for about twelve years. 
Pangeran Aria was fortunate in that he came to power under the pro-
tection of his father and faced no open opposition from princes and 
nobles in the court. The most obvious rival, Pangeran Dipakusuma, 
initially showed his displeasure by absenting himself from court occa-
sions. Nonetheless, the chains of kinship in which he was enmeshed 
held firm: because Sultan Abdul Rahman had given him a daughter in 
marriage, he was both cousin and son-in-law of the king and brother-in-
law to Pangeran Aria. Indeed, similar bonds of sexual union united the 
entire court, for in 1691 following the death of Pangeran Dipati, and 
when he himself felt close to death, Sultan Abdul Rahman had shared 
out his concubines among favored princes and nobles. 19 Although he 
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lived for another fifteen years, the distribution of his wives was a visible 
reminder of links that drew the court together, and no powerful cabal 
sought to usurp the Palembang throne. 
Against this background of peace Palembang's economy thrived, 
despite restrictions imposed by the Dutch contract. This in itself is a 
tribute to longstanding trading skills. As the Dutch themselves acknowl-
edged, "From olden times the people of Palembang have been traders 
and seafarers .... They are experienced in seatravel from ancient 
times." The "great private trade" of Pal em bang, which drew comment 
in 1671, was still flourishing a generation later. 2o But it can also be 
argued that Sultan Abdul Rahman himself played a leading role in the 
prosperity that enabled tradition to lay aside memories of royal imposi-
tions. Exploiting Palembang's position as the best source of VOC pep-
per when supplies in Jambi began to dry up, he contended that the 
Dutch should properly grant him special favors "so that our brotherly 
union is apparent to all countries below the winds."21 Eager to retain 
Sultan Abdul Rahman's goodwill, the VOC made a number of conces-
sions that were crucial in maintaining Palembang's commercial attrac-
tion to other native traders. September 1685 saw the end of attempts to 
monopolize the sale of native textiles, and local ships were permitted to 
bring in Madurese and Javanese cloth. Isaac van Thije had argued that 
any efforts to control such sales would cause an uproar among the ordi-
nary people, since although court women still preferred Indian textiles, 
most of the men "from the king to the lowest paddlers" wore batik or 
other types of Javanese and Madurese cloth. Pieces from India were 
reserved for special occasions. Other concessions permitted Palembang 
inhabitants to carry pepper directly to Batavia rather than delivering it 
at the VOC lodge, allowed Chinese from Batavia less restricted access 
to the Palembang market, and authorized Sultan Abdul Rahman to 
purchase slaves in Batavia for use in the upstream pepper plantations. 22 
One of the keys to Palembang's commerce lay in its peddling trade. 
Examination of a list of small ships leaving for Batavia between Decem-
ber 1684 and February 1685, for instance, shows a range of items being 
carried, including areca nut, gambier, rattans, cotton, wax, small clay 
pots, jernang and other resins, and large numbers of kajang mats. 23 
This latter item, indeed, provides an example of how the European 
presence affected trading patterns in unspectacular but socially signifi-
cant ways. Kajang mats had a multitude of uses, from sails for perahu 
to sacks for pepper, but since they were woven from nipa palm they had 
a limited life. There was thus a constant market, which was further 
enhanced by the rise of great port cities like Batavia. In 1689 two thou-
sand kajang mats were loaded onto VOC ships leaving Palembang for 
Java; by 1700 the number had risen to five thousand. The growing 
demand for kajang mats provided steady work for the producers, orang 
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laut women who collected the leaves and wove them during the drier 
months of the year. This occupation provided their families with income 
to help carry them through the west monsoon, when adverse winds lim-
ited fishing. Transportation also gave employment to small traders, 
since VOC captains were reluctant to load cargoes of mats because they 
were bulky and susceptible to fire. From about 1701 it became common 
for native perahu returning to Java from Palembang to carry mats at 
the rate of .25 rials per hundred, with the average cargo numbering 
between two and four hundred. This arrangement was a further incen-
tive to production. In the four months between November 1703 and the 
end of February 1704, a total of 14,700 kajang mats was shipped to 
Batavia alone. 24 
Palembang's jungles continued to support a vibrant trade that in-
cluded valued products like the numerous tree resins (damar). Of these 
probably the best known came from various rattans grouped together as 
jernang, which yielded a red substance used both as a dye and in medic-
inal preparations. Bangka was also known for a scented wood obtained 
from diseased trees of the species Gonstylus bancanus. Since it was found 
to be acceptable in Persia as a substitute for the more expensive gaharu 
or aloes wood (Aquilaria), Batavia occasionally placed orders in Palem-
bang. When this happened the resident had to seek out suppliers on the 
islands of Bangka and Belitung, but it is not difficult to understand why 
it was so hard to obtain. Because the treees were not cultivated, but 
grew wild in the jungle, obtaining the wood took some time. After an 
infected tree was found, it was cut down and dragged to a swamp, 
where the trunk gradually decayed. A year or more passed before the 
valuable heart was exposed. Collection was thus time consuming and 
laborious, and one resident complained that he was forced to canvass 
"stupid, naive" people who carried small amounts by perahu from 
Bangka and Belitung. It was impossible to predict how much might be 
delivered in a season or to foresee the quality; in 1697 he said at least a 
quarter of the "aloes" wood he had received was unsuitable for sale. 
The stiff competition from Javanese and Chinese buyers meant he had 
only managed to obtain supplies with Sultan Abdul Rahman's assis-
tance. 25 
Another forest product was rattans, which were used for a variety of 
purposes ranging from whips to ships' tackle, according to the length 
and thickness. So valuable was this trade that in 1658 the ruler ofJambi 
had even laid down that rattans be sold only to him.26 Yet though the 
demand was virtually insatiable, it was difficult to obtain large supplies. 
Some types, found in marshy swamp-forest areas, could be collected 
only during the dry season; other varieties, growing deep in the jungle 
where their prehensile-like thorns fixed them firmly to the rain forest 
canopy, were equally inaccessible. The best rattans came from the 
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Lalang area, where the arduous work of cutting and gathering was car-
ried out mainly by the forest dwellers, who then exchanged them for salt 
and cloth obtained from local traders. The latter were probably respon-
sible for boiling and drying the rattan to remove gums and resins, after 
which the canes were brought to market in bundles of two or three hun-
dred. Periodically the resident received orders from Batavia to buy rat-
tans, but the competition from Javanese buyers was fierce, and he was 
sometimes forced to purchase supplies that were still green. 
In addition to the traditional harvesting of jungle and ocean prod-
ucts, some interior groups in Palembang were growing cotton in prefer-
ence to pepper, as well as a relatively new crop, gambier, used for dye-
ing and for betel preparation. Previously gambier had been considered 
sufficently rare to be included among gifts sent to Batavia, and in 1690 
fifteen plants were presented to the governor general. It was possibly 
during this period that the practice of cultivating gambier in combina-
tion with pepper was introduced, and in later years gambier was to 
become one ofPalembang's important exports. The most popular alter-
native to pepper, however, was rice, encouraged by the downward shift 
of pepper prices and by periodic shortages when trade with Java was 
disrupted. In 1706, for example, when no Javanese ships arrived, a 
koyan of rice cost between 60 and 65 rials, and because of this high 
price, "great and small" growers alike had gone over to padi planting. 
Although the price dropped by almost half after the 1707 harvest and 
after the arrival of traders from Java, recurring shortages were a consid-
erable incentive for rice cultivation. The ruler warned Batavia that he 
intended to divert energy into growing rice rather than pepper. 27 This 
trend continued, and by the end of the eighteenth century the bulk of 
ulu tribute paid to the court was in the form of rice. 
There is little doubt, however, that the clandestine traffic in pepper, 
carried out in defiance of the Dutch monopoly, was the main source of 
Palembang's trading profits. In 1689 the annual harvest was estimated 
at eighty thousand piculs, but the resident calculated that less than half 
was being delivered to the VaG. The disadvantageous Dutch monop-
oly contract could not cut off trading connections that had been estab-
lished over centuries, and the VaG vision of a closed sea in which key 
archipelago ports were under Dutch control and where all traders were 
required to carry a pass was unworkable. The sheer extent of the oceans 
and the numerous coasts outside VaG influence made such a system 
impossible to supervise. Native captains saw the possession of a written 
pass as a form of protection against pirates and Dutch patrol boats, not 
as a document that bound them to sail with certain products to certain 
places at certain times. Traders constantly arrived in Palembang hold-
ing a pass for some other destination, claiming that they had been 
blown off course by contrary winds, while others lacked passes because 
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they came from areas without Dutch posts. Conversely, a trader might 
set out from Batavia or Melaka with a legitimate pass giving his name 
and destination and listing his cargo and the number in his crew. Yet if 
he put in at some native port and acquired a new cargo, his pass became 
meaningless. In all such cases Sultan Abdul Rahman took the part of 
local captains and argued strongly against any penalty. 28 
Frequently operating under royal patronage, numbers of traders 
were thus willing to defy Dutch patrols and smuggle pepper to nearby 
ports where the price was higher. This traffic occurred during the calm 
period of the east monsoon, and the geography of the Palembang coast-
line made prevention impossible. Behind the curtain of the swamp for-
est were innumerable tidal streams that formed a constantly shifting 
network joining the main river and its major arms. The principal out-
lets were the Banyu Asin, Air Hitam in Jambi, and Air Salih, with the 
latter in turn linked to rivers that led directly to Komering, one of the 
prime pepper areas. Another waterway, the Selat Jarang, had three 
branches that led out to sea. These were too shallow for the passage of 
Dutch cruisers, but they were much used by smaller native craft, which 
also sailed out to meet incoming Chinese junks. Flowing into the Banyu 
Asin was the Lalang River, which as late as 1686 was unknown to the 
Dutch. To their surprise they discovered that it was a much-frequented 
meeting place for English and Portuguese vessels and local perahu, ide-
ally suited for this purpose because the channel was deep enough for 
European ships to anchor. 
Sultan Abdul Rahman was willing to tolerate such private trade 
because he suffered no commercial loss. Although he did not receive the 
Dutch toll on smuggled pepper, he himself erected tollhouses higher up 
on important rivers, and patrols along the coast by loyal orang laut 
helped ensure that only a lucky trader succeeded in taking his goods 
from Palembang without paying some duty to the king. The sultan also 
realized quickly that he gained no benefit from the Dutch demand for 
white pepper, which lost about 40 percent of the pepper grains in the 
making but gave him the same toll of .75 rijksdaalders per picul. In 
1691 the making of white pepper for sale to the Dutch was forbidden. 
The royal clan, so often the source of opposition, cooperated with the 
Palembang ruler because they drew considerable benefit from covert 
trade in pepper, in part because of their privileged access to the pepper-
growing areas. When the Dutch set up their post in Palembang, the 
upland people themselves brought their pepper down or sold it to trad-
ers who came upstream. From the beginning of his reign, however, Sul-
tan Abdul Rahman began to arrogate greater control to himself and his 
family, establishing new weights, "appointing variousjenang or supervi-
sors," and forbidding private individuals to go to the interior. Although 
Chinese played an active role as downstream agents, they were not per-
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mitted upstream as had been the case in Jambi; indeed, the Palembang 
resident claimed that not "a single Chinese" lived in the ulu. 29 By 1672 
a royal pepper monopoly was in place, and Sultan Abdul Rahman and 
his relatives made frequent trips upriver to ensure that their control 
over pepper collection was maintained. A piagem issued by a certain 
Pangeran Purbaya (probably the eldest son of Pangeran Aria) dating 
from 1699 C.E. thus lays down that anyone who takes pepper out before 
ordered to do so should be sent to Palembang with his wife and family, 
regardless of status. 30 The trade of the royal family was further 
encouraged because their vessels were exempt from normal tolls in 
Batavia if they went as part of the escort for a royal ship. They could 
therefore take advantage of the higher payment for pepper the vac 
offered in Batavia, where there was also a far more varied range of 
cloth. In addition to the trading privileges they enjoyed, the royal clan 
was actively involved in smuggling, and as far as the Dutch were con-
cerned some of the most notorious offenders were the court women. In 
1681, for instance, nine perahu laden with pepper belonging to the wife 
of Pangeran Dipati slipped out of Palembang, the captains then trans-
ferring the cargo to a larger vessel, which carried it to Riau, the new 
capital ofJohor on Bintan Island. Sultan Abdul Rahman's own mother 
was termed an "experienced tradeswoman (coopwijf). "31 
Although pepper was often secretly carried north to Kedah and Aceh 
and over the mountains to the new English post at Bengkulen, the most 
important destinations were those frequented by the Chinese. Unaf-
fected by the glut in Europe, the market for pepper in China had con-
tinued unabated, fueled by a rising population where households 
bought it not by the ounce but by the pound. Furthermore, following 
the conquest of Formosa in 1683, Chinese authorities adopted a more 
liberal attitude toward overseas trade. Chinese shipping began to 
expand, and junk captains were fully prepared to evade vac cruisers. 
In 1694 it was said that China could not get enough Palembang pepper, 
since it was not only of good quality but cheaper than that from the west 
coast of Sumatra. 32 
There were three major points in Palembang's trade with China. The 
first was Riau, reestablished as the capital of Johor after the attack by 
Jambi iii 1673. Johor had successfully remained outside the monopoly 
system of the vac, and its new port, situated on Bintan Island where 
the Carang River flows out into a wide bay, developed into a gathering 
point for Chinese, Indian, and European traders as well as ships from 
all over the archipelago. This busy center needed to be supplied with 
food, and Palembang had long been a source ofJohor's supplies, partic-
ularly since small perahu could sail to Riau from Palembang the entire 
year. The presence of Chinese junks, with cargoes ranging from silk 
cloth to opium, iron ware, and food items, drew Palembang traders like 
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a magnet. In 1692 it was estimated that perhaps as much as twelve 
thousand piculs of pepper may have been annually smuggled out to 
Riau in smhll 'perahu to meet the Chinese; in subseqent estimates this 
figure rose even higher. The bendahara, the minister who acted as 
regent in Riau, had made real efforts to lay old enmities to rest. His 
goodwill continued when he succeeded as ruler of J ohor, following the 
king's assassination in 1699. Despite Palembang's horrified reaction to 
this regicide, economic links remained strbrtg, and by 1714 plans for a 
marriage alliance were in progress. 33 
A second important point in the trading connection with China lay to 
the north. Soon after he came to power Sultan Abdul Rahman had 
bO'ught junks specifically to sail to Vietnam, Siam, and Cambocfia; 
eight years after the c()ncrtis'ion of' tnelirsf monopoly treaty with the 
vac, three or four ships were still leaving annually for Siam loaded 
with pepper. 34 Trade in this direction was encouraged by the expansion 
of a settlement on the Cambodian coast known as Ha Tien or Kiang 
K'ou and called Pantai Mas by the Malays. The name Kiang K'ou is 
mentioned in Dutch sources as early as 1623, but according to legend it 
emerged in the latter part of the century under the leadership of one of 
the many migrants who left China during this period to make their liv-
ing overseas. Situated on a branch of the Mekong, Ha Tien was more 
accessible than other ports in Cambodia. Trading vessels were carried 
there naturally via a strong ocean current that flowed through the Tai-
wan Straits, along the southern coast of China, around central and 
southern Vietnam, and into the Gulf of Siam. The same stream contin-
ued on down the coast of the Malay Peninsula, and with this favorable 
siting Ha Tien developed into a rendezvous for the junk trade from 
China, Formosa, Macao, Vietnam, and Siam as well as drawing much 
traffic from the archipelago. 35 It also became a key exchange point in 
the network that supplied Palembang with salt and rice during the west 
monsoon. 
A third area of relatively new importance was Siantan, which 
replaced Pulau Tioman as the most important rendezvous in the South 
China Sea". Advantaged by a good harbor, it too was geographically 
well located. A strong current passed this area during August, following 
the southwest monsoon, bearing the vessels bound for China and Viet-
nam with it. At other periods of the year it was easily reached by ships 
from the north coast of Java. Siantan was thus able to act as a secondary 
distribution point for spices and other items, and soon became a favor-
ite port of call for Siamese ships en route to Palembang with cargoes of 
rice, salt, lac, and rough Vietnamese and Chinese porcelain. Initially 
the captains of such ships dealt mainly with a shifting community of 
Malay and Minangkabau traders, many of whom were married to 
Siantan women. By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the 
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exchange economy that centered on Siantan was dominated by Bugis 
and Makassarese, a significant development in view of the two to three 
thousand Makassarese and Bugis then living in Palembang. 36 
Sultan Abdul Rahman was the primary beneficiary of Palembang's 
overseas trade, and by the end of the seventeenth century his wealth 
had become legendary. Besides being "the greatest pepper merchant," 
he received a percentage of the tolls paid by incoming and outgoing 
traders as well as the lavish gifts they presented to obtain his favor. 
Another source of income was the old custom that on the death of a for-
eign merchant the ship and cargo went to the king. The demise of any 
well-to-do subject could also provide the occasion for his or her property 
to be confiscated by the ruler in payment for real or alleged debts. Cere-
monies such as the weighing of a princess against silver coins continued 
to feed the royal coffers, to which were added the large amounts of pep-
per and rials the king received as tribute from the interior. 37 
The Dutch were impressed by reports of "millions" of rials and of a 
treasury that grew "yearly,"38 but surrounding rulers would have been 
just as struck by Sultan Rahman's command of human resources. 
Wealth and subjects were always intimately connected, and Palem-
bang's retention of authority over the inhabitants of the ulu was a key 
element in its economic success. New pepper areas were opened up by 
imported slaves and by captives taken during raids into J ambi territory, 
and from about 1690 the voluntary drift of people to Palembang from 
Jambi became more apparent. The suku pindah groups who populated 
much of the Rawas area, and who had been previously considered 
among the principal pepper growers in J ambi, now acknowledged the 
ruler of Palembang as lord. Several thousand Minangkabau were also 
cultivating pepper in ulu Tembesi. In these areas, at the periphery of 
Palembang territory, government was relatively light. Occasionally a 
party from downstream would appear on a hunting trip to collect pep-
per or taxes, but for the most part authority rested entirely in the hands 
of the local headmen and the elders who assisted them (collectively 
known as the peroatin). Sultan Abdul Rahman and his son were both 
aware of the need to retain ulu goodwill, consistently arguing against 
increases in the price of Indian cloth and drawing influential upstream 
leaders into discussions regarding the introduction of new coinage. 
When they rejected one type of rial the future Sultan Muhammad Man-
sur simply told the VOC resident that he would not force his subjects to 
accept the unfamiliar coins against their will. 39 
A second essential element was the local Chinese community, largely 
composed of peranakan. In 1682 there were about thirty Chinese mer-
chants, four of whom were appointed to supervise pepper deliveries to 
the Company. They also had responsibility for selling vac cloth, 
which they received on credit, on behalf of the Dutch. Below them were 
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four other private merchants who had little to do with pepper and had 
no influence in the fixing of prices for goods. Twenty-one less prosper-
ous Chinese traders acted as agents for the wealthier merchants in the 
bazaar and supplied the court with cloth for the interior. At this time 
there was only one Indian Muslim merchant. 40 
Ten years later three ofthe four men in charge of the ruler's business 
were still Muslim Chinese, and at least one often acted as a royal agent, 
carrying pepper to be sold in Riau. All were established traders, accus-
tomed to maintaining commercial records; for example, the goods left 
by one Chinese who had acted on the king's behalf included not just 
cloth, silver utensils, gold thread, and so forth, but various "writings, 
books and accounts."41 In the constant dealings with Europeans 
required of the king's factors, Chinese familiarity with documentation 
for trading purposes was clearly advantageous. In 1694 a private Dutch 
burgher from Melaka claimed-without evidence-that he had bought 
fourteen thousand piculs of pepper from Sultan Abdul Rahman's prin-
cipal scribe and agent, a peranakan Chinese entitled Kiai Raksadita. 
However, the latter produced the receipt he had filed away "which is 
otherwise than among these Javanese [i.e., Palembang people], who 
seldom keep receipts longer than the affair itselflasts."42 
It is reasonable to suggest that Sultan Abdul Rahman's access to Chi-
nese bookkeeping skills made possible a closer supervision of the royal 
economy and a greater awareness of the sources and disbursement of 
the ruler's income. Certainly there is clear evidence that continuing 
efforts were made to bring all the Chinese under the royal umbrella. 
They were frequently required to accept Islam and shave their hair as a 
token of conversion and would then be given a local woman as a wife. 
When the Chinese received cloth and goods on credit from the court 
they became both kinsmen and debtors, a combination that worked 
together to make them into subjects. Because of marriage and debt rela-
tionships, the resident remarked, "almost all Chinese have an interest 
in the Palembang court." In mid-1691 Sultan Abdul Rahman 
requested that any Chinese, regardless of origin, who had taken up resi-
dence in Palembang and who owed him money or was "trusted" (i.e., 
had credit) should be placed under his jurisdiction. If the Dutch did not 
agree, he threatened, he would be compelled to evict all Chinese from 
his lands, to take from them all the goods they owned, and to claim back 
the women given to them by the court as concubines. In 1696, after 
continued pressure, Batavia finally agreed that jurisdiction over all Chi-
nese in Palembang would be surrendered to Pangeran Aria. 43 
Less obvious than the Chinese but equally important to the economy 
were the orang laut of Sungsang and Palembang's offshore islands. By 
the 1680s resistance in Bangka had been virtually eliminated, and it 
seems that Sultan Abdul Rahman had been able to strengthen the ties 
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between himself and the local inhabitants. Nineteenth-century tradi-
tions confirm VOC reports of a marriage between Sultan Abdul 
Rahman and the widow of the previous Bangka head, through which 
the people there" acknowledged the Palembang ruler as their legitimate 
king."H Neighboring rulers responded by recognizing Palembang's 
claims to overlordship in the waters around Bangka and Belitung, and 
in 1698 the sultan of Sukadana sent an envoy with a gift of diamonds as 
compensation after his people attacked Belitung and took fifteen people 
prisoner. Through its orang laut, alternately raiders and collectors, 
Palembang was ensured of a steady supply of slaves and sea products, 
in return for which protection was extended against any marauders.45 
Indeed, Palembang's standing in the Melaka Straits was such that when 
the Johor ruler was killed in 1699 a number of his orang laut subjects 
said they would not serve under the new dynasty but would leave for 
Palembang instead. 
The final link in the economic chain is the most difficult to discern, 
but the vitality of Palembang's forest trade provides testimony to the 
continuing interaction with the shadowy jungle dwellers, the orang 
kubu. To this can be added an intriguing report dating from October 
1692. In that month the "wild people" along the Bulian and Bahar riv-
ers, tributaries of the Lalang, rebelled against Jambi authority and 
"fled to Palembang ... to take refuge with Ratu Mas Dipati." Ratu 
Mas, it will be remembered, was a Jambi princess, daughter of the 
revered Sultan Agung, widow of the former Palembang crown prince, 
and now betrothed to his brother, designated as the next king. With this 
pedigree she was clearly the highest-born female in the country, and the 
inclusion of her name in royal correspondence indicates that she had 
already assumed the place at court appropriate to a future queen. 46 
Added to this, her very title would have summed up memories of that 
other powerful Ratu Mas, the Palembang princess who had ruled 
J ambi in the time of its prosperity. 
Kubu belief that this distant queen would somehow provide them 
with a refuge is a revealing comment on how Palembang rule had come 
to be perceived by the end of the seventeenth century. Although it is 
tempting to see reverberations of the Ratu Sinuhun myth in this call to 
"Ratu Mas," it can also be interpreted as an appeal to the gentler 
aspect of the parent-ruler image thought to have manifested itself in 
Palembang overlordship. Dutch sources provide further evidence that 
the stories of peace and prosperity attached to Sultan Abdul Rahman's 
memory were generated by genuine regard. In his prime he had con-
tended that "a king should win the hearts of his people," and in his old 
age the "love" the people bore the susuhunan and their verdict that his 
had been a "good" reign drew comments from the vac residentY 
Few people in Palembang would have personally remembered any king 
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before him, and he must have appeared invulnerable. Even the Dutch 
were amazed. "It seems," wrote another resident "that the king cannot 
die .... He is 123 years old and has never had a serious illness."48 His 
progeny were a testimony to his virility; in 1690 he was said to have had 
seventy children and grandchildren, an impressive statement in a soci-
ety where the lives of children were fragile. Sultan Abdul Rahman died 
on 10 December 1706, but the sense of unchanging rule was perpe-
tuated. On 25 October 1708, announcing that he wished everything to 
be "as good as in the reign of my father," Sultan Mansur made the 
symbolic move to the palace of the deceased susuhunan, surrendering 
his own residence to his son and heir, Pangeran Purbaya. According to 
the resident, "People say everything is being done as in the time when 
the older sultan lived there."49 His description of the new ruler distrib-
uting generous gifts to all the leading nobles and Chinese while they 
weighed him against Spanish rials and lead picis in itself approaches 
allegory, for the nub of Palembang's economic activity was the king 
himself. To him the country's wealth flowed and by him it was dis-
pensed. The memories associated with "Cinde Balang," in short, stand 
as a cultural personification of a successful economy and a Good Time. 
The Bad Time in Jambi 
The elevation of Cinde Balang into a community ancestor represents a 
realization of the potentialities of indigenous kingship. In Jambi the 
"time of the panembahan" in the early seventeenth century was simi-
larly remembered as a period when people were well off and the country 
was ruled wisely. The tensions that always existed in the ruler-subject 
relationship were submerged by the favorable verdict of communal 
memory. A decade after his death in 1679 a similar process had 
occurred in regard to Sultan Agung. Nurtured by his prestige and lon-
gevity, his name too had become a symbolic referent invoking an idyllic 
"time," compared with which the present was merely a shadow. The 
appparent failure of subsequent J ambi kings to match the achievements 
of their forebears was to have far-reaching effects on dealings with the 
interior and on the association between them and their "brothers" in 
Palembang. 
Much of the heroic stature acquired by the panembahan and his 
grandson, Sultan Agung, can be traced to the contrasting bleakness of 
the years that followed. The effects of the decline in pepper prices, the 
end of the junk trade, and the domination of the Dutch and English 
were being felt well before Sultan Agung's death in 1679. By 1670 
Palembang produced an estimated forty thousand piculs of pepper 
annually, while J ambi was delivering only about sixteen thousand, less 
than half the amount of former times. In 1676 prolonged rains swelled 
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many rivers, and old people said they had never seen water so high. In 
Merangin, Tebo, and Tembesi, pepper gardens were flooded and 
ruined. 50 Two years later the J ambi resident bemoaned the stockpiles of 
cloth that lay unsold and rotting in the vac warehouse and the extent 
to which trade had fallen away. With rice scarce and expensive, Jambi 
could no longer compete as a market with the nearby ports of Palem-
bang, Riau, and Bengkalis. Then came the disastrous wars with Johor 
and Palembang. In 1679 the main settlement was destroyed in the 
Johorese attack, and the upstream areas, notably Tembesi, were con-
stantly raided by Palembang forces so that many pepper gardens were 
consequently abandoned or destroyed. 
The Dutch monopoly, established after the departure of the English 
in 1679 and as part of the conditions of the 1681 contract, thus came at a 
critical time. Stricter measures against smuggling and the monopoly of 
textiles militated against commercial recovery. The vac's own figures 
reveal the unwillingness of the ulu inhabitants to deliver pepper and 
Jambi's failure to attract traders from elsewhere. Between August 1683 
and 31 July 1684 the Dutch lodge in Palembang made a profit of37 ,570 
guilders, while only 2,868 guilders were recorded for Jambi in the 
period from 1 August 1684 to 31 July 1685. Nor did native traders fare 
much better. In 1680 five ships arrived from Johar with five thousand 
rials' worth of Indian cloth, but could sell very little; on another occa-
sion an Indian brought in four thousand pieces of cloth, which had to be 
put into storage for lack of buyers. 51 
Jambi's commercial decline directly affected the wealth of the ruler, 
Sultan Anum Ingalaga, for the income previously drawn from tolls and 
duties on pepper dried up as foreign and internal trade shrank. A public 
indication of his declining prestige was the divorce of his daughter in 
1682 by the sultan of Banten. 52 It may have been with the hope of find-
ing another wealthy patron that Sultan Ingalaga made application to 
the king of Siam, sending the message that he was willing to submit the 
gold and silver flowers, the traditional sign of vassalage demanded by 
Siamese kings, in return for trading privileges. However, the vac did 
their utmost to ensure that this link was not strengthened, and ulti-
mately the gesture came to nought. Sultan Ingalaga openly admitted 
that his country was economically in a "bad condition." "I am living in 
great difficulties," he wrote to the vac, at the same time asking per-
mission to delay repayment of his debts for another three years. 53 
As a direct result of his poverty Sultan Ingalaga now began to depend 
more heavily on a share of the booty brought back by his orang laut who 
"in place of fishing have spread everywhere pirating." At home the 
Chinese were among the first to feel the effects of the ruler's penury, and 
a number had their property and valuables confiscated to help defray 
Sultan Ingalaga's expenses. Given the declining economic situation in 
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Jambi, it is not surprising that there was an exodus of Chinese traders, 
with a large group settling in Palembang. By 1700 most had left, and lit-
tle remained except the name "Pecinaan" attached to the settlement 
around the Dutch lodge. Piracy on the seas and the departure of the 
Chinese further discouraged maritime trade, in turn making the capital 
even less attractive to the ulu, where the impact of the ruler's straitened 
circumstances was also apparent. Sultan Ingalaga was now attempting 
to control the internal pepper trade by reserving the main areas for him-
self and to increase his profits by offering growers a low price. It was 
said that villagers fled when news was received of the approach of royal 
emissaries. 54 
A further reason for the alienation of the interior was the extent of 
authority wielded by the three queens, Sultan Ingalaga's two Makas-
sarese wives and the former "Bugis whore," To Ayo. The latter, her title 
raised from Ratu Mas Dipati to Ratu Mas Sultan, was able to hold her 
position against her Makassar co-wives despite her origins, and she was 
considered dominant "not only in trade but in everything." Mean-
while, Karaeng Fatimah (daughter of the former ruler of Goa, and pre-
viously wife of the ruler of Banten), who brought with her all the pres-
tige of the Makassar royal house as well as substantial wealth, was 
installed as Ratu Sultan Ingalaga. Together, the political skills and eco-
nomic power of the three queens were so great that they essentially 
ruled the country. In the rich pepper-growing areas of Merangin and 
Tembesi they took control of several villages formerly under Pangeran 
Dipanegara and on occasion even went to the ulu areas to collect pepper 
and carry off children, attractive maidens, and goods. Although one 
article of the 1683 treaty specifically attempted to exclude them from the 
pepper trade, they were known to be smuggling to Melaka, Riau, 
Macao, and Bengkalis, buying up supplies of the high-quality cloth 
available there from Indian and English traders. 55 Ratu Mas Tengah, 
the third royal consort, equipped a ship under a famed pirate, Panglima 
Teko, to trade in Siam, and the Dutch believed the desire of the queens 
for access to Siamese luxury goods lay behind the ruler's approach to 
Ayutthaya. Sultan Ingalaga seemed unable to refuse them any request. 
Orders reached Batavia for lace, mirrors, and textiles like gold cloth 
and gobar serasah "of the new kind,"56 in addition to the horses, dia-
monds, muskets, Dutch gunpowder, and gilded and flowered paper that 
the debt-ridden Jambi court was still purchasing. 
In a society disposed to perceive rulers as wise and caring, it was 
these "foreign" women, rather than Sultan Ingalaga himself, who 
initally felt the brunt of popular enmity. Their "insatiable lust" was 
viewed as the cause of Jambi's troubles, and they were blamed for the 
growing corvee burden that had fallen on upstream communities since 
the early 1670s. Recurring conflict had brought constant demands for 
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labor to defend the capital and prepare ships and defenses; in 1680, 
when an attack from Palembang was expected, there were claims that 
"all the ulu people in Jambi had been brought down." Two thousand 
men were sent to guard the Lalang area, through which passed the prin-
cipal land route between downstream Jambi and Palembang. No 
sooner had they returned to their village than another summons came 
for the bovenlanders to again come down to prepare stockades. The 
Dutch resident reported the apprehension of those upstream as they 
sought to escape the king's pressers. But even while most ulu people 
were working on Jambi's defenses and the construction of a new 
mosque, others were diverted upstream to cut wood for a "new fortified 
house for the ruler's first wife."57 In every sense the royal women, 
whose origins lay outside Jambi, seemed to fit one stereotype of the 
downstream queen, which presented her not as a caring mother but as a 
cruel manipulator of royal authority. 
Throughout the 1680s the growing impositions of the ilir made the 
upstream ripe for rebellion. All that was needed was a leader of stand-
ing. There were certainly several candidates available, but the clearest 
challenge came from Pangeran Dipanegara, whose family had long 
ruled over Merangin and who claimed that in genealogical terms he and 
his brother had greater rights to the throne than did Sultan Ingalaga 
himself. Following a public quarrel with the Jambi ruler, Pangeran 
Dipanegara fled upstream to Rawas, where he became a focus for dissi-
dent elements. 58 
Although Sultan Ingalaga managed to ride out this crisis, he was 
nonetheless desperately in need of support that would enhance his sta-
tus and economic resources. An apparent solution seemed to present 
itself in the person of an ousted Minangkabau ruler, Sultan Ahmad 
Syah, bearing the customary title yang dipertuan sakti, who appeared 
at Belitung in December 1684. Sultan Ahmad soon compelled attention 
because his call for a holy war against the infidel Dutch in preparation 
for an imminent Judgment Day and the end of the world appeared as 
the fulfillment of prophecy. In much of the archipelago the decade 
between the turn of the Javanese century in 1677 and that of the Mus-
lim calendar in 1688 had been a period of anticipation and apprehen-
sion, far this was one of those fateful times when it was expected that a 
leader would emerge to purify the faith and set the world to rights. 59 In 
a climate in which rumors of impending doom were gaining currency, 
Sultan Ahmad was widely regarded not merely as a scion of the revered 
Minangkabau line, but as a living god. Allied for a time with Palem-
bang's Pangeran Aria, he soon attracted several thousand people, not 
only Minangkabau but Makassarese and Malays from Riau, Johar, 
and Jambi. At first the Dutch dismissed Sultan Ahmad as simply 
another raider, but they grew more concerned when they learned that 
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letters announcing his mission were being sent to Aceh, west Sumatra, 
J ava, Borneo, and as far east as Sulawesi and Maluku. 60 
It was natural that Sultan Ahmad should look to Jambi for particular 
support because'ofitsspecial relationship with the Pagaruyung court. 
About 1680 Sunan Ingalaga had gone upstream to Jujuhan to meet 
Puteri Jainilan, the Minangkabau queen, and during this meeting the 
boundary and the authority of the J ambi ruler ove; Minangkabau liv-
ing along the Batang Hari had been reaffirmed. 61 In May 1686 an 
ambassador arrived in Tanah Pilih with the-request that Sultan Inga-
laga join Sultan Ahmad, offering in return a portion of any booty taken 
in battle. The Jambi ruler must have been delighted at the prestige of 
this association and at the potential wealth it promised, for in just a few 
months about four thousand Minangkabau-men, women, and chil-
dren-came to live in Jambi, where they were treated as the king's 
"spoiled darlings." Sometime after this the relationship between Sultan 
Ingalaga and Sultan Ahmad was affirmed when the Minangkabau 
leader adopted the Jambi ruler as a son. 62 
These events impelled Batavia to take action, for clearly the Com-
pany could not allow Jambi to fall under the influence of those who 
openly advocated a war to evict infidels. In May 1687 Gerrit Coster, 
assisted by troops from Banten and Palembang, led a vac expedition 
to blockade the J ambi River. But Sultan Ingalaga refused to comply 
with Coster's demand that he surrender all Minangkabau. He had 
sworn, he said, to be their protector. 63 When the anti-Dutch mood grew 
more threatening, the vac personnel in Jambi, fearing for their lives, 
secretly crept aboard one of the blockading Dutch ships. Sultan Inga-
laga and his wives took up residence in the Company lodge while the 
J ambi fleet was made ready and stockades constructed along the river-
banks. 
From his perceived position of strength, the Jambi ruler attempted to 
negotiate a truce. Rejecting his overtures, the Dutch withdrew to the 
Kompeh River about a mile below the town. Although vac forces 
were insufficient to ensure victory, Coster received unexpected support 
when several nobles and their followers defected. Among them was 
none other than Pangeran Dipati, Sultan Ingalaga's eldest son and heir 
to the throne. Daunted by the now formidable opposition, Sultan Inga-
laga fled upstream to Muara Tebo with his Minangkabau following and 
a few supporters. Downriver, Coster later wrote, "God blessed our 
weapons," and the town ofJambi was taken on 5 September 1687. Act-
ing on his own initiative, Coster then installed Pangeran Dipati as king 
of Jambi, naming him Sultan Kiai Gede, and in return the new ruler 
agreed that any remaining Minangkabau, Makassarese, and Bugis 
were to be expelled. 64 
In the formulation of memories of a Bad Time, this installation of a 
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Dutch client as ruler ofJambi was critical. A son's disobedience was not 
uncommon, particularly within the royal clan, but it could only be cul-
turally acceptable in extraordinary circumstances. Kiai Gede had pub-
licly sworn he would never recognize Sultan Ingalaga as his father" as 
long as there was breath in his body," but his defiance had been con-
doned and even rewarded. In the process the ambiguous relationship 
between J ambi kings and those of Palembang had been brought to the 
fore, since Sultan Abdul Rahman publicly demonstrated his continuing 
animosity toward Sultan Ingalaga by honoring Kiai Gede with the title 
of pangeran ratu. Pangeran Aria of Palembang also arrived in Jambi 
with a contingent of Komering troops to provide Kiai Gede with further 
support. The Jambi ruler was thus placed under a weighty debt, which 
he was not permitted to forget. During his stay in J ambi, for example, 
Pangeran Aria claimed a certain court lady as a gift for his father, even 
though he knew that the new Jambi ruler had enjoyed her for many 
years and had recently taken her as a lawful wife. 65 
Upstream, whence Sultan Ingalaga had fled, there could be no ques-
tion as to who should rightfully be king in J ambi. Past enmities forgot-
ten, interior communities, especially those living under the cultural 
shadow of Minangkabau, rallied to his support. At the same time Sul-
tan Ingalaga also attempted to subvert one of the bases of ilir strength 
by offering gifts and promising booty to the orang laut in return for 
assistance. When Coster set sail for Batavia with most of his force at the 
beginning of 1688, the situation was thus ripe for open confrontation 
between father and son. Accordingly, a company of more than two hun-
dred soldiers, together with a contingent of Palembang men, was left 
behind under the resident, Sijbrandt Swart, to prepare Tanah Pilih's 
defenses. 
As the water in the river rose after the wet season, Sultan Ingalaga 
was able to move downstream. On 16 March 1688 his army, made up of 
about fifteen hundred men and about a hundred women, was reported 
close to the capital. However, he decided against an attack and a few 
days later appeared at the Dutch lodge with a large following to negoti-
ate peace terms. In return for a satisfactory settlement, Sultan Ingalaga 
offered to give up claims to the throne and live quietly with his wives 
and children "just like Sultan Agung." Believing that this was simply a 
ruse, Swart unilaterally decided to take action. When Sultan Ingalaga 
fled to the home of one of the nobles, he was placed under arrest and put 
on a ship bound for Batavia, together with all his wives, children, con-
cubines, slaves, and personal belongings. InJuly 1688 Sultan Ingalaga, 
now an impoverished exile in Batavia, expressed his situation in the 
most emotive way he could. He felt, he said, as if he had "no father, 
mother, or brothers." 66 
As ifto echo Sultan Ingalaga's despair, the ever-tenuous but nonethe-
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less crucial alliance between Jambi's upstream and downstream fell 
apart as ulu supporters of the exiled ruler found a champion in his 
younger son, Pangeran Pringgabaya. Refusing to recognize his brother 
as ruler, Pringgabaya retreated upstream to Muara Tebo, where he 
founded a new settlement known as Mangunjaya. Under his rule it 
began operating as an independent kingdom, developing rice lands and 
even minting counterfeit Spanish rials. With their own ruler and capi-
tal, the ulu districts controlled by Pringgabaya were ready to counter 
any ilir claims to authority. Kiai Gede might have the sponsorship of the 
VQC, but Pringgabaya was under the patronage of Pagaruyung, to 
whom he had sent" a lump of earth, a drop of water, a fish and a cutting 
of grass" as a symbol that he submitted Jambi's lands, rivers and jun-
gles to Minangkabau overlordship. Kiai Gede might also have received 
honors from Palembang, but his brother could boast the prestigious title 
of sri maharaja batu johan pahlawan syah (great king and champion war-
rior), bestowed on him by the Pagaruyung court. 
In economic terms the Muara Tebo area became even more impor-
tant than before. Strategically placed on the junction of the Batang 
Hari, Tebo, and Sumai rivers, Mangunjaya was situated on the major 
land and river routes between Minangkabau, Inderagiri, and Tungkal 
and was connected by direct routes to the border settlement of Tanjung. 
From here mountain tracks led to Padang, Bengkulen, and other places 
on the west coast. These links quickly attracted Bugis traders, who 
brought cloth and salt to trade for pepper and the gold that was mined 
along the upper Batang Hari. The Johorese were also prominent in 
the Mangunjaya economy; they came up the Tungkal River and then 
walked overland with their opium and textiles purchased from Indian 
traders in Riau. Access via the Tembesi meant that people from Palem-
bang were similarly arriving in the area to buy and sell. It seems that 
Pringgabaya even gained the trust of the kubu, the collectors of forest 
produceY In 1691 his status was further raised when he was joined by 
Sultan Ingafaga's "father," Sultan Ahmad Syah, the yang dipertuan 
sakti, wnom many worshipped "as a god." With a combined force of 
about ten" thousand people, Pangeran Pringgabaya was said to reign in 
the intei1o'r' ""with more glory and might" than did his brother down-
stream. An Indication of his confidence was his decision to take the title 
of pangeran dipati anum, normally the prerogative of the heir to the 
throne. 68 
For thirty years Jambi was effectively divided at Muara Tembesi into 
two kiJ:lgdoms, one centered upstream at Mangunjaya and the other 
downstream at Tanah Pilih. Despite several attempts, it was impossible 
for Kiai Cede to evict Pringgabaya by force, even with vac help. 
Mangunjaya was an estimated forty Dutch miles from the downstream 
capital, which meant five or six days' hard rowing. During the wet sea-
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son the river's strong downward flow impeded movement upstream, 
and even during drier periods skilled navigation was necessary because 
of the many unseen snags and shifting currents. Although Kiai Gede 
had great faith in European weaponry, it had little effect on the success 
or failure of campaigns in the interior. The cannonades and blockades 
that had been fairly effective in besieging downstream settlements were 
useless, for boats were always vulnerable to hidden enemy attack from 
the jungle curtain, and it was not easy to engage the enemy in battle on 
land. The terrain was uncompromising, covered with thick rain forest 
marked only by tracks which were sometimes blocked by bamboo 
stakes. Requisition of food locally was difficult and unpredictable 
because villages were scattered and their inhabitants likely to flee at any 
sign of danger. Occasionally troops might come across a plot of rice in 
the jungle, but an active native soldier, the Dutch estimated, required 
at the minimum 1.5 pounds of rice (about .75 kilograms) per day. Ade-
quate supplies therefore had to be transported. In addition, the porters 
needed to carry kajang mats, rattans, ammunition, and guns, as well as 
cloth and other gifts necessary to win and maintain the loyalty of pot en-
tial followers. Finally, sickness was an ever-present threat, and was 
often fatal. In 1690, for instance, the resident reported to Batavia that 
on his most recent trip upstream his "fireworker" had died. 69 
Pringgabaya's army also faced problems. Like Kiai Gede, he shared 
the conviction that European-style weapons were essential in warfare, 
but they were expensive and difficult to obtain. Javanese-made bullets, 
for instance, cost about four to ten rijksdaalders per hundred, while 
Malay gunpowder (to which pepper was sometimes added) cost one 
rijksdaalder the gantang. English gunpowder, found to be particularly 
suited to native flintlocks, was preferred, but it too was scarce. 70 Some 
villages made their own artillery and ammunition, but this required 
access to materials. Local army leaders were of necessity active traders, 
and Pringgabaya kept himself supplied with the means to manufacture 
ammunition and weapons by exchanging upstream gold for lead, tin, 
and iron from Johor traders. Like his brother, he also faced the problem 
of feeding the large and uncoordinated body of men, women, and chil-
dren that made up a native force. Although stockades were normally 
connected by paths to nearby villages, if an army was hungry it simply 
melted away. Villagers coerced into military service would usually stay 
with their leader as long as he could feed them, but there was frequent 
mention of "overlopers," that is, the people who fled from one side to 
another primarily to obtain food. Amoeba-like, an army's size con-
stantly fluctuated, reflecting not only the prestige of the leader, but the 
priorities of its members. It could shrink markedly, for instance, when 
time came to plant padi and could even abandon the field if some trag-
edy, such as the death of a leader's child, was seen to portend defeat. 
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Despite the political stalemate, it soon became apparent that in eco-
nomic terms Kiai Gedt: was fighting a losing battle. In 1689 no pepper 
at all reached the Dutch lodge, and by 1695 the Tanah Pilih population 
was so poor that when two Banten ships br~ught in a hundred corge of 
cloth (about two thousariapieces), it was sufficient to supply demand 
for tfie next three years. Even rough Javanese cloth was too expensive 
for some people, though it cost only ~2S ria.l a piece. Local women 
began once more to weave, a practice that appears to have been less 
common during the days when the pepper market was buoyant and 
Indian cloth plentiful and cheap. "There are now as many looms as 
there are people," commented the resident.71 Rice was particularly 
dear, partly because the harvests of 1691 and 1694 had been destroyed 
by flooding, but primarily because of the lack of Javanese ships. By 
1695 the cost was between fifty and sixty rials the koyan, and two years 
later there was "no rice at any price." Previously one of the major items 
the downstream offered to the interior had been salt brought by 
Javanese and Siamese traders, but now this too was in short supply. As 
the years went by the situation was to deteriorate further. In 1707 rice in 
Jambi cost forty-three rijksdaalders the koyan as against thirty-two in 
Palembang and thirty inJava; salt was fifteen rijksdaalders the koyan in 
Palembang, but thirty-two in Jambi. 72 ' 
Economic contrasts reflected other changes in the relationship be-
tween Jambi and Palembang as Kiai Gerlt: began to resent the inferior 
status his obligations had imposed on him. Ignoring years of strife, .Kiai 
Gedt: harked back to times when, he said, the two countries had lived 
"in good brotherhood" and when there had been an understanding that 
"Palembang should not despoil Jambi, nor Jambi Palembang." Cur-
rently it seemed that Sultan Abdul Rahman and his son intended to 
extend their control over all J ambi. 73 The imbalance in the J ambi-
Palembang relationship was publicly demonstrated in the behavior of 
the royal family. When the 1678 treaty between the vac and Palem-
bang had been concluded, Sultan Agung had supervised proceedings so 
that it was drawn up "in the Jambi manner." During his stay in Palem-
bang he had been treated with great honor, with Sultan Abdul Rahman 
sitting on a cushion at his feet. With the situation reversed, the J ambi 
ruler Kiai Gedt: was now obliged to defer to his Palembang "father." 
Batavian officials, who had long believed that the close relationship 
between J ambi and Palembang was not in vac interests, cared little 
for such tensions as long as trade was not affected. Indeed, Dutch 
actions themselves served to point up Palembang's higher standing. In 
1690 the vac drastically reduced its representation in Jambi because 
of continuing losses and the murder of Swart by one of his slaves. A 
small contingent remained, but administratively it was under the resi-
dent of Palembang, who continued to report on Jambi affairs until 
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1707. Should either Kiai Gede or his brother wish to communicate with 
Batavia, he was required to use the Palembang resident as intermedi-
ary. The gifts the Palembang ruler sent to the Kiai Gede in mid-1694 
were a symbolic reminder of the inequity in their status, reminiscent of 
the relationship Palembang had once had with Mataram. Sultan Abdul 
Rahman presented his Jambi client with "a thin horse and a perahu 
jalur," but in return he asked from Jambi "a musket, a dancemaiden, 
and a smith."74 
Palembang's superiority to J ambi was further demonstrated in demo-
graphic terms. Repeatedly Kiai Gede complained of raids into Tembesi 
by Palembang people, and in 1688 it was reported that about two thou-
sand people from this region and Merangin, "the best and only pepper 
area of this kingdom," had been captured and taken away. In one dis-
trict there were said to be were no inhabitants at all for a distance of 
about thirty or forty Dutch miles. 75 Many were also leaving voluntarily, 
seeking a new overlord in Palembang, where there were reputed to be 
"mountains of gold." Nor was it only ordinary men and women who 
were migrating. One Jambi noble who had cooperated with the Dutch 
also decided to move to Palembang, bringing with him forty-one peo-
ple, including women, children, and slaves. Another, who had been 
given a wife in Jambi to persuade him to stay, preferred to go to Palem-
bang, where he had been honored with high status and a noble title. 76 
Kiai Gede also lost control over Tungkal, another area of economic 
importance that had long been disputed between Jambi and Johor. In 
1695 Johor's claims here seemed established, but in 1706 it was once 
again given to Jambi by the ruler of Johor as a gesture of goodwill. 
However, the people of Tungkal claimed that their connections were not 
with Kiai Gede but with Pangeran Pringgabaya in Mangunjaya; they 
had previously been under the panembahan and now wished to be 
under the person they considered his rightful heir. Since they were not 
of Sultan Ingalaga's lineage, they said, Kiai Gede could not compel 
them to be his subjects. By 1708 Pringgabaya was theoretically lord of 
Tungkal, although much of the trade was still going to J ohor. 77 
To Kiai Gede's surrender of authority over the upstream and the 
periphery was added the drift of people from his ilir capital. Not only 
was he losing subjects to Palembang, Inderagiri, Johor; they were also 
fleeing upstream, sometimes conducted secretly at night by Pangeran 
Pringgabaya's recruiters. For Kiai Gede the lurking specter of becom-
ing a king without subjects looked set to become reality. In 1695 there 
were only six hundred men in Tanah Pilih able to carry arms, and the 
next year this had fallen to four hundred. The twenty-five people allo-
cated each day to defend the town were simply not enough to inspire 
confidence. 78 
A further matter for concern was the collapse of Kiai Gede's ties with 
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the orang laut, traditionally so closely connected with the J ambi royal 
house. Previously the people of Simpang (Kuala Nior) had always been 
on guard to act as pilots and envoys, but now they could be absent for 
weeks at a time. Often a Dutch ship would arrive in the river and find 
there was no one to take up Batavia's letters or assist the crew with load-
ing and unloading vessels. The departure of so many orang laut meant 
those who were left were more vulnerable to raids by other groups from 
Palembang and Johor. In this situation Kiai Gede's attempts to compel 
orang laut loyalty by calling up their debts were of no avail. There were 
indeed local orang laut preying on the few Javanese vessels whose cap-
tains still saw some benefit in coming to Jambi, but their booty did not 
reach the downstream court. 79 
If more evidence of Kiai Gede's failures was needed, it could be seen 
in his inability to hold the tenuous loyalty of that shadowy group, the 
orang kubu. Under Sultan Agung the prestige of the downstream ruler 
had been such that even "a party of wild people, alias orang kubu" was 
willing to accept his mediation in their disputes. But in 1692 some orang 
kubu were in open revolt, their attacks so effective that no one from 
Tanah Pilih dared venture out into their rice fields. The reason for 
orang kubu anger was straightforward: Kiai Gede had sold into slavery 
three of their children who had been presented to him as a gift. The 
Lalang River kubu also renounced Jambi's overlordship, and no trade 
in jungle products was possible. Without the loyalty of trusted middle-
men, it was impossible to make contact with the forest dwellers, and in 
1694 VOC representatives in Jambi were unable to obtain a supply of 
rattans Batavia had requested because the "wild people" had fled. 80 
It was the upstream Minangkabau who lost most by the disruption of 
trade caused by the ulu-ilir division, and it was they who took the initia-
tive to try and reconcile the two brothers. In 1696 the "emperor of the 
Minangkabau," with the assistance ofleading Islamic elders, attempted 
to bring about a reunion. Nearly two years later, in July 1698, Kiai 
Gede went upstream for a prearranged meeting, leaving his women and 
children in the care of the Dutch sergeant. During this gathering, 
attended by the Minangkabau chiefs and a large number of interior 
people, a solemn oath was sworn between the two brothers, and Kiai 
Gede handed over the kris Macan Turu (Sleeping Tiger) as a sign that 
he was willing to see the throne pass to Pringgabaya's son. He also 
agreed that he should retire to "old Jambi" and live privately, like his 
grandfather Sultan Agung. To affirm the promises made, the oath of 
reconciliation was then engraved on a copper or silver plate and worn 
by Pringgabaya as a belt, while he himself gave a daughter to Kiai Gede 
to rear as his own child. In the optimism that followed this apparent 
reunion, three hundred people came downstream to trade. 81 
It soon became clear, however, that the 1698 agreement was insuffi-
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cient to allay the animosity between the two brothers, and perceptions 
of a Bad Time appeared to be confirmed as Jambi remained divided. 
Pringgabaya was still upstream, and Kiai Gede refused to honor his 
oath and surrender royal authority, even though he himself was increas-
ingly alienated from his people. Looming behind this rejection by so 
many of his subjects was the darkening sense of a lost legitimacy sug-
gested in Dutch sources and spelled out in oral tradition. Going against 
the normal manner in which myths are constructed, legends telling of 
the loss of sacred items by the king convey messages of the deep cultural 
unease that became attached to memories of Kiai Gede's reign. Accord-
ing to one story the sultan of J ohor seized J ambi' s sacred weapons and 
gongs; another account relates the loss of the kris Si Genjai when the 
J ambi ruler fled upstream. 82 Dutch records in fact show that after the 
attack of 1687 the sacred cannon, Linda Mustaka and Linda Panon, 
believed to embody the protective powers that guarded the country, 
were taken into vac custody. In vain did Kiai Gede argue for the 
return of these items, which "were always passed from king to king. 
The kingdom of Jambi should not be deprived of them." Sultan Inga-
laga had also taken with him into exile the sword Sri Mengula and the 
kris Banyak Putera, which were still in Dutch hands in the eighteenth 
century and which, said the J ambi ruler, "belonged to his ancestors."83 
The absence of Jambi's palladia in a sense prefigured the economic 
decline now occurring. Without the regalia, poverty and distress were 
not only expected but, in cultural terms, inevitable. 
Kiai Gede's personal situation was rendered more vulnerable by the 
widespread belief that Jambi's rapid deterioration must have resulted 
from some heinous act among one of the highborn, almost certainly the 
king. Accusations that he had committed one of the greatest sins, repu-
diation of his father, were now heard more frequently; it was, people 
said, "an offence against God and custom." Pringgabaya made it 
known that any money and gifts he collected in the ulu were to be sent 
to Batavia for Ingalaga's upkeep, since Kiai Gede had refused to recog-
nize his filial obligations. Furthermore, said Pringgabaya, the Islamic 
teachers had told him that he would be "cursed by God" if he did not 
bring about his father's return and that the country could never prosper 
unless Sultan Ingalaga or the queen came back to Jambi. If rebellion 
was necessary to accomplish this, it would be "according to the customs 
and obligations which children owe their parents."84 
The actions of Kiai Gede himself further heightened the sense of 
moral breakdown and impending catastrophe. So anxious was he to 
gain a following that any fugitive who fled from the interior was made 
"quality" and given a river district to command. Searching desperately 
for ways to alleviate his financial distress, Kiai Gede flouted many of 
the age-old strictures governing the conduct of kings and thus 
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heightened the widespread hostility toward him. He was accused, for 
instance, of taking freeborn people and selling them as slaves, of imp os-
ing large undeserved fines, and of stealing from his own family under 
the pretense of borrowing. He even sold off the dowries of some of the 
court women, including items that had been brought from Palembang. 
Not surprisingly, the principal court ladies and several of his best sol-
diers secretly fled up to Pringgabaya in the interior. Deserted by the 
orang laut, Kiai Gede used his guardsmen to act as his pirates, and 
groups of about fifty men were permitted to steal at will, attacking any 
trader bold enough to come downstream. As a reward for sharing their 
booty with him they were permitted access to court women, but their 
conduct soon showed they were beyond Kiai Gede's control. From any 
other subject, murder and theft on the scale practiced by Kiai Gede's 
guards would have meant death by the kris and the imprisonment of 
wife and children, but he was afraid to take any action against them lest 
they leave him bereft of support. 85 
The greatest condemnation of Kiai Gede was the widespread belief 
that he had defied the laws governing sexual relations. It was irrelevant 
that Dutch inquiries found no evidence to support these allegations; 
Kiai Gede's reign was already being seen as a Bad Time, integral to 
which was royal immorality. Popular imagery thus hastened to provide 
supporting stories of incest, sodomy, and "unnatural" treatment of 
royal women. Kiai Gede was said to have taken as a concubine his 
niece, Pringgabaya's daughter, who had been given to him to rear in 
1698; according to rumor he had even slept with his sister and his own 
daughter. 86 Although those involved denied anything improper had 
occurred, this purported incest aroused Pringgabaya so much that he 
publicly announced he intended to kill his brother. The upstream 
nobles said they too could no longer tolerate Kiai Gede's rule because 
he had taken a concubine of Sultan Ingalaga as his own while his father 
was still alive. Talk of a "foulness" in Jambi that needed to be cleansed 
implanted memories that did not easily disappear. Traditions collected 
in later times condemned Kiai Gede for alleged incest with his mother, 
while one account ascribes the division of Jambi to "something evil" 
between Kiai Gede and a woman belonging to his "father," Sultan 
Agung. He had also committed derhaka by attempting to kill Sultan 
Agung and then by persuading the Dutch to banish him. In these stories 
Kiai Gede is clearly presented as a usurper guilty of heinous crimes who 
has used the vac to attain his own ends. So reprehensible was his 
behavior that in the nineteenth century his heirs were still excluded 
from the J ambi succession. 87 
If any further proof were needed at the time of Kiai Gede's unsuita-
bility as king, it was his persistent failure to bear sons, whereas Pringga-
baya could boast proudly of six. It must have seemed like an omen in 
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1693 when there was a widespread epidemic illness lasting three 
months. Several court women died, among them Kiai Gede's pregnant 
wife, delivered of a baby son who also failed to survive. Surrounded by 
hostility, fearing for his own life, Kiai Gede was so devastated by this 
tragedy that he said he would give up the throne. 88 He now depended 
totally on Dutch support and went nowhere without his women and his 
personal store of wealth. 
Meanwhile, the deteriorating economic situation had impelled the 
vac to reconsider its commitment to J ambi, and in January 1697 the 
Dutch military complement was again reduced. Since the vac seemed 
to have no confidence in Kiai Gede, the position of Pringgabaya 
appeared even stronger following the 1698 agreement. His constant 
claim that he was not aiming for power for himself but merely acting as 
a dutiful son fed the popular belief that the Sultan Ingalaga, the true 
king, caring and paternal, would someday return to Jambi and bring 
back the prosperous days of the past. The resentment that had surfaced 
during his reign was forgotten as messages, remembrances, even one of 
his teeth were sent back to Jambi to encourage his supporters. Expecta-
tions of Sultan Ingalaga's imminent return were fostered, if anything, 
by his death in 1699, for when his body was returned to Jambi, Kiai 
Gede had it buried secretly with none of the normal ceremony. Many 
people refused to believe that their king was dead, claiming that a 
Dutchman had been buried in his place. 89 
By the end of the century the Bad Time in Jambi had become even 
worse because the situation in the ulu was hardly better than that in the 
ilir. Pringgabaya lacked the earlier patronage he had received from the 
Minangkabau, since he had fallen out with the powerful yang dipertuan 
sakti when the latter tried to extend his control over much of the 
Minangkabau-settled interior. Quarrels also broke out with the Mi-
nangkabau heads at the upper reaches of the Batang Hari, who objected 
to the manner in which Pringgabaya had interfered with their trade and 
his usurpation of authority in an area where "our grandfathers had 
control." His efforts to monopolize commerce with the downstream dis-
tricts had forced salt up to the extraordinary price of eighty rijks-
daalders the koyan, and most settlements above Mangunjaya, includ-
ing the Minangkabau areas of Tujuh Kota and Sembilan Kota, rejected 
his authority. Finally, Pringgabaya was no longer acknowledged in the 
rich pepper area of Merangin, where the son of the old Pangeran 
Dipanegara, aided by his economic links with Bengkulen and Kerinci, 
had reestablished control. 90 
To assert his position, Pringgabaya turned to force; in the ensuing 
raids and skirmishes, villages were burned and their occupants put to 
flight. The situation worsened as men of little experience favored by 
Pringgabaya were elevated to positions of considerable power. A new 
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administration was introduced, termed the raja sembilan belas (the nine-
teen lords), "all of them Bugis, Makassarese, slaves and runaways"; 
they were given control over the upland rivers, and nothing could be 
done without their approval. In other areas Pringgabaya sought to bind 
people to him by the presentation of gifts and titles. Soldiers fleeing 
from the ilir were welcomed and given new positions; some local 
authorities were now entitled to call themselves pangeran, a term previ-
ously reserved for princes. The growing hostility to Pringgabaya meant 
that he, like Kiai Gede, began to fear for his life. Never moving without 
his wife and treasure (a few piculs of gold), he prepared his own food to 
avoid poison and refused to take any action without consulting" a cer-
tain book which Malays call kitab kelima" in search of auspicious 
moments. 91 
In these unsettled circumstances the pepper trade in J ambi showed 
no signs of improvement. The tiny contingent of "postholders" left to 
guard the vac compound reported that only 130 piculs of pepper had 
been delivered in the 1704 book year, and in the following twelve 
months it was even less. Yet the Dutch were reluctant to abandon the 
post because of fears that the English might return. By 1706 Batavia 
was convinced that definite action was necessary, and in October of that 
year the incoming governor of Melaka and the new Palembang resident 
went to J ambi in an effort to organize some solution regarding the ques-
tion of who should rule. Attempts to negotiate a settlement were frus-
trated, however, because Pringgabaya refused to meet his brother, 
accusing him of incest and disloyalty to their father. 92 In September 
1707 another envoy, Abraham Patras, therefore arrived in J ambi to 
take up where the previous mission had left off. 
Patras found the situation in J ambi extremely complex. The animos-
ity between the two brothers was intense, and there were constant 
rumors of planned assassinations. Nor could he detect any popular feel-
ing favoring one prince above the other, although he believed no other 
individual would be accepted as king as long as either was alive. What 
was clear was the deplorable state of the country, the flight of its people, 
and the desperate need for the restoration of peace and the union of ulu 
and ilir so that trade could revive. The nobles who communicated with 
Patras had no doubt about the proper solution. First, the contract with 
the Dutch should be revived, and the Company should return "as in the 
time when the panembahan first established himself at Kota Baru" 
(Tanah Pilih). Second, the people wanted a reconciliation between their 
two princes so they could reign together as Sultan Agung and his son 
Sultan Ingalaga had done so many years before. Sultan Agung, it was 
pointed out, had stepped aside to allow his son to govern while he him-
self had retained the respect due the senior ruler. 93 
After several months of negotiations, Patras was able to institute a 
142 Rulers and Memories 
meeting between the two brothers, and on 14 August 1708 a "brotherly 
oath of friendship" was sworn at the paseban, the great gathering place. 
In an assembly of princes, nobles, and common people, Pringgabaya 
vowed that Kiai Gede, as his older brother, should be the senior king, 
"just like Sultan Agung in the time of Sultan Ingalaga, that is how we 
shall be." On 10 September Kiai Gede formerly installed Pringgabaya 
as younger king and regent of the whole kingdom. To record this 
momentous event, Pringgabaya, the nobles, and the interior heads 
asked Patras to assist them in setting out a written record of the prom-
ises that had been made, which were to come into effect as soon as Kiai 
Gede handed over the state kris. Dated 14 Rajab, Saturday evening in 
the year 1119,94 this compact set out the following terms: 
1. All the people of the nine rivers asked that the same methods of gov-
ernment be adopted by Sultan Kiai Gede and Sultan Sri Maharaja 
Batu (i.e., Pringgabaya) as in the time of Sultan Agung and Sultan 
Ingalaga. 
2. Each should forget the ills done to each other and should live like Sul-
tan Agung and Sultan Ingalaga, since Sultan Ingalaga and all the 
nobles and princes and ordinary people of Jambi had respected Sul-
tan Agung. Everyone, including Sultan Sri Maharaja Batu, would 
be obliged to honor Kiai Gede in the same way as Sultan Ingalaga 
had honored Sultan Agung. 
3. Anyone who had previously criticized either king, whether prince, 
noble, or ordinary person, should be pardoned. But henceforth, any 
critics would be punished by the two brothers acting together. 
4. Sultan Kiai Gede was to live like Sultan Agung and enjoy the same 
privileges. Raja Maharaja Batu should live at Tanah Pilih like Sul-
tan Ingalaga with his wives, children, and grandchildren. 
5. All the inhabitants of Jambi should be permitted to return to their 
original homes, whether upstream or downstream, where they could 
live with their relatives. 
6. The Minangkabau should be treated well, as in the time of Sultan 
Agung and Sultan Ingalaga. A syahbandar should be appointed, 
Mangunjaya should be abandoned and all the guns brought down to 
Tanah Pilih. 
7. If either prince failed to recognize these promises, he would not be 
honored as king. 
8. Raja Maharaja Batu was to live in peace with the Company, like Kiai 
Gede, as customary from olden times. 
A crucial factor in restoring the Good Time of Sultan Agung was the 
return of the English. As one noble put it, "Before, when Jambi was 
flourishing, there were two lodges, that of the English and that of the 
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Company."95 The final clause of this compact therefore specified that 
the English should be allowed to return to Jambi and open a post. On 
their own initiative, the court was also responsible for drawing up 
another agreement to regulate the flow of revenue and labor to the 
ruler. Dated Jumadilakhir, Tuesday, 1119, at the time of eight 0' clock, 
it proclaimed that "on this day all was forgiven, and this will last forever 
for the children and children's children who live along the Jambi 
river."96 The people of Sungai Tabir were to bring Sultan Kiai Gede 
tribute, while responsibilities for supplying his guard, bringing his 
wood and water, and performing other corvee services were shared 
among several other communities living along tributaries of the Batang 
Hari. The final document drawn up by the court took the form of a 
genealogy of past J ambi kings with Pringgabaya presented as their suc-
cessor. In return he promised to govern correctly and to protect traders 
from all interference. During a communal celebration of the conjunc-
tion of the present and the past, a great feast was held on the Dutch side 
of the river, and the head imam read aloud for all to hear the vows 
Pringgabaya had made. 97 
Means of measuring the passing of time, though of growing interest 
within court circles, had little relevance for the mass of people in Palem-
bang and Jambi. For them, historical time was heroic time, and the sig-
nificant events of the past were remembered through their association 
with the great ancestors. In Palembang, where the written records of 
the Dutch East India Company provide an understanding of why mem-
ories associated with Sultan Abdul Rahman endured, the emergence of 
rulers as culturally heavy figures who ruled over a Good Time exerted a 
significant influence on the the ruler-subject relationship. By attaching 
the activities of his or her own forebears to the "time" of legendary but 
powerfully encoded names like Sultan Cinde Balang or Ratu Sinuhun, 
the common person acquired access to a weighted and prestigious past. 
But whereas in Palembang the standing of kingship was considerably 
enhanced during the last part of the seventeenth century, the situation 
in Jambi evolved quite differently. Here the death of Sultan Agung in 
1679 symbolized the end of the Good Time. The economic decline that 
followed and the ulu-ilir division saw a marked deterioration in the 
emotional attachment to individual rulers. The written contracts drawn 
up in the J ambi court in 1708 were concluded in the belief that time 
could in a sense be recreated, that the solemn conclusion of these com-
pacts would bring back the Good Time of the panembahan and of Sul-
tan Agung. But full equality was impossible in any brotherly relation-
ship, and if Pringgabaya were to model himself after Sultan Ingalaga 
and become Jambi's senior ruler, it was necessary that his elder brother 
stand aside as their grandfather Sultan Agung had done. However, at 
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this very point Kiai Gede, previously willing enough to take a subservi-
ent position, was presented with a newborn son by "Nyai Kedil, one of 
his legal wives, and also his dearest."98 Rescued from the fate of tung-
guan putus, Kiai Gede was now filled with the ambition of bequeathing 
kingship to his own descendants. In consequence, the possibility of any 
immediate resolution to the J ambi conflicts began to slip further away. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Contracts and Obligations: 
Upstream -Downstream 
Relations in Eighteenth-Century 
Jambi 
The European convIctIOn that trade was best con-
ducted within a framework of written records is perhaps most clearly 
exemplified by the numerous contracts the vac concluded in Asia, for 
the perception of these agreements as the basis for its commercial activi-
ties lay at the heart of the Company's dealings with Indonesian king-
doms. Throughout nearly two hundred years vac representatives held 
firmly to the belief that once two parties had agreed on terms and had 
signed copies, the contract should structure their relationship. If both 
sides accepted and understood this document, any deviation from the 
agreed text must be regarded as an offense, and the Company was 
empowered to take appropriate measures to protect its trade should the 
cosignatories practice" deception." 
The people of J ambi and Palembang were well accustomed to the 
idea of a contractual friendship. For generations relations between indi-
viduals and groups had been solemnized by ritual, communal feasting, 
the swearing of oaths, the threat of supernatural punishment should 
promises be broken, and above all by exchanges intended to affirm the 
alliance. The most lasting manifestation of friendship was always .the 
creation of new kinship ties by the giving and receiving of women and 
by ceremonies during which the leader of one group adopted the other 
as a son or brother. At the same time, these ties could be reinforced by 
other solemnities. Frequently, for instance, a buffalo representing the 
unity of two groups was slaughtered and the meat and blood then ritu-
ally consumed. Each party took a horn, on which a record telling of 
their agreement might be incised. This was then retained in the com-
munity as a sacred heirloom. In a quarrel between two marga in 
Komering ulu in the nineteenth century one headman thus produced a 
buffalo horn dated 1576 A.J. (1653 C.E.) as proof of his clan's territorial 
rights.! 
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Stored with the community's ritual objects, such indigenous contracts 
were normally revered rather than consulted. In a society where literacy 
was limited it was far easier to direct questions toward some respected 
elder who could provide an authoritative answer; as a result of this reli-
ance on oral transmission, the understanding of what some past con-
tract contained might be quite different from actuality. In the mid-nine-
teenth century, for instance, a Lampung man brought out a treasured 
copper piagem that his ancestors had received from Banten and asked 
a Dutch official the meaning of the Javanese inscription. He was upset 
to discover that "it did not say how far the authority of his lineage 
reached." This piagem, like other "documents," had been treasured 
not just because it was a symbolic reminder of a past agreement, but 
because it was imbued with its own sacral force. When a visitor to the 
Pasemah region was shown copies of treaties local groups had made 
with Stamford Raffles, he found that the wax seals were invariably 
missing. Since they were believed to contain the concentrated power of 
the signatories and to be charged with the sanctity of the exchange, the 
people had eaten them. "Somehow, should the writing get lost the seal 
at any rate had become part of themselves and its potency would 
descend to their heirs."2 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these attitudes were often 
puzzling to Europeans. In Dutch eyes, treaties were certainly a declara-
tion of friendship, but their primary purpose was to facilitate trade and 
to list specific commercial arrangements to which both sides were 
bound. They were not in any way "sacred" and could be altered or 
renegotiated to suit changing circumstances. When local kings avowed 
their friendship but disregarded the contract provisions, their behavior 
was regarded as further evidence of native perfidy. But despite constant 
disillusionment, vac officials continued to believe that the key to com-
mercial success lay in the signing of an advantageous contract, which 
the native signatory would honor. For their part, the courts of J ambi 
and Palembang did understand that contracts were a formal announce-
ment of the relationship with the Europeans, and as time went on more 
discussion was given to the implications of particular articles. But for 
them the most important clause was always the first, with its affirmation 
of lasting friendship and its promise of an enduring tolong-menolong 
association not only with this king but with his descendants. The 
remainder of the contract was always subsidiary to this great declara-
tion. 
Following the formal signing of the contract, copies bearing the seals 
of the vac, various nobles, and the king himself were exchanged. In 
Jambi and Palembang, where these sacrally charged items were nor-
mally kept with the royal regalia, the occasional losses of original con-
tracts in Batavia would have been bewildering if not incomprehensible. 
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In the courts of southeast Sumatra the signed copies were viewed in the 
same light as the buffalo horns of the ancient oaths. Like the charters of 
medieval England, they were "a symbolic replica of the ritual by which 
the exchange was solemnized ... both a legal record and a quasi-magi-
cal object."3 No royal wedding ever bound the "brother" or the 
"father" in Batavia to the royal houses of Jambi and Palembang, and 
no progeny were produced as a living testimony to their close relation-
ship. But in nineteenth-century Palembang court officials nonetheless 
believed that when contracts had been signed with the Dutch a hundred 
years earlier forty youths and forty maidens had been sent to Batavia, 
like the legendary exchanges that had once occurred with China. 4 In 
effect, the contract had made them kin. The varying hopes and expecta-
tions that resulted from the contract/kinsman association are no better 
exemplified than in the relationship between the vac and J ambi dur-
ing the eighteenth century. 
Efforts at Ulu-lIir Reconciliation 
For a short time after the agreement of September 1708 the Dutch were 
confident that a signed contract would be sufficient to maintain the 
older king-younger king concept and restore Jambi's prosperity. It soon 
became apparent, however, that this division of authority was unworka-
ble. In the first place, Kiai Gede was clearly reluctant to relinquish gov-
ernment and assume the passivity associated with the senior ruler. The 
birth of his son had fostered hopes that he could retain kingship in his 
own lineage, and he was heartened by the support he received from Sul-
tan Mansur of Palembang, who had adopted the newborn prince as his 
own child. There was even some talk in Jambi that Kiai Gede might 
marry a Palembang princess. A year after the 1708 contract he had not 
honored the agreement to leave the royal residence and move to the 
house his father had once occupied, and Pangeran Pringgabaya was still 
living on his boat moored on the river. 5 
In the second place, Pangeran Pringgabaya's ability to command 
popular support as the reigning king was increasingly under question. 
In the downstream port it was felt that he lacked commitment to the ilir, 
since he and his leading supporters had left their wives and children in 
Mangunjaya and had not allowed the downstream people taken there in 
former times to return home. His real ties were in the ulu, where he had 
lived for twenty years, and his refusal to relinquish the revenues of Sun-
gai Tabir was a particularly contentious issue, since this district had 
been intended to provide Kiai Gede with an income. But the very 
strength of Pring gabay a's position in the ulu also began to work against 
him. In the competition with his brother to control both people and 
resources, Pringgabaya soon began to transgress the bounds separating 
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the obligations due an overlord from simple exploitation. The 
Minangkabau at the headwaters of the Batang Hari resented his inter-
ference in trade, while the people of Tujuh Kota had openly declared 
they they would not accept his authority and were already building 
defenses in expectation of warfare. Pringgabaya had also alienated 
Pangeran Sutawijaya, the mangkubumi (first minister) and heir to the 
pepper-rich Merangin area. Betrothed to Sutawijaya's sister for twelve 
years, Pringgabaya seemed reluctant to conclude the marriage, and he 
had attempted to install his favorite, a former Makassar slave, as 
Merangin's head. The people of Merangin strongly resisted this move, 
and Pangeran Sutawijaya, understandably alienated, had promised 
Kiai Gede that if good military leadership were available, he would take 
up arms against Pringgabaya. 6 
Despite the complexity of the situation, Dutch faith in the powers of 
the contract appeared unshaken. In November 1709 the vac adminis-
trators in Batavia drew up a draft treaty, which the Jambi resident, 
Abraham Patras, presented to the two brothers. Confirming vac 
monopolies over trade in pepper and opium, it named as negotiating 
parties the Dutch East India Company on the one side and on the other 
"the kings Kiai Gede and Sri Maharaja Batu Johan Pahlawan Alam 
Syah, the first as senior and the second as reigning sultan.'" 
The J ambi nobles, equally concerned at the continuing hostility 
between the brothers, also sought to oversee a reconciliation, invoking 
the age-old tradition of the verbal oath, made even more potent by a 
contract in the Dutch style. In late 1709, at the liminal period between 
Syaban, the eighth month of the Islamic calendar, when the ancestors 
were traditionally propitiated, and the onset of the holy fasting month of 
Ramadhan, they supervised the swearing of friendship between Kiai 
Gede and Pringgabaya. Under the supervision of the jakih (Muslim 
legal authority) the two brothers affixed their seals to a written docu-
ment dated "1121, the year Wau, 30 Syaban, at eight o'clock" (4-
November 1709). By this they promised "in the name of Allah" to gov-
ern "as in the time of Sultan Agung," since Allah "had put kings on the 
earth to do good and to follow the law of Allah." In the presence of all 
the leading nobles, the princes held hands and vowed that if they did 
harm to each other, or their people, or their women, they would justly 
merit divine retribution. 8 
Efforts to find a solution to the J ambi question were also initiated by 
Minangkabau leaders, who as always were concerned about develop-
ments in Jambi because of the potential disruption to trade. Although 
Muara Tebo still operated as an exchange point, especially for cheap 
Indian cloth brought up from Padang and Bengkulen, the ulu's access 
to salt had been restricted in recent times by the effects of the vac's 
monopoly on the west coast and its destruction of salt pans there. Since, 
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in the words of Patras, the ulu "could not do without salt," upstream 
traders now began to arrive in Tanah Pilih, bringing with them the 
serviceable Indian cloth that they bought elsewhere and sold much 
more cheaply than the VOC. The salt they brought was imported from 
Batavia and Java's east coast and normally sold for the equivalent of 
twelve to sixteen rijksdaalders the koyan. Like the Dutch, however, 
Kiai Gede realized that access to salt could be a means of compelling 
ulu compliance. In 1707, having purchased a large portion of available 
supplies, Kiai Gede was able in effect to operate a monopoly, charging 
twenty-eight rijksdaalders the koyan. 9 Because of the need to guarantee 
unimpeded access to such essential items, Minangkabau leaders on the 
upper Batang Hari believed that some resolution with the downstream 
court was necessary. Indeed, this was considered so crucial that appeals 
for mediation went beyond the rantau areas and up to the court of 
Pagaruyung itself. 
The subsequent Minangkabau intervention in the J ambi disputes 
was especially significant because of the awe with which the Pagaru-
yung rulers were popularly regarded and the powers associated with 
them. The impressive letters bearing the seal of the yang dipertuan sakti 
or of Puteri Jamilan, the Minangkabau queen, that periodically arrived 
in J ambi were redolent with ancient claims. Genealogies traced their 
glorious descent from Iskandar Zulkarnain, King Soloman, and the 
Prophet himself and listed the powerfully charged items they possessed 
-the pike that had killed a hundred thousand giants, the cloth woven 
by the noble heroine Sita, a piece of the wooden staff kayu gamat, which 
had been shared with China and Turkey. to 
On various occasions seventeenth-century sources refer to arrange-
ments by which successive kings ofJambi accepted their status as a vas-
sal ofPagaruyung, and the importance of these "contracts" is indicated 
by their retention in oral memory. Stories collected in the nineteenth 
century recalled that the great Minangkabau yang dipertuan had once 
summoned the sultan of J ambi to a meeting at the border settlement of 
Semalidu. "I wish to give the rantau to you," he said, "because I do not 
have the strength (kuasa) to come and see all my subjects in the rantau 
rivers. I wish to give you the region from Semalidu to Tanah Pilih, from 
the Tujuh Kota and the Sembilan Kota to Jambi ... from Petajin 
[near Muara Tebo] to Muara Sebak [near the coast, on the Nior 
River]." Two buffalo were then slaughtered, one facing upstream and 
one downstream. Their blood was mixed with the horns, and after these 
were buried, the meat was eaten and an oath ofloyalty sworn. The sym-
bolic mixture of darah daging (flesh and blood) made Jambi and 
Minangkabau one. The same legend also recounts the efforts made to 
delineate the jurisdiction of the three regents who controlled the Batang 
Tiga, three river districts at the headwaters of the Batang Hari, in the 
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name of Pagaruyung. They were accorded the area "from the notched 
durian to the sialang tree" (a tree where wild bees have nested), while 
downstream from Tanjung would be under the ruler of Jambi. Who-
ever broke this oath would suffer "the curse of daulat" (the special pow-
ers of royalty). 11 
It was these old contracts that Minangkabau now evoked in hopes of 
bringing about some resolution. Pringgabaya's apparent refusal to 
honor an agreement made by their "grandfathers" led the Batang Tiga 
regents-Raja Hitam of Satiung, Baginda Ratu of Siguntur, and Raja 
Muhammad of Batujini-to come downstream in 1708 to voice their 
resentment. They were followed by even more impressive visits, for in 
November 1708 and again the following year envoys arrived from 
Puteri Jamilan, the Minangkabau queen, to remind her two "grand-
sons" of earlier agreements made between Pringgabaya and the yang 
dipertuan and of the meeting between herself and their father. On that 
occasion she had charged him with the government of J ambi, and this 
reponsibility now fell on them. As a mark of special favor she sent the 
princes and the first minister gifts of "robes which I myself have 
worn."12 
Despite these initiatives, animosity between the two princes sim-
mered as Pringgabaya increased his efforts to win the support of both 
Palembang and Johor. But opposition to him in the downstream court 
as well as the interior was increasing, and in late 1710 a short-lived 
rebellion broke out in Mangunjaya, led by a man and woman who said 
they planned to install the first minister, Pangeran Sutawijaya, as king. 
When Kiai Gede appeared upstream, however, support for the rebel 
leaders collapsed. Pangeran Pringgabaya's weapons, his mother, wives, 
concubines, and children, as well as several nobles who had remained at 
Mangunjaya, were all sent downstream. Kiai Gede himself continued 
up to Jujuhan and Tanjung, and in early 1711 he felt sufficiently confi-
dent to inform the governor general that "all the people of Sembilan 
Lurah" (a reference to Jambi's "nine" districts) were now under him.13 
By this time the Dutch, persuaded by Patras, had withdrawn their 
earlier support for Pringgabaya in favor of their former client, Kiai 
Gede. In September and October 1710 two small VOC forces left Bata-
via for Jambi, and on 14 December Pangeran Pringgabaya was forcibly 
taken into custody. He and his family were then conducted to Batavia, 
from whence he was exiled to Banda, where he died in 1716. The 1709 
contract therefore remained unratified, and a new treaty was concluded 
in September 1711 with Kiai Gede alone. So close was the association 
between them that some upland groups now believed Kiai Gede 
planned to give the Dutch eighty of their children, forty girls and forty 
boys, as the traditional symbol of their relationship. 14 
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Ulu-llir Divisions and Minangkabau Migration 
The new Dutch contract was predicated on the assumption that the col-
lapse of Jambi's pepper trade had been caused by the ulu-ilir division. 
vac officials therefore believed that the solution lay in the installation 
of a downstream king who would be recognized by all. In the absence of 
any other clear contender and despite previous experience, they hoped 
that Kiai Gede would fill this role. Very soon, however, it became 
apparent that he was still unable to capture the ulu's loyalty and sup-
port. A primary reason for this failure was the marked increase in 
Minangkabau migration and their unwillingness to enter into the 
unwritten but implicit ulu-ilir contract unless it held out promise of real 
advantages. 
Minangkabau groups had been settled in the upper Batang Hari for 
well over a century, growing pepper and mining gold, but the defeat of 
Aceh by the Dutch in 1667 had encouraged an unprecedented surge of 
migrants and seasonal workers into the Jambi rantau, drawn by the 
development of new gold-mining areas around Jujuhan, Tabir, Tebo, 
and in ulu Tembesi. In 1688 the Dutch described one such district on 
the upper Batang Hari, about two weeks' travel from Jambi. Here 
many thousands of people came seasonally to seek gold after the heavy 
rains of the wet season had washed down gold-bearing soils from small 
streams and creeks. More than two hundred years later there were still 
memories here of a time when the water was yellow because of gold dig-
ging upriver, when kampung were great and numerous, when children 
and women wore much gold jewelry, and every day people ate as much 
rice as they wanted. 15 
In the early eighteenth century Minangkabau gold seekers began to 
move farther downstream, following two principal routes. The first was 
the Batang Hari itself, which gave access to the gold-producing rivers of 
Sumai, Bungo, Tabir, and also (via the Tembesi) to the newer mines of 
Limun; the second, which probably developed somewhat later, went 
overland across the Kerinci plateau and then followed shallow moun-
tain streams like the Merangin, which tumbled down from the high-
lands to become one of Jambi's great rivers. The Dutch were only 
vaguely aware of these developments, but something of the enterprise of 
early migrants comes through in surviving stories of heroic ancestors 
who made the journey down to J ambi from the Minangkabau 
heartlands to legitimize claims to territory through their possession of 
secret knowledge (ilmu) and sacral items such as a giant elephant tusk. 16 
The prominence given to the Minangkabau in J ambi folklore reflects 
their growing social and economic visibility. Gold had been exported 
fromJambi for at least two hundred years, but in the eighteenth century 
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it gained a new importance because of the decline of pepper. Advan-
taged by skills developed in gold-producing areas of their homeland, 
Minangkabau migrants dominated both the production and the sale of 
Jambi's gold. A primary factor in Minangkabau success was their 
group cooperation. Usually six to seven men among whom there was" a 
kind of equality" worked together in a joint enterprise, pooling their 
resources and knowledge. This cooperation made possible the exploita-
tion of a larger surface area and probably encouraged the introduction 
of more sophisticated equipment. The evidence is not conclusive, but it 
seems that in Jambi the traditional way of obtaining gold, especially in 
the shallow mountain streams, was simple panning, a technique also 
used in the deeper downstream rivers during the dry season. The col-
onies of Minangkabau in Limun, Batang Asai, and Pangkalan Jambi, 
however, had apparently begun to excavate shafts to tap gold-bearing 
veins lying just below the ground's surface. The Dutch also spoke of the 
use of "machines" by the neW arrivals, apparently a reference to 
Minangkabau adaptation of the kincir or waterwheel. Originally devel-
oped for irrigating wet rice fields, this was being used to divert water 
from canals into sluices as the gold was being washed. By these methods 
a band of workers could collect from six to twenty tahil of gold per 
annum. 17 The Minangkabau domination of gold production gave them 
a commanding position in the economy of ulu J ambi, for in many 
places in the Sumatran interior, gold became a medium of local 
exchange. "Every man," commented William Marsden, "carries small 
scales about him, and purchases are made with it so low as the weight of 
a grain or two of padi." It was the Minangkabau who were the most 
able gold traders, their experience apparent in their ready detection of 
any attempt to adulterate gold by adding iron or copper filings. 18 
The emergence of Minangkabu as leaders of ulu resistance to the ilir 
probably owed much to the fraternity of the gold fields and the eco-
nomic resources at the command of successful miners. But they were 
also accepted by non-Minangkabau, who believed Minangkabau gen-
erally to have "the character of great sorcerers, who by their spells can 
tame wild tigers and make them carry them whither they order them on 
their backs." The special knowledge that enabled the Minangkabau to 
produce kris and other weapons of such potency gave them also the abil-
ity to propitiate the spirits of the earth. Their ability to dig for gold suc-
cessfully was proof that they were in league with supernatural forces. 19 
Men with these credentials could be readily accepted as local leaders. 
The most telling factor in the standing of individual Minangkabau 
was their frequent claim to be envoys of the revered Pagaruyung court. 
Anyone who purported to be the messenger of such a power was 
accorded enormous prestige, and from the late seventeenth century one 
can trace a succession of Minangkabau claiming to be sent from the 
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yang dipertuan or Puteri Jamilan. Of these the most successful was 
Raja Kecil, who for a brief time (1717-1721) reigned as king ofJohor, 
his standing as a messsenger of the Minangkabau queen further 
enhanced by the widespread belief that he was a son of the murdered 
Sultan Mahmud of Johor returning to reclaim his heritage. In Jambi 
the same ph en one non was apparent on a lesser scale. In 1689, for exam-
ple, a Minangkabau named Raja Balang appeared with six thousand 
men to join Pangeran Pringgabaya, and a few years later a certain Raja 
Putih, a Minangkabau "from over the green mountain" arrived at 
Mangunjaya with his following. 20 
A clear statement that some ulu communities were still dissatisfied 
with downstream rule came in March 1711, when a Minangkabau 
called Raja Ibrahim, presenting himself as a representative of the yang 
dipertuan sakti and Puteri J amilan, appeared in the ilir capital with a 
small escort of seven or eight people. Raja Ibrahim brought with him 
the silver plate on which was written the 1698 contract that Pringgabaya 
and Kiai Cede had mutually sworn under Minangkabau auspices. It 
was known that he had been a favorite of Pringgabaya, and he claimed 
this plate had been given him as proof he was a true representative. He 
also had with him letters accrediting him as the agent of "Duli Yang 
Dipertuan Sultan Pagaruyung who occupies the royal throne of 
Minangkabau and its vassal lands." According to Raja Ibrahim, the 
rulers of Minangkabau, "the kings behind the green mountain," were 
disturbed that although they had given Pringgabaya the title of sultan, 
he had been banished to Batavia. They therefore intended, he said, to 
send a large army to ensure that he was brought back and reinstated. 21 
Raja Ibrahim persisted in the claim that the Minangkabau ruler in 
Pagaruyung had ordered him to take up arms to bring about Pringga-
baya's return. As leader of the Minangkabau in the Mangunjaya area, 
he was regarded with particular veneration, and it was not long before 
another rebellion broke out near Muara Tebo. Although the uprising 
initially comprised only about forty people armed with a few Minangka-
bau muskets, support for Raja Ibrahim grew, especially among the gold 
miners. Raja Ibrahim also gained the allegiance of numerous upstream 
groups when he appointed as his deputy the foster father of Pringga-
baya's daughter. A number ofulu heads were related to Pringgabaya by 
marriage and had previously received their districts as a gift from him. 
Such people therefore supported Raja Ibrahim in his demand that 
either Pringgabaya or his eldest son, Raden Astrawijaya, should be 
returned toJambi to govern in Kiai Cede's place. 22 
Urged on by Resident Patras, Kiai Cede was persuaded to personally 
lead upstream a force of about eight hundred men, to which were added 
eight Ambonese employees of the VOC. But his reports from the inte-
rior were confused and conflicting, alternating between optimism about 
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the possibility of taking Mangunjaya and despair about evidence of new 
dissension. Although it was obvious that the Minangkabau were by no 
means united against him, he dared not make a stand against the 
rebels. On 10 July 1711 he left for Tanah Pilih, where he arrived four 
days later, bringing with him the inhabitants of several ulu villages. It 
was estimated that about twenty-five hundred people would now be 
resettled near the J ambi capital. 23 
The Mangunjaya rebels thus remained in possession of their forts 
around Muara Tebo. Raja Ibrahim was known to be corresponding 
with some of the downstream nobles and several court ladies, and he 
announced publicly that he would not submit until Pangeran Pringga-
baya, "the sultan our father," was returned. He and his followers were 
apparently convinced that they were acting under the direct orders of 
Pagaruyung, and support for their cause was fed by numerous letters 
circulating in the upstream region urging resistance. Purporting to 
come from the Minangkabau rulers, these were widely accepted as gen-
uine. One sent to the Dutch, for example, was said to come from "Sul-
tan Mualam Duli Yang Dipertuan Besar Syah, son of Sultan Iskandar 
Zulkarnain who occupies the throne of Minangkabau and its tributary 
lands." It announced that "Duli Yang Dipertuan had made his grand-
son, Sultan Sri Maharaja Batu Johan Pahlawan Alam Syah king of 
Mangunjaya, and had given him the lands from the foot of Gunung 
Merapi to Mangunjaya." Because he had been taken away, the country 
had been destroyed, and "Duli Yang Dipertuan of Pagaruyung wished 
that the captain of J ambi would place everything on the old footing 
again."24 
Patras did not believe that these letters, sent to communities where 
few could read, were in fact from the Pagaruyung court. Envoys whom 
the Dutch accepted as legitimately representing the yang dipertuan of 
Minangkabau, since they carried a royal kris as proof, denied the exis-
tence of any such correspondence. Local Minangkabau rajas, they said, 
had sent these letters to frighten Kiai Gede and his people. But what-
ever their provenance, they were clear evidence of a general Minangka-
bau dissatisfaction with the current economic situation and of the belief 
that this could be rectified by Pringgabaya's return. Determined to find 
a solution to the continuing unrest, Patras finally threatened to cut off 
salt supplies to the interior, since he knew that the ulu could "only get it 
from elsewhere with difficulty." A short time later, in December 1 711 , 
the Minangkabau regents-Raja Hitam, Raja Mohammad and Bagin-
da Ratu-dispatched an envoy to Tanah Pilih with the message that 
they were willing to help suppress the rebels. According to other envoys 
from Pagaruyung, if steps were not taken to put down the rebellion, the 
yang dipertuan was determined to undertake the task himself. 25 
Assisted by the vac, Kiai Gede was then emboldened to make yet 
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another expedition upstream, this time with twenty-six ships and seven 
hundred well-armed men. Although promised pardon, the rebels 
refused to surrender. In the battle that followed, Mangunjaya was 
finally taken, its defenses destroyed, and Raja Ibrahim and several 
other leaders captured. In early February 1712 Kiai Gede returned to 
the capital, escorted by a party from Tujuh Kota. In a Dutch bid to bol-
ster the Jambi ruler's standing, three of the leading rebels were publicly 
hanged on a specially built gallows, an act the resident knew would 
cause "a great shock" among the people. "I do not think," he wrote to 
Batavia, "that anyone will rebel against their lawful king again." Raja 
Ibrahim's death "in shackles" in the Company jail in 1714 thwarted the 
resident's plan to have him executed as an example to other Minangka-
bau. But an indication that ulu opposition to the ilir was still flourishing 
became apparent even while Raja Ibrahim lay incarcerated, for letters 
purportedly from Puteri J amilan arrived in Tanah Pilih asking that he 
be released and that Pringgabaya be brought back as king once more. 26 
New Kings, New Contracts, Old Problems 
For a brief period it seemed that some accommodation in Jambi's ulu-
ilir relations was possible and that hopes of economic recovery could 
become reality. Certainly there is ample evidence that interior com-
munities like Tujuh Kota welcomed the prospect of reconciliation with 
the downstream capital and the opening of trade after thirty-five years. 
Indeed, expectations of return to the prosperity of the past excited 
responses in areas far removed from Tanah Pilih. Beyond Jambi bor-
ders the Minangkabau kings of Passimpe sent envoys downstream to 
their "elder brother" to assure him that they and other Minangkabau 
groups had together resolved to honor the oath taken "by our ancestors 
in olden times at Rantau Kapas with the panembahan." Henceforth 
they would come downstream to trade so that '-'Passimpe would be Jam-
bi's head and Jambi would be Passimpe's tail," with Tanah Pilih the 
main negotiation place. The heads of Serampasand Sungai Tenang, far 
on the boundary with Kerinci, whose contacts with Tanah Pilih had 
lapsed for a generation, also asked that trade be resumed "as of 0Id."27 
Kiai Gede himself seemed to be more appreciative of the extent to 
which ilir commerce depended on good relations with the Minangkabau 
and showed a greater willingness to accommodate their needs. In 1717, 
independently of the Dutch resident, he drew up a "contract" with local 
Minangkabau traders that guaranteed their property and people from 
seizure by the ruler, placed them under Minangkabau rather than 
Jambi law, limited the kind of corvee required, and exempted them 
from tolls and the requirements to present expensive gifts. 28 
Nonetheless, hopes of recovery were short-lived, for the restoration of 
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ulu-ilir relations depended on the economic recovery of the downstream 
port, and this proved impossible to attain. Relations with Johor were 
soured in 1714 when Kiai Gede attempted to prevent pepper from being 
taken to Johor via a well-established route down the Tungkal River. 
The resulting attacks by Johor orang laut on vessels sailing to and from 
Jambi were highly effective in deterring maritime trade, and by 1718 
three hundred Minangkabau traders who had settled in the capital two 
years before had all left. The failure of the downstream economy in turn 
undermined efforts to restore economic links with the interior, and the 
vac's account books reflected the deteriorating situation. Between 
1707 and 1719 the Dutch received only 3,397 piculs of pepper in Jambi, 
and the losses amounted to 112,216 guilders. 29 
Less than four years after the failure of Raja Ibrahim's rebellion, ulu 
dissatisfaction was again threatening to erupt into violence. His own 
income slipping away, Kiai Gede and his unpopular favorites made ever 
greater demands on his people for payment of debts, presentation of 
tribute, and rendering of corvee; there were rumors that he had 
destroyed certain documents that set out the rights of ulu dwellers and 
on which he had earlier placed his seal. The view of the ilir king as 
miserly and oppressive seemed confirmed as Kiai Gede, under pressure 
from the Dutch to produce more pepper, announced that any cotton 
gardens discovered would be destroyed. When he married the wife of 
his predecessor, a practice sanctioned by tradition, the image of the 
immoral, uncaring king was complete, for Pringgabaya was at that 
point not dead but alive in Banda. 30 
It was not lightly, then, that the people of Tujuh Kota complained 
that "old laws and customs" were no longer observed. Excluded from 
decision making, the downstream nobles were equally unhappy. Led by 
Pangeran Nattaningrat, Kiai Gede's powerful son-in-law, they accused 
the ruler of governing without consultation, "against the old custom of 
the kingdom and its laws." From their standpoint, the solution to 
unpopular rule had already been provided by vac actions in 1687 and 
1710: the king should be deposed and a new one installed. When Kiai 
Gede went upstream to Tujuh Kota in September 1718 to collect taxes 
and tolls, the ilir leaders began to formulate a plan to unseat him in 
favor of Pangeran Pringgabaya's son, Raden Astrawijaya. About a 
hundred people left Tanah Pilih for Muara Tembesi to rally ulu sup-
port. 31 
By February 1719 the rebel force, numbering about eight hundred, 
had established themselves upstream from Tanah Pilih and had begun 
to attack the royal residence. About eight thousand men from the 
Minangkabau settlements of Tujuh and Sembilan Kota and adjacent 
districts were reported to be coming down to join the uprising, and 
perahu from the interior arrived daily. The rebel leaders were adamant 
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that they would have nothing more to do with Kiai Gede and that Jambi 
could flourish only if Raden Astrawijaya was installed as king. Bereft of 
support, Kiai Gede took to his bed at the end of May. When the Dutch 
resident, Paulus van der Stoppel (1718-1721), learned that Pangeran 
Nattaningrat and the leading nobles planned to seize the king's wives 
and all his gold, he decided to intervene. Placing the royal residence 
under a VaG guard, van der Stoppel took possession of the regalia and 
the sacred cannon, forbade any marriage between the king's wives and 
ulu heads, and prevented members of the royal family from retreating 
upstream. This was the situation on 20 June 1719 when Kiai Gede died 
after an illness of less than three weeks. Two days later his body was 
buried "in the presence of many headmen from the uplands," and in 
September 1719 the VaG sent Raden Astrawijaya back from Batavia. 
He was duly installed as Sri Sultan Astra Ingalaga, a title that deliber-
ately incorporated that of his grandfather, "because this person is 
revered by theJambinese."32 
While the new king remained in the lodge, the interior heads, the 
nobles, and the resident met to frame what they hoped would be a last-
ing solution to Jambi's problems. The leading courtiers, including Kiai 
Gede's son-in-law, Pangeran Nattaningrat, and the latter's son Raden 
Demang, acknowledged the new king and made an oath that they 
would be true to him until death. Everything would be restored "as it 
was in the time of Sultan Agung and Sultan Ingalaga," and messages 
were sent upstream to announce the new order. But the prime instru-
ment in inaugurating Sultan Astra Ingalaga's reign and in laying out 
the subject-ruler relationship was the written contract. In December 
resident van der Stoppel, the ruler, the principal nobles, and heads of 
the "nine rivers of Jambi" signed an agreement that confirmed the 
VaG pepper monopoly yet at the same time proclaimed that the king-
dom would be governed according to "the old customs as they were in 
the time of Sultan Agung." These would not be changed but would 
endure for the signatories and their descendents forever. 33 
Whatever hopes lay behind the signing of yet another contract proved 
to be unfounded. Once again the resident's letters from Jambi bewailed 
the unrest upstream, which he attributed to the increased demands for 
tribute and extortion by powerful royal favorites. It became apparent 
that support for Sultan Astra was not as universal as the Dutch had 
believed, and once again this hostility was articulated in complaints 
about his perceived moral shortcomings. Although it was understood 
that any new king was customarily entitled to the wives and concubines 
of his predecessor, Sultan Astra had given the ulu heads a written guar-
antee, a "contract," that he would not sleep with a certain gundik who 
was so unpopular that she was accused of poisoning Kiai Gede. There 
was naturally an outcry when he announced that she was already 
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pregnant by him. He was also accused of neglecting his obligations to 
his relatives, having divorced his first wife without giving her proper 
maintenance and keeping Kiai Gede's widow and her son, Pangeran 
Surianegara, confined in the palace without economic support. The 
sight of a former queen of J ambi exchanging hair oil and bundles of 
leaves for rice caused a public scandal. The thirteen-year-old Suriane-
gara did not forgive the king for condemning him to penury and vowed 
that he would eat no more rice until he had avenged the wrong 
done him.34 
The most obvious leadership for opposition to Sultan Astra came 
from Pangeran Nattaningrat, who had been married to the now 
deceased daughter of Kiai Gede and had appointed himself guardian of 
the previous ruler's widow and son. During a trip upstream to Muara 
Tebo in May 1720, Nattaningrat found common cause with the orang 
ulu leaders, with whom he swore an oath to remove Sultan Astra Inga-
laga and put Pangeran Surianegara, Kiai Gede's son, on the throne. 
Supported by the heads of Kota Tujuh and Kota Sembilan, Pangeran 
N attaningrat claimed that Sultan Astra was not following the "cus-
toms" established by the Company and Kiai Gede and was therefore 
not worthy to be king. Once again, however, the Dutch intervened to 
support their chosen candidate, and under great pressure from the resi-
dent, the upland heads agreed to take an oath ofloyalty to Sultan Astra. 
The penghulu of Muara Tebo, Tujuh Kota, Sembilan Kota, Petajin, 
and the areas from Tanjung to UjungJabung put their name to a docu-
ment in which they recognized Astrawijaya as ruler, "according to 
ancient customs." Sultan Astra then moved to protect his position by 
arresting Pangeran Nattaningrat and his son Raden Demang, impris-
oning them in the palace. 35 
Such measures were completely ineffectual in winning popular sup-
port for Sultan Astra, either in the court or among the population at 
large. The basic problem was, of course, the economic decline of the 
downstream port, but the Dutch still believed that the Jambi situation 
was amenable to some form of compromise. The problems, they 
argued, must lie in the nature of the contract that van der Stoppel had 
concluded in 1719. In June 1721, accused of a "poor administration," 
he was therefore demoted and recalled to Batavia. Abraham Patras was 
dispatched once more to J ambi, and on 21 October a new contract was 
concluded, following the same form as that of 1711. Despite continuing 
difficulties between upstream and downstream, Patras was also able to 
initiate a reconciliation between the king and his cousin, Kiai Gede's 
son, Pangeran Surianegara. During an emotional meeting, Suriane-
gara handed over the state kris, and in the accompanying ceremony he 
was accorded the new title of Sultan Muhammad and married to Sultan 
Astra's sister. A few months later another potential source of opposition 
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seemed to be eliminated by the death of Pangeran Nattaningrat. In 
November 1724 Sultan Astra's position appeared confirmed when the 
Dutch resolved that Pangeran Surianegara, together with his family, 
should in future make his home in Batavia. 36 
It was apparently Surianegara's departure that triggered off another 
rebellion, this time against Sultan Astra. It was led by the principal 
nobles, who had long fretted against the loss of their lands and people 
and the influence of the ruler's favorites. They found considerable sup-
port among the upland peoples, for both groups complained that Sultan 
Astra was not abiding by "the contract"; the interior heads in particu-
lar argued that promises of a return to the same pepper price they had 
received in "the time of Sultan Agung" had not been honored. 37 In 
January 1725 a cabal headed by Pangeran Nattaningrat's son Raden 
Demang took possession of the state kris and royal treasure and impris-
oned the king in "a stone house." They then informed the resident that 
they wanted "a son or grandson" of Kiai Gede on the throne-that is, 
Pangeran Surianegara or Raden Demang himself. 
For several months Jambi was without a ruler. However, a brother of 
Sultan Astra had escaped to the interior, where he found a welcome 
among the Tujuh Kota, whose loyalty had now reverted to the Pringga-
baya line. In May 1725 a large force from this area arrived downstream 
once more, pushed their way into the royal compound, and released the 
imprisoned Sultan Astra. On June 11 their leaders placed him on the 
throne again, compelling the inhabitants of Tanah Pilih to take an oath 
of loyalty and swear that they would never take up the sword against 
Tujuh Kota. Raden Demang, however, did not give up easily. By late 
June he had forced the ulu rebels out of their defenses and had forced 
them to retreat upstream. With Dutch compliance Sultan Astra was 
again deposed, and in July Batavia sent Kiai Gede's son, Pangeran 
Surianegara, back to Jambi. With great ceremony and in the presence 
of princes and nobles, the youth was installed as ruler with the title Sul-
tan Muhammad Syah. Baginda Ratu, one of the Minangkabau regents 
from the upper Batang Hari, adopted the new king as a brother and 
asked that trade with the uplands be resumed. In 1726 Raden Demang, 
now first minister, brought down the principal interior headmen, 
including those of Tujuh Kota, Sembilan Kota, the suku pindah, and 
Tembesi. Setting aside their krises, they kissed the feet of the new ruler 
and swore to live peacefully under his rule. The curse of "the ten 
plagues" would fallon any who was disloyal to him or to his protector, 
the Company. 38 
On 21 December 1726 this apparently promising situation was dealt 
a body blow when Surianegara, the new Sultan Muhammad Syah, died 
of smallpox, an event that caused a "great shock" among the people, no 
doubt confirming the belief that Kiai Gede's line was cursed. Once 
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again there was no king in Jambi. Now it was the turn of the Pagaru-
yung court to propose a solution, and under Minangkabau auspices an 
agreement was made whereby Sultan Astra should be released and his 
four brothers permitted to return to J ambi. In March 172 7 the 
Minangkabau yang dipertuan himself appeared in Tanah Pilih, bring-
ing with him the three Jambi princes who had taken refuge upstream. 
On 30 March, after two years' imprisonment when "he did not know if 
it was day or night, and when sometimes he had spent two days without 
food or being able to wash," the dethroned Sultan Astra was again free. 
To forestall any possible challenge by Raden Demang, a large number 
of uplanders in boats decorated with yellow flags and umbrellas (the 
symbol of royalty) arrived downstream and anchored two miles above 
the lodge. 39 
The Minangkabau yang dipertuan left suddenly before the matter 
was completely settled, but the seal of approval his appearance in J ambi 
had given to the regime brought fresh hopes ofulu-ilir reconciliation. In 
early 1728 one of the Minangkabau regents from the upper Batang 
Hari sent the message that he would urge his subjects along the Limun 
River to sell their gold in Tanah Pilih. There were encouraging reports 
that in Tembesi the suku pindah groups, numbered at about four thou-
sand, were planting pepper again, and they also appeared willing to 
cooperate with the king regarding corvee duties. Even if the heady days 
of pepper cultivation had gone, the Dutch expressed cautious hopes that 
J ambi might well be able to act as a distribution center for salt and 
cloth. 
The VOC decision to retain its J ambi post was signalled on 30 
August 1727 when a new contract was signed and a start made on the 
reconstruction of the Dutch lodge. The position of the restored king 
appeared further strengthened following the departure, capture, or 
death of all his leading opponents. Raden Demang left for Palembang, 
and several followers of the rebel nobles were publicly shot in the public 
square, the paseban, as a warning to others. Palembang's Sultan 
Mahmud Badaruddin (1724-1757), whose mother was from Jambi, 
appeared favorably disposed and agreed to assist in capturing those 
opponents of Sultan Astra who had taken refuge in his territory. This 
friendship was furthered by the visit to Palembang of the aging sister of 
the former Sultan Ingalaga (d. 1699), a lady of "enormous prestige," 
"illustrious and eminent," to see her Palembang relatives. In the mes-
sages she presented, Sultan Astra clearly stated that he wanted an end 
to the estrangement between Jambi and Palembang and "unity be-
tween the two as in the days of old."40 His explanation that previous 
flaws in his government were due to immaturity, poor advisers, and the 
absence of family support seemed convincing enough, and there were 
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hopes that he and his brothers would now be able to provide a much 
needed leadership. 
It quickly became clear, however, that the problems Jambi had faced 
over the previous fifty years had not disappeared. The contracts formu-
lated in Batavia were based on the belief that the downstream could 
dominate the interior. This had never been the case inJambi, and there 
was no evidence of any change, especially in light of the continuing 
penury of the downstream court. A key factor was the loss of orang laut 
loyalty, which had dribbled away in the face of the ruler's poverty. 
Inability to offer protection to incoming traders or to drive off enemy 
raiders became particularly serious because of continuing disturbances 
in the southern Melaka Straits. In 1722 Bugis forces had taken the 
island of Riau, defeating the Minangkabau prince Raja Kecil, who had 
for a short time reigned as king ofJohor. Jambi's close association with 
Minangkabau made it a prime target for Bugis hostility, and it was said 
they would also have attacked Tanah Pilih had it not been so far inland. 
Several Bugis vessels were reported near the mouth of the J ambi River, 
precipitating a hasty construction of defenses. Although Sultan Astra 
Ingalaga had been able to pacify the new rulers of Riau, the damage 
done to Jambi's maritime trade was already extensive. 
A deteriorating port economy further contributed to the decline of 
pepper growing, already displaced in most areas by rice or cotton. 
Some replanting of pepper was undertaken in the 1730s, but continuing 
raids by Palembang groups in Tembesi and beyond discouraged further 
expansion. Along the Ketalo River, for instance, the people said that 
they had begun to develop gardens three times but had been forced to 
leave them on each occasion. In 1739 the resident estimated that the 
Dutch could still expect about two hundred piculs per annum, but in 
that year a very dry east monsoon season followed by heavy rains and 
flooding destroyed many mature vines and thousands of young ones. 
Two years later most pepper plants were struck by a disease that caused 
them to lose their blooms within a month. In 1740 a general order that 
uplanders need not come downstream for· corvee duties except for 
defense was extended to release ulu people from all court service as long 
as they agreed to plant pepper. The retraction of trade with Java and 
Siam, however, made it even more imperative to plant rice. One of the 
leading princes said he wished to convert a newly laid out pepper gar-
den at Muara Siau into a rice field, and two years later all downstream 
people were ordered to plant rice, with a fine to the value of ten rijks-
daalders if they refused. 41 
Because Tanah Pilih offered so few attractions, Dutch hopes of estab-
lishing a steady trade in gold proved elusive. As Sultan Astra explained, 
along the established gold-bearing rivers like the Tabir, Tebo, and 
I 
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Bungo there had been a longstanding custom that goods were distrib-
uted on credit with payment expected in two or three years. When he 
urged that this practice be reinstated, promising himself to act as guar-
antor, the resident pointed out there was little indication that the inte-
rior people were ready to come downstream. It was well known that 
higher prices for gold could be obtained in Inderagiri, Bengkulen, and 
especially Palembang, and it would be a long time before they could be 
wooed away. 42 
The difficulties in reestablishing trading links between the coast and 
gold-mining areas of the interior was also due to the effective invasion of 
these districts by Minangkabau. By 1728 the J ambi ruler said that the 
Minangkabau gold seekers were swarming in their thousands, "like 
wild men," and there were said to be fifteen or twenty in every village. 
More than a decade later the resident commented that there were many 
more "Minangkabau" in the interior than Jambinese, and that the lat-
ter were outnumbered ten to one. In 1761 it was even claimed that "all 
bovenlanders" were called Minangkabau. It is therefore not surprising 
that the ongoing accommodation between local society and Minangka-
bau newcomers is a recurring theme in J ambi' s local traditions. 43 One 
motif concerns the establishment of forms of government that recognize 
the customs of both sides in order to settle disputes arising between the 
new arrivals and older communities. According to a tradition collected 
in the Bangko area of Jambi, for instance, two Minangkabau lineage 
heads joined with the district chiefs of Muara Langkap on the Jambi-
Kerinci border to form a federation in which Minangkabau and J ambi 
customs were both acknowledged. Nearby at Nilo a sidang (gathering) 
composed of the "father" -the dato berempat (the four lineage heads 
associated with Kerinci)-and the "mother"-the menteri bertiga (the 
three ministers linked with the batin groups in the Bangko region)-
met to settle quarrels. 44 
By contrast, other stories tell of murder and death when the existing 
inhabitants were forced to relinquish territory to incoming Minangka-
bau who often resisted paying even nominal ground rent. Dutch 
sources bear out the impression that conflicts arose when the new 
migrant groups, anxious to gain access to favored areas, evinced little 
knowledge of or regard for local claims. Such tensions were often fuelled 
by the downstream king, anxious to link himself with these economi-
cally powerful groups. In 1721, for instance, Sri Maharaja Raja Hitam, 
one of the regents from the upper Batang Hari, claimed that Sultan 
Astra Ingalaga had awarded him rights over the mines in the Tebo area 
in return for support. As evidence, he produced a written document 
from the sultan and Resident van der Stoppel specifying that half the 
gold should be sold to the sultan and half to himself. If this edict was not 
obeyed, announced the royal order, the people would no longer be per-
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mitted to the fish in the ruler's rivers, use his water, cut his wood, or live 
on his land. But as large numbers of Minangakabau arrived to work the 
Tebo gold, resistance to their presence grew. 45 When the local people 
refused to give up their mining rights, claiming them as a heritage from 
ancient times, a noble, Ngabei Karta Laksamana, was sent upstream in 
early 1722 to take control. It was hoped that as a smith he would be able 
to effect a compromise, since in Minangkabau tradition goldsmiths 
were always regarded as neutral figures who were able to order the end 
of hostilities between rival parties. The Tebo villagers, however, still 
refused to comply, saying they would deliver tribute to aJambi ruler but 
not to a Minangkabau and declaring that they wanted to be governed 
"as in the time of Pan em bah an Rantau Kapas."46 
The difficulties involved in creating new economic and cultural links 
between these Minangkabau communities and the downstream port 
were even more obvious in the gold-producing district of Limun. It was 
only with the intervention of the Minangkabau ruler in 1729 that the 
four Limun heads agreed to recognize Sultan Astra Ingalaga as their 
overlord, although they requested that their leaders continue to be 
installed by the Minangkabau regents, acting as representatives of 
Pagaruyung. In 1732, however, the area was drawn into Palembang 
politics when Sultan Anum, the deposed Palembang ruler, fled to 
Limun. Here he married the daughter of one of the Minangkabau 
heads and set up defenses to resist the Palembang forces sent to capture 
him. His final surrender in 1736 did not put an end to the troubles in 
the area, because the gold diggers were divided into two factions, those 
who had supported Sultan Anum and his father-in-law, and those under 
another Minangkabau leader who had been attached to the Palembang 
forces. They were impervious to downstream efforts to restore order, 
even when Sultan Astra had announced his intention of closing the 
J ambi River to force the gold miners to acknowledge him as ruler. In 
1740 the Minangkabau invited Sultan Astra to install several heads in 
Limun with the aim of encouraging commercial and political links with 
the ilir, but there was little evidence of changing commercial loyalties. 
Not only was Limun linked into the economic network of the interior; 
there were also well-travelled paths to Palembang, only eight or ten 
days away. In 1744 a new path was cut to link the two with resthouses 
established at points along the route. A tributary of the Batang Hari, 
the Sikut, provided another connection with Rawas, while Surulangun, 
in Palembang territory, developed into a major meeting place. In addi-
tion, Limun was only twelve days' travel overland from Bengkulen, 
where the English were said to be willing to defray the expenses of trad-
ers willing to bring their gold down from the interior. 47 
European officials, primarily concerned with ocean-borne com-
merce, were only dimly aware of the vast traffic that was carried across 
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the Sumatran interior. Here a person often walked for weeks along jun-
gle paths, carrying a load weighing as much as fifty kilograms in a spe-
cially constructed basket on his or her back. "It astonishes a lowlan-
der," wrote one observer, "to see with what ease they walk over these 
hills, generally going at a shuffling or ambling pace."48 At the urging of 
the Dutch, Sultan Astra attempted to restrict Limun's trade, prohibit-
ing commerce with Palembang, forbidding the transport of rice up-
stream, proscribing sales in Indian cloth, and attempting to "block up 
the jungle paths." All such endeavors proved ineffective because of the 
many overland routes linking Limun to other areas. Even the promises 
given to Minangkabau overlords were not sufficient to induce the 
Limun gold miners to trade in a downstream port that offered little 
commercial advantage. 
The Dutch had hoped that they might be able to resuscitate Jambi's 
trade through the sale of opium, but this too proved impossible because 
the opium trade was already in Minangkabau hands. In the early part 
of the seventeenth century it had been extremely difficult to sell opium 
in Jambi, but in the following decades consumption had expanded dra-
matically. This process had been encouraged by links with poppy-grow-
ing areas of India provided by English traders, with Riau and the 
English post in Bengkulen important redistribution points. In Jambi 
several court nobles were known addicts, and when Sultan Astra came 
to visit the Dutch lodge on New Year's Day in 1722 he brought with him 
his own prepared opium pipe. 49 
Opium smoking was not a cheap habit, since the drug commanded 
high prices; a chest containing about 140 English pounds, for instance, 
could be purchased for about three hundred rials and be sold again for 
five hundred, and on "occasions of extraordinary scarcity" it could sell 
for its weight in silver, upwards of three thousand rials a chest. In 1737 
the VOC resident in Jambi was selling opium at 101 percent above the 
price in Batavia. Addiction was part of the reason for the high prices, 
but opium was also seen as a magic potion that enhanced a man's viril-
ity, courage, and strength, especially before battle or some other dan-
gerous enterprise. It was therefore a valued gift, and when he intended 
to recruit the help of some interior heads a downstream minister asked 
the Dutch in advance for opium and Chinese tobacco. 50 
The Minangkabau gold miners of Limun and Batang Asai were 
known as consumers of opium, but they were also active traders in the 
drug. The Dutch had hoped that they- might be persuaded to buy sup-
plies from the VOC in J ambi in exchange for gold so that opium could 
become an alternative to specie. 51 However, they found that the prox-
imity of Bengkulen and Riau so frequented by English traders made 
this goal unattainable. The benefits of the salt trade, touted as another 
prospective lure for upstream gold miners, were equally disappointing. 
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Drastic measures by the resident and king, such as forbidding any salt 
to go upstream unless there was evidence of trade with the VOC, were 
impossible to enforce. 
Sultan Astra Ingalaga was fully aware of the need to strengthen his 
ties with the interior. One means of doing this was by reaffirming the 
ruler's position, and between 1729 and 1734 he spent long periods in 
the ulu with the hope of settling the continuing disputes between 
Minangkabau and local people. But the newcomers, he told the resi-
dent, refused to pay heed to him, and although he could rightfully com-
mand the suku pindah groups along the Tembesi to cut wood and tell 
the Tujuh and Sembilan Kota people to plant pepper, he could not 
make gold diggers and Minangkabau traders come down to Tanah 
Pilih. "All the people connected with the gold trade are subjects of the 
yang dipertuan," he explained; "they are not under me but upstream 
kings." Their cooperation could only be obtained through the interven-
tion of the "three united princes" of Batang Tiga. The authority of 
these regents was reinforced further in 1732, when PuteriJamilan, the 
Minangkabau queen, sent them "a pike and a sword" as a symbol to 
the upstream gold miners that they governed on behalf of her and the 
emperor of Minangkabau. For a time Sultan Astra was even in consul-
tation with the regents in the hope of expelling all newly arrived 
Minangkabau from the villages of Tujuh and Sembilan Kota. 52 
Part of the underlying cause of the continuing village disputes was the 
great importance placed by the Minangkabau on the necessity of gain-
ing redress for any real or imagined wrong. Minangkabau adat (custom-
ary law) gave the "sister's brothers, sons and nephews" of an injured 
party full rights to wreak revenge. If murder was involved and the 
guilty party could not be found, vengeance could be exacted from fam-
ily members "to the very last degree." Indeed, a contemporary com-
mentator in Padang considered the Minangkabau desire for retribution 
to be "the canker of the coast." In J ambi calls for revenge were exacer-
bated by the large numbers of itinerant unmarried men ready to 
respond to the call of their leaders or kinsmen. In 1738, for example, a 
troop of a hundred Minangkabau invaded the village of Kembang Seri 
on the Batang Hari and destroyed all the pepper gardens there. They 
said they would not leave the people in peace until the J ambi ruler had 
given compensation for the death of one of their countrymen who had 
lived on the king's side of the river but had been killed by a Kembang 
Seri villager. Because the identity of the murderers was unknown, no 
arrest had been made, but now the safety of the entire river was threat-
ened as other Minangkabau living at Limun went upstream with their 
weapons to lend assistance. Although the leaders were finally captured 
and brought down to Tanah Pilih, a year later a Minangkabau prince 
calling himself Yang Dipertuan Baginda Duljamal still demanded more 
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than six hundred rials as compensation. Sultan Astra had little choice 
but to pay him, since he was "a powerful and neighboring king."53 
The disregard of upstream Minangkabau for Sultan Astra's authority 
and the defiance of their leaders was indicative of continuing ulu dissat-
isfaction with ilir government. In February 1733 a deputation from a 
number of Minangkabau raja along the upper Batang Hari arrived at 
Tanah Pilih with a message asking that Raden Demang, Kiai Gede's 
grandson, be brought back from exile in Batavia. Other upstream com-
munities, taking their lead from influential court figures, increasingly 
saw recognition of royal jurisdiction as something to be negotiated and 
accepted only if the terms were favorable. Everywhere there were 
reminders of the deteriorating status of the downstream king. Tradi-
tionally, for instance, elephant tusks had been regarded as a royal 
monopoly, but now private trade was common. The resident was simi-
larly told that in former times people had rarely dared to oppose a royal 
letter; currently documents bearing the king's seal giving a trader free 
passage and exempting him from any debts incurred by his "ancestors" 
received scant regard. 54 
Authority over the interior had never come easily to the kings of 
Jambi, but there had been times in the past when interior groups had 
actively courted their patronage. Now the ruler and his agents were 
themselves forced to seek out clients. Sometimes, indeed, they were suc-
cessful. In 1736 one of Sultan Astra's brothers went up to Kerinci to 
persuade the people there to bring their gold to J ambi instead of 
Bengkulen, which they had patronized for the last twenty years. This 
intervention was apparently fruitful because among the king's presents 
sent to Batavia in 1741 were four pieces of "medicine trees"55 that grew 
in the Kerinci region, an indication he now had some authority there. 
Local legends also suggest that the lower areas of Kerinci remained 
within the Jambi orbit, and it is to the Jambi ruler that tradition 
attributes the division of cloth that created the two federations of 
Kerinci, the delapan helai kain (eight pieces of cloth) and the tiga helai kain 
(three pieces of cloth). 56 But this relationship could be maintained only 
if the people themselves desired it. Most ulu areas could operate eco-
nomically independently of the downstream center, with local federa-
tions establishing their own verbal contracts to regulate such matters as 
boundaries, the administration of gold mines, and the regulation of 
debts. To enforce his own authority a particular headman might request 
a piagem from Jambi, but it appears that honors from the ilir king were 
increasingly insignificant. 57 
A further reason for the declining status of the downstream court was 
the lack of royal leadership. Several of the princes in the court were 
opium smokers, and Sultan Astra himself did not rise before midday. 
Without the symbols ofleadership, especially the state kris, his standing 
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was further undermined. It was even reported that he had sold some of 
the remaining regalia. Proximity resulting from his prolonged residence 
in the interior also served to destroy the illusion of the king as a distant 
but caring father as fines were exacted, debts forcibly collected, corvee 
imposed, and complaints about royal appointees ignored. Among the 
Sembilan Kota it was openly said that "no upstream people want the 
king to stay there any longer." 58 
Because of Sultan Astra's lengthy sojourns in the interior his brothers 
began to act themselves like kings, attempting to attract their own fol-
lowing and build up their resources. Disturbed at these developments, a 
party of court nobles went upstream in 1733 to persuade the ruler to 
return to Tanah Pilih and participate in a new oath of unity. A written 
document dated 9 Haji 1145 (23 May 1733 C.E.) was drawn up, 
reiterating that the laws of Jambi should be the same as those "of the 
time of Sultan Agung and Sultan Ingalaga" and laying down that indi-
viduals who ignored them would be punished "by the thirty plagues of 
the Koran."59 The lack of success of these measures is suggested by the 
fact that two years later Raden Demang, Kiai Gede's grandson, was 
brought back from exile at Sultan Astra's request with the hope that he 
might be able to restore harmony to the realm. Shortly after his arrival, 
however, he died in suspicious circumstances during a fishing trip. 60 
Meanwhile, the rivalry between the royal brothers steadily increased, 
in every way opposing the cultural ideal of fraternal allegiance typified 
in legends like that of the great Orang Kaya Hitam loyally supported by 
his brothers and sister. Disputes among the brothers were so constant 
that the resident did not even bother providing details, merely telling 
his superiors that "the usual court quarrels" were in progress and to 
recount them would mean an "unending narrative." Several of the 
princes had acquired appanages that previously had been important for 
pepper and spent long periods upstream, supposedly encouraging the 
planting of pepper but in reality exacting tribute and taxes. One, for 
instance, controlled Merangin and Air Hitam while the youngest, 
Pangeran Sutawijaya, took over Tujuh Kota, where in 1741 he was for-
cibly pulling out cotton trees. The headman of Kembang Seri com-
plained that the most senior prince, the pangeran ratu, had forced peo-
ple to perform corvee, despite royal orders, and had enslaved thirty 
children. The people begged the ruler to take action, since this exploita-
tion was causing many people to flee "to look for another lord."61 
By the 1740s the Dutch were convinced popular opposition to Sultan 
Astra was so strong that it was again time to find an alternative king for 
J ambi. They were also concerned at deteriorating relations between 
Jambi and Palembang. Although Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin had 
indeed married Sultan Astra's sister, she was in fact the widow of an 
opponent of the Jambi ruler who had fled to Palembang. Far from 
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bringing Jambi and Palembang together, this union fueled ill feeling 
between them. Sultan Astra, who had not been informed of the mar-
riage, said he felt so "wounded" by the insult that his only recourse was 
to go to war.62 The Dutch had no desire to see a renewal of conflict, and 
their plans for a change of government in Jambi, perhaps even the 
installation of an "upstream" and a "downstream" king, therefore 
assumed greater significance. Increasingly disapproving of Sultan 
Astra, they focused their attention on his youngest brother, Pangeran 
Sutawijaya. Despite the latter's unpopularity in some quarters, he still 
retained a following in the interior and was known to have the approval 
of the Minangkabau regents, who had used his services in settling dis-
putes between them and Tujuh Kota. Having donned "the white 
cloth," he was also supported by the Islamic teachers. In particular, 
Pangeran Sutawijaya had a good relationship with Sultan Mahmud of 
Palembang, whose niece he had married. 63 
In 1742, faced by a group of nobles who said they would no longer 
recognize him, Sultan Astra reluctantly agreed to step aside in favor of 
Pangeran Sutawijaya, hand over what regalia he still possessed, accept 
the title of panembahan, and move downstream to Kompeh. A written 
document announcing the change in government was prepared by the 
resident on 21 October 1742 . On 25 January 1743, in the presence of 
the princes and representatives of all the interior groups, Pangeran 
Sutawijyaya was confirmed as Sultan Anum Seri Ingalaga. Sultan 
Astra Ingalaga was to be termed Panembahan Puspanegara, with his 
income to come from one of the Jambi rivers. The following month the 
ruler put his seal to another document drawn up by the resident by 
which he swore to honor the 1721 treaty negotiated by Patras "of hon-
ored memory."64 
The Demise of the vac Contract 
The renewal of the vac contract in 1743 came at a time when the 
implications of the Dutch-Jambi relationship, itself shaped by the con-
tract, were becoming more apparent and the inherent tensions less easy 
to resolve. To a considerable extent such tensions were due to the 
dependence of downstream kings on VOC support. From 1687 until 
their final departure in 1768 the Dutch had a direct influence on the 
choice of every Jambi king, and this fact had become apparent in the 
language with which the governor general was addressed. At the begin-
ning of the seventeenth century the J ambi ruler had seen himself as 
superior to most Europeans with whom he came in contact. Dutch fac-
tors, as his children, were under his protection, while the governor gen-
eral in Batavia was his brother. Throughout the eighteenth century the 
kings of Palembang also continued to refer to the governor general as 
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their "brotherly friend." By contrast, he had become the "father" of the 
kings of J ambi, with all that this connoted. Sultan Astra, who had 
grown up in Batavia, even termed himself the governor general's ser-
vant, and his links with the Dutch were openly confirmed when he took 
a woman from Pecinaan, the VaC-supervised settlement around the 
lodge, as a wife. Because of Dutch involvement in their selection, suc-
cessive kings felt vac support was necessary to maintain their posi-
tion. Kiai Cede, for instance, considered the small vac presence so 
essential to his continuing security that he did not wish to have a corpo-
ral put in irons for murder because this would reduce the military com-
plement. 
Dutch intervention in Jambi affairs in turn meant that the residents 
of the eighteenth century were more like powerful nobles than mere 
heads of a trading lodge. The tendency to see the resident as a second 
ruler was apparent even on the death of Kiai Cede in 1719, when he 
willed his wives, concubines, children, and grandchildren not to his heir 
but to the Dutch. 65 an departing for a trip upstream, Sultan Astra simi-
larly gave his seal to the vac, saying, "I have left you in charge of my 
palace, women, and my honor and reputation."66 The resident had 
such influence that he could even decide who should properly be per-
mitted to settle in the downstream capital. In 1717, when ten orang laut 
vessels from Lingga came upriver and asked Kiai Cede to take them 
under his protection, he was initially favorable. But he was overruled by 
the resident, who claimed they were pirates and should be ordered to 
leave. The leaders of the 1719 rebellion themselves claimed they were 
acting with the resident's approval. Only when it became known that 
van den Stoppel had prevented the king's women from marrying 
upland headmen and had distributed rice and money to rally opposition 
to Kiai Cede did Batavia define more rigidly the extent to which a resi-
dent could "rule." Even so, in the absence of a king following the death 
of Sultan Muhammad Syah in 1726, Isaac Couijn took over govern-
ment completely, passing out brandy to encourage support for his own 
royal client and even imprisoning two princes. 67 
As kings appeared unable to settle upstream quarrels, the position of 
successive residents was further enhanced. Not only did they act as 
mediators by resolving disputes; they also distributed gifts to interior 
heads and presented them with the insignia of office, an embossed rat-
tan. Because of the instability of government and the frequent absences 
of rulers upstream, residents assumed many tasks normally assigned to 
leading nobles, such as sending letters with the king's seal to the inte-
rior. Acting as Company agents, they even began to. trade in wax and 
elephant tusks, previously con~idered a royal monopoly. The continu-
ing failure of Jambi kings to revive the country's former prosperity 
meant that many people came to prefer the vac as their overlord. Sev-
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eral royal women, neglected or divorced, appealed to the resident as 
their guardian and protector; a number of interior heads brought their 
verband brieJjes (contract letters), the piagem that were believed to set out 
their rights and that past kings had given their forebears, to the resident 
in case the ruler made any change in them. When Baginda Ratu of Si 
Guntur, one of the Minangkabau regents, asked for toll-free trade down 
the J ambi River for his people, it was to the resident that he sent his 
present of rice, receiving in return various cloth goods to "encourage 
his loyalty." 68 
There were also important symbolic statements of Dutch "kingship" 
inJambi, for key items remained in the possession of the vac. Despite 
a request by Pringgabaya, it appears that the sword Sri Mengula and 
the kris Banyak Putera, which his father had taken to Batavia, were 
never returned. In 1719 the regalia, consisting of the kris Macan Turu, 
the kris Si Genjai, as well as supernaturally endowed swords, muskets, 
and cannon were all in Dutch hands as surety against Kiai Gede's 
debts. 69 The resident even had his own "kingdom," the settlement of 
Pecinaan around the Dutch lodge with its inhabitants, a motley collec-
tion of Chinese, Jambinese, and other "eastern nations." The recon-
structed Dutch lodge itself had been built with more than twenty thou-
sand stones brought from the walls of the king's residence and from 
"old Jambi," so that Sultan Astra could rightly say, "My house is the 
Company's house."7o 
The emergence of the Jambi resident as what was essentially a second 
king raised contentious questions regarding jurisdiction. The attraction 
of living in Pecinaan was considerable, because these people now 
became vac subjects and were exempt from any obligations to the 
king as long as they served the resident when required. The Dutch also 
argued that all incoming foreign traders should be under the resident's 
control, although the court held that this should apply only to those who 
came with a vac pass. The 1719 contract that van den Stoppel and his 
assistant Willem Daems drew up in consultation with the court nobles 
specifically tried to address the problem of the relationship between 
Tanah Pilih and Pecinaan. It entitled the resident to service from Peci-
naan people" as in the time of Sultan Agung" but laid down that if for-
eign traders wished to place themselves under the ruler, the resident 
could not prevent them from doing so. 71 
The 1719 contract, significant because it was initiated locally rather 
than in Batavia, was nonetheless as ineffective as any other in resolving 
the ambiguous relationship between the vac and the kings of J ambi. 
It can be argued that much of the animosity directed toward individual 
rulers resulted from their invidious position as agents of a commercial 
company whose treatment of locals was usually uncaring or even 
cruel. 72 But the ruler's dependence on the Dutch meant he could not 
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readily resist either onerous trading demands or requests for men to cut 
and deliver forest trees from upstream areas, to pull the cables that 
towed Dutch ships upstream, to unload their cargoes. As the underlying 
contradiction between VOC agent and independent king became more 
evident, successive rulers also became more critical of individual resi-
dents. Such complaints, whether based on perceived or real failings, 
provide a barometer of relations between the Dutch and J ambi. When 
Jambi subjects expressed grievances against their kings, they were 
repeatedly made in terms of moral shortcomings. The same holds true 
of accusations made by rulers about residents. They were imparting a 
message not only about a particular person but about their relationship 
with the VOC as well. Actions that might have been excused or 
explained in happier times now became the basis for resentment and 
discontent. This was especially so in regard to the treatment of local 
women, who were often flagrantly exploited as sexual partners regard-
less of their marital status and without the royal sanction that would 
have legitimized the relationship.73 Sultan Astra also complained bit-
terly about Jacob Vries de Witt (acting resident, 1728) who in fufill-
ment of a niat (vow) that he would hold a great feast ifhe recovered from 
an illness, sailed upriver with all the women from Pecinaan and even 
carried an opened yellow parasol, "which none except the sultan is 
allowed to use." On his return he began to cavort openly with his con-
cubines, and when he was reported in the lodge "drunk with his whore, 
the lower half of his body naked," the king told him he should" conduct 
himself like a Christian."74 Beneath the frequently expressed resent-
ment about the way Dutch officials in Jambi usurped the ruler's role 
and arrogated royal privileges are intimations of an alienation that was 
ultimately to bring "the contract" to an end. 
This alienation gathered pace from the accession of Sultan Anum in 
1743 and accelerated following a visit he made to Palembang in 1745, 
which resulted in a formal reconciliation. On this occasion Sultan 
Mahmud Badaruddin expressly told the resident that he and the J ambi 
ruler were "brothers-in-law, and blood relatives," and Sultan Anum's 
attitude began to show an obvious change after his return home. Argu-
ing that it was "not good for two suns to shine in Jambi," he now said 
that he feared nothing and that there was no need for the VOC to 
remain. Three years later his views were even stronger. In high hopes of 
concluding a marriage between his son and Sultan Mahmud's grand-
daughter, he announced that "Palembang and Jambi are one, why 
should I be afraid of the Company?" The resident's attempts to per-
suade him to cut his ties with Palembang were totally unsuccessful. 75 
In this atmosphere the periodic differences between resident and 
ruler that had long been part of the vac relationship became more 
serious. Sultan Anum now claimed that children born of a mother from 
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the king's side of the river and a father from the vac side were his sub-
jects; he even argued that the people of Pecinaan should be under him 
as well. There was growing evidence of royal resentment toward Dutch 
trading restrictions, particularly in regard to salt and gold purchases; 
local people acting on behalf of the vac, previously permitted to go 
upstream to trade, were now told that they must sell their salt to the 
ruler. Without informing the resident, Sultan Astra ordered the beating 
of the gong (gum-gum) on both sides of the river, proclaiming that all 
gold should be sold to him. In 1748 he went up to Limun, where he per-
sonally tried to purchase supplies and prevent the people there going 
downstream. 76 
Sultan Anum's disenchantment with the Dutch association was evi-
dent later that year when he went upstream to Muara Tebo. Despite 
repeated requests to return, he stayed there for twelve months, and two 
years later he threatened to go and live permanently in the interior. It 
was clear that he could see little advantage in the vac contract. The 
Company was now entering its final years and was increasingly unable 
to supply the trading items the ulu wanted. The people of Limun, 
though they were known to have more than forty tahil of gold in store, 
said they would not come down because they could not obtain the 
desired goods. The Dutch could not compete with Palembang, whose 
king maintained his own warehouse halfway between Palembang and 
Limun, where traders could stay free of charge and in which were 
stacked all kinds of cloth. In 1750 Limun traders took at least 425 tahil 
of gold to Palembang to exchange for cloth and opium, and the entire 
Limun district was said to be filled with piece goods obtained from the 
English or in Palembang. ather independent peddlers carried gold 
back and forth to Rawas, also under Palembang sovereignty, where 
they obtained everything they wanted. In 1748 a new path had been cut 
to facilitate connections between Limun and Bengkulen, where gold 
was sold to the English. 77 
Various reasons were put forward for Jambi's difficulties. The Dutch 
resident felt a major problem lay in the king's inability to read and 
write, so that he could not study documents and had to believe every-
thing he was told. Sultan Anum attributed his problems to the opposi-
tion of his brothers and his son-in-law. The royal princes, he said, did 
not rise before midday and spent the rest of their time gambling and 
watching amusements and dancing. At his request several were arrested 
and sent to Batavia, but he still feared the vac might support one of 
his remaining brothers as king. The first minister complained that Sul-
tan Anum refused to give him the "great seal," "the main sinew and 
soul of this office," which authorized him to make rulings as he thought 
fit.78 The Minangkabau considered the fault lay with the king himself 
and his treatment of the interior people, especially those of Tujuh and 
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Sembilan Kota. They were ashamed, they said, that they did not come 
downstream to trade, but the ruler constantly interfered with river traf-
fic. Relations were so strained that when a Minangkabau delegation 
arrived downstream to discuss trading concerns, Sultan Anum declined 
to meet them, pleading grief at the death of his daughter. 79 
Further, it seems that Sultan Anum himself had come to see the asso-
ciation with the Dutch not in terms of a beneficial alliance but as a rela-
tionship that had somehow aroused supernatural ire. His daughter's 
death in 1750 convinced him that his country was cursed, a belief that 
seemed confirmed by another epidemic illness two years later when his 
son by his second wife died. "Old people cannot remember such an 
unhealthy time here," wrote the resident. In the same year a major 
earthquake occurred; "a whole mountain and two negeri [villages] disap-
peared into the water, and for three days the river downstream was 
filled with mud and dead fish."80 These developments were not condu-
cive to a sense of well-being, and in January 1754 the situation wors-
ened when there was an open display of violence between the Dutch and 
the Jambi court. The details of the quarrel are not clear, since the resi-
dent, Johannes Aalders, was a confirmed drunkard, and his account of 
what happened is confused. It appears, however, that an altercation 
occurred when Aalders refused to surrender a wealthy merchant to 
court justice; this was followed by further disputes during which he 
aroused court enmity by firing on the palace. Sultan Anum responded 
in kind. Realizing that he was ill-equipped to defend the lodge, Aalders 
panicked. On 9 February the entire J ambi garrison appeared in Palem-
bang, saying they had fled for fear of being killed. 81 
Although Sultan Anum showed no desire for the Dutch to return, the 
VOC authorities nonetheless decided to reopen the post. J ambi had 
yielded no profits for more than half a century, but if abandoned it 
might become a hiding place for pirates and provide an opening for the 
English. Furthermore, Aalders had left behind gold and money belong-
ing to the Company. Sultan Anum refused to repay this and rejected 
demands that he come personally to Batavia to apologize. An expedi-
tion of nearly three hundred men was therefore sent to Jambi in June 
1754 to blockade the river. 
Struck by disease, the VOC force suffered nearly fifty deaths in the 
first three weeks and was soon forced to withdraw. A stronger expedi-
tion followed, and on the insistence of his nobles, Sultan Anum finally 
sent envoys to negotiate with the Dutch resident in Palembang. Here 
Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin of Palembang acted as mediator, and on 
his "friendly and fatherly advice," Jambi concluded another treaty with 
the VOC on 1 June 1756. Sultan Anum promised to compensate the 
Dutch for their losses and confirmed the trading privileges they had 
obtained by the contract of 1721.82 
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It is hardly likely that the vac had any real expectations that this 
new contract would in fact restore Jambi. By this stage, indeed, vac 
officials themselves were losing faith in the power of the written agree-
ment to regulate commercial relations with native states, and from 1743 
it was considered unnecessary to maintain an official contract book. 83 
By mid-1758 the J ambi ruler had still not sent envoys to Batavia as he 
had earlier promised to do and was already regretting his decision to 
allow the Dutch to return. "It is my land," he said, "and no one else 
has anything to say about it except me." He was even thinking of asking 
"another foreign Company" (i.e., the English) to settle in Jambi. The 
resident's threat that the vac would then send a thousand men and 
bring Jambi to its knees evoked a bitter response. If the Dutch tried to 
attack again, Sultan Anum told the acting resident, he would simply 
retreat to the interior where no one could chase him. The vac should 
not imagine Jambi would be like Java, "where people can be compelled 
more easily. Here the river goes up high and it would be hard to reach 
me without harming the Company, which has already had experience of 
how many people can be lost, not through the might of my subjects but 
through the power of the spirits (duyvels). "84 
The anti-Dutch mood in Jambi was heightened in February 1760 
when eleven large Bugis ships appeared at Simpang carrying about four 
hundred fighting men. During this visit a betrothal was negotiated 
between the two-year-old daughter of Sultan Anum and the Bugis 
leader Raja Haji, who was subsequently given the royal J ambi name of 
Pangeran Sutawijaya. 85 This alliance came at an opportune moment, 
for Sultan Anum had received a further blow. In 1757 his patron, Sul-
tan Mahmud of Palembang, had died, to be succeeded by Sultan 
Ahmad Tajuddin. Like his father, Sultan Ahmad was much admired by 
the Jambi ruler, who expected that a proposed marriage between the 
daughter of this" rich and powerful king" and his own son and heir, the 
pangeran ratu, would cement their new friendship. But despite the fact 
that the wedding plans were already well in train, Sultan Ahmad told 
Sultan Anum that the proposed union could not take place untilJambi's 
affairs and its relations with the vac had improved. In September of 
that year he took the decisive step of cancelling all arrangements and 
marrying his daughter to the son of the imam besar (the head imam), an 
Arab sayid. In a conversation with the Dutch resident he dismissed 
J ambi as a place where little could be achieved because of its uncompro-
mising terrain, "full of mountains andjungles."86 
Sultan Anum was still smarting from this humiliation in April 1760 
when the resident announced his decision to leave J ambi because the 
sultan would not fulfill the contract. The court nobles, convinced that 
Jambi could not survive without the vac and desperately searching for 
an alternative, pushed for the installation of a new king. Since Sultan 
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Anum was unwilling to stand down in favor of his popular son, it 
seemed that the only acceptable candidate was Pangeran Natakusuma, 
brother of the sultan of Palembang. Pangeran Natakusuma's rights 
through inheritance were unimpeachable, for his wife was aJambi prin-
cess, the daughter of Sultan Muhammad Syah (d. 1726) and thus the 
granddaughter of Sultan Kiai Gede. In August 1761 Sultan Anum sent 
a special envoy to Palembang with a personal invitation for Pangeran 
Natakusuma to become ruler ofJambi, so that they could govern jointly 
"as brothers together." 87 
Had this union occurred, it would have been the logical outcome of 
Jambi-Palembang relationships during the previous century and would 
have changed the face of southeast Sumatran history. But over these 
hundred years the Dutch had consistently worked against a close associ-
ation between J ambi and Palembang; on reflection, they again decided 
that it would not be in VOC interests to see a Palembang prince on the 
Jambi throne. Such an alliance would make Palembang too powerful, 
and it was vital "to keep a balance between native kings." The Palem-
bang resident used all his powers to dissuade the sultan from accepting 
the J ambi offer, and eventually the plan was abandoned. 88 
Jambi was now flung back on the Dutch once more. In early 1761 a 
new resident, A. F. van Solms, had reached Jambi, successfully chas-
ing away a party of Bugis led by Raja Haji, whom he encountered 
downstream. Van Solms immediately began constructing another lodge 
on higher ground at Kompeh Besar, downriver from Tanah Pilih. He 
also took heart from the fact that he was given the court name of 
Pangeran Sutasarta, the first time a resident had received such an honor 
for many years. In October 1763 he was successful in obtaining Sultan 
Anum's agreement to yet another contract; it obliged the Jambi ruler to 
send envoys to Batavia, to make restitution for the goods left by Aalders 
in 1754, to provide protection for the new Dutch lodge at Kompeh, and 
to relinquish claims to authority over Pecinaan. The bovenlanders, 
especially those from Minangkabau and Limun, would be encouraged 
to come downstream, and efforts would be made to foster pepper plant-
ing. In return, the Dutch would take Jambi again under their protec-
tion and would pay an increased pepper price of 73/. rijksdaalders a 
picul. 89 
Nonetheless, Batavia had misgivings, particularly about the attitude 
that the heir, the pangeran ratu, might take after Sultan Anum's death. 
Virtually in control of government, the pangeran ratu had openly said 
that J ambi could not fulfill the terms of the contract his father had con-
cluded. 90 He himself feared that when his father died the Dutch might 
throw their weight behind his cousin, a son of Sultan Astra.Ingalaga. In 
view of the VOC's history of king-making in Jambi, the pangeran 
ratu's future looked precarious. In local eyes the break between them 
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was symbolized by the VOC's decision to move downstream to Kom-
peh Besar. As the Pecinaan people said, it was akin to a separation 
between parents. "Our lord's order [to move] is very difficult, because 
we belong half to our mother and half to our father, and the sudden 
move of the Company is like that of a mother. If the father [i.e., Sultan 
Anum] could be again closely allied with the mother [the Company], 
and again sit next to her, and the mother do likewise, then these humble 
servants will together again return and live under their mother, accord-
ing to old custom."91 No such reconciliation came about. On 20 March 
1768, "in the morning at six 0 clock," the Dutch post at Kompeh Besar 
was attacked by about a hundred men. This event finally prompted 
Batavia to leave J ambi; after more than a hundred and thirty years, the 
vac post was irrevocably closed. Communication with the court 
ended abruptly, and a letter from J ambi to the sultan of Palembang in 
1771, raising the possibility of a reconciliation with the VOC, received 
a cool response. 92 
The Dutch regarded the written contracts they signed with J ambi 
kings as a means of furthering their own goals and providing the ilir 
ruler with VOC support. Local leaders became willing participants in 
the contract-making process, seeing in these powerful documents a way 
of recreating a golden age of prosperity believed to have existed in the 
past. Yet given the economic imbalance between ulu and ilir, such 
hopes were illusory. With the crumbling of the pepper market, gold 
became Jambi's most important product; but like so many resources, it 
was located upstream. The vitality of the ilir port thus depended on a 
continuing exchange with the interior, but the ability ofJambi rulers to 
participate in this reciprocal interaction was undermined by their need 
for vac support and Dutch insistence that they defend a monopoly 
contract intended to serve the Company's interests. Kings who were 
condemned as exploitative, greedy, and miserly were readily seen as 
immoral as well, and it was often in these terms that local dissatisfaction 
was expressed. The possibility of any resolution was rendered more 
problematic by the migration into the ulu of Minangkabau gold miners, 
who were culturally less inclined to acknowledge the authority of the 
Jambi ruler. By the time Sultan Anum finally turned against the Dutch, 
the standing of downstream kings had been eroded. Their continuing 
inability to galvanize popular support becomes apparent when we turn 
to examine Palembang, where a civil war also resulted in the installa-
tion of a Dutch-backed ruler. Here, however, the king developed into a 
genuine folk hero, and in the upstream areas ilir overlordship was 
essentially unchallenged. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Kings and Heroes: 
Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin of 
Palembang (1724-1757) 
One outgrowth of expanding literacy in western Eu-
rope in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the developing 
corpus of philosophical writings that sought to examine the nature of 
government and in particular the justification for kingship. Resistance 
to the notion of divinely ordained rulers was especially evident in the 
United Provinces of the Netherlands, where responsibility for national 
concerns rested not with a king and council but with a body known as 
the Estates General. Yet even here what might be seen as a republican 
tradition was countered by equally strong monarchical sympathies 
growing out of an emotional attachment to the House of Orange, whose 
founder, William the Silent, had led the struggle for independence 
against Spain. This tradition was fostered because the complicated sys-
tem of government in the Netherlands made it possible for a member of 
the House of Orange to be elected stadhouder (viceroy or governor) of all 
or most of the provinces and so gain a position similar to that of a king. 
Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was thus an 
uneasy tension between monarchical and republican tendencies. For 
twenty years from 1650 there was no stadhouder, and the regents of the 
Estates General regained control of government; in an outburst of 
Orangist sentiment in 1672, however, William III was reinstated as 
stadhouder. From 1702 there were another four decades of rule by the 
regents, but in 1747 William IV became the first hereditary stadhouder 
of all the provinces. 
The ambigious attitudes toward kingship apparent in Dutch society 
had curious parallels in Jambi and Palembang, where legends remem-
bered a time when there had been no kings, and where the authority of 
the ilir rulers over the interior was conceived as one of partnership 
between the capital and "the nine rivers." As a VOC envoy in Palem-
bang in 1755 put it, "The ruler is not sovereign, and in affairs of impor-
tance does not act without consulting with his nobles and even ordinary 
people ... The king is only master of his own household affairs."! One 
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cannot, of course, take the comparison too far. One crucial difference 
between kingship in the Netherlands and in Jambi and Palembang was 
the conceptual distance between later stadhouders and their illustrious 
ancestor, William the Silent. Despite their personal ambitions, his 
decendants were never more than men, pale shadows of their le'gendary 
forebear. The epic hero celebrated in chapbooks and popular histories 
belonged to a mythical past and was increasingly irrelevant in a present 
where any public figure could be the butt of satirical pamphlets and 
lampoons. Although the House of Orange continued to command 
respect, there were no traces of the apotheosis associated with "the 
Father of the Fatherland." 
But in Jambi and Palembang, where the present and past were inex-
tricably interlaced, the great ancestors still established the relevant cri-
teria by which contemporary kings could be measured and set standards 
they could still attain. The rulers held in highest regard were those 
whose lives and achievements most nearly echoed those of the heroic 
\ past, and the crumbling of Jambi kingship was at least partly due to a 
failure to match the examples provided by the rulers of popular legend. 
Kingship in Palembang, like that in Jambi, was also built on delicate 
foundations, and yet during the eighteenth century the prestige of its 
rulers reached unprecedented heights. The king in his role as hero is 
tellingly exemplified in the reign of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin 
(1724-1757). When the Dutch began collecting popular accounts of 
Palembang's history at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they 
found that "Sultan Lemabang," as he was commonly known after his 
burial place, was grouped with figures such as Aria Damar, Ratu Sinu-
hun, and Cinde Balang and was regarded as one of the most impressive 
heroes of Palembang's past. His name was coupled with a time when 
Palembang was peaceful, when people gained much profit (banyak perun-
tungan), and when many traders came. 2 But Sultan Mahmud's standing 
was not due simply to the fact that his wealth and domains far exceeded 
those of his neighbors. In his own career Sultan Mahmud had essen-
tially reenacted the heroic life associated with the ancestors of legend. 
Fifty years after his death remembrances of his "time" were still so 
powerful that his great-grandson also adopted the title Mahmud 
Badaruddin as a public reminder of his prestigious descent. 
The Origins of the Heroic King 
To appreciate the factors contributing to Sultan Mahmud's heroic sta-
tus, it is necessary to trace the manner in which he came to power, for 
his emergence from obscurity was itself critical in formulating images of 
his rule. In 1710 it is unlikely that anyone would have seen a future king 
in the person of Pangeran Jayawikrama, a son of Sultan Muhmmad 
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Mansur Syah by a minor wife. The succession seemed already firmly 
established, since the old ruler had named as his heir Pangeran Pur-
baya, his only son of fully royal birth. This choice met with wide 
approval, and it was generally assumed that on Sultan Mansur's death 
Pangeran Purbaya would take his place. However, in October 1710 
Pangeran Purbaya died unexpectedly; it was commonly believed he had 
been poisoned. 3 
The inevitable accusations of conspiracy fueled antagonisms between 
the two princes who hoped to assume the now vacant position of heir. 
Sultan Mansur himself was known to favor his oldest remaining son, 
Pangeran Dipati Anum, the elder brother of Pangeran Jayawikrama. 
However, an influential faction within the court opposed this choice on 
the grounds that the mother of these two princes, a woman fromJambi, 
was a commoner. They argued that the rightful successor was the fully 
royal pangeran ratu, Sultan Mansur's younger brother. The need to 
resolve this dispute grew more urgent from the end of 1713 because of 
Sultan Mansur's failing health. The ruler himself proposed a compro-
mise; his brother should be regent until Pangeran Anum was old 
enough to succeed. A marriage could .be negotiated with a daughter of 
Johor's raja muda, a union that would bring Pangeran Anum both the 
support of a powerful neighboring kingdom and a royal bride to com-
pensate for his mother's low birth. 4 
With his father mortally ill, Pangeran Anum was justifiably appre-
hensive that a hostile court would refuse to honor this arrangement. 
However, his attempt to seize power in September 1714 was unsuccess-
ful because he could not rally sufficient support, and following Sultan 
Mansur's death his uncle was installed as Sultan Agung Kamaruddin. 
When Pangeran Anum refused to accept the prestigious but lesser title 
of pangeran ratu, he was condemned to exile. In early November, 
accompanied by four of his brothers, including PangeranJayawikrama, 
he departed for Bangka. Sultan Agung then informed the J ohor court 
that all marriage arrangements should be cancelled, and shortly after-
ward he assumed the impressive title of sultan ratu. 5 
Pangeran Anum by no means relinquished his ambitions. Against 
Sultan Agung's express orders he had taken with him to Bangka a large 
amount of gold and silver, weapons, provisions, and about five hundred 
people. From Bangka he sent envoys to Batavia, promising the Dutch 
"everything in Palembang" to "the very last grain of rice" if they 
would assist him to regain what was rightfully his.6 In May 1715, by 
which time it was clear no help from Batavia would be forthcoming, 
Pangeran Anum left Bangka for Palembang, his ostensible purpose 
being the interment of two deceased relatives in the royal graveyard. 
But he was known to have a following on Bangka that numbered a good 
two thousand, and Sultan Agung, suspecting an attack was imminent, 
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dispatched a force to compel his nephews to retreat. They took refuge in 
Johar, where they were received with honor, but the possibility of an 
alliance disappeared when they lost favor with the raja muda. 7 Toward 
the end of 1716 the Palembang princes left Riau and sailed to Siantan, 
where Pangeran Anum and Pangeran Jayawikrama both married 
daughters of local leaders. In March 1717 they returned to Bangka, 
fuelling further rumors of an impending attack on Palembang. B 
Pangeran Anum had good grounds for believing that he would be 
successful, for Sultan Agung's choice of advisers had alienated powerful 
nobles. The atmosphere of uncertainty was exacerbated because the 
succession still lay open; Sultan Agung had produced no heir and had 
failed to appoint a mangkubumi. There were a number of potential 
contenders, including the absent Pangeran Anum. Clearly nervous 
about his position, Sultan Agung had for some time been preparing his 
warships and building defenses. The borders in Rawas were similarly 
strengthened to discourage any attack through Jambi, and a mission 
was sent to J ohar to affirm Palembang's desire for friendship. 9 
In Batavia the VOC Council maintained a close eye on Palembang 
affairs, for they were less than happy with Sultan Agung's handling of 
commercial matters. Furthermore, they were being courted by Pange-
ran Anum, who had already dispatched three missions asking for assis-
tance, referring to the governor general as his "father" and to himself 
as a "son" and sending a gift of Bangka tin as an inducement. 10 What 
made the Dutch particularly anxious to see the Palembang succession 
settled, however, was the raiding by Pangeran Anum's followers on 
passing shipping. The resident, Abraham Patras, reported that many 
people favored the prince's return, since he had indicated that he was 
now willing to accept the position of either pangeran ratu or mangku-
bumi. In March 1717 matters came to a head when Pangeran Anum 
sent a letter addressing Sultan Agung as father and asking if he could 
come and pay a visit to the grave of Sultan Mansur, his own father and 
"Your Majesty's older brother." 11 
In retrospect, Pangeran Anum's request can be interpreted as an 
open assertion of his royal descent. On 24 October his fleet entered the 
river, and it was soon apparent that he intended to seize power by force. 
Five days later he "and all his relatives" paid their respects at his 
father's grave; shortly afterward "old Palembang" (a short distance 
below the Dutch lodge) was in his hands. "Everything is burning," the 
resident noted in his journal; and Sultan Agung, facing the prospect of 
defeat, finally agreed to permit Pangeran Anum to return. During "a 
great assembly" on 8 November he was declared mangkubumi and pre-
sented with a kris, the country's cannon, a seal, and "a written docu-
ment" announcing his new position as well as his entitlement to the rev-
enue from tolls. Sultan Agung then wrote to Batavia to announce that 
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on Saturday, 8 Haji 1129 at 12 o'clock the direction of government had 
been given over to "our son Pangeran Dipati Anum" who was now to 
be regarded" as if he was my own flesh and blood" with authority over 
all affairs in Palembang. In a solemn ceremony he had been named Sul-
tan Anum and presented with the clothing appropriate to this high 
status. 12 
Although Sultan Anum thus appeared to have triumphed, the vac 
continued to receive bitter complaints from Sultan Agung, who accused 
his nephew of appropriating all revenues and awarding high titles to his 
favorites. He had even installed his younger brother, PangeranJayawi-
krama, as the pangeran ratu. In early 1719 Sultan Anum announced he 
was henceforth to be called Sultan Ratu Anum and demanded that his 
uncle surrender the state kris and change his title to susuhunan as a sign 
that he relinquished authority. This Sultan Agung refused to do. InJan-
uary 1721 he sent a secret mission to Batavia to ask the Dutch for help 
and for the return of the son of a previously exiled prince as an alterna-
tive heir. 13 
In Batavia it was decided that the situation in Palembang again war-
ranted some kind of intervention, especially as it was known that Sultan 
Anum was requesting help from Bugis princes in Wajo and Mandar. 
The complexity of the affair demanded a representative who was fully 
versed in Palembang matters, and in May 1721 Abraham Patras was 
accordingly sent back as commissioner. When he arrived in June he 
found that skirmishes had already broken out because Anum had heard 
of Sultan Agung's secret mission to Batavia. But although Sultan Anum 
was popular in the interior, a number of influential nobles had been 
alienated when he had taken their wives and children into his own com-
pound as hostages for their support. Any resolution seemed impossible 
because Sultan Agung announced he would rather die than "again 
come under the authority of Sultan Anum," and that if "two kings 
ruled, all Palembang would fall into ruin." 14 
Two factors distinguished the situation in 1721 from that three years 
earlier; the first was the new influence wielded by Pangeran Jayawi-
krama; the second the hostility that had developed between him and 
Sultan Anum. Although Pangeran Jayawikrama had been raised to 
pangeran ratu, he considered he had not been sufficiently rewarded for 
his loyalty. Resentful of his brother's continuing arrogation of authority, 
he had paid court to Sultan Agung's eldest and recently divorced 
daughter. While Sultan Anum had also proposed marriage, she had 
rejected both him and his eldest son. The suit of Pangeran Jayawi-
krama, however, had been accepted. For Sultan Anum this apparent 
betrayal was a source of deep humiliation. "It is this marriage," wrote 
Patras, "which is the cause of the present war and which accounts for 
the bitterness between the brothers." Years later, Sultan Anum still 
182 Kings and Heroes 
blamed Sultan Agung's daughter for causing divisions between him and 
his brother, and there can be no doubt that at the time emotions were 
intense. One of Sultan Anum's own concubines even warned Jayawi-
krama that his brother was plotting to poison him.15 
The alliance with Sultan Agung considerably strengthened the posi-
tion of Pangeran J ayawikrama, who already had a high standing among 
the populace generally and whom Patras described as a man of "cour-
age and good spirits." Hoping that he would eventually be able to over-
see a peace settlement, Patras helped to institute an arrangement by 
which Sultan Anum agreed to govern in consultation with Sultan 
Agung, while the older man retained the income from the pepper tolls, 
giving Sultan Anum whatever portion he thought was proper. 16 But the 
enmity between Sultan Anum and Pangeran J ayawikrama made it 
unlikely that a compromise would have any lasting success. Following 
the departure of Patras for J ambi in September, fighting again broke 
out, and the situation was unchanged when he returned in November. 
The key to success was clearly control of human resources. Although 
Patras estimated that Sultan Anum had ten times as many people as his 
brother and uncle, many of his followers were reluctant to oppose their 
old king and his popular son-in-law, Pangeran Jayawikrama. Anum's 
ability to maintain a large fighting force lay primarily in his access to 
cheap rice supplied by his supporters in the interior. Ships under his 
control also brought guns and gunpowder from Johor; these were used 
to mount attacks on vessels belonging to Sultan Agung. The latter, his 
maritime trade threatened, lacked the means to purchase either food or 
ammunition, and his followers had to pay four or five times as much for 
their rice. Although J ayawikrama also had authority over a considera-
ble number of people and commanded a contingent of nearly two hun-
dred Bugis, it was doubtful whether he would be able to hold their loy-
alty. In January 1722 he and Sultan Agung told the Dutch they feared 
their people would desert them because they had no food. Already 
"slaves and ordinary people of the lowest kind" had fled to Sultan 
Anum. 17 
Since 1714 the Dutch had been uncertain whom they should support 
as king of Pal em bang. There was always a tendency to favor the "legiti-
mate" ruler, but in the end their own interests were the deciding factor. 
Sultan Agung and Pangeran J ayawikrama seemed more willing than 
Sultan Anum to accommodate the Company's commercial goals. They 
had even given Patras a gold box containing earth, dry grass, and rice 
as a symbol of their willingness to surrender Palembang to the vac in 
return for support. It was therefore decided to make Sultan Agung a 
loan of 1,500 rijksdaalders to buy supplies; shortly afterward, when sev-
eral ships loaded with rice arrived from Siam, the older ruler was able to 
sell rice at the same price as his nephew. 18 
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vac officials in Batavia nonetheless believed that further action was 
necessary because they feared Sultan Anum might again retreat to 
Bangka, where tin was now known to exist in viable quantities. Mean-
while, Sultan Agung had offered to pay for any expenses incurred by 
the vac in supporting his cause. In March 1722 four hundred Com-
pany soldiers were accordingly sent to Palembang; there they combined 
with the forces of J ayawikrama to patrol the Musi and prevent Sultan 
Anum from fleeing upstream. At the same time Sultan Anum was 
informed of Batavia's decision to support Sultan Agung and told to 
place himself under the authority of his "lawful king." 
Although Anum was willing to surrrender his cannon, he refused to 
give up his small arms, or have a European guard in his palace, or place 
any of his sons in the vac lodge as hostages. Foreseeing resistance, the 
Dutch commander ordered Sultan Anum's compound surrounded, and 
for several hours a steady cannonade was maintained. Under cover of 
darkness, however, Sultan Anum and his family set fire to the palace 
and escaped upriver. 19 
With the lessons of J ambi before them, the downstream court and its 
Dutch supporters were determined to prevent Sultan Anum from 
becoming a focus for opposition in the ulu. Pangeran Jayawikrama 
himself led a force upstream to capture the fugitive, and although he 
was unsuccessful, Sultan Anum was prevented from establishing a set-
tled base or crossing the Barisan to Bengkulen by the vigilance of the 
border villagers in Pasemah and Rejang. Two further expeditions sent 
upstream provided a further statement of ilir authority, and by early 
1724 Sultan Anum was reported to have taken refuge in the J ambi inte-
rior.20 
Although Sultan Agung and Pangeran J ayawikrama appeared victo-
rious, they both realized how much they owed to vac assistance. New 
clothes were the gifts normally bestowed by a ruler on a favorite, and 
Sultan Agung told the governor general he felt as if he were burdened 
with many heavy garments, so that his body was "not strong enough to 
bear them." He would never be able to forget the assistance that had 
come "like rain on parched grass, brought the dead from their graves 
and had helped make Palembang and Batavia one." In June he con-
cluded a contract with Patras by which he reiterated his willingness to 
pay any costs incurred by the Dutch for their military intervention. He 
confirmed the Company's monopoly of pepper without demur, and to 
this was added exclusive rights to the tin being produced from newly 
developed mines on Bangka. 21 
an 15 March 1724 Sultan Agung died, and five days later the nobles 
elected Pangeran J ayawikrama as ruler, installing him with the reign 
name Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin "in the presence of Palembangers 
high and low and the interior heads or peroatin." Like his father-in-law, 
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Sultan Mahmud carried with him memones of indebtedness to the 
VaG, which he did not set aside despite the strains that were later to 
occur. The closeness of this relationship was exemplified in the respect 
Patras was accorded, and even at the time the Palembang court asked if 
he could remain and be promoted, because "he knew about Palembang 
affairs." Immediately following his own installation Sultan Mahmud 
sent Patras (who had yet to be appointed to the council of the Indies) 
gifts fit for a governor general, the items for which Palembang was 
famous-pepper, gambier, elephant tusks, rattan mats, ambalo wood,22 
wax, as well as the new product, tin. In 1755 when another VaG envoy, 
Johannes Paravicini, arrived to negotiate a revised contract, he found 
that Patras had a "great name" as "the founder and restorer of their 
liberty." Sultan Mahmud's resistance to any changes in the existing 
contract was at least partly due to its association with "the blessed" 
Patras, who was still mentioned with veneration well over fifty years 
later. By elevating the VaG envoy and later governor general to heroic 
status, Sultan Mahmud and his heirs were acknowledging that Dutch 
intervention had been an important factor in his success. In 1714 he had 
been merely the son of a lowborn gundik. Now he was ruler of what was 
to become one of the wealthiest states in the archipelago. 23 
The King and Bangka's Riches 
As we have seen in the case of Sultan Abdul Rahman, wealth and the 
capacity for generosity were integral to the conceptualization of a 
"good" king. Palembang had known prosperous kings before, but Sul-
tan Mahmud was believed to surpass them all. In 1755 Paravicini was 
told that the ruler's riches in money, gold, silver, and jewels comprised 
"an almost incalculable treasure." For the ordinary man and woman 
this treasure was clear proof that Sultan Mahmud was not of the com-
mon herd, but had been favored by destiny. Their king himself shared 
this view, for as he told one resident, "I have money, and am well 
enough blessed by heaven."24 
Several differences between Palembang and J ambi at this stage help 
account for the former's economic superiority: the lack of protracted 
internal divisions, the absence of major demographic change in the inte-
rior, the relative strength of Palembang's pepper trade. Nonetheless, in 
regard to the latter there were already marked changes. Although the 
pepper gardens of the Palembang interior were considered "in good 
order" at the beginning of Sultan Mahmud's reign, as in Jambi, pro-
duction showed a steady decline. VaG figures never include the entire 
Palembang harvest, but they are nonetheless revealing. In 1729 some 
3,660,000 Dutch pounds of pepper were delivered to the lodge; in 1741 
the figure was 3,026,375; in 1743 it had declined to 2,737,300; and in 
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1751, it stood at 669,718. 25 The basic reason for Palembang's emer-
gence as one of the wealthiest Indonesian kingdoms was thus not pep-
per; rather, it was the exploitation and development of the tin mines on 
Bangka. 
The existence of tin on Bangka had been known at least since the late 
seventeenth century, and although never exported in large quantities, it 
appears to have been used in making picis as well as ammunition. How-
ever, the vac only became aware of Bangka's tin in 1717, following 
Pangeran Anum's flight there. 26 By 1722 several factors encouraged 
greater Dutch interest. Tin was already valued as a ballast in ships 
bound for Europe and had a good market in India; however, the vac's 
immediate hope was that it could be used to purchase Chinese tea, now 
in high demand in Europe. Tin was one of the few items that the Dutch 
were able to sell profitably in China, where it was used in a variety of 
ways: to manufacture utensils, both for export and home use; to make 
tutenag (an alloy similar to aluminum, used through much of the archi-
pelago in the same way as pewter); and for tin foil, employed widely in 
religious ceremonies and also in the manufacture of tea cannisters. Well 
before the vac learned about Bangka's tin deposits, Chinese vessels 
were already sailing there directly to buy up supplies. Palembang ships 
bound for Java were also loading tin ostensibly as ballast but in fact for 
sale in Batavia. In December 1719 Sultan Ratu delivered thirty-six 
thousand pounds of tin sand and twenty thousand pounds of slab tin to 
Batavia, telling the Dutch that he planned to encourage the people of 
Bangka to expand their tin mining. 27 
Although the 1722 treaty promised the vac a monopoly of Bangka 
tin, both Sultan Mahmud and the Dutch were uncomfortably aware of t 
the fragility of Palembang's hold over the island. The acceptance of 
Palembang's overlordship was relatively recent, and the exercise of 
authority was impeded by geographical separation, for Bangka waters • 
were treacherous and negotiable only by those with extensive knowl-
edge of local conditions. After the winds changed in March, for 
instance, adverse currents could force ships onto rocks or sandbanks, 
and during this period the northeast coast was virtually inaccessible by 
sea. Sultan Mahmud had himself spent some time living on Bangka and 
was aware of how easily overlordship could dissipate. He therefore took 
a particular interest in the administration of Bangka and Belitung, 
requiring local heads to appear before him annually with gifts of tin, 
wax, mats, and knives and hatchets made of Belitung iron. Determined 
to limit private trade in tin, he sent his own vessels out to accompany I 
Dutch patrol ships and guide them through the dangerous reefs. In 
May 1729 Sultan Mahmud set off personally to Bangka with more than 
fifty well-armed warships, and when he returned he left behind half his 
fleet to keep watch. Those who attempted to sell tin without remitting to 
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the ruler some share of their profits were severely punished, while 
Dutch residents who indulged in the forbidden but common private 
j trade were denounced to their superiors in Batavia. For the greater part 
of his reign, traffic in tin by Sultan Mahmud's subjects from which he 
• did not benefit was kept to a minimum. Even in 1755 a native vac 
employee who had been secretly sent to Bangka to investigate the extent 
of smuggling found it impossible to buy any clandestine supplies 
because the miners said this was against the king's orders. 28 
In 1722, when the contract with Palembang had been renewed, the 
tin trade had been of minor importance in the local economy; by 1729 
the Bangka mines were said to be the primary source of the king's 
wealth, with four to five thousand piculs being delivered annually to the 
Dutch lodge. 29 But while Sultan Mahmud may have been relatively 
successful in preventing his own subjects from selling tin independently, 
he found that the large numbers of Bugis and Makassarese arriving in 
the region were not nearly so responsive to his wishes. Palembang had 
long been a place for migration from Sulawesi; now Bugis communities 
in Selangor and Linggi on the Malay Peninsula and especially in 
Johor's capital Riau (where they had assumed control in 1722) gave 
added stimulus to the outward flow. Bands of refugees, searching for 
underpopulated and undergoverned areas to settle, saw Bangka as an 
obvious target. The 1720s therefore saw the development of small Bugis 
mining settlements, the inhabitants supporting themselves by selling tin 
"legally" in Palembang or more frequently smuggling it to Riau. 
Like so many local rulers, Sultan Mahmud regarded these new arriv-
f als warily. On the one hand, they were renowned traders and skilled 
fighters whose services could be of benefit; on the other hand, they were 
I notoriously unwilling to accept established authority, and Sultan Mah-
• mud's own ships were by no means exempt from the attacks of Bugis 
raiders. His reaction to several requests for permission to settle in 
Palembang territory suggests that recent occurrences, especially in 
Johor, had made him nervous. In 1728, for instance, a party of nearly 
• fifty Bugis men, women, and children who arrived on Bangka from 
Madura were captured and sent back. Later that year a party of five 
Bugis arrived as envoys from one of their high-ranking countrymen in 
Selangor, asking for permission to trade. Although they were allowed to 
return unharmed, their goods were confiscated. 30 
A test of Sultan Mahmud's resolve came toward the end of 1729 
" when a Bone prince, Arung Mappala, arrived on Bangka from Banjar-
masin. Using a combination of persuasion and force, he was able to 
assert his authority over about four hundred Bugis who were then min-
I ing tin on Bangka. He made his base on Tanjung Ular, a high, rocky 
point protected from sea attacks by a reef, from which vantage point 
Bugis ships were able to preserve the northern coastline as their own. 
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Arung Mappala's following was further swelled by the arrival on • 
Bangka of Sultan Mahmud's brother, the refugee Sultan Anum, in 
November 1730. The building of forts and clearing of jungle paths to 
facilitate movement across the island made it apparent that they 
planned to take control. 
On receiving news of developments on Bangka, Sultan Mahmud 
moved swiftly, dispatching five thousand men and 130 warships to 
defend his interests. Despite their numerical inferiority, however, the 
Bugis proved well able to hold their own. After several skirmishes in 
which the Palembang forces were routed, the VaG resident told his 
superiors that in his view Sultan Mahmud could not defeat Arung Map-
pala and Sultan Anum, and that without Dutch assistance Bangka 
could well be lost. 31 The situation was the more serious because the 
number of Bugis on the island was steadily increasing, with daily arriv-
als from Johor, Linggi, Batu Bara, and Inderagiri. Two-thirds of 
Bangka was under the control of either Arung Mappala or Sultan 
Anum. 
Seeing his domination of the tin trade in Palembang slipping away, 
Sultan Mahmud again promised to pay all VaG costs if the Dutch 
would lend him their assistance. Batavia lost no time in responding. 
Sultan Mahmud was given muskets with which to arm his men, the 
river was patrolled, and stockades were erected. In March 1731 a VaG 
fleet was sent to cruise the Bangka Straits, and a few weeks later the res-
ident landed on the island with a small force of Europeans. Their subse-
quent attack on the Bugis post at Tanjung Vlar was completely success-
ful. Its defenses were destroyed, Arung Mappala forced to retreat, and ~ 
about a hundred people taken prisoner. With the arrival of a Palem-
bang force in July, the campaign was over. By September, Arung Map-
pala had left Bangka, while Anum had fled to Belitung and from thence K 
to Tungkal. In the words of the resident, the people of Bangka "ac-
knowledged the authority of their rightfullord."32 
There can be litttle doubt that assistance from the Dutch had been 
vital in Sultan Mahmud's retention of control over Bangka. He· never 
forgot that debt, nor the advocacy he attributed to Abraham Patras. 
When the latter was installed as governor general in 1735, a congratula-
tory mission arrived from Palembang accompanied by three ships 
loaded with gifts. Patras died after only two years in office, but during 
this period Sultan Mahmud made significant concessions to Dutch f 
demands, such as agreeing to "extirpate" all gambier and cotton 
bushes and repaying a large proportion of the costs involved in the ' 
Bangka campaign. Rather than gestures of weakness, these concessions 
were a recognition of the heavy obligations he owed to the VaG. 
With his authority over Bangka restored, Sultan Mahmud's primary 
concern was to exploit the riches for which he had fought. The main 
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impediment to achieving this goal was the sparsity of Bangka's popula-
tion. If the Palembang ruler was to retain control ofthe tin trade, it was 
vital that the island be peopled by loyal subjects who would acknowl-
edge his rights over the mines. It was natural that Sultan Mahmud 
should think first in terms of his own relatives. His first and most loved 
• wife was a part-Chinese Siantan woman, now entitled Mas Ayu, whom 
he had married some years before when he had taken refuge on that 
island with his brother. In September 1734 he announced that because 
of his love for Mas Ayu he was sending a fleet of ships back to Siantan to 
bring to Palembang more than a thousand of her "relatives, good 
friends, and servants." Five hundred were settled in the Mentuk area of 
Bangka, with the specific aim of increasing tin deliveries by establishing 
close links between producers and buyers. 33 The females of this family, 
bearing the title "yang," were henceforth reserved exclusively for the 
sultan's palace. 
A second attempt to settle "family" on Bangka was less successful. In 
1737 Sultan Mahmud married a Mandarese princess from Cenrana in 
Sulawesi, and she so captured his affection that she was elevated to sen-
ior queen "and placed above all other women." As a result, a number 
of her relatives from Mandar, Makassar, and Banjarmasin soon arrived 
in Palembang with hopes of status and rewards from a rich patron. Sev-
• eral were given high titles, and a number settled on Bangka to mine tin. 
With their privileged position buttressed by the influence of the queen, 
t they in turn attracted other refugees. By 1745 it was estimated that 
i about a thousand Mandarese were living on Bangka, especially around 
Kelabat Bay.34 It was not long before disputes with neighboring com-
munities broke out. The head of Mentuk complained that "Bugis" (in 
which he included Mandar and Makassar people) were raiding the min-
ing areas, seizing the smelted tin as well as the wooden troughs where 
the tin was washed. Unable to refuse his wife's requests for favors, but 
reluctant to accede to the demands of his importuning relatives, Sultan 
Mahmud turned again to the Dutch. Through a combination of treach-
ery, persuasion, and force, resident and ruler were together able to con-
vince the Mandar leaders to leave. 35 
The marked increase in Chinese migration to Bangka in the mid-
eighteenth century should therefore be seen against a specific back-
ground. Sultan Mahmud realized his income depended on continued 
development of tin, but he lacked the human resources to open new 
minBs. Chinese had been an integral part of Palembang's economy for 
generations, and in their new occupation as tin miners they were ini-
tially accepted without conflict or disruption. In a sense, of course, the 
peranakan community in Palembang was already "family." Several of 
Sultan Mahmud's wives had Chinese blood and his business matters 
were also handled by local Chinese merchants. It was they who kept his 
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accounts, supervised pepper deliveries, negotiated with the Dutch, and 
dealt with matters such as recalling picis and minting new ones. 36 The 
leading peranakan merchants were sufficiently influential to oppose 
Sultan Mahmud's choice as kapitan cina (captain of the Chinese) and 
have their own candidate appointed instead. The arrival of Mas Ayu's 
family and their settlement around Mentuk had further strengthened 
the position of Sultan Mahmud's peranakan relatives. When Thomas 
Horsfield was collecting oral traditions two generations later, it was well 
known that the original head of Mentuk had been the father of one of 
Sultan Mahmud's wives, a part-Chinese whose family had been Mus-
lim for several generations. Horsfield was told that under him sustained 
efforts had been made to clear the area of jungle and develop agri-
culture. 37 
Peranakan Chinese also remained in charge of tin collection as the 
numbers of Chinese miners began to increase during the late 1740s. 
Some of the latter may have fled from Batavia after the disturbances 
there in 1740, but most were more recent arrivals. Chinese migration to 
the Nanyang, the southern seas, had been on the rise since the late six-
teenth century, but there had been a marked expansion after the with-
drawal of imperial prohibitions on overseas trade in 1683. Lured by the , 
prospect of future riches, young men from China itself or from the over-
seas Chinese communities in Siam, Cambodia, Vietnam, and else-
where in the archipelago took passage for Bangka on native ships and 
the junks willing to defy Dutch patrols. Many of these migrants would 
have honed their mining skills at home in places like the tin- and cop-
per-producing districts of Yunnan and possibly overseas in the gold 
fields of west Borneo and Vietnam. These skills were combined with the 
concept of a partnership, the kongsi, in which all participants shared in 
the profits. 38 When this highly successful form of cooperative enterprise 
was joined with an indigenous administration like that of Sultan 
Mahmud, which actively sought to encourage mining, development 
proceeded apace. 
The main mining settlement on Bangka for most of the century was 
Bela. According to later accounts it was developed after Mentuk by a 
Chinese called Ah Sing, and indeed a certain "Kapitan Assin, Chi-
nese" is mentioned in the the shipping lists of 1757 as the "king's ser-
vant." Ah Sing's descendants said he had been appointed kapitan cina 
of Bela and that he had then introduced more efficient methods of min-
ing and had given ingots a specific weight. He also began to encourage 
people from China and Borneo who "knew about collecting tin ore and 
about mining, and about the uses of canals and aqueducts" to come to 
Bangka. From Bela, Chinese settlement spread to the Bay of Kelabat, 
where the harbor was suitable for native vessels, and from here mining 
moved into the northwestern peninsula. By 1747 the resident noted at 
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least seventeen new tin-mining settlements, and by the mid-1750s it was 
estimated that there were about four thousand Chinese on Bangka. 
Thus, although Malays, "Bugis," and the "mountain people" contin-
ued to mine tin, the Chinese comprised the overwhelming majority of 
miners.39 
This demographic change in turn affected the rate of tin production, 
for Chinese mining methods were more efficient, more sophisticated, 
and therefore more rewarding than those used by local workers. None-
theless, they still involved the coordination of human labor rather than 
complex machinery. The Bangka kongsi were each composed of a hun-
dred or more men under the direction of a leader who was also responsi-
ble for maintaining the accounts. Their first priority was to establish 
rights of access to some stream or river, not only to wash the tin but also 
to facilitate transportation to some collection point. Next came the 
arduous task of digging out canals, six feet deep and six feet wide and 
up to two hundred feet long, through which water could be directed and 
controlled by sluice gates. The excavated tin sand was piled on the 
banks and thrown into the canals, where it sank to the bottom. When 
the sluice was opened, the water rushed through the canal, washing the 
rubble away. Skilled smelters then formed the tin into ingots, and by 
mid-century there were said to be about ten smelteries on the island. 40 
Although it took six to seven months before a mine could be brought 
into production, the mining techniques of the Chinese and their open or 
kulit workings gave them a considerable advantage over indigenous 
methods, which relied on digging narrow cylindrical shafts. Between 
1733 and 1754 the tin delivered to Batavia rose from 1,879 piculs to 
about 16,000 piculs per annum. By 1755 it was estimated that Bangka 
could produce 73,000 piculs annually.41 Even at the relatively low vac 
price of 7.5 Spanish rials per picul this represents a sizeable income for 
t the ruler, and in fact much of Bangka's tin was sold secretly elsewhere 
for a substantially higher sum. Most significant at this stage, however, 
is that control over the Chinese and general direction over the mines 
remained in the hands of Sultan Mahmud's appointees. These officials 
collected the tin from the miners and brought it to Palembang, return-
ing with goods and food, especially rice. In the resident's view, this 
, steady flow of rice to Bangka was one of the principal reasons for the 
increase in production, and without it tin from Bangka would have been 
• substantially reduced. Sultan Mahmud also provided the mines and 
smelteries with gunpowder and ammunition purchased secretly in Riau 
or ordered from Batavia so that the workers could protect themselves 
, against raiders. He himself sent out armed fleets, and sometimes more 
than a hundred of his ships, all equipped for war, patrolled Bangka's 
waters. 42 
Sultan Mahmud's control over Bangka meant that the smuggling or 
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private trade that gave rise to growing Dutch complaints occurred with 
his knowledge and direct involvement. Because the prices the vac , 
offered for tin were comparatively low and because the Dutch were not 
willing to buy all the tin Palembang produced, it was more profitable to , 
carry cargoes to posts like Riau outside vac surveillance or to sell 
directly to overseas buyers. As mining spread to the northeastern coast 
of Bangka, which was closer to Riau and less accessible from Palem-
bang, there was a noticeable rise in the number of ships in Bangka , 
waters, often flagrantly flouting vac requirements that they purchase 
passes. In 1747, for example, thirteen Chinese junks, at least two of , 
which came from Siam, were observed off Palembang, their captains 
claiming that they had been "delayed" because of "strong currents." 
Some had passes, but several others argued that they did not need them 
or said they were unaware that they were supposed to go first to 
Batavia. 43 
Although the oceans were less easy to police than inland rivers and 
jungle paths, Sultan Mahmud was nonetheless able to exploit the smug-
gling of tin as his predecessors had done before in regard to pepper. 
With his peranakan Siantan relatives at Mentuk acting as supervisers, I 
small perahu that could avoid vac cruisers carried tin supplies to col-
lecting centers such as Air Hitam, between Jambi and Palembang, I 
where they were loaded onto larger vessels or sold to independent trad-
ers. Disregarding whatever destination was specified on their passes, 
royal junks under the command of Palembang Chinese also took car-
goes of tin to Ha Tien to be exchanged for rice and other goods. Some 
even sailed directly to China. In 1753, for example, although Sultan 
Mahmud sent twelve ships to Batavia loaded with tin, another five car- t 
rying pepper and tin sailed directly to Canton, Amoy, and Ningpo. 
When the Dutch suggested that vac ships collect tin from Bangka, • 
Sultan Mahmud roundly declared that the island was under his juris-
diction and that it was his right to collect revenues and tin, and to dis-
pose of goods as he wished. 44 
Because tin was then so central to vac interests Sultan Mahmud 
had his way on this matter and was able to bargain with Batavia to pre- f 
serve a number of other privileges that ensured essential food supplies 
would not be impeded. Although rice planting had replaced pepper in It 
many areas, being combined with cotton, gambier, or tobacco, Palem-
bang still relied heavily on incoming traders for rice and salt. The 
arrival of ships from Java from September was thus vital for the local 
economy. Continuing vac efforts to compel all Javanese trade to pass 
through Batavia, however, meant that for some captains Palembang 
ceased to be a destination. In 1733 Sultan Mahmud wrote to ask that 
"according to old custom" traders from Java and Madura be permitted J 
to obtain passes from vac officials in Surabaya, Semarang, and Ceri-
t, 
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bon rather than in Batavia. They could then sail immediately to Palem-
bang with their rice, tamarind, vinegar, and salt. Palembang ships 
should likewise be able to receive their passes from local authorities so 
that they could bypass Batavia and go directly to the rice- and salt-pro-
ducing areas of Java's northeast coast. 45 Although the Dutch continued 
to resist the idea of open trade between Palembang and Java, Sultan 
Mahmud took care to buy up enough rice from incoming cargoes so 
that he always had a supply on hand. In addition, communities that had 
abandoned pepper growing in favor of rice now submitted part of their 
harvest as tribute. In 1744 when the failure of rice crops caused hunger 
in some interior areas, he was able to alleviate the problem from his 
own stocks. In the same way, if ports in Java were closed or if rice failed 
to arrive, Sultan Mahmud was in a controlling position. 
A second source of rice for Palembang was the junks from Siam, 
which arrived in early January and February after the Javanese had 
left. In 1745, when the Dutch attempted to prohibit traffic to the north, 
Sultan Mahmud retaliated by sending envoys to Siam offering to send 
the "gold and silver flowers" to Ayutthaya in return for regular rice 
supplies. Probably aware of the panic a similar move by Jambi had 
aroused among the Dutch sixty years earlier, he realized that this could 
be an effective negotiating point. The following year Batavia agreed to 
, open the route between Palembang and Java as far as Semarang in the 
hope that this would stimulate pepper and tin supplies by discouraging 
trade to Siam and the north. In response, Sultan Mahmud agreed to 
discontinue correspondence with Siam. However, he still protested 
against vac efforts to limit trade to Siam and Cambodia, especially 
since there were periodic rice shortages in Java. It was impossible, he 
argued, for his people to cultivate both pepper and rice simultaneously; 
in the words of the pangeran ratu, "It was from olden times the custom 
that when the Javanese left, the Siamese and Cambodian ships came 
with rice and salt, and it was by this means that the land had survived so 
long." Sultan Mahmud maintained that he would be willing to lose a 
few, perhaps a hundred people for the vac, but he would not let his 
whole kingdom starve. If the old ways were not permitted, he threat-
ened go to the interior and plant rice, and the vac would then get no 
pepper. In 1747, despite Amsterdam's misgivings, attempts to restrict 
trade between Palembang and Cambodia and Siam were for a time 
abandoned. 46 
Sultan Mahmud's ability to manipulate the relationship with the 
Dutch to his advantage was particularly evident in his conflicts with 
Gerrit Pan, resident from 1747 to 1750. Pan's efforts to limit passes and 
inspect royal vessels as he did small perahu so incensed Sultan Mahmud 
that he threatened to send all the people from Siantan and "other 
places" who had migrated to Bangka back to their own countries, so 
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that the vac's tin trade would collapse. During 1749 he ensured that 
little tin was delivered to the Dutch lodge, and of necessity Pan was 
forced to comply with the court's request for more than fifty passes. Sul- I 
tan Mahmud registered his dislike of Pan in other ways, such as install-
ing another Chinese agent without prior consultation and appealing to I 
Batavia when there were disagreements regarding procedures for 
weighing tin. He also accused Pan of smuggling and of turning a blind I 
eye to English ships buying tin from Bangka. At one point Sultan 
Mahmud even told the orang laut at Sungsang not to guide vac ships 
upriver. For several months during 1750 Sultan Mahmud feigned ill-
ness and refused to see the resident. The final straw occurred when Pan 
left his lodge to live on a bamboo raft on the river, shortly afterward 
abducting the wife of his Chinese neighbor. 47 Although Pan defended 
himself vehemently, he was unable to counter Sultan Mahmud's influ-
ence in Batavia and eventually left Palembang in disgrace. 
Because Sultan Mahmud and the vac saw the contract as working 
to their mutual advantage, the periodic disagreements about prices and 
debt repayment were normally resolved. The nature of their association 
was made apparent in 1755 during the course of a Dutch mission to 
Palembang headed by the syahbandar of Batavia himself, Johannes 
Paravicini. Although there were initial difficulties because Paravicini 
lacked the required letters of accreditation, he impressed the court suffi-
ciently for Sultan Mahmud to call him "a second Patras," while Paravi-
cini considered the Palembang ruler good-hearted and "exceptionally 
intelligent." In the contract they concluded in 1755 Sultan Mahmud 
agreed to take stronger measures against smuggling and piracy, confis-
cate any junks arriving from China, increase pepper production, and 
permit inspection of ships by Company cruisers. He even said he would 
discourage the use of picis in favor of other forms of currency and forbid 
the planting of coffee, rice, and cotton. The vac was also expected to 
make a contribution to the working of the alliance and in return for 
exclusive rights to Palembang tin therefore promised to support the sul-
tan in "the peaceful o<;cupation of his state." To prevent a recurrence of 
former animosities Paravicini stressed the importance of sending com-
petent residents who treated "the king as a king, and his subjects as 
people."48 
Dutch confidence in Sultan Mahmud's abilities was evident the fol-
lowing year when he was asked to help in drawing up a new contract 
between the vac and Jambi. By the end of his reign Sultan Mahmud 
clearly considered this friendship had served him well. Through Dutch 
assistance he had been made king, and their support had been vital in 
the maintenance of his authority over Bangka. The wealth from the tin 
trade made his position in Palembang unassailable. In his own words, 
"I cannot understand why kings who are allies of the Company quarrel 
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with it, while experience shows us that they always succumb and the 
Company triumphs. I war with the Company, but in quite a different 
manner. I fire pepper and tin at the Company, and it bombards me with 
good Spanish rials." In contrast to J ambi, the Dutch in Palembang thus 
became caught up in the traditions associated with a successful reign. 
Although both Sultan Mahmud and Sultan Anum asked for help, says 
, one account, the Company decided to help the former because his gifts 
(a golden chessboard, Palembang earth, and his own nails and hair) 
were greater. "Then the Company came from Batavia to build a lodge. 
They were given a place upstream at Sungai Aur to build a fort of bam-
boo .... Now everything in Palembang was completely in order .... 
There was again peace in Palembang." Long after Sultan Mahmud's 
death it was remembered that under his rule "every year traders of all 
kinds came to Palembang and brought tin from Bangka and iron from 
Belitung, all bringing riches to Palembang. The country was extremely 
prosperous. "+9 
The King as Overlord 
If Sultan Mahmud's wealth provided the basis for legend, it also gave 
him the means by which he could extend his overlordship into the inte-
rior of Palembang and thus increase his command over the ulu. Sultan 
Mahmud himself realized that this was not easy in the underpopulated 
lands of Sumatra, where the loss of even a few people was a matter for 
concern. As he told the vac resident, "It is easy for a subject to find a 
lord, but it is often difficult for a lord to find a subject, much less main-
tain one." But despite acknowledged difficulties Sultan Mahmud was 
far more successful than his J ambi relatives in maintaining the up-
stream-downstream association. Apparently inconsequential details 
point up the difference. Elephants' tusks, for example, which could be 
obtained only from the depths of the interior jungles, were traditionally 
a royal monopoly. In 1726 the vac directors in Amsterdam were so 
impressed with the number included in Palembang's gifts for Batavian 
officials that they inquired about the possibility of Dutch entry into the 
trade. The resident replied that it was difficult to find tusked elephants 
in Sumatra, where they were generally small and tuskless. Those sent 
by Sultan Mahmud to Batavia were brought from the boundaries of his 
kingdom, along the borders of Bengkulen, wbence he usually received 
two or three pairs a year as tribute. In Jambi, by comparison, there 
were complaints that the royal monopoly was being ignored and that 
elephants' tusks were being sold by private individuals. 50 
Sultan Mahmud's ability to maintain his standing in the interior was 
due in part to geography. An obvious contrast with Jambi was Palem-
bang's distance from the Minangkabau areas. By the middle of the 
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eighteenth century there had been some Minangkabau movement into 
Rawas, but only in numbers amenable to ilir control. Sultan Mahmud • 
was aware, however, that there was the potential for problems. In 1752, 
for example, disputes broke out in one interior district, and some 
Minangkabau were killed. Problems were avoided when the Palembang 4 
villagers were punished and ordered "to give the Minangkabau enough 
people to compensate them for those lost." Furthermore, in contrast to 
Jambi, the downstream Palembang court had already established cer-
tain traditional rights among the most distant upland groups whom the 
Dutch described as guards or wachthouders. In return for freedom from 
taxes and corvee, they were charged with watching the borders and • 
ensuring that the king's subjects did not leave without his permission. 51 
Use of force was undoubtedly an important factor in confirming • 
Palembang's authority in the interior. Contingents from Komering 
raided into the border areas of Rawas and ulu Tembesi which, as "the 
heart of the pepper lands," were still disputed with Jambi. Many of the 
growers there were carried off to Palembang, with defenses along the 
Jambi boundary built to ensure that they remained. Ultimately more 
effective than force, however, was the enticement of protection, eco- I 
nomic advantages, and attachment to a prestigious overlord; these fac-
tors persuaded numbers of new "subjects" to place themselves under 
Palembang voluntarily. The suku pindah were induced to return • 
"within Palembang's boundaries," while Sultan Mahmud's mediation 
was even accepted by Minangkabau migrants in the rich gold-bearing • 
areas of Limun. In 1741 an expedition that included several VOC 
employees was sent up to ensure the continuing disputes there among 
local heads were satisfactorily resolved. On another occasion, when told 
that about a thousand people from ulu Bengkulen had attempted to 
drive some interior Palembang people from their villages and pepper 
gardens, Sultan Mahmud dispatched armed forces to chase out the 
unwelcome invaders. 52 
A further contrast between J ambi and Palembang was the strength-
ening of the economic links binding ilir and ulu together through tight- , 
ening royal control over upstream-downstream trade. A principal factor 
in this process was the introduction of what was referred to as "tiban- , 
tukon," a phrase apparently derived from combining the Javanese 
tiban, referring to an object given to an inferior, and tuku, meaning 
"purchase."53 Although a royal monopoly over pepper had theoretically 
been in place in Palembang since the beginning of Sultan Abdul 
Rahman's reign, it had not been enforced in recent times. About 1738 
or 1739, however, Sultan Mahmud closed trade in pepper to the inte- I 
rior to anyone except himself or members of his own family. All pepper 
would be bought up in exchange for cloth and other items at a set rate 
that gave the royal purchasers a substantial profit, since the textiles had 
196 Kings and Heroes 
~ been bought cheaply by agents in Batavia. It was the ruler who fixed the 
prices, and between twelve and fifteen men were appointed as his repre-
sentatives or jenang to collect all the pepper from the "nine rivers."54 
It is easy to see compulsion as a reason for the relatively smooth oper-
ation of tiban-tukon, but it is clear that it could not have functioned 
without ulu compliance. The rulers of Jambi were all too aware of the 
drain of gold from Limun to centers in Palembang and thence to the 
coast. At intervals along the connecting jungle paths, several only 
f recently opened, were small rest huts stocked with cloth brought from 
Palembang for purchase by passing gold traders. Far more important 
than enforcement, therefore, was Sultan Mahmud's recognition that 
the upstream-downstream relationship could be maintained only 
I through acquiescence. As one resident remarked, "The orang ulu are 
an obstinate people who only acknowledge the king's authority as much 
as they themselves wish." Sultan Mahmud told the Dutch repeatedly 
that the upstream groups must be governed "very softly," for they 
would simply run away ifhe attempted to use violence against themY 
A variety of examples illustrates how this conviction functioned in 
practice. The issues of corvee labor and monetary payment had in the 
past frequently provided bases for dispute. But now, on occasions when 
the vac asked for assistance in the collection of wood for buildings or 
palisades, the interior heads were asked to come downstream to discuss 
the costs according to the length and thickness of the logs and the time 
involved. Perennial problems regarding currency variation were also 
• resolved amicably. Sultan Mahmud acted as an advocate for his subjects 
when he tried to explain why they would not accept Spanish rials, which 
were different in appearance from the old Mexican ones, being slightly 
thicker in the middle than around the edge and having a different 
emblem on the face. When conflicts between England and Spain made 
rials difficult to obtain, Sultan Mahmud promised to do his best to per-
suade the interior people to accept ducatoons and rupees as an alterna-
tive. In 1743 he took several good examples and asked the interior heads 
why they were unacceptable, considering they were made of silver and 
were heavier than Spanish rials. But when ulu representatives remained 
suspicious and insisted they could not accept this new currency, Sultan 
Mahmud was unwilling to pursue the matter further. 56 
Indications of Sultan Mahmud's standing in the ulu emerge even in 
the normally unsympathetic Dutch sources. In 1733, encouraged by the 
return of peace, several headmen from Rawas who were then living in 
'Jambi appeared before Sultan Mahmud to say they wished to return to 
Palembang. One was given the traditional embossed rattan or cane of 
authority, and as a sign of his new relationship with the downstream 
• court, he left his son to be brought up with the family of a leading noble, 
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the commander of troops on the Jambi frontier. Ties of marriage or • 
blood were invoked elsewhere as a basis for establishing the ilir connec-
tion. In 1740 about four thousand people from Bengkulen under eight. 
heads moved back to Palembang, complaining that they had been badly 
treated by the English. Arguing that they were all "descended from the 
ruler of Palembang" and were thus his subjects, they said they had left 
during the war with Sultan Anum but now wished to return to their vil-
lages, about four or five days' travel upriver. They were willing to begin 
planting pepper, but in return they wanted protection against raids by I 
Rejang people, who they said had carried off about a thousand vic-
tims. 57 
The most significant evidence of Sultan Mahmud's prestige can be 
seen in the extension of Palembang influence into Lampung, where 
Banten had claimed jurisdiction since the seventeenth century. The dis-
tricts under contention lay along the border river of Tulang Bawang ~ 
which, as Lampung's most important pepper-producing area, had long 
fretted against Banten's authority. In 1735 the heads of Belambangan 
and Pakuan, both in ulu Tulang Bawang about four days' travel from • 
the Palembang capital, appeared before Sultan Mahmud "with all their 
relatives." Their purpose was to pay homage to the Palembang ruler' 
and to ask him to take them and the two thousand people they repre-
sented under his protection. They promised they would then set about .. 
replanting their pepper gardens. As a justification for their request, the 
head of Pakuan told the court that in the past his forebears had owed ~ 
allegiance to "one of [Sultan Mahmud's] ancestors" whom they called 
Sultan Kebon Gede. An indication of Sultan Mahmud's own attitude 
was his reference to this area not as Lampung but as Komering Darat 
(interior Komering). 58 
The vac paid particular attention to Lampung developments 
because of the current demand for pepper as an exchange item for the • 
much-desired Chinese tea. The arrival of the Pakuan delegation in 
Palembang was significant because this district, situated at the junction • 
of the Wai Umpu, Wai Besai, and Wai Kanan, was famed for its pep-
per. According to their spokesman, the people of Tulang Bawang • 
wanted to free themselves of Banten's "terrible yoke." With the knowl- • 
edge and assistance of people from Palembang, they had already dug a 
canal joining the Wai Umpu to the Tulang Bawang, enabling traders to 
evade Banten toll posts. Rest houses had also been constructed along • 
jungle paths to facilitate the transport of their pepper to Palembang. 59 
The following year Banten attempted to assert its position along the I 
Tulang Bawang, sending a fleet of seventy ships. A large force of armed 
men drove people from their villages, burned houses, and imprisoned 
headmen suspected of disloyalty. As the Banten troops moved toward 
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the Palembang border, however, they were pushed back by a Komering 
• army led by Palembang's pangeran ratu. Most then surrendered, and 
many weapons were captured. 60 
From this point a heated dispute developed between Sultan Mahmud 
and the Banten ruler, Sultan Abdul Fatakh Mohammad Syafai Zainul 
Arifin, regarding their historical claims to Tulang Bawang. The latter 
claimed that Banten had controlled Lampung for 263 Muslim years and 
that the tributaries of the Tulang Bawang had all been governed by his 
grandfather. Sultan Mahmud, for his part, alleged that his ancestors 
had exercised authority there in olden times and that in his "old 
archives" there was evidence to show that Lampung had been seized by 
a predecessor of the Banten ruler. The people of Komering Darat, said 
Sultan Mahmud, were "descended from Palembang," and Tulang 
Bawang was among the "nine rivers" of Palembang his forefathers had 
controlled. 61 The Tulang Bawang representatives agreed with Sultan 
• Mahmud's claims, with the stipulation that they were not subjects of 
Palembang "but saudara or brothers" and had always been free oftrib-
ute. Their ancestors had come from Ranau, "an inland sea," and they 
had been encouraged by Palembang to settle in Tulang Bawang in ear-
lier times. 62 
To strengthen his claims Sultan Mahmud, like the ruler of Banten, 
I had begun distributing titles, krises, and piagem reiterating his right to 
collect pepper and to act as mediator in local disputes. The Dutch noted 
that about a hundred Lampung leaders from Pakuan, Pagar Dewa, and 
• Menggala down to the Abung River had already received new and 
"extraordinary" titles from Palembang. In Pagar Dewa, for instance, a 
man previously called Gunung was known as Raja Alam; another, 
Gommo, now had the title aria; a certain Anak Gajah had been named 
Pangeran Kasumadinata. The presentation of such titles raised the sta-
tus of the recipient considerably, for a nineteenth-century observer 
I remarked that the marriage value of daughters of a man with a high 
rank (pangkat) could be four times as great as that of those without. Nor 
was it only males who were the recipients of these honors, for women 
, too were receiving" gifts and titles" to entice them to bring their pepper 
to Palembang for sale. 63 
Escalation of fighting between Palembang and Banten toward the 
end of 1737 forced the Dutch to take action because they believed that 
without access to Tulang Bawang pepper, that "so desired grain," the 
economy of their vassal Banten would collapse. Since Lampung was the 
"pearl in Banten's crown, the source of all its revenues," vac authori-
ties continued to support Banten claims to Tulang Bawang, despite evi-
I I dence that this was contrary to the wishes of most local people. It is a 
testimony to Sultan Mahmud's feeling of obligation toward the Dutch 
that he was willing to accept the subsequent settlement of September 
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1738, although it clearly advantaged Banten. By this agreement the 
ruler of Banten was recognized as the "rightful king" of Tulang 
Bawang; in return he agreed to bear the expenses for the establishment 
of a small VaG post there to maintain peace and supervise pepper pur-
chases. In this way the VaG hoped to restrict the amount of Lampung 
pepper reaching Palembang. 64 In the following December a Dutch com-
missioner convened a meeting of Lampung, Palembang, and Banten 
representatives. The Dutch had decided to demarcate the boundary • 
between Palembang and Banten territories by reference to specified riv-
ers and mountains; it could then be shown on VaG maps. Explaining 
the reasons behind his rejection of local petitions for Tulang Bawang to 
be placed under Palembang, the governor general told Amsterdam that 
there were no written records regarding suzerainty over the area and 
that everything was based on "oral accounts and simple stories."65 
The agreement of 1738 did nothing to end the personal rivalry • 
between the Palembang and Banten rulers or lessen the ambition of 
each to control Tulang Bawang. Initially at least the local pepper grow-
ers benefited from the rival distribution of gifts, piagem (popularly 
known as "copper skins" or kulit tembaga), and titles. 66 "At present," 
remarked one Dutch official with only a degree of exaggeration, "you I 
find more pangerangs, kiai mas, and temenggungs than ordinary peo-
ple, and if a free slave gives as little as four bahara of pepper to the Ban-
ten representative or five or six rials worth of gold to the Palembang 
nobles he gets whatever title he wants." Pepper cultivators were also 
able to bargain for better prices for their products. The head of Pagar 
Dewa said frankly that it mattered little to him who bought his crop; he 
simply sold to the one who gave the best price. With this as the crite-
rion, it was easy to see why Palembang was preferred to Banten, for its 
traders were willing to offer about eight rials a picul, and in 1741 six • 
Lampung chiefs appeared in Palembang with the request that Sultan 
Mahmud carry their pepper to Batavia. 67 
Sultan Mahmud continued to press his claims to Tulang Bawang, 
supported by local heads who dispatched their own delegations to the 
Dutch lodge in Palembang with pleas that they once again be allowed to 
trade in this port "under their old and own lord." The VaG-supervised 
treaty thus did nothing to change the undeniable fact that Palembang's • 
influence in Tulang Bawang was much more of a reality than Banten's. 
Indeed, when a VaG official asked for the return of the krises that Sul- _ 
tan Mahmud had presented to eighteen local heads, one man refused 
outright, saying it was a gift from the Palembang ruler. The small VaG 
posts along the Tulang Bawang River were powerless to stop Palem-
bang traders moving into the area, especially since larger ships could 
not go higher than Pagar Dewa, about twenty kilometers upriver from 
Menggala. Nor was trade dependent on river transport, for the jungle 
) 
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paths made smuggling possible through the entire year, even when river 
levels dropped during the dry season. Excluded from the Palembang 
interior by the royal monopoly, traders from Palembang were buying 
pepper from Tulang Bawang by continuing the traditional practice of 
advancing goods and money in expectation of deliveries. Ships from 
Palembang arrived laden with trade items, and special warehouses were 
even erected to store them. Dutch attempts to enforce a compromise by 
which three bahara of pepper should be sent to Banten for everyone 
sold to Palembang only aroused further hostility. 68 
Although there were periodic complaints about Palembang's intru-
sion and forcible collection of pepper, it was toward the VaC-supported 
Banten representatives that Tulang Bawang hostility was largely 
directed. Locals objected, for instance, to the forced trading methods 
used by Banten traders, whose kulak was very large, "about thirty 
pounds in the hundred overweight" and who paid with goods that had 
"little use" and were valued too high. Violence toward Banten's agents 
grew more frequent, resulting in major clashes between Palembang and 
Banten forces during 1741. In November of that year, however, a Ban-
ten fleet sent to Tulang Bawang was driven off. In another confronta-
tion the following month nearly fifty Banten soldiers were taken pris-
oner and smuggled past the Dutch lodge into Palembang in small 
perahu covered with kajang mats. Judged guilty by Sultan Mahmud, 
they were all sent to Belida, more than a day's travel up the Musi River. 
There they were divided up and consigned separately as slaves to vil-
lages lying considerable distances apart. The expectation that Lampung 
chiefs present themselves regularly at the Palembang court now became 
a virtual obligation, and the whole Menggala area was soon reported to 
be "full" of Pal em bang people. Since 1738 Banten had received no pep-
per deliveries of any significance from Tulang Bawang, for everything 
went to Palembang. Many Lampung headmen and their followers were 
indebted to Sultan Mahmud for undelivered pepper and had thus effec-
tively become his subjects. 69 
But Sultan Mahmud's overlordship in Tulang Bawang did not 
merely give access to pepper. From about 1730 Palembang movement 
into this area had gained momentum in response to the newly circulat-
ing tales of almost unbelievable finds of gold. The gold-producing dis-
f tricts were along the tributaries at the upper end of the Tulang Bawang 
River, the most important being Jitan, above Belambangan. Travel 
I thence was difficult, for the rivers were often made impassable by rapids 
and swift currents, and perahu had to be unloaded and carried overland 
until another navigable place was reached. All told, the journey from 
, the coast to Jitan could take well over three weeks. Many, however, con-
sidered the rewards worthwhile, for in the Jitan area gold was readily 
I found, either by panning or by digging out canals along the river bank 
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using methods similar to those practiced by tin miners. Shafts were also 
excavated, and about half an hour's travel from Jitan there was a large ,t 
working "two or more rods wide and 1.5 fathoms deep." In such places 
miners were already reported to be using the waterwheel to drain off 
water, probably reflecting some acquaintance with mining techniques 
developed by the Minangkabau. The Dutch representative at Tulang I 
Bawang believed that there was much gold as yet undiscovered, which 
could be exploited if a hundred "knowledgeable miners" were sent to 
help develop the area. 70 
For a brief period in 1747 it seemed that a gold-mining partnership 
between Banten and the vac would be successful, but subsequent 
agreements coincided with a rebellion against the Banten queen and 
thus came to naught. Yet the small Dutch post on the Tulang Bawang , 
remained as a symbol of Banten's putative sovereignty, preventing the 
king of Palembang from openly ruling territory that was effectively his. 
As a result the mid-eighteenth century in Lampung displays the lack of I 
order so often associated in local legends with kinglessness. Far from 
any center of authority, Sultan Mahmud's representatives themselves, 
often abused their position, and one even attacked a vac sergeant, 
saying that the Dutch were "only men." There was also a rising num-
ber of adventurers, notable among whom were Bugis and Makassarese. ' 
Finding Bangka mining dominated by the Chinese, they drifted into I 
Lampung to join some local leader or set up their own small fiefs. Some 
were bold enough to invoke the name of the Palembang ruler to justify 
raids on local settlements and the seizure of women, pepper, and gold. 71 
Another reason behind the apparent lawlessness was a growing chal-
lenge to the position of the traditional lineage heads, sometimes from j 
their own followers, whose ambitions had been encouraged by the indis-
criminate granting of favors by both Banten and Palembang. Elders 
began to express concern that some of their subjects had been given 
titles grander than their own and could boast of favors from the Banten 
or Palembang ruler. In July 1742, for instance, a party of Lampung 
men was included in a Palembang mission to Batavia and returned 
"laden with presents and titles of honor." Some had even been intro-
duced to the governor general and the council. 72 
For many Lampung people there was a clear answer to the prevailing 
lack of government. They needed to be attached more closely to a pres-
tigious king to whom they could appeal for protection or support. The 
most obvious candidate was Sultan Mahmud of Palembang. The vac 
may not have recognized him as ruler of Tulang Bawang, but economic 
realities fed into legends that helped confirm a belief that the area was I 
linked to Palembang by ties of ancestral kinship. In 1818 a Dutch offi-
cial in Lampung was told that one of their great culture heroes, Saba- I 
tang, was descended from a Wali named Raja Iskandar, who had estab-
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lished himself at the foot of Bukit Si Guntang "near the site of the later 
town of Palembang." Returning home from his travels in Java, Saba-
tang's ship foundered near Palembang, and the spirits then changed it 
into an island that attached itself to Bukit Si Guntang. Sabatang had 
seven sons, and the seventh, Umpu Si Runting, had many descendants 
who left their homeland somewhere near Lake Ranau and moved along 
the Musi and other Palembang rivers into Tulang Bawang and other 
parts of Lampung. 73 
The perception of Palembang as a distant but powerfully relevant 
kingdom is also found in Lampung epic songs or tetimbai. Often set 
against a "Palembang" background, these sung poems, like their coun-
terparts from the Palembang ulu, mirror the ambiguity of the Lam-
pung-Palembang relationship. For example, the tetimbai of Si Dayang 
Rindu, written versions of which date at least from the eighteenth cen-
tury, tells the story of a beautiful maiden from the Niru district (a tribu-
tary of the Lematang River) who is desired by the Palembang ruler, 
Pangeran Ria. Although he offers a great bride price, her father refuses 
the offer because she is already engaged to another man. Faced by the 
great army of the Palembang ruler, Si Dayang Rindu is forced to leave 
her betrothed and board a Palembang ship. However, the exultant 
Pal em bang commander so angers her menfolk that they can endure the 
humiliation no longer. In the ensuing battle with the Palembang forces, 
all the ulu leaders are killed and the people flee, with one version listing 
the names of the villages where they dispersed. But the upstream even-
tually triumphs because when Dayang Rindu is taken to Palembang she 
flies away to heaven before the union can be consummated, leaving the 
pangeran to lament his loss. 74 
One expert in the sung poetry of south Sumatra has been struck by 
the perception of the Palembang ruler contained in these traditions. 
While the actions of the Palembang king are not condoned, he himself is 
never personally vilified. In the early nineteenth century, oral accounts 
attributed the extension of Palembang's authority in ulu Komering and 
along the Tulang Bawang to the reign of "Sultan Lemabang" (Sultan 
Mahmud Badaruddin), and the ambiguity of the resulting relationship 
is symbolized in another telling of the Dayang Rindu legend collected 
by a Palembang man in the 1880s from the ulu Ogan area and trans-
lated from bahasa ulu (the upstream language) into Malay. It describes 
how the Palembang king is made aware of Si Dayang Rindu's beauty 
when he finds a strand of her hair floating downriver in a golden cup. 
Although her suitor is killed, the Palembang ruler cannot defeat the ulu 
men. When fighting has been going on for some time, he finally resorts 
to the ruse of sending one of his women as a gift to Dayang Rindu's 
grandfather, renowned for his exploits in battle. This woman discovers 
the secret of the old warrior's invulnerability and tells the king, whose 
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followers are then able to kill him. Dayang Rindu is brought down to 
Palembang, but she is followed by another suitor. To save her honor he 
kills her and then cuts her body into two pieces. The upper half is taken 
back to her family in Niru, but the lower half remains with the king in 
Palembang. 75 
The King as Hero 
Although Sultan Mahmud died in 1757, the memories of his reign 
remained potent ones. Succeeding in 1804, his great-grandson also 
chose to be called Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin in the hope of recreating 
just such another reign and of bonding himself with a powerful ancestor 
who would be a ready source of assistance. In after years, threatened by 
attacks from both British and Dutch, this second Sultan Mahmud made 
a special pilgrimage (ziarah) to offer prayers at the Lemabang grave and 
to invoke the help of his great forebear. The passing of time only 
enhanced the legend, and when Dutch officials and amateur historians 
first began to collect local accounts about Palembang's past they found 
that of all its kings, "Sultan Lemabang" was considered "the richest 
and mightiest."76 The process of elevation into a cultural hero was well 
in train, and in several areas Sultan Mahmud, like Ratu Sinuhun or 
Cinde Balang, was credited with the introduction of culturally signifi-
cant items, such as certain titles and customs, together with scales and 
weights. Less than two generations after his death some groups had 
woven the name of Sultan Lemabang into the genealogies of their leg-
endary poyang, providing the fragile bond by which they could link 
themselves with the larger political and economic order. 
The emergence of a figure around whom the myth of heroic kingship 
could be reconstructed, enhancing the prestige of the downstream capi-
tal and providing a shared focus for the loyalties of communities that 
otherwise had little in common, is precisely what appears to be lacking 
in J ambi during this period. It would be easy to explain this difference 
in terms of material wealth; however, it is not enough to say simply that 
the kings of J ambi were poor and those of Palembang rich and power-
ful. As one historian of popular culture in Europe has argued, power 
alone is not enough to bring about the metamorphosis into a popular 
hero. Louis XIV of France, for example, spared no efforts to present 
himself as a heroic figure, but it was his grandfather, Henri IV, who 
captured the imagination of French peasants and who is prominent in 
their folklore. 77 In Palembang Sultan Mahmud's son and successor, 
Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, reigned for twenty years and was said to have 
been well-liked and at least as rich as his father, but he did not earn the 
same niche in the popular mind. 
In all societies the extent to which historical figures are transmuted 
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into myth appears to depend on the degree to which elements in their 
lives correspond to cultural stereotypes of heroic behavior. Sultan 
Mahmud, it can be argued, acquired a special place in the collective 
Palembang memory because in so many respects the deeds associated 
with him paralleled those of the great figures of legend. The themes and 
formulas that provided the anchors for the typical heroic life-the rejec-
tion, the battle, the conquest, the brave warrior, the great lover, the 
prosperous king-were being played out in Sultan Mahmud's own 
career. In other words, he became a personification of the heroic princi-
ple, and the stories about him were articulated in the same spirit that 
informed those attached to formidable ancestors like Iskandar Zulkar-
nain, Si Pahit Lidah, or Aria Damar. It might even be possible to go 
further and suggest that heroic models were so well known, so persua-
t sive, and so explicit that they helped influence the way in which individ-
uals responded to events and were thus part of the historical action they 
help explain. 78 
The range of stories about Sultan Mahmud written down or collected 
over the past two hundred years is in itself a testimony to his standing as 
one of the outsize figures around whom the past is constructed. Those 
originating from the court were compiled by officials who had access to 
"written sources as well as stories told by old people" and who could 
refer to royal genealogies and court records that listed memorable dates 
and events. In his March letter of 1724 the Dutch resident simply noted 
that Sultan Mahmud was now ruler, but a court chronicle, apparently 
compiled about 1851, gives the date of this installation as 27 Jumadil 
Akhir, 1136 (23 March 1724), on Thursday, at 1 o'clock. Again, 
according to vac reports Sultan Mahmud died on "16 September 
[1757], at six o'clock"; court records provide the Islamic date, 1171, on 
the third day of Muharram, on a Friday evening at the time of the sun-
set prayers (magrib).79 In the eighteenth century Islamic dating in 
Palembang's court documents became more common as a greater num-
ber of people became conversant with the Muslim calendrical system. 
These dates provide an indication of events during Sultan Mahmud's 
reign that the literate elite considered worthy of attention, such as the 
building of a new palace in 1150 A.H. (1737 C.E.) and the completion of 
a great mosque in 1161 (1748).80 
Stories about Sultan Mahmud from outside the court have a rather 
different character and reflect the interests of the local community. An 
example comes from an oral history of Bangka, recorded by an official, 
Temenggung Kerta Negara, in 1861. Here considerable attention is 
given to the arrival on Bangka of Sultan Mahmud's part-Chinese Sian-
tan wife, Mas Ayu, and her guardian, Wan Akub, as well as the 
involvement of her family in support of the future sultan. A woman pos-
sessed of supernatural powers (bertuah), Mas Ayu woke her new hus-
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band one night "about four o'clock." She urged him to take action ifhe 
wanted to become king over all Palembang, for she had dreamed that 
she had swallowed Palembang itself. When her husband refused to 
believe her, she told him to shake her head. He did so, and on hearing a 
sound like water inside a coconut, he realized that she possessed special 
gifts and accepted her prophecy. Mas Ayu then gave Sultan Mahmud a 
magically empowered kris she had inherited from her father and accom-
panied him during the attack on Palembang. Following his triumph, 
her family was rewarded by being allowed to remain on Bangka. Her 
menfolk were given the title of abang and the women that of yang, with I 
the provision that they would be reserved as wives for the sultan or 
members of his family. 81 
Whether collected at the court or village level, these stories about Sul-
tan Mahmud have been preserved because they were written down, I 
often by a Dutchman or at his behest. It is not possible to gauge the I 
extent of "editing" that occurred in the selection of material or its pre-
sentation or how far the content of these stories has altered over time. 
An account of the 1722 treaty that emphasizes the Company's accept-
ance of Palembang's authority, for instance, was recorded in the nine-
teenth century and may have been intended to direct a message to 
Dutch colonial officials. Yet at the same time the modern historian is 
sharply reminded of the tenacity with which certain culturally impor-, , 
tant details can be retained, such as the name of a certain Arab, Syaikh 
Abu Bakar Baspato, mentioned in passing in Dutch material as a nego-
tiator, but in local accounts serving as a reminder that this was the time 
when Arabs began to settle in Palembang. 82 
What is most striking about these accounts is not their variation or 
even their" accuracy," but the presentation of Sultan Mahmud in terms 
of the formula that permeated the heroic my thus. One of the most com-
mon of such formula, in Palembang as elsewhere, concerns the hero's 
rise from obscure origins to greatness. Palembang folklore throws up 
the common theme of the young boy who, appearing in a village, is 
adopted by a childless couple who only later become aware of his special 
powers; another recurring motif is that of the princely ancestor locked 
in a box and cast out on the waters by some jealous father, to be found 
and reared by a fisherman and his wife ignorant of his origins. Stories 
about Aria Damar, the legendary ancestor of Palembang kings, tell of 
his birth from the union of the ruler of Majapahit with the daughter of a 
raksasa (giant, monster), who fled the palace when her origins became 
known. As a youth Aria Damar served the king unrecognized until his 
descent was acknowledged and he was sent to become ruler of Palem-
bang. Sultan Mahmud, excluded from higher circles because of his 
mother's humble parentage and only as an adult accepted as a claimant I 
for the throne, fits neatly into this pattern. 83 
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In the long passage toward reclaiming his rightful inheritance, the 
individual destined for heroic status must suffer humiliation, endure 
rejection, and confront great danger. His very success in overcoming 
these obstacles is proof that he is fated to be a leader. To achieve his ulti-
mate goal, he must depart and undergo a period of testing before claim-
ing his own. His adventures are themselves a symbolic representation of 
the hero's character, spiritually preparing him to meet the challenges 
that will confront him on his return. 84 The career of Sultan Mahmud 
appeared to embody all these elements. For several years, in company 
with his brother Sultan Anum, he had lived as an exile, wandering the 
archipelago. Even at the time this absence gave him considerable stand-
ing, and he told the envoy Paravicini that during his youth he had spent 
much time roaming and therefore knew "all the Malay coasts and 
islands."85 His exile on Bangka and his journeys to distant lands thus 
I provide the context for many of the stories associated with him, all of 
which implicitly justify his elevation as king. 
One of these, "Cerita raja-raja didalam negeri Palembang" (Tales of 
the kings of Palembang), begins with Sultan Mansur's death in 1126 
(1710 C.E.) and describes how his two sons, shut out of their inherit-
ance, leave for Bangka with a great fleet, later return to Palembang, 
and then flee again to Lingga. The account breaks off at the moment 
the Minangkabau prince Raja Kecil, here called the raja of Singapore, 
invites them to join his entourage. Although fragmentary, descriptions 
of the fleet of perahu setting out from Sungsang resonate with unspoken 
allusions to the great departures of legend, like that of the semidivine 
prince Sang Sapurba, who left Palembang for the island of Bintan, from 
whence his son founded a dynasty in Singapore. 86 A further account 
collected in the Palembang interior describes how the young Sultan 
Mahmud, then Pangeran Jayawikrama, escapes to "the land of the 
Bugis" because "he wants to see the customs of other countries." Here 
I he amazes the Bugis with his courageous words and even defeats the 
raja Bugis in a personal duel. Consequently he is acknowledged as king, 
but he sails back to Palembang, leaving behind a minister (menteri) as his 
representative. When he returns to Bangka, everyone is amazed to hear 
how he defeated the land of the Bugis. His sakti has been tested against 
the most feared warriors of the archipelago and has not been found 
wanting; he is a renowned conqueror who has "defeated many coun-
tries."87 
The great hero, the essence of energy and fertility, is by definition an 
accomplished lover, and Dutch sources provide numerous references to 
the women who were taken into Sultan Mahmud's palace. Whether 
I they came from Palembang, Jambi, Siantan, Java, Sulawesi, or from 
local Chinese families, these women were a testimony to his virility and 
his prestige overseas. At the same time the traditional hero is also capa-
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ble of a deep and abiding attachment when his true match appears. 
Again, Sultan Mahmud's career furnished the necessary material. 
From Dutch sources we know that in May 1715 Sultan Anum and 
PangeranJayawikrama asked to return to Palembang to bury "a prince 
and princess." In the accounts collected in the nineteenth century this 
princess is presented as a wife of Pangeran Jayawikrama. One version 
relates that she died in Palembang itself, but when her husband came 
back to arrange the funeral, his uncle refused him entry and sent him 
away with the unburied corpse. In another, his wife Raden Ayu fell sick 
on Bangka and died. Her body was placed in a coffin, but on returning 
to Palembang to bury her the funeral party was met with violence and 
forced to retreat. The image of the faithful husband driven away with 
his dead wife touched a chord among a people for whom romantic love 
lay at the core of many a story. It may also have exerted a particular 
appeal in the women's quarters of the royal palace, where the idea of 
lasting affection between a man and a woman was the ideal, but where 
reality saw many wives and concubines in competition for the favors of 
their shared husband. A manuscript that belonged to an eighteenth-
century Palembang princess tells the story of the legendary Javanese 
prince Panji, whose beloved wife Angreni is killed by order of her 
father-in-law so that Panji will marry the daughter of the king of Kediri. 
Grief-stricken, Panji goes to sea, taking his wife's body with him. A 
storm springs up but drops as he approaches the shores of Lemahbang 
(in fact the name of a kampung near the Palembang kraton, where Sul-
tan Mahmud-"Sultan Lemabang"-was later buried). Panji is him-
self told the story of another hero, Aji Darma, who also lost his loved 
wife. Because he could not contemplate union with another woman, he 
travelled to many lands in search of battle so that he could be reunited 
with his wife in death. Panji was much moved by this story, which pro-
vided the motivation for his campaigns in Bali and east Java. A century I 
after Sultan Mahmud's installation, it was still believed that he too 
fought against his uncle because of his anger and sorrow when his wife 
was refused a proper burial. 88 
Possibly the greatest trial the hero must face in his years of adversity 
is the opposition of enemies, who often come from the ranks of those 
closest to him-a jealous father, a resentful uncle, an unfaithful wife, a 
disloyal brother. Once more Sultan Mahmud's life provided all the 
appropriate ingredients. Passed over by his father, rejected by his uncle, 
he then fell out with his brother Sultan Anum. The ensuing struggle for 
power provides the themes for numerous stories individually and collec-
tively demonstrating that Sultan Mahmud is no ordinary man. The 
contest for the love of a beautiful woman, for instance, is a classic arena 
in which special powers, courage, and audacity can all be demon-
strated. The desire of both Sultan Anum and his brother to acquire the 
208 Kings and Heroes 
hand of the sultan ratu's daughter attracted even Dutch attention, and 
local accounts of her seduction display PangeranJayawikrama in all his 
heroic colors. Reminded by a "milk brother" of the ruler's pronounce-
ment that the princess would marry the victor in some future contest, 
Pangeran J ayawikrama formulates a bold plan to gain her hand. One 
night he and his foster brother succeed in making their way into the 
closely guarded palace where the princess lives. A marriage is then nec-
essary to save her honor; by his cunning, daring, and resolution 
PangeranJayawikrama has overcome his rivals. 89 
Pangeran Jayawikrama's apparent invincibility is further proof that 
he is destined to be a great leader. On one occasion he was attacked 
while sitting on the steps in front of his house. "He fell into the water, 
but survived, although the stairs were smashed by the bullets." Even 
after he becomes ruler he withstands attempts by his relatives to kill him 
while he sleeps. Because of his ilmu, say old people, the sultan proved 
invulnerable. But vac sources suggest that these perceptions are not 
merely empty formulae. According to Dutch records, Sultan Mah-
mud's successful domination of the rice trade caused considerable hos-
tility among the more powerful princes; but an attempt by one of his 
brothers, Pangeran Dipati, to mount a rebellion against him failed com-
pletely. Company correspondence hints at Sultan Mahmud's ousting of 
\I other rivals, for in 1757 there is mention of a "pretender" to the Palem-
bang throne who had taken refuge in Bone. 90 Perhaps the most oft-cited 
instance of the ability of Sultan Mahmud to repel those who intend him 
harm is based on an incident that took place in 1728. According to the 
resident's letters, early that year a party of Balinese slaves attacked and 
killed their master, the pangeran ratu, together with several other peo-
ple. Sultan Mahmud's successful pursuit and punishment of the assas-
sins, confirmed in Dutch correspondence, is interpreted in a number of 
stories as evidence of his ability to stand against the conspiracies of his 
enemies, even if they originate among his own relatives. 91 
Like so many heroes, Sultan Mahmud did not inherit power but took 
it by force. His ability to survive opposition shows his unusual abilities, 
but the seizure of kingship is in itself a major exploit. A successful usur-
pation was the ultimate test of political legitimacy, and the very acts of 
betrayal by which Sultan Mahmud attained power are themselves a 
sign of special status. By defying and surviving his society's moral 
order, Sultan Mahmud acted in the shadow of some of the great ances-
tors who themselves had committed incest, fratricide, adultery.92 As he 
enters the heroic realm, kingly transgressions that could be seen as the 
cause of the people's distress in less prosperous times are elevated into 
triumphant cultural challenges affirming his predestined greatness. 
Set against the disorder that prevailed after the death of Sultan Man-
sur, Sultan Mahmud's rule is depicted as initiating a new "time." In 
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the words of one text, "There was a period of disturbance in Palem-
bang. When darkness fell, the people of one and the same negeri mur-
dered each other, so that there was not a moment of peace. Food was 
very scarce because the traders from overseas stayed away and the peo-
ple from the interior were afraid to come downstream. The difficulties 
in Palembang at that time were very great, and both in the ulu as well 
as in the ilir there was much banditry." The specter of a conflict that 
divides kin has reared its head, for "many priyayi (nobles) and menteri 
and people were killed on both sides, although they were all children of 
Palembang (anak Palembang)." In this situation, the heroic king emerges 
to restore order. "The entire population, from the city to the head-
waters of the nine rivers, was of one mind that J ayawikrama must be 
sultan, to reign over Palembang with all its dependencies."93 The dis-
ruption common to the beginning of a dynasty is thus put to rights at his 
installation, for with his reign, peace and prosperity return. 
Although filtered through the heroic prism, the legends attached to 
Sultan Mahmud do not stand alone. The ideal of the king as ruling in I 
consultation with the community's leaders to maintain the social equi-
librium was not so far removed from reality. When Paravicini visited 
Palembang he noted that although Sultan Mahmud was a strong and 
authoritative ruler, he took care to consult the court nobles and interior 
heads on matters of importance. The 1755 contract was publicly read 
aloud, and discussion on its contents lasted four days. Sultan Mahmud 
himself insisted that there would be "great dejection" among his people 
if he did not follow old customs. The following year the resident 
summed up the situation succinctly: "The king is in harmony with his 
children and the whole kingdom is completely peaceful." When Sultan 
Mahmud died in 1757 he had been ruling for thirty-four years, as long 
as many people could remember, a length of time well able to be 
translated in popular accounts into the holy figure of forty years. 94 The 
throne passed peacefully to his son, but powerful remembrances of his 
reign were left behind-a new mosque, a new palace, a royal graveyard 
at Lemabang. In time Sultan Mahmud was also attributed with other I 
ancestral actions, like the determining of weights, the fixing of tribute, 
and the introduction of new titles. By the 1890s his standing was so high I 
that he was even said to have ended the customs of jujur and ambil 
anak, which had traditionally regulated marriage. 95 
The career of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin and his place in Palem-
bang memory is another reminder of the osmosis between the world of 
the present and that of legend. It is not just that historical heroes 
become almost indistinguishable from those of myth and folk tales; 
more explicitly, in these heroic societies "the experiences of celebrated 
mythical protagonists are re-experienced by the living in analagous cir-
cumstances." It is thus possible for individuals to anticipate their ances-
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tral status and in their own lifetime not simply to resemble but in fact to 
become figures oflegend. In eighteenth-century Palembang the prestige 
of Sultan Mahmud had important repercussions, for by attachment to 
the same overlord a range of different tribal groups in the hinterland 
together became his "subjects." In this type of cultural order, where the 
actions of rulers had a "multiplying" and therefore a "disproportionate 
historical effect," the status of the king as it were defined the limits of 
the land. 96 The most telling expression of this royal prestige is seen in 
Palembang's relations with Jambi. As Sultan Mahmud remarked, he 
and the J ambi ruler were indeed "brothers and kinsmen"; in fact, how-
ever, there could be no doubt of their relative standing, for Sultan 
Anum, like a poor and powerless relative, had effectively asked to be 
taken under Palembang's protection. 97 The difference between Palem-
bang and Jambi was manifested in the persons of their rulers. It is sig-
nificant that today the graves of eighteenth-century Palembang kings 
are still preserved as a proud memorial to the past, while those of their 
relatives in J ambi lie overgrown and deserted by the quiet waters of the 
Sepin. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Descriptions and Judgments: 
Southeast Sumatra in a 
Time of "Decline" 
Throughout the eighteenth century the European view 
of writing as the most efficacious vehicle for communicating informa-
tion was evident in the growing number of publications issued by the 
proliferating scientific societies. In the sharing of "useful discoveries," 
it was believed, the educated elite of Europe could be drawn together as 
"one single society, united by a common goal which is the progress of 
the sciences and letters."! Although it was axiomatic that Europe was 
the center of intellectual activity, the written medium meant that even 
those at the periphery of enlightened thought could participate in the 
great endeavor. The year 1778 saw the founding of the Bataviaasch 
Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (the Batavian Society of 
Arts and Sciences) which, though the most distant from Europe of all 
the scientific societies, was nonetheless linked to like bodies through the 
correspondence and articles contained in its Verhandelingen (Transac-
tions). 
The Batavian Society differed from its counterparts in Europe, how-
ever, because it was mainly composed of high-ranking vac employees 
who espoused the belief that the Company should be more than a mere 
commercial concern. Ideally, it should also be involved in the pursuit of 
nobler goals, such as the "natural history, antiquities, customs and 
mores" of the peoples of the Indies. This vision of the European official 
as not simply a trader but as a man of science was soon apparent in rela-
tion to Sumatra. In the space of a few years, four studies appeared, all 
by men involved with the East India Companies whose work had been 
encouraged by their association with scientific societies. 2 The first issue 
of the Verhandelingen even included a lengthy piece on Palembang by one 
of the founders of the Batavian Society, J. C. M. Radermacher. 
These new works on Sumatra attracted attention in Europe's "en-
lightened" circles, partly because they dealt with a little-known region 
of the world but also because they claimed to be based on accurate and 
methodical observation. It was this, the authors contended, that distin-
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guished their efforts from travel accounts intended for a popular audi-
ence. In his History oj Sumatra, William Marsden spoke for his fellows 
when he stressed that his object was "not, ultimately, to write an enter-
taining book, to which the marvellous might be thought not a little to 
contribute, but ... to add ... to the general knowledge of the age 
... [and] to furnish ... facts to serve as data. "3 
Vehement insistence on empirical observation as a basis for scientific 
conclusions created more stringent criteria for descriptions of non-
European societies. Yet the very strengths of this approach contained 
inherent dangers. In Sumatra, as elsewhere in the Indonesian archipel-
ago, the belief that scholarly research should be drawn from personal 
experience inevitably meant that those areas that were important to 
Europeans or that for some reason had attracted their attention, 
received much greater attention than those where Europeans did not go 
or where they had no economic involvement. Furthermore, because of 
the importance educated Europeans placed on literacy as a mark of 
"civilization," societies unable to produce written histories of their own 
fared badly. J ambi represents a classic case. Despite the fact that the 
Dutch had been trading there for a hundred and fifty years, it warrants 
only a few lines in Radermacher's account; it had, after all, been aban-
doned by the Company more than a decade before. In his History, Mars-
den applies the same implicit criteria. Although he accepted that Jambi 
had been "of some importance at an earlier stage of European com-
merce," the "treachery" of the inhabitants meant it was now "little fre-
quented by any other than native merchants." Because Jambi's "his-
tory" was stored more in oral legend and folklore than in court writings 
and because Europeans judged it economically insignificant, it was rele-
gated to the margins of scholarly interest; in the words of the prestigious 
Encyclopaedia oj Netherlands India "nothing is known of Jambi's history" 
until 1833, when it was taken under Dutch "protection."4 
The same comments cannot be made of European treatment of 
Palembang, and its importance to the vac is evident in Raderma-
cher's account. By the early nineteenth century the English too had 
hopes of extending their commercial interests in southeastern Sumatra, 
and these ambitions are apparent in the attention accorded Palembang 
and Bangka in contemporary writings. 5 But the Dutch were equally 
determined to maintain their favored position in Palembang in the 
wake of the vac's demise, and this determination resulted in a wave of 
articles and reports that provided hitherto unavailable material on the 
area. Because of its continuing importance to both Dutch and English, 
written sources for Palembang are more extensive than for J ambi, and 
as a result its history for the last decades of the eighteenth century is 
more accessible. 
These contemporary observers were generally agreed that although 
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Palembang was obviously prosperous, it was still touched by a process t 
of "decay" that was affecting all archipelago societies. 6 The descriptions 
and judgments they so confidently committed to paper, however, were 
informed by deep-seated convictions of European cultural superiority. I 
Although commentators themselves provided details of the pressures to 
which many societies in the region were now subject, they were often 
unable to see the implications of the "data" they had so carefully set 
down. The history of the archipelago shows that what Europeans 
described as "kingdoms" were in fact cultural-economic unities com- t 
prised of a web of kinship-infused relationships. Eminently suited to • 
bOJ;lding smaller communities, these relationships could be successfully 
transposed to a larger stage. Nonetheless, there was always a degree of * 
tension in the resulting associations, a tension that increased in direct 
proportion to the numbers of participants involved. Constant nurturing • 
was necessary to maintain ties that depended on volition rather than 
compulsion, and this proved increasingly difficult in the changing envi-
ronment of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. In the 
Palembang case the "degeneration" that Europeans perceived repre- • 
sen ted the fragilities inherent in the indigenous state. It is also apparent 
• that such strains were more evident on the oceans, the environment 
Europeans knew best. When they looked landward toward Palembang's 
interior, it was harder to sustain the "decay" argument. Here, notwith-
standing considerable demographic dislocation, the centuries-old ties 
between ulu and ilir were not undermined and in many cases were even 
strengthened. But in attempting to explain this phenomenon, contem-
porary European observers translated upstream-downstream relations 
into an idiom they could understand. Although based on "data," their 
verdicts were as a result culturally awry. 
The Changing Environment on the Oceans 
Most Europeans familiar with the Malay-Indonesian archipelago were 
aware that the political and economic climate of the late eighteenth cen-
tury was very different from that prevailing a hundred years earlier. 
The difference was particularly evident in regard to maritime trade, 
where one of the most noticeable shifts was the decline of the Dutch East 
India Company and the collapse of the "closed sea" concept it had 
fought to preserve. A monopolistic outlook, conservative ideas, and 
cumbersome organization had proved major obstacles to any effective 
response to changing commercial demands, and from 1740 what has 
been termed the Dutch "world emporium" could no longer dominate 
trade in certain commodities as it had once done. 7 In the first decades of 
the century the English East India Company displaced the vac as the 
leading importer of pepper into Europe, and it was the English who 
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came to dominate the expanding China trade in tea and porcelain. The 
bases of the vac monopoly system were finally swept away by the 
defeat of the Netherlands in the fourth Anglo-Dutch war of 1780-1784. 
In the subsequent peace negotiations the vac was forced to accept the 
principle of free navigation to the eastern seas, the death blow to its 
commerce in the Indonesian archipelago. 
The inflexibility of the Company's economic policies had clearly con-
tributed to its withdrawal from Jambi; the same inflexibility was also 
apparent in Palembang, where the Dutch never relinquished their hope 
of resuscitating the pepper trade. Such aspirations were quite unrealis-
tic in view of pepper's displacement not only by rice but by other more 
profitable cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, and gambier. A series of 
earthquakes in the late 1750s destroyed many gardens, most of which 
were never replanted, and in 1758 Palembang failed for the third suc-
cessive year to deliver twenty thousand piculs of pepper as the contract 
specified. In 1776 another disaster struck when a prolonged drought 
killed more than forty thousand vines. Meanwhile, problems also arose 
in the tin trade because the market in Canton collapsed in the late 1750s 
and did not recover until the 1780s. For some time, therefore, the Com-
pany was concerned to reduce the amount of tin purchased. In 1765, for 
example, it took only sixteen thousand piculs, although it had previ-
ously indicated a willingness to buy as much as thirty thousand. But 
Palembang was still bound to the Dutch by a monopoly contract, and 
the ruler was thus unable to "legally" sell his tin elsewhere. Faced with 
his own mounting surplus, he took the obvious step of seeking out his 
own markets, particularly in China. In the years that followed, junks 
arrived regularly at Amoy, Ningpo, and Canton, sometimes bringing 
more tin in a single delivery than the entire annual sale to Batavia. 
Although tin shortages again developed in the 1780s, the Dutch were 
then in a poor position to compete with the high prices offered by other 
buyers. 8 
Against this background Palembang rulers renewed their contract 
with the Dutch in 1763, 1775, 1776, and again in 1791, but the accom-
panying negotations were never without problems. For the vac the 
commercial advantages of maintaining an establishment of more than a 
hundred people in Palembang steadily diminished, despite the large 
amounts of tin they did receive. Rising costs forced Batavia to make 
more stringent demands on their trading partners, the acceptance of 
which hinged on the ability of individual residents to present Dutch 
desires in a favorable light. In his mission of 1755, Paravicini had 
stressed the importance of selecting competent representatives, and 
occasionally vac personnel fulfilled their duties well. In 1758, shortly 
after his installation, the new ruler Sultan Ahmad Najamuddin (1758-
1774) bestowed on Resident Huybert Jan de Heere a "great tombak or 
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pike with a kris, each overlaid with gold, saying that I could carry this 
through his whole land in his name and could use it in his stead if it was 
necessary, against his own subjects as well as any others who might try 
to harm me."9 
To a considerable extent de Heere's success was due to his sensitivity 
to local customs. He made a point, for instance, of paying a visit to the 
court every two weeks, since the ruler liked to hold an audience "even if 
there was nothing to say." Because of his favorable standing, de Heere 
was quietly able to build up the marshy land around the Dutch settle-
ment on Sungai Aor and create a new village he called Uitvlugt (Loop-
hole), "a whole negeri" of about three hundred Chinese and natives 
who made their living by market gardening. "These people," he said, 
"regard themselves as my vassals, and me as their lord." Sultan 
Ahmad's attitude toward the vac is evident in the request he made in 
1760, when he asked the Dutch to ensure that "no one succeeds me 
except my son the crown prince, Pangeran Ratu."lO 
As the eighteenth century progressed, however, it became increas-
ingly more difficult to find other competent Company servants able to 
deal with native rulers. Asked to select one of his scribes to go to J ambi 
as head, de Heere himself told his superiors that although his assistants 
were all "upstanding" men, they were not fluent in Malay.ll It is not 
surprising that no subsequent resident in Palembang received the same 
honors as de Heere or that following his departure relations with the 
Dutch were often troubled. The recurring disputes over weights, coin-
age, debts, and slow deliveries continued, given an added sharpness in 
1770 by Sultan Ahmad's alarm at the design of a new lodge which, he 
claimed, resembled a fort that could well eclipse his own residence. 
Although he finally agreed to accept the new design, shortly afterwards 
he began enlarging and improving his palace. 
In 1774 Sultan Ahmad relinquished the throne to his son, Sultan 
Mahmud Baha'uddin, and as he lay dying two years later again asked 
the vac to give the new ruler its support. Nonetheless, the years after 
Sultan Ahmad's death saw further strains develop between the Dutch 
and the Palembang court. The exchanges so central to the economic 
process fell away; resident and ruler rarely met, envoys visited Batavia 
less frequently, attempts were made to reduce the ceremonial surround-
ing the receipt of Company letters. When a large fleet sent by the 
Estates General passed through the Bangka Straits in 1784, Sultan 
Mahmud intended to send merely "a few pieces of salted buffalo meat 
and some dried fish," but the resident told him this was not accept-
ableY As in J ambi, complaints of the moral failings of individual resi-
dents, such as insults to royal women, were more frequent, and court 
attitudes were reflected in the behavior of ordinary people. By the 1790s 
Dutch officials who had grown accustomed to gifts of food to alleviate 
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the high cost of living in Palembang found that the customary offerings 
from the vac's own people, the kapitan cina and the people of Sungai 
Aor, were less forthcoming. For the first time the Dutch also became 
targets of the group known as the "permitted thieves." There were even 
occasional incidents of violence toward the Dutch posts in Palembang 
and Lampung, some apparently carried out with the implicit blessing of 
the court. 13 
The eighteenth century had also seen the vac challenged by 
renewed English competition. In south Sumatra pepper growers along 
Palembang's border areas had gone to Bengkulen to trade for many 
years, but for the first time in well over a century it was possible to 
envisage the English actually displacing the Dutch. In 1781, following 
the outbreak of the fourth Anglo-Dutch war, the Palembang resident 
heard with consternation of the fall of Padang to English troops, and 
there were even rumors that Melaka would be taken. Padang was 
returned to the Dutch in 1785 after hostilities ended, but the next year 
Captain Francis Light negotiated the lease of the island of Penang to the 
East India Company. It became apparent that the leaders of this new 
port intended to compete directly with Melaka and even Batavia. In 
1795 the dominance of the English seemed confirmed when the 
stadhouder of the Netherlands permitted a temporary British occupa-
tion of Melaka and Dutch possessions in west Sumatra to prevent their 
capture by the forces of Napoleonic France. 
The group most influential in alerting local rulers to the potential 
eclipse of the Dutch was the English country traders who had begun to 
frequent ports in the Melaka Straits as opportunities in India les-
sened. 14 Kingdoms whose rulers had not signed monopoly treaties with 
the Dutch, such as Aceh, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and above all 
Riau, became popular ports of call. The patronage of the English was 
welcomed not only because they could supply cheap Indian cloth, but 
also because they brought cargoes of opium, use of which was now 
entrenched in Malay society. English country traders, unlike the vac, 
also dealt in guns, ammunition, and gunpowder considered superior to 
that derived from local production. The exchange of cloth, opium, and 
weapons for the spices and tin essential for the China market encour-
aged an expanding interaction between native traders and the English, 
even in areas where monopoly contracts signed with the vac suppos-
edly excluded them. 15 
Local kings were impressed by the possibilities of the English alterna-
tive. In 1758 Sultan Anum of Jambi had even told the Dutch that he 
would ask" another foreign power" to settle in J ambi, a clear reference 
to the vac's English rivals. The following year, English from Selangor 
and Kedah were reported to have appeared in the J ambi River, selling 
cloth and opium in such quantities that it was even reaching the 
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Minangkabau areas. In 1762 the Palembang court sent a mission to the 
English in Bengkulen to investigate the possibility of their paying higher 
prices than the Dutch for tin and pepper. 16 English economic inroads 
gathered pace, and the outbreak of the war between England and the 
Netherlands in 1780 heightened speculation about the consequences of 
a vac defeat. The numbers of English ships cruising the Melaka 
Straits caused considerable apprehension among the Dutch in Palem-
bang, and the resident reported that Sultan Mahmud Baha'uddin (r. 
177 4-1804) was in close contact with English traders, despite protesta-
tions to the contrary. There were even reports of his sending to one cap-
tain the presents normally dispatched to Batavia, promising that if more 
Englishmen arrived he would conclude a contract and give the Dutch 
lodge to them. Yet any such negotiations were perforce conducted in 
secrecy, for the vac monopoly made it impossible for Sultan Mahmud 
to follow the practice of neighboring kings and publicly adopt favored 
English traders as royal "sons."17 
Another feature that distinguished the eighteenth century was the 
marked expansion of Bugis migration to the western archipelago follow-
ing their conquest of Johor's capital, Riau, on the island of Bintan in 
1722. As a result an arrangement had been reached whereby a Bugis 
prince held the position of yang dipertuan muda (the deputy lord) and was 
effective ruler, while the Malay sultan held the purely symbolic position 
of yang dipertuan besar (the great lord). Widely regarded as "the best mer-
chants among the eastern isles," the Bugis soon consolidated their hold 
over Riau's economy, affirming its reputation as the most important 
exchange center west of Java. With Bugis ships bringing spices and 
slaves, jungle and sea products, tin and pepper, Riau became the hub of 
a Bugis/Makassar network linking virtually every port in the archipel-
ago. Inevitably, it was a magnet for both English and Chinese traders. 
In 1783, for example, the governor of Melaka reported that several 
European ships and thirteen junks were lying at anchor in Riau, includ-
ing two flying the imperial flag. 18 
Riau's proximity made it a tempting lure for Palembang traders who 
wished to sell their products in a more open market. At the same time it 
was a reminder of Bugis penetration into the region, for by the mid-
eighteenth century Bugis groups had not only assumed power over the 
Riau archipelago, but had carved out their own kingdom in the former 
J ohor territory of Selangor. Their position in neighboring J ambi was 
also strong. Sultan Anum had given a daughter in marriage to the Bugis 
yang dipertuan muda, and following the Dutch departure in 1770 the 
Jambi court became increasingly drawn into the Bugis ambit. Palem-
bang rulers were somewhat more wary, partly because of their contract 
with the vehemently anti-Bugis Dutch, but also because their experi-
ence with Sulawesi princes had not always been happy. In 1771 Sultan 
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Ahmad refused to permit the crew of a ship from Mandar to settle in 
Palembang, saying that he already had "too many bad people in his 
land." No Bugis lady from Riau was ever received into the Palembang 
court as a royal wife and no Palembang princess offered to Riau. 19 Yet 
the Bugis remained a forceful economic and political presence that nei-
ther Sultan Ahmad nor his son could afford to ignore. 
European descriptions of Palembang during this period invariably 
pay attention to another recent development-the increase in Bangka's 
Chinese population. The effects of the Chinese presence in Palembang 
itself had always been somewhat muted because most were under the 
control of Muslim peranakan, men of mixed ancestry who were related 
to the king, shared his religion, spoke his language, and whose titles and 
authority were evidence of their special standing. 20 Although successive 
contracts with the VOC had specified that the Dutch should have juris-
diction over Chinese traders, the resident in 1763 commented that he 
had little to do with them because they were almost all under the sul-
tan's authority. To this point peranakan Chinese had served the king 
well and from the 1750s had been crucial in the revival of direct trading 
links with China and in the seaborne trade with Siam and Ha Tien. In 
1764, for example, the Dutch discovered that the ruler had commis-
sioned at least seven Palembang Chinese to organize the construction of 
junks in Siam intended to carry tin from Palembang to China. 21 
Initially the same held true of Bangka, for during the first years of 
Chinese migration to the island the miners had been under the supervi-
sion of the king's own peranakan clients and relatives. As the numbers 
of Chinese increased, however, it was more difficult for peranakan lead-
ers to maintain their authority. By the beginning of Sultan Ahmad's 
reign the migrant Chinese population on Bangka was estimated at 
25,000-30,000. While liaisons with local women certainly did occur, the 
increased numbers of Chinese travelling between Palembang and Java 
on native ships shows up the transiency of the mining population. The 
"marriages" that took place were usually temporary and were in any 
event limited by the sheer preponderance of Chinese males. By the 
early 1780s there were as many as twenty separate kongsis on Bangka, 
each composed of between two hundred and a thousand Chinese miners 
whose ties with their homeland remained strong. Deceased peranakan 
leaders, for instance, were normally buried with their Palembang rela-
tives, but this new breed of Chinese captains wanted their bodies sent 
back to China for burial. Separated both geographically and culturally, 
the connections between the Bangka kongsis and the Palembang ruler 
were. based almost entirely on pragmatic exchanges of money and 
goods. The tin the Chinese collected was theoretically delivered only to 
royal agents, with a quarter of the payment being given in cash and 
three quarters in cloth, rice, and other goods. Rice was reckoned at a set 
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price of a hundred rials the koyan regardless of whether prices fell or 
rose, while the value accorded other goods fluctuated. In addition, the 
king gave the miners cannon and weaponry to defend the wooden stock-
ades built near the diggings. 22 
Lacking traditional ties of loyalty or patronage with the Palembang 
ruler, there was no incentive for the Bangka Chinese to abide by trade 
relationships they deemed disadvantageous. It was considerably more 
profitable for miners in isolated settlements to sell tin to passing ships, 
like those of the English and Bugis, who offered a higher price-report-
edly half as much again as that given in Palembang. The Chinese thus 
becaI?e ever more prominent as "smugglers," private traders who 
bypassed the ruler's monopoly, and a number of kongsis were indepen-
dent enough to mint their own tin coinage. The networks they estab-
lished made possible direct trade with Riau, Ha Tien, and even China, 
since the richest mines on the northwest and eastern coasts were not 
readily accessible to either vac cruisers or the king's patrols. In 1778 a 
Chinese map of Bangka was discovered showing the most important 
"smuggling places," and Chinese knowledge of local waters was so 
great that the resident advised hiring a Chinese pilot to take a vessel into 
Kelabat Bay. 23 
Toward the end of his reign, aware that his control over the Bangka 
Chinese was weakening, Sultan Ahmad changed the way in which the 
island was administered. All Chinese captains were replaced by court 
nobles from Palembang, and by 1780 only two areas were under Chi-
nese heads. Although several of the newly appointed tiko24 were cer-
tainly peranakan, they lived in the capital and were represented by 
Bangka people "of good birth." Through them the tiko extended money 
to the mine workers, who then delivered the tin for eight rials the 
Bangka picul of 150 kati; the tiko in their turn sold it to the ruler for 
eight rials the light picul of 100 kati. From his profit of 50 percent the 
tiko had to pay for transport and also supply the king's palace with 
necessities. The deficiencies of this system soon became apparent, for a 
financially pressed tiko would be unable to supply goods on credit, and 
Chinese miners felt aggrieved because the Bangka picul was about fifty 
kati heavier than that used in Palembang. Some Chinese, comparing 
the price they received from the tiko with that obtained by the ruler 
from the Dutch, considered his profits unreasonably high. Without 
wives and families in Palembang and aware of other alternative sources 
of income in the mines of Perak or Borneo, many decided to leave. 
Although population estimates of Chinese miners on Bangka in the 
1780s varied from oetween 6,400 to 13,000, it was a far cry from the 
25,000-30,000 of previous times. This Chinese emigration in turn 
markedly reduced the flow of tin to the capital.25 
Another group usually mentioned in accounts of Palembang from 
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this period were the Arab migrants, who by the mid-eighteenth century 
exerted considerable economic influence in the Melaka Straits. By the 
1760s, for example, there was already a group of "Arab priests" who 
acted as royal advisers in Palembang, and their commercial activities 
are evident in the lists of incoming and outgoing ships kept by succes-
sive residents. In 1759 only ten Arab vessels are noted, but by 1795-
1796 there were more than forty. When Radermacher publillhed his 
description of Palembang in 1781 he contended that private trade there 
was dominated by Arabs, operating both on their own account and as 
royal agents. A recent study of the Semarang salt trade has noted that 
between 1774 and 1777 about half the shipments from that port were in 
the hands of Palembang Arabs, and of the thirty-six ships leaving 
Palembang for Melaka between September 1795 and August 1796, 
twenty were owned by Arabs. 26 The Dutch were so much in fear of their 
competition and influence that in 1791 when the J ambi ruler made 
inquiries about reviving the vac contract, he was told that expulsion 
of all Arabs would be a condition for the Company's return. 
The Arabs of Palembang were a select community, primarily men 
from the Hadhramaut who bore the title sayid as evidence of their 
descent from the Prophet. As his kinsfolk, sayids were regarded not 
merely as authorities on religion but were attributed with "supernatural 
power" (,al sultat al-ruhiyah), which made them venerated and even 
feared. Since local kings competed to persuade these prestigious men to 
join their courts, promising them status, riches, titles, and high-ranking 
women, the number of Arab migrants was in effect a measure of the 
material inducements individual rulers could offer. In the mid-eigh-
teenth century there were only very few sayid merchants in Jambi; in 
Palembang, by contrast, the sayid community increased steadily. Sul-
tan Ahmad Tajuddin was particularly anxious to encourage them to set-
tle in Palembang, and during his reign sayid numbers grew markedly. 
Shortly after his accession he had gone so far as to cancel a planned 
wedding between his daughter and the son of the J ambi ruler, marrying 
the lady instead to Palembang's "head priest," a sayid. 27 
Wealthy sayid families, like other Arabs, were part of a commercial 
network that stretched across the archipelago and back to India and the 
Arab heartlands. The Dutch attributed their rapid penetration to the 
special advantages granted them by local rulers, such as toll-free trade, 
but the reasons for their commercial success are much more complex. It 
was not merely that they were linked by marriage to the wealthiest and 
most prestigious royal families; the sayids of Hadhramaut were consid-
ered the most commercially adroit of all the Arab groups, products of a 
culture with generations of mercantile experience in such matters as 
accounting, investment, credit arrangements, written contracts. Ex-
ploitation of these skills had far-reaching implications in the personal-
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ized, orally structured economies that typified most Indonesian areas. 
While family ties were naturally important for all Arabs, and particu-
larly the sayids, the commercial ethos underlying their business activi-
ties "had already moved beyond the family framework ... placing pri-
mary emphasis on economic self-interest."28 
Local rulers, who had seen the exchange of women and gifts and hon-
ors as the principal means of strengthening their links with these vener-
ated relatives of the Prophet, had direct experience of this "economic 
self-interest." Arab loyalty to a single court was not easily won, and no 
ruler would dare to intimidate or threaten them as they often did the 
Chinese. Certainly Palembang was wealthy, but members of its sayid 
community were commonly involved in a number of centers, and they 
readily moved when better trading opportunities were perceived else-
where. They were easily attracted, for example, to neighboring ports 
such as Riau, while a number transferred their activities to the new 
English settlement on Penang or to other European-controlled towns. 
Nor were they necessarily ready to observe the strictures intended to 
maintain the ruler's hold over his economic resources, and at least one 
sayid was sufficiently bold to take to wife a high-ranking Mentuk lady, 
even though these women were traditionally reserved for the ruler. 29 
European sources depict the interaction between these groups pri-
marily in terms of commercial competition for access to Bangka's tin. 
Less apparent, however, was the challenge their rivalry posed to the 
kinship-obligation relationships that had sustained Palembang's fragile 
jurisdiction over the offshore islands. New mines were discovered on 
Bangka in 1779, and twenty years later one commentator could still 
remark that "the tin mines have yielded immense quantities of ore, and 
appear inexhaustible."30 But in the highly competitive environment of 
the late eighteenth century, producer and middlemen alike proved far 
less amenable than before to the authority of the Palembang king. The 
Dutch had long been unable to prevent "smuggling"; now the ruler too 
was being progressively excluded from the profits of Bangka's lucrative 
private trade. Chinese, Bugis, Malay, and Arab merchants bought up 
tin along the isolated east coast and then either went directly to Riau to 
buy cloth and weapons or made coastal assignations with English cap-
tains. The latter sometimes appointed their own agents on Bangka, 
dropping off cloth and opium, which was then secretly taken back into 
Palembang. It was also apparent that the king's own relatives and sub-
jects were increasingly prepared to flout his orders and trade in tin on 
their own account. In an effort to limit these activities the Palembang 
ruler prohibited the import of opium and in 1778 under Dutch pressure 
forbade all trade to Riau, but these were empty gestures. Palembang 
was no match for Riau in commercial terms, and ties of patronage and 
kinship were thus placed under enormous strains. One of the three 
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principal "smugglers" on Bangka was Abang Tiwi, brother of Sultan 
Mahmud Baha'uddin's "much loved" Mentuk wife, who received 
goods on credit from sayid traders to whom he secretly sold tin. Though 
the ruler's relative, he was summoned to court to be punished and was 
eventually put to death. 31 In 1784, partly in hopes of affirming their for-
mer economic position, VOC forces captured Riau. But although the 
island was placed under direct Dutch control, the trading network 
slipped amoeba-like away to reshape itself around alternative ports such 
as Terengganu, which had for some time served as a meeting place for 
English, Portuguese, Chinese, and Bugis traders and a dissemination 
point for opium and firearms. Now it became an important outlet for 
the tin and pepper previously taken to Riau. 
Among the Palembang subjects whose cooperation facilitated the 
inroads of outsiders into the tin trade none were more crucial than the 
orang laut. The sea people who guarded Sungsang, the entry to the 
Musi River, had a very old relationship with Palembang kings, and as 
Palembang's authority moved further offshore, successive rulers had 
sought to establish similar ties with the orang laut who frequented the 
waters around Bangka, Belitung, and Lepar. But the subsequent links, 
established at least partly by force, could never be taken for granted. 
Retaining the loyalty of sea peoples who could readily attach themselves 
to some other court depended primarily on the ability of the Palembang 
ruler to serve as a legitimizer for orang laut leadership and as a conduit 
for economic activity. When Sultan Ahmad came to power in 1757, this 
certainly appears to have been the case, and Belitung headmen still 
appeared annually at court with gifts, receiving in turn titles and hon-
ors. The ocean products they delivered, like beche-de-mer (teripang), 
seaweeds, and the iron extracted from the rocks surrrounding Belitung, 
were indispensable for attracting overseas buyers. Orang laut also con-
tributed directly to the economy by delivering to the market slaves 
taken in raids, acknowledging their acceptance of Palembang suzerain-
ty by offering the king their choicest booty. In 1759, for example, a 
party from Bangka brought to port the captured occupants of a founder-
ing Portuguese vessel. Although the captain, the son of the Timor resi-
dent, had died, Sultan Ahmad was so taken with the captain's "young 
and pretty daughter" that he took the entire crew into his palace, asking 
the widow to adopt Islam and become his wifeY Recognizing Sultan 
Ahmad's involvement in raiding and concerned at the numbers of 
Javanese slaves for sale in Palembang, the Dutch for the first time 
included in the contract of 1763 an article obliging the ruler to act more 
forcibly to contain piracy. 
Raiding, however, showed no signs of diminishing, for in the latter 
half of the eighteenth century the influence of Sultan Mahmud 
Baha'uddin over the sea people was noticeably weaker than that of his 
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father and grandfather. A primary reason was orang laut involvement 
in the ever-expanding search for slaves, itself largely attributable to the 
"voracious demand" for human labor from the vac, its officials, and 
private Dutch citizens. Orang laut raiding reached a peak never before 
experienced, and the competition for slaves of all kinds meant that no 
perahu, however small, was safe from attack. Whether carrying a few 
women intending to work in Palembang as prostitutes or a travelling 
wayang troupe en route to Banten, small native craft could represent a 
prize of several hundred rials to an orang laut captain. 33 
Because of the inexhaustible market for slaves and the extent of orang 
laut participation, more traders were prepared to go directly to less 
accessible islands such as Belitung and Lepar. Here they could deal 
firsthand with orang laut "pirates" and purchase an adult male for as 
little as ten to fifteen rials, well below the price asked in Palembang 
itself. As a result, the linkages between orang laut and outside traders 
grew stronger. Orang laut with their own clientele were far more willing 
to bypass royal prerogatives and act independently of the Palembang 
king, both in raiding and in disposing of their slaves and booty. In 1784, 
for instance, Sultan Mahmud Baha'uddin was told that a group of 
"Bilitongers" had on their own intitiative deliberately led a Chinese 
junk bound for Mempawa onto a reef. Most of the crew were drowned, 
but without recourse to the ruler the orang laut took the captured survi-
vors and cargo to be sold in Mentuk. The situation was made more 
complex when the flight of the Johor ruler from Riau in 1787 left many 
of his erstwhile orang laut subjects without a patron. A hundred years 
earlier their forebears had seen a royal protector as vital for their well-
being and after the Johor regicide of 1699 had willingly looked to 
Palembang; now, however, they showed no inclination to recognize the 
southeast Sumatran coast as Palembang's domain. In 1790 orang laut 
from Lingga even killed one of the Sultan Mahmud's envoys. 34 
A weakening of already fragile ties between the orang laut and the 
Palembang court was exacerbated by the presence of numbers of inde-
pendent agents, Malay, Minangkabau, Bugis, and Arabs who had 
taken to the seas to "seek their fortune." For them too raiding became a 
source of livelihood, and they often proved less than willing to share 
their profits with the Palembang ruler or acknowledge his authority 
over the seas that were their hunting ground. When this kind ofleader-
ship allied with orang laut groups, piracy assumed a new dimension 
because it combined local maritime knowledge, navigational skills, cap-
ital, and access to arms. To this some adventurers could add the emo-
tional appeal of deeper associations. The grandson of Raja Kecil, the 
Minangkabau prince who had claimed to be the son of the murdered 
Sultan Mahmud ofJohor, was able to rally considerable" support among 
Palembang's orang laut, many of whom were descended from groups 
224 Descriptions and Judgments 
once linked to the Johor court. Pangeran Yusuf, Sultan Mahmud's 
uncle, was another well-known raider who was for some time able to 
carve out his own fiefdom around Bangka and Belitung. The Siantan-
descended people of Mentuk were especially drawn to him because he 
was supported by Pangeran Dipati, a son born of the marriage between 
Mas Ayu of Siantan and Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin. In areas of 
Bangka where Pangeran Yusuf held sway he demanded a Spanish rial 
from every inhabitant, and in Belitung pirate captains were delivering 
their captives to him because he was their "protector."35 The influence 
of Sultan Mahmud Baha'uddin over raiding patterns in the seas where 
he claimed authority was thus considerably less than his predecessors as 
his orang laut subjects, often under the leadership of rival princes, 
proved willing to attack royal vessels and carry offPalembang people. 
In this environment the arrival of the Ilanun in the 1780s represented 
yet another strain on the maintenance of the ruler-subject relationships 
so crucial to maritime trade. Apparently originating from central Min-
danao, Ilanun movement to the coastal areas and farther afield to Sulu 
and northwest Borneo may have been caused by a volcanic eruption 
about 1765 that destroyed much of the Ilanun heartland. The relocated 
Ilanun communities gained a formidable reputation for raiding, form-
ing profitable partnerships with wealthy Taosug traders who provided 
capital for expeditions and markets for captives and booty. Several of 
their leaders became linked through marriage to the rulers of Sulu and 
Cotabato, although others were virtually independent of any overarch-
ing authority. 36 
The Ilanun were first noticed in Palembang waters in 1783, when a 
small fleet was reported to be raiding for slaves around Bangka. In 
1787, however, Ilanun forces were instrumental in driving the Dutch 
from their post on Riau, and their consequent involvement in Johor 
politics meant they began to appear regularly in the western archipel-
ago. During the northwest monsoon between December and February, 
their great fleets rode out from Borneo or from semipermanent colonies 
on the small islands dotting the South China Sea. 37 By 1790 Ilanun 
bases could be found in Retih, Riau, Jambi, Pulau Berhala, Tungkal, 
and Air Hitam, and from these settlements the Ilanun systematically 
preyed upon neighboring coasts. 
As raiders the Ilanun far eclipsed the orang laut. Their fleets could 
consist of dozens of boats, the largest carrying up to eighty fighting men 
and about a hundred rowers. They were consequently able to build up 
such speed that in a light breeze they could well outstrip European ves-
sels. Any becalmed craft was helpless because Ilanun boats were 
equipped with iron hooks with which they could engage their victims 
and with heavy rails at the bow to assist in boarding. Another reason for 
the success of Ilanun raiding was their access to weapons and gunpow-
Southeast Sumatra in a Time of "Decline" 225 
der, some of which they obtained through trade with the English and 
some of which they made themselves. A third factor was the naviga-
tional skills that enabled them to negotiate the coastal waters of the 
Melaka Straits. Traditional knowledge was augmented by compasses 
and telescopes bought or plundered from Europeans and more particu-
larly by local orang laut captured in raids and pressed into Ilanun ser-
vice. With their larger ships, superior arms, and knowledge of the envi-
ronment, the Ilanun were quite willing to defy Palembang's principal 
orang laut settlement at Sungsang and raid up the Musi River, attack-
ing native cargo vessels, Chinese junks, and Dutch ships alike. Growing 
bolder, the Ilanun also began to board Arab vessels, which they had ini-
tially regarded with awe. Between January and October 1791 the 
Ilanun overmastered twelve ofPalembang's best ships and captured six-
teen smaller perahu sailing to Bangka. VOC vessels too were attacked 
with impunity, with "European" (usually mestizo Christian) women 
being taken as wives for Ilanun leaders. As they acquired greater 
knowledge oflocal geography, Ilanun raiders also moved up coastal riv-
ers, attacking interior regions that had hitherto considered themselves 
safe from seagoing piracy. In one area "far up" the Tulang Bawang, for 
example, they took seventy people. 38 
With their slave-based trading network stretching from Sumatra to 
Sulu and eastward to the Moluccas, the Ilanun soon saw the potentiality 
of direct involvement in the tin trade. In some areas of Bangka, slaves 
or intimidated locals worked mines specifically for Ilanun "overlords," 
and it was even said that they were collecting more tin than was being 
delivered to Palembang. Often it was fear of reprisals rather than pros-
pects of rewards that made Palembang orang laut agree to join the 
Ilanun as raiders, but in other cases they entered willingly into the asso-
ciation because it was more profitable than their former relationship 
with the court. The well-known Panglima Raman, for example, son of 
a Bugis father and an orang laut mother, assisted the Ilanun in mount-
ing raids on coastal settlements and passing ships and shared in the pro-
ceeds. Joined by some Palembang orang laut groups, like those from 
Lepar, he showed no compunction in attacking ships at the very mouth 
of the Musi River or in raiding Bangka coasts and carrying the prison-
ers off to Lingga. 39 
The inability of the Palembang ruler to protect his people further 
damaged the ties between the court and the offshore islands. On a num-
ber of occasions Sultan Mahmud Baha'uddin said he was unable to 
repel the raiders, and in 1794 the resident claimed that the king could 
not put more than twenty armed ships to sea. By 1796 Bangka had suf-
fered almost constant Ilanun raiding for about six years, and Sultan 
Mahmud complained that fifteen hundred of his people had been taken 
in the previous twelve months alone. As a result Chinese miners were 
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fleeing the island, while local inhabitants were taking refuge deep in the 
interior. The situation was exacerbated by a major smallpox epidemic 
in 1798 that killed thousands of people. 40 Something of the horror of 
these years survives in a Belitung legend telling of an Ilanun pirate 
whom the local people nursed back to health and adopted as their son, 
to be like an anak kandung (womb child); when he returned years later, 
however, he offered them not the respect and affection due to parents, 
but the attack, humilation, and torture normally meted out to hated 
enemies. 41 
By the beginning of the nineteenth century the control of the Palem-
bang ruler over the waters surrounding his kingdom had been severely 
reduced. The numbers of people involved, the competition in the tin 
trade, and the traffic in human beings combined to undermine the deli-
cate intermingling of favors bestowed and obligations incurred that 
were the only means of sustaining a political and economic order on the 
seas. Palembang's authority over the offshore islands had always been 
subject to challenge, but during the previous century interlocking link-
ages, albeit tenuous, had been established and in the main sustained. 
What European observers judged to be the declining power of a mari-
time trading state was therefore more a demonstration of the strains 
placed on a basically land-based kingdom that had extended its suzer-
ainty into seas where economic rivalries were fierce. In contrast, the 
ancient ulu-ilir relationship remained remarkably resilient, even though 
it too was operating in a context that required constant restatement of 
old links and careful fostering of new ones. 
A Changing Environment in the Ulu 
The Europeans who wrote what were intended to be scientific accounts 
of Sumatra in the late eighteenth century were all aware that substantial 
populations existed in upstream areas, but only Marsden and his con-
temporary, Charles Miller, felt sufficiently confident to describe ulu 
groups at length. Radermacher had no direct experience of Palem-
bang's interior, and his judgment that its inhabitants were "stupid and 
simple" was based largely on his opinions ofulu representatives he had 
seen during royal audiences. vac sources are at first glance only 
slightly more revealing, since eighteenth-century Palembang rulers per-
mitted Dutch representatives access to the interior on a mere two or 
three occasions. Informants in the court were not necessarily more 
knowledgeable, for princes and nobles rarely visited the upstream 
appanages they had been assigned. Further, as the pepper production 
declined, vac attention shifted from the ulu to the more economically 
profitable tin trade of the coast. Dutch interest in the interior was only 
revived in the early nineteenth century in the face of greater English 
involvement in southeast Sumatra. 
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Although Marsden did draw attention to the writing system used by 
the Rejang and other interior groups, contemporary Europeans gener-
ally saw little of historical worth in the stories of ancestral peregrinations 
by which ulu communities recalled their past. When juxtaposed with 
archival material, however, accounts of heroic adventure in which the 
poyang masters his adversaries and claims authority over new lands 
assume a new significance. Taken together, the sources suggest that in 
the ulu, as on the seas, demographic movement was contributing to an 
extremely fluid and at times threatening environment. Intervillage raid-
ing, for example, had long been a feature of the upstream landscape, 
but now access to more effective weaponry bought from the English or 
from Bugis traders along the west coast rendered it potentially more 
damaging. One such instance occurred in 1765 when seven hundred 
Bengkulen Malays equipped with English muskets appeared in ulu 
Palembang, destroying two whole villages and forcing the inhabitants 
to flee. They were repelled only after the arrival of a force from the ilir, 
also well armed. It also appears that Palembang rulers were less able to 
contain Minangkabau migration into Palembang-controlled Rawas. In 
1779 about six hundred Minangkabau were reported to be moving in 
from Limun, attacking local people and burning pepper plantations, 
presumably in retaliation for perceived wrongs they or their kinsmen 
had suffered. 42 
But though Minangkabau migration was to have a significant effect 
on the later development of Rawas,43 it paled beside the continuing 
Palembang expansion south of the Mesuji River, which Dutch contracts 
had specified as Lampung's northern boundary. Banten's overlordship ;) 
had little meaning here, and in 1777 Palembang people were reported 
to be "all through" the Tulang Bawang region, their movement facili-
tated by the numerous jungle tracks connecting riverine routes. Inhab-
itants of Lampung's border districts could reach Palembang's down-
stream capital in a few days, and the Palembang ruler continued to 
sponsor the distribution of titles and honors to persuade pepper growers 
to sell to his agents. It was said, in fact, that although a man could buy 
the title of pangeran for eighty rials from Banten, the king of Palem-
bang would give it for nothing. Now this pressure was also being felt in 
central Lampung, where there were frequent Banten accusations of 
Palembang people along the Wai Besai and Wai Abung. Bearing gifts 
and letters from the Palembang king, they demanded in return entry to 
gold-bearing areas. In 1793 the VOC was predictably unsuccessful in 
bringing about recognition of the Lampung-Palembang boundary by 
means of a new contract. 44 \ I \' \ ' 
Palembang's push southward was generated not just by the attraction 
of Lampung's gold and pepper but also by its human resources. A num-
ber of traditions from the Komering region talk of Palembang rulers 
who were eager to populate the area, and the perennial concern to 
228 Descriptions and Judgments 
retain and increase population may have been more critical in the late 
eighteenth century following several devastating smallpox epidemics. 
Because smallpox had recurred periodically in the ilir, inhabitants there 
had been exposed to contact for many generations and had built up a 
degree of resistance. Thus, even when severe, epidemics did not prove 
fatal to a large proportion of the population. In the interior, however, 
exposure to infectious diseases had been much more limited, and the 
possibility of widespread deaths rose with increased ulu-ilir interaction. 
The young, the old, and pregnant women were all particularly vulnera-
ble, and whole villages could be decimated in a few weeks. In 1758 
smallpox ravaged the interior and in 1772 again swept through Lema-
tang, Komering, and Ranau, while Rawas was reported to be depopu-
lated as survivors fled to the safety of uninfected areas. More outbreaks 
occurred in the 1790s, and there were claims that deaths in the ulu from 
smallpox exceeded ten thousand. 45 Losses on this scale could not readily 
be replaced, especially since so many of the victims were children and 
fertile women. 
These developments may help account for Palembang's increased 
raiding into Lampung, since any decline in population meant a parallel 
decline in food production. Although many former pepper-growing dis-
tricts had shifted to dry rice, Palembang now had to supply food to the 
thousands of Chinese tin miners on Bangka, and in 1783 it was esti-
mated that they would require about twelve hundred koyan of rice per 
annum. When ships from Java did not appear or when the quantity was 
inadequate, the lack of local supplies could have severe repercussions, 
especially after 1770, when the vac reintroduced restrictions limiting 
trade with Siam. Vlu rice growing was thus essential to the smooth run-
ning of the economy, and should planted areas be abandoned or crops 
fail, the results could be catastrophic. In 1775, for instance, there was 
almost no rain in some interior districts for five or six months, and the 
following year another poor harvest resulted in an estimated five thou-
sand people allegedly dying of hunger. Though the 1791 treaty permit-
ted trade with Siam once more, in 1796 another crop failure pushed the 
cost of rice to 123 rials the koyan, and there was not enough to supply 
the downstream port, let alone the Bangka miners.46 The constant 
threat of lack of food would have lent a new urgency to the development 
of rice lands. Stories collected a generation later told of Pal em bang raid-
ers capturing whole families from areas as distant as Wai Sungkai and 
resettling them in ilir Komering and along Sungai Belitang to grow 
rice. Warehouses were constructed in the vicinity of Pal em bang; certain 
communities were obliged to keep them stocked with rice so that in 
times of shortages, supplies could be distributed to those in need. 47 
There was another dimension to this raiding, for much of the Palem-
bang thrust into Lampung occurred independently of the downstream 
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king and in response to local dynamics. One factor, for example, was 
the spread of opium, which was carried into Lampung by Palembang 
traders despite royal prohibitions. It was difficult for those who became 
addicted to escape the cycle of debt and what the Dutch called menschen 
roof or "theft of people" for sale as slaves was often a response to the 
need to acquire funds for new supplies or to repay creditors. These 
developments fed into cultural patterns that encouraged raiding, prime 
among which was the need to furnish the jujur or bride price. Usually 
the jujur was paid in slaves or goods, and many men remained indebted 
all their lives for the eighty rials or so that their wife may have cost 
them. This otherwise burdensome amount, however, could be easily 
made up by the capture of just two potential slaves, for a male could be 
sold for about thirty rials and a female for forty. There were other cul-
tural imperatives at work, like those found among the so-called orang 
Abung, originating from the fertile Abung River area in central Lam-
pungo Abung traditions called for human heads as part of bride price, 
but if any members of a raiding party were killed, it was necessary to 
seize additional captives for sacrifice as atonement. These captives, who 
could be used in other community rituals, were by preference obtained 
from distant districts, and from the 1780s there were periodic com-
plaints of raids by "Abungers" in the Palembang interior, in turn invit-
ing retaliation. Growing competition between different groups for 
access to economic resouces both stimulated and exacerbated conflicts, 
and legends are still told of raid and counterraid as the people of 
Komering moved down into favored lands that the Abung regarded as 
their own. 48 
At a time when rivers and jungle tracks were being carved up into 
what approached pirate zones and where even Europeans were not 
exempt from attack, the orders of the distant ruler in Palembang often 
had little effect. In 1782 Sultan Mahmud announced that he planned to 
clear an important access path between the Mesuji River and Palem-
bang, but more than a year later it was still unsafe. 49 In an environment 
in which adyenturers thrived and the collective authority of the elders 
was frequently flouted, efforts to extend Palembang influence may even 
have contributed to raiding activities. When seeking to appoint a repre-
sentative, the Palembang court naturally favored those who had 
emerged as local leaders, but such men often owed their status to the 
fear they aroused as raiders. With a following made up of "relatives" 
bonded to them by the gifting of women captured in raids, they now 
received the apparent cachet of royal approval. The consequent exten-
sion of raiding between groups had far-reaching implications because 
the death of any community member could set up a chain reaction of 
vengeance, with feuds extending into two and three generations. 
The Lampung-Komering districts were further affected by pressure 
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from the flow of humanity down from the Pasemah heartlands. A trick-
ling migration along the tributaries of the major river systems had prob-
ably been occurring for many years, but about the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury it became more marked. The primary reason appears to have been 
a shortage of resources within Pasemah itself. The Pasemah highlands, 
like those of Minangkabau, were w~ll populated in contrast to the low-
lands, and in 1817 an English traveller estimated that there were about 
a hundred thousand people in Pasemah Lebar alone. As elsewhere in 
the archipelago, demographic superiority was based on the ability to 
produce surplus food, in this case wet rice grown along the flat and fer-
tile valley floors, which were easily flooded and worked with water buf-
falo. Dutch observers also believed that the dominance of ambil anak 
marriage, by which a man was adopted by his wif~'s family, encouraged 
earlier unions and more children than among communities where jujur 
was paid. The continuing demand for rice and the limits on ~!litable 
land acted as stimuli to push Pasemah groups out in search of low-lying 
areas near running water where they could layout their fields. The 
need for new space may have become more imperative because swidden 
agriculture encouraged the spread of alang-alang grass (Imperata cylin-
drica) in cleared areas of the interior. Once alang-alang was established, 
it was difficult to bring the ground back into production. By the early 
nineteenth century numerous communities that traced their origins 
(
to Pasemah had established themselves in the districts of Kisam, 
Semendo, and Makakau and along the upper areas of the Ogan and 
Komering. 50 
In Pasemah legends these migrations are often depicted as the spread 
of a great family, where poyang accepted strangers as their children and 
reached amicable arrangements with other poyang in newfound lands. 
Yet although the territory into which the Pasemah groups moved might 
have appeared uninhabited jungle, it was, of course, the preserve of 
already established groups whose concepts of boundaries and inherited 
rights were deep rooted. Dutch sources suggest that from the 1780s peo-
ple living along the Komering, Ogan, Enim, and Lematang rivers had 
become aware of the growing challenge posed by Pasemah migration as 
these newcomers sought to appropriate favorable tracts of land, raided 
villages, captured young men to supply them with labor, and seized 
women for marriage partners. Indeed, equally striking in the surviving 
oral accounts are the recurrent descriptions of conflict between Pase-
mah groups and those communities whose territorial claims they chal-
lenged. 51 
Orally.transmitted stories of migration and settlement are difficult to 
relate to a specific time, and demographic shifts in the Palembang inte-
rior were certainly not a new development. The nature of the sources 
does not facilitate reconstruction, and the modern historian feels some 
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sympathy with nineteenth-century Europeans who complained about 
the difficulty of tracing past developments there because of the "lack of 
written documents in which the history of the land is recorded."52 
Nonetheless, the available material combines to suggest that the latter 
part of the eighteenth century saw a steady migration of peoples down 
from the highland areas and continued movement of various Palem-
bang groups into Lampung. Memories of raid and warfare reflect the 
fragmentation of an area occupied largely by small tribal societies 
among whom competition for economic resources meant constant con-
tention for territorial occupation. 
In such a context it might appear that ulu-ilir relations would be , 
placed under severe strains, yet from the indigenous standpoint it was 
precisely this type of "lawless" situation that made access to an overlord 
most necessary. In a highly competitive environment the mediating ser-
vices of a prestigious king whose decision would be respected by all con-
tending factions was often the only recourse for settling ongoing dis-
putes. One piagem found in Pasemah dating from 1685 A.]. (1759 C.E.), 
for instance, specifies that "if people undertake raids against another 
village, and the attacked are killed, the blood price [bangun] must be 
paid; if anyone from among the attackers are killed, then nothing need 
be done." Another piagem from Tanah Abang on the Ogan River indi-
cates that the ruler's assistence was similarly called upon to restore trade 
beween villagers and the kubu, the jungle dwellers. 53 That downstream 
intervention often occurred in response to ulu petitions is suggested in a 
piagem from Ujan Mas, a district near Muara Enim highly favored for 
settlement because of its location on flat land at the junction of several 
rivers. The decision recorded by the Palembang court carefully deline-
ates the territorial boundaries between Ujan Mas and its neighbors, 
mentioning in the process thirteen rivers and more than twenty differ-
ent settlements, details that could only have been provided by people 
from the area. 
It further appears that the judgment of ilir kings was being sought in 
disputes involving the taking of debt slaves. One piagem given to the 
head of Muara Rupit in Rawas in 1729 A.]. (1802 C.E.) "as a token that 
he carries ~llt' the king's commands" laid down that if a question of 
debts arose between a Palembang person and an orang ulu, and if the 
debt was not paid, up to double the amount could be claimed. "Higher 
than that he may not go." If previous declarations had not been made to 
the council of elders (peroatin), then no claim could be made. It was for-
bidden to apply pressure for debts resulting from gambling or cockfight-
ing, and local leaders should consult together to ensure there was no 
fighting or killing. No one was permitted to sell human beings, for "that 
is the exclusive right of the king," and no trader or foreigner was per-
mitted to take up residence in the interior under pain of being fined. 
\ ' 
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Eighteenth-century court documents also include copies of several 
piagem distributed to interior heads that differ from those of earlier 
times in specifying that neither the debtors nor their families should be 
enslaved. While such piagem often include traditional claims, it is nota-
ble that on the reverse side of several is a Malay translation of the 
Javanese original, suggesting that it was not merely a formulaic state-
ment but was intended to be read and understood. 54 
In 1818 one observer commented that trade in Palembang was 
declining, the taxes were arbitrary, and the nobles high-handed. "Yet it 
is amazing that despite all this oppression, the kings of Palembang can 
maintain their authority over the whole outstretched kingdom without 
an army and even without police."55 While descriptions of lawlessness 
on the seas could readily be attributed to the ineffectiveness of an 
administration deprived of European guidance, it was less easy to 
\: explain why the ulu-ilir association apparently held good when "ban-I ditry" was so prevalent and when "government" seemed so minimal. 
Explaining this apparent anomaly was the concern of the numerous 
descriptions of Palembang compiled as the vac staggered toward its 
dissolution in 1799 and as both the English and Dutch governments 
looked to inherit its interests. 
Ulu-llir Ties and the Downstream Capital 
Dutch and English observers of southeast Sumatra during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries came from societies in which 
governmental bureaucracies were growing increasingly more efficient 
and more centniIizecCWlien seeking to explain in writing how Palem-
bang operated "without an army and without police," contemporary 
commentators assumed that the s-iiiVivat6rtIie-liIu-ilir association must 
be somehow due to the incorporation of measures similar to those that 
had been so successful in shaping the nation-states of Europe. Their 
descriptions accordingly transformed the downstream capital into an 
I administrative "center," the territorles-occupiea oy the varIOUS clan 
I groupings (marga) into "provinces," and the amorphous links between 
ulu and ilir into a bureaucratic chain of command that stretched from 
the coast to the interior. This chain was depicted as being held together 
by ".officials," foremost among whom were the jenang, the royal repre-
sentatives. They were responsible for the transmission of royal orders to 
district chiefs, who seemed to be the principal sources of authority in the 
interioi.Be~ring the title of dipati or pesirah and usually claiming 
descent from a long line of leaders, these chiefs were locally nominated 
and confirmed by the downstream ruler. What appeared to be the next 
level of command was occupied by village headmen distinguished by 
Malay and Javanese-derived titles like ginda (baginda) and kria (kiai aria), 
lurah or ngabei. European descriptions then traced the "chain" into the 
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villages, where the key figures were identified as the matagawe (literally, 
family elders in charge of work), appointed by 'theil-kinsmen and 
approved by the king. A group of three or four of these elders, the peng-
gawa, assisted the vill~g~ head and was responsible for collectingtfl.h-
ute, e'ncouraging the planting of crops like pepper, receiving strangers, 
delivering letters and reports, resolving minor quarrels, and imposing 
fines. Together, the pesirah and village leaders of a marga were termed 
the peroatin, the adat heads, who formed a kind of council, which could 
include as many as twohu'ndred people. This met at the largest village 
to discuss common concernsaIiddecide on the resolution of serious 
offenses. The ruler in Palembang was involved only when there was 
some protracted quarrel, a killing, or accusations against a dipati. 56 
Having endowed native government with something approaching a 
"structure," Europeans were concerned to determine its functions. In 
their view a bureaucracy was properly concerned \-yith tas~s such as 
maintaining the law, raising revenue, and organizing military duties, 
all of which rendered a population more responsive to central control. 
From this viewpoint it was not difficult to see tribute and corvee labor in 
Palembang as the equivalent of taxes and military service nor to depict 
them as another reason for the survival of the ulu-ilir relationship. 
Some observers even equated the jenang with a revenue collector, 
because he helped channel "taxes" and labor to the ruler or individual 
court nobles and princes. The pesirah too was considered an important 
link in the revenue chain, since every three years most district heads 
went downstream to pay homage (sebo), accompanied by various mata-
gawe who each brought a gift of rice as well as cotton, fruit, and coco-
nuts. 
Details of this type were of prime importance to both Dutch and 
English as each assessed the advantages of greater involvement in 
Palembang and sought to calculate the-wort11-o{tIle tribute submitted to 
the ilir court. However, what impeded efforts to clarify and evaluate 
Palembang's system of revenue gathering was the variety of ways the 
state's "incoJIle" was raised. Thus, although rice-growing districts such 
as those along the middle reaches of the Musi, the Lematang, and the 
Ogan were required to submit a percentage of their padi harvest, the 
amount was not standardized, being esi:Tm'ate-(r-~t one fifth in some 
areas and in others a quarter. Along the Komering tribute was com-
monly offere<:i i!lpepp~r and by turun beneh, the sending down of rice 
seed after the family's needs were met; the final amount could range 
from half the crop to a quarter or a third. Other areas were subject to 
the tiban-tukon system, whereby cloth, iron, salt, and other items could 
be bought only from royal agents for fixed and often artificially high 
prices; in return, the people delivered pepper, cotton, and jungle prod-
ucts such as wax. 57 
Lacking in the collection of revenue, Europeans considered, were 
\ I 
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regulation and order. In the capital, for instance, the population was to 
all appearances free of tax, but family heads were required to supervise 
the execution of certain tasks for their patron, who was either the ruler 
himself, a prince, or a court noble. 58 European commentators were also 
unsure as to whether gifts should be categorized as revenue, since on all 
court oCcasIons-at the end of the fasting month; at a king's succession; 
at a royal marriage, baptism, or circumcision-the pesirah was ex-
pected to give presents to the ruler and thejenang, the cost of which was 
largely met by people in his district. 59 Should the jenang visit a village, 
he and his entourage had to be fed and feted, and on occasions-like the 
Muslim New Year, matagawe near the capital each gave their jenang a 
~ chicken, a coconut, rice, dried fish, spices, firewood, and other small 
,~items, which were then passed on to the sultan to feed guests. 
Similar difficulties of classification were encountered in regard to 
labor duties. Europeans familiar with Javanese recognized that the term 
sikep referred to work of some kind, and in Palembang too they found 
that large numbers of people, termed orang sikep, provided personal ser-
vice either in lieu of or in addition to tribute. Again, however, there was 
enormous variation. The heaviest corvee seemed to fall on those who 
Jived along the Banyu Asin, the Musi, the Lematang, the Komering, 
and the Ogan, which were most accessible from Palembang itself. Obli-
gations could cover a wide range of activities. The orang laut of Sung-
sang were thus required to patrol the river between PaleIIlbang ari(Hhe 
sea, while some Komering districts were expected to build boats and 
furnish rowers. Other villages took turns providing labor for the palace 
(sikep dalam); people from Belida supplied four to six hundred water car-
riers, rotating every three months. At the mouth of most rivers, particu-
lar groups were assigned for other duties such as the transport of tiban-
tukon goods, and to these could be added specifically local tasks; the 
villagers of Beting, for instance, cared for the nests of the waterbirds at 
the mouth of the Abab River. 60 
While groups living along rivers near the downstream capital were 
subject to sometimes onerous demands, those who lived at the margins 
of Palembang territory appeared by contrast to have minimal obliga-
tions. "Around the entire country from the borders of J ambi al9ng the 
soOrce of the Rawas, the Rupit, Lakitan, Beliti, and Kelingi, with the 
inclusion of all Rejang, up to the Musi, the Ogan and the Komering 
runs a cord, called by the people 'sindang,' the depth of which is five, 
six and ten hours walk . . . which is free from all tax in return for act-
ing as watchers of the land." The responsibility of sindang villages was 
to guard the borders, not only to forestall outside attack but more par-
ticularly to prevent the king's people escaping. It was difficult to gauge 
the extent of Palembang authority in such areas, since the sultan's 
jenang were acknowledged, but geographical inaccessibility meant that 
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the tiban-tukon system had never been imposed. Herman Muntinghe, 
who came to Palembang as commissioner in 1818, even considered that 
the Pasemah districts lay outside Palembang's suzerainty and must be , 
excluded from any calculations regarding potential income. 61 
The identification of a nascent bureaucracy linking upstream and 
downstream through the tribufe-liifmr'system seemed to provi~ea. con- b\.,-
vincing explanation for Palembang's ability to survive as a kingdom. 
What giwe Europeans of the period greater confidence in their recon-
struction of the administrative "structure" in Palembang was access to 
written court documents that comprised lists of ulu obligations and 
tax~s-'-The'core of this mat~rial" :was compiled during the reign of Sultan 
Mahmud Baha'uddin, who from his installation had taken a greater 
interest in the maintenance ancCstorage of records as a tool of govern-
ment. His attitude is evident in a remark made to the Dutch envoy in 
1791, when he asked that the receipt for 36,588.5 rials he had repaid to 
the vac be written on the back of the contract because "loose papers" 
fl', 
.t 
were easily mislaid. 62 After the British looted the Palembang kraton in '1 '; , 
1812, they salvaged a good percentage of the letters its kings had receive(rfrom~atavia over the previous forty years. These indicate that -4' " " t, 
from about 1776, following Sultan Mahmud's succession, correspon-
ttl: \J'-I 
dence was filed more systematically, facilitated by the now common " (,' I 
practice of employing dates. 63 Perhaps encouraged by the numbers of 
document-conscious Arabs attached to the court, perhaps desirous of 
emulating Javanese rulers, perhaps as a result of expanding elite liter-
(0""" \ 
, 
..I,' 
acy, Sultan Mahmud also attempted to record in writing the numbers of ,i,,' I "1,', 
people living along the main rivers and tneir obligations in tribute and ,f' '\ I _.' ( 
corvee. According to a text written in Javanese and dated 1719 A.J. • !I 1~"! 
(1792 C.E.), ctltwas the time of the king's decision to ~.E<?J!~ctive \ '! i i 
survey / of the royal servants and the state of the realm, and to examine 
the regulations everywhere in the country districts / At the border of the 
town and moreover outside in the hills, the dependencies which have 
regulations from the realm."64 This survey was maintained and ex-
panded by his sons, and it is probably significant that the kings of 
Palembang were now able to read ';In;rwrit~. In the early nineteenth .f "Ii' 
century both the 'Dutch and English were able to consult court material 
that listed between 840 and 849 ulu villages and the number of mata-
gawe in each, together with the services and tribute for which they were 
subject. 65 
Europeans were certainly not incorrect in locating a kind of chain 
linking ulu and ilir, and the "officials" they identified were undoubted-
ly important individuals; the jenang, for instance, had been noted as 
men of influence at least since the seventeenth century, while the 
peroatin, the adat heads, were similarly people of high standing. Nor 
were they wrong in their assumpti:on that the willingness of upstream 
( 
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groups to travel downstream for royal service was a comment on kingly 
authority, especially in a period when a continuing program of royal 
building produced a constant demand for corvee. In 1759, when his son 
suggested he should "leave a reputation to his descendants," Sultan 
Ahmad began work on a new palace of wood, surrounded by a walled 
compound. The work of felling the trees and transporting them down-
stream took the better part of four years and at times involved as many 
as two thousand people summoned from the uplands. 66 By 1765 another 
fort as large as the previous one was also under construction; and when 
the VOC decided to use stone and brick to reconstruct its lodge, Sultan 
Ahmad responded by calling down several hundred laborers to extend 
his own residence, using bricks baked in kilns along the Ogan River 
under the supervision of a Chinese. Meanwhile, it was decided to erect 
mausolea that would provide suitable memorials to these kings after 
death, and both Sultan Ahmad and Sultan Mahmud Baha'uddin made 
substantial extensions to the Lemabang complex. Such projects in-
volved considerable labor, and when one of the leading princes died in 
1776, five hundred people were reported to be working on the grave. 67 
Yet although observers in the early nineteenth century were generally 
satisfied that they understood the nature of Palembang's administra-
tion, their concept of a "traditional" governmental structure implied a 
stasis in ulu-ilir relations that had never existed. 68 Furthermore, influ-
enced by their own expectations and by access to written court lists of 
tribute and service, they attributed to the downstream court a degree of 
control it had never possessed. Europeans failed to realize that records 
like the "census" of 1792 were rarely consulted and that they were more 
a symbolic reminder of connections than a statement of specific and j 
inflexible obligations. The people of Beli<!a,_\¥~re thus theoretically 
required to deliver about five th(;;:;:sa~~fgantang of rice, but according to 
, royal documents.this was "sometimes more, sometimes less." As Sultan 
Mahmud Baha'uddin explained to a Dutch envoy in 1791, if real trust 
existed between contracting parties, there was no need for a precise 
description of mutual responsibilities. 69 
European perceptions of the ulu as the domain of a sturdy but simple 
yeomanry subservient to a civilized ilir were reinforced by descriptions 
from travellers in the interior. During a trip to the Pasemah areas in 
1811, Stamford Raffles commented on the health and prosperity of the 
villagers he met, although he regretted they had "no written memorials 
of past transactions or events, nothing in the form of history." The 
Palembang capital, on the other hand, with its strong Javanese influ-
ence, was adjudged to be "the most civilized part of Sllmatra." 70 To 
some extent these attitudes Were reinforced by 'Stories cotlected from the 
people themselves. Along the Komering, for-example,Eiiropeans were 
told that once, long ago, Ratu Sinuhun and Sultan Lemabang (Sultan 
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Mahmud Badaruddin) had given the ancestor of each family twenty-
five gantang of rice and other items. Each matagawe whose forebear 
had received this gift had to honor the debt by annually returning a pro-
portion of his rice (0 the ilir court. The name of Sultan Lemahang was 
similarly invoked as the originator of the custom by which all men of ulu 
Komering (where the population was estimated at ten thousand) were 
subject to sikep perang, the obligation to fight for the downstream king, a 
punishment because their ancestors had killed ajenang. 71 
The view of the ilir as the dominant partner in the upstream-down-
stream nexus tended fo ooscuretIie~ facfthat geographical realities made 
forCible levying of tribute or corvee extremely difficult. As one percep-
tive observer -C-omrnented, the crucial element in a smooth relationship 
was the ability of the ilir court to employ" gentle persuasion." In effect, 
ulu inhabitants had to be lured downstream.72 Gifts and service ten-
dered to the ruler therefore never went unrecognized, although the rec-
ompense given was not necessarily manifested in a way Europeans 
understood. When a pesirah returned home after paying homage, for 
instance, he took back with him proud evidence of the honors bestowed 
on him-a complete set of courtly garments, a kris, a new title, and a 
piagem-which together were considered ample recognition of what-
ever tribute he had brought. In the 1780s tribal chiefs as far distant as 
the hill country behind Bengkulen valued such honors sufficiently to 
make the long tripeastwa:rd to receive the title of pesirah from the 
Palembang king. When the Dutch took th~_!'9Y<llpala(;~ in 1821, they 
found warehouses filled with Chinese porcelain stored for distribution 
as gifts. 73 .• 
Concerned with establishing the series of offices that connected the 
upstream and downstream, Europeans in the early nineteenth century 
paid little attention to the kinship ties that infused political and eco- ' ',i ' 
nomic interaction. Occasionally, however, the sources contain revealing 
glimpses of social practices such as the cust0I!},,9f a_c::qgiring "milk broth-
ers," bywh,ic::h the royal family, the dobIes, and "even the lower' cl~se;;·, could have "many brothers and sisters whom they protect and ,(,'ii'r,. I Vll 
from whom they receive protection." In the same mode, the exchange 
of women and the endurillg perception of the ruler as a distant kinsman 
remained a fundamental means of affirming bonds between the--ilir 
court and upstream communities. Most of the attendants within the 
court were females, and many were from ulu districts, gathered during 
royal hunting and fishing expeditions. Significantly, upstream chiefs 
rewarded with the princely title of pangeran were normally those who 
had presented the palace with a daughter, for they had in effect become 
the king's relatives. Rawas and Komering in particular had a reputa-
tion for supplying the palace with attractive women, some of whom 
probably became royal favorites. Local sources note Sultan Ahmad's 
n! ' 
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attachment to what the Dutch termed his "seraglio," and one resident 
considered a liking for women to be "the great weakness" of Sultan 
Mahmud Baha'uddin; he had "many" wives and secondary wives, sev-
eral of whom had" great credit" with him.74 The links that this kind of 
exchange established in village consciousness is suggested in the many 
stories that tell of girls impregnated by the ruler whose sons are then 
sent back to become great village ancestors.-
This is not to imply, of course, that the ambiguity inherent in the ulu-
ilir relationship had disappeared. For people in the downstream areas, 
banishment to the interior was considered "a great punishment," and 
stories continued to circulate of perverse upstream customs and of vil-
lages inhabited solely by creatures with large heads and small bodies. 
Nonetheless, the ulu was still considered a potential place of refuge, and 
it was there, rumor ran, that the klnjflladchosen to bury the royal trea-
sure. Conflicting attitudes were similarly apparent in the ulu. Pasemah 
groups were especially insistent that they were not subservient to 
Palembang, pointing to the tradition that they were descended from a 
11 poorer brother of the mighty queen Ratu Sinuhun. They paid homage 
(sebo) every three years to the Palembang ruler, but they were not liable 
for corvee and were not "indebted" (berutang) to him.75 In other areas 
there is continuing evidence that the ulu communities were ready to 
protest against labor demands and to insist on better treatment before 
they would acknowledge Palembang as overlord. In 1766 eight thou-
sand people from twelve villages reportedly moved back to Jambi 
because they had been required to go downstream and clear a large 
stretch of jungle for the cultivation of rice and fruit trees. Although Sul-
tan Ahmad sent envoys to persuade them to come back, only seventy 
returned, on the condition that they would be free from corvee and 
taxes. Rewards and titles were not always sufficient to guarantee ulu 
compliance, and in 1778 the Dutch resident commented on the resent-
ment felt by groups brought downstream to work on the new palace. It 
is not difficult to locate themes of interior resistance in stories detailing 
the exploitation of ulu women by Palembang rulers and the brave resis-
tance of their male kinsfolk. 76 
The personalization of upstream-downstream relationships em-
bedded in such stories is revealing. Like those cited earlier from Lam-
pung, they often represent the ruler of Palembang as unjust and harsh; 
but it is not he who is banished, or imprisoned, or put to death for 
apparent misdeeds toward his subjects. Somehow the king is always 
able to make amends for his actions, and the blame is deflected onto 
some unworthy representative. The motifs that periodically surface in 
legends from Jambi, telling of the loss"C;fthe royal his or the ruler's 
immorality, are conspicuously absent in Palembang accounts. -
The contrast between the ability of Jambi and Palembang rulers to 
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maintain a standing in the ulu can be traced to a number of factors, the 
most obvious of which is economic. The departure of the vac in 1770 
had seen no revival in Jambi's commerce;ami6ugIi'EiigIish"mercnants 
occasionally went there to sell opium, it was known to Europeans 
chiefly as a pirate lair. Palembang's maritime trade had also been 
affected by the. piracy so prevalent in the Melaka Straits, but it nonethe-
less remained the preeminent exchange market in SoiItheast Sumatra. 77 
Its estimated population of twenty-five thousand inhabifants iiichiCfed a 
large commercial community of Arabs, Chinese, Cochinchinese, Cam-
bodians, Siamese, Malays, Javanese, Bugis, Makassarese, and Man-
darese who brought the products so desired in upstream communities-
salt, metal tools, porcelain, and textiles. To these were added goods 
manufactured in Palembang and also much prized in the interior, such 
as gold and silverwork, guns, and silk cloth. Palembang was also noted 
for the ordered administration of its marketplace, a feature that aroused 
favorable comments from Europeans in the nineteenth century as it had 
done from Chinese hundreds of years before. Upstream dwellers thus 
knew that the items they brought, whether cotton, tobacco, -woven 
mats, or jungle products, could be sold in an orderly environment in 
which the tensions inherent in commercial transactions were kept at 
bay. Weights were carefully regulated and the exchange rate for picis 
fixed at sixteen per Spanish rial. Should disputes occur, appeals could 
be made to one of the three syahbandar whose duty it was to collect cus-
toms, ensure repayment of debts, and resolve quarrels. 
There were, of course, other exchange centers. In the upstream areas 
of Tulang Bawang and Komering, river connections with the capital 
were difficult, and Muara Dua therefore served as a regional market 
where Palembang traders and local sellers could meet. A similar settle-
ment was Muara Rupit, situated at the junction of the Rupit and 
Rawas rivers, favored because of its strategic siting and the forest paths 
leading to the gold-bearing areas of J ambi and the west coast. Lahat, in 
the Pasemah heartland, provided a meeting place where slaves could be 
traded in return for salt brought from the ilir. However, although 
undoubtedly prosperous, such places operated essentially as distribu-
tion points, facilitating the flow of goods between the interior and the 
downstream capital. None ever emerged as a rival to Palembang in the 
way that Muara Tebo had done in Jambi, and contemporary descrip-
tions attest to the strength of the economic links between upstream and 
downstream. "Every day," wrote Radermacher, "one sees hundreds of 
ships going up and down the river."78 
But the difference in the ulu-ilir relationship in Palembang and 
Jambi did not hinge merely on the fact that the former was rich and the 
latter poor. Another crucial element was J ambi's proximity to Minang-
kabau. While honors bestowed by the kings "over the green mountain" 
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were received with pride, the perception of the Jambi ruler as a 
Minangkabau vassal made it difficult for him to stand as an indepen-
dent source of prestige and legitimization, especially as the interior was 
increasingly settled by Minangkabau migrants. Radermacher even 
considered Jambi to be part of Minangkabau, and in local sources it 
came to be listed as one of the eight bab or gateways to the Minangka-
bau heartlands. 79 
Though the Pagaruyung court also claimed Palembang as a "grand-
child," its influence there was always muted. In ulu legends and folk-
lore, Palembang rather than Pagaruyung was cited as the most relevant 
source of sacral authority, as the place where ancestral rulers and their 
living descendants could be petitioned for support and assistance. On 
the hill of Si Guntang, on which the progenitor of Malay kings had once 
appeared, were the graves of revered figures like Raja Iskandar; and the 
ulu heads who swore their oaths ofloyalty on this sacred site were them-
selves touched by its supernatural strength. Around the town itself, at 
Sabukingking, Candi Balang, and Lemabang were the burial places of 
former rulers, concentrated points of energy where offerings could be 
made for protection from misfortune or in hopes of future blessings. 
The belief that the influence of these awe-inspiring ancestors could 
extend even into very distant upstream villages was a cultural magnet of 
the utmost potency. 
In ilir J ambi the graves of past heroes like Orang Kaya Hitam at 
Simpang still drew supplicants, but in its "poor and inconsiderable" 
capital such holy sites were not matched by the pageantry of a king res-
plendent in his glory. In the center of the town of Palembang, by con-
trast, the impressive structure that was the king's residence represented 
another concentration of power into which those from upstream could 
tap. Here, during the set days of the royal audience, the imagery of leg-
end became palpable. Magnificently dressed, the ruler sat in state as the 
focal point of a hierarchy where the rank of each courtier was displayed 
by the color and design of his or her clothes and the decorations on their 
banners. The ulu heads who paid their homage on behalf of kinsfolk 
and followers carried back with them eloquent symbols of the new ... status 
they had attained, not just in the form of titles and gifts, but in the 
stories they could relate. Descriptions of the Palembang king,splen-
didly arrayed, speaking the royal language of Javanese, surrounded 
by his guards, women, and nobles and by the albinos, hunchbacks, 
dwarves, and twins that were his by right must have been heard many 
times. In each retelling the ulu audience, though geographically so dis-
tant, were more than entertained; they became emotional participants 
in the royal spectacle. 80 
During the latter part of the eighteenth century one further factor 
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helped enhance the special status of Palembang's downstream capital: 
its emergenc~ as a. c.t:nterfor. Islamic studies. The ability to attract reli-
gious specIalists who could take responsibility for ritual activities and 
act as royal advisers had long been a hallmark of the successful archipel-
ago state, and Palembang was no exception. The growth of a substan-
tial Arab community fostered greater connections with the Islamic 
heartlands, and by 1787 the traffic ofIslamic "priests" between Palem-
bang and Java had become so marked that it aroused Dutch concern. 81 
The presence of these men in the Palembang court would also have 
been a clear incentive to the translation and preparation of Muslim 
texts, and the names of several Palembang scholars have been pre-
served. The most famous, Abdul Samad al-Palimbani, is believed to 
have been the son of a Hadhrami migrant and a Palembang noble-
woman. Although he spent most of his adult life in Mecca, his writings 
in Malay became known throughout the archipelago, and his name was 
a telling reminder of his Sumatran birthplace. 82 
With learned teachers attracted by royal support, Palembang's repu-
tation as a patron of Islam grew steadily. Through their Arab connec-
tions its rulers could claim descent from the Prophet himself, while the 
pious could point with pride to the great mosque built during the reign 
of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin and set apart from lesser buildings by 
its large glass windows and jewelled cupola. In their own replications of 
the downstream environment, ulu communities reaffirmed their will-
ingness to look to the ilir court as an appropriate model. Like Palem-
bang kings, upstream groups incorporated ancestors from Mecca into 
clan genealogies, and an Englishman in the Pasemah highlands in 1817 
noted that a mosque stood in the middle of each village. The teachers 
who had encouraged their construction and had promoted the faith 
were being rapidly absorbed into local folklore, providing a new source 
of heroes famed for their miraculous deeds and wise leadership. And in 
joining the ancestral ranks, these religious figures brought with them a 
mental iconography that invoked the great centers of Islam-Mecca, 
Aceh, Banten, Demak, Ceribon, Minangkabau-a world into which 
the downstream capital provided a gateway. 83 
Behind all these developments was the simple fact that for the greater 
part of the eighteenth century and for the first decade of the nineteenth, 
Palembang was at peace. "Many of the old inhabitants," wrote 
Thomas Horsfield in 1812, "speak ... with rapture of the prosperity 
which was enjoyed by all conditions of people during [Sultan Ahmad's] 
reign." In 1774 this ruler decided to assume the position of susuhunan 
and allow his son to rule. Following his father's death, Sultan Mahmud 
Baha'uddin stressed he might well introduce new laws that would bene-
fit the realm, but for the rest he would not disturb the adat lama (old cus-
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toms). Potential challenges from within the court failed to materialize, 
and when Sultan Mahmud Baha'uddin died in 1804 his son duly fol-
lowed him as ruler. 84 
A crucial ingredient in the maintenance of this peace was the vac 
presence, for in return for a general compliance with the contract, the 
Dutch offered successive rulers their support against would-be contend-
ers. By 1791 the J ambi ruler had become convinced that his forebears 
had been wrong to evict the Dutch, whom he now saw as the reason 
behind Palembang's prosperity. TwentY_I(!~rs later a son of Sultan 
Mahmud Baha'uddin could still telltIie J;:J?glish that "in all former 
times, from the first introduction of the Hollanders into Palembang 
... they have been of the greatest advantage to our ancestors." In 
comparison with the turbulence associated with the abolition of the sul-
tanate in 1825, the days of the vac were remembered as a Good Time. 
In the words of a former court official writing a generation later, "As 
long as Palembang lived in harmony with the Company, peace and 
safety increased. It was a time of great prosperity for the whole country 
and all its inhabitants, for peace reigned in the land. Traders came in 
great numbers, from overseas and also from the interior, because the 
king of Palembang maintained a just and well ordered administration, 
and protected his own people as well as strangers."85 
The enlightened Europeans of the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries were members of an extended intellectual familylin~ed 
not by blood but by a style of thinking, a belief in the notion of rational-
ity.86 The aim of supplying reliable "data" that would advance k;:~~l­
edge led a number to attempt descriptions of non-European societies in 
the Indonesian archipelago, including those in Sumatra. Jambi, oflittle 
economic interest to Europeans, was essentially ignored. Palembimg, 
by contrast, attracted increasingly more attention as both English and 
Dutch representatives evaluated the potential rewards should control be 
extended over this area. Placing Palembang in the maritime environ-
ment they knew best, such men saw "piracy" and "smuggling" on the 
oceans as evidence of a steady deterioration in indigenous political 
authority. But the ties between Palembang and the offshore islands had 
always been fragile, and it was this fragility rather than some kind of 
decline that was now being exposed. Europeans themselves found the 
decay argument more difficult to sustain when they turned to consider 
Palembang's relationship with its interior. Here, though only dimly 
understood by those who described them, the types of exchanges that 
were failing on the oceans were still able to draw together subject and 
ruler, upstream and downstream, in a generally workable association. 
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Three hundred years and a world of experience are 
caught between the sixteenth-century Portuguese map that began this 
study and that included by Marsden in the 1811 edition of his History oj 
Sumatra. The very lack of geographical precision that typifies the earlier 
work contributes to its mood of exuberance; in Marsden's map, by con-
trast, this excitement has given way to a more sober presentation where 
the principal rivers, the major settlements, the mountain ranges are all 
clearly identified and where added annotations provide practical infor-
mation in the manner approved by a scientific age. 
In a sense, the changing European assocation with Jambi and Palem-
bang is encapsulated in these two maps, so widely separated by time. In 
the sixteenth century, Europeans had been emboldened to embark on 
voyages to unknown lands on the other side of the globe because they 
believed great riches could be found there and because they believed 
that such voyages were indeed feasible. By the end of the eighteenth 
century, this process had gone so far that Edmund Burke could talk of 
Europeans "unrolling the Great Map of Mankind" in which "there is 
no state or gradation of barbarism ... which we have not at the same 
instant under our view."! The Dutch and English East India Compa-
nies established to carry out trade in such regions were born of cultures 
intimately involved with many of the great scientific and technical 
advances of the age. Their representatives in Jambi and Palembang 
considered basic literacy and numeracy essential for any individual 
claiming to be educated, and they were quick to criticize a people where 
the ability to read and write was exceptional. 
The approach to commerce that grew out of these attitudes did not sit 
easily with the trading environment that Europeans encountered in 
southeast Sumatra. Here, to a far greater extent than in Europe, suc-
cessful trading relations depended on the creation and maintenance of· 
kinship ties with the ruler, the center of the tribute-trade nexus. Other 
migrant groups, notably the Chinese, were bound to the court by high 
titles, privileged offices, and the bestowal of women; for the Europeans, 
however, this type of exchange was always limited. As a result, gifts and 
written documents assumed additional importance as a means of incor-
poration into a society in which the ruler was the principal merchant. .. 
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But because the Dutch and English resisted inclusion, considering their 
own culture inherently superior, they remained observers of the local 
scene rather than participants. The publications about Sumatra their 
countrymen produced at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of 
the nineteenth century certainly testify to a greater awareness of the 
region, but they were built on an assumption that the "enlightened" 
men of Europe were better able to understand the true nature of Suma-
tran society than were local people themselves. 
While contemporary Europeans spoke of a decline in the strength of 
native kingdoms, they were only dimly aware of the extent of the 
changes that had occurred over the previous two hundred years, 
changes that had significantly affected the relationship between J ambi 
and Palembang. As early as the seventh century there are hints oflink-
ages between these two areas, and when Europeans arrived their associ-
ation was so close that the royal families were essentially part of the 
same clan. Palembang had long been the superior partner because of its 
greater population, its superior resources, and above all its far-reaching 
trading links. During the sixteenth century, however, the movement of 
Minangkabau into the upper Batang Hari helped transform Jambi into 
a major pepper area. Although Palembang also acquired the reputation 
of a pepper producer, for two generations Jambi was undoubtedly the 
"elder brother," a position reflected in the status enjoyed by its king, 
Sultan Agung (d. 1679). The confidence generated by prosperity 
encouraged his son to cast off the overlordship of Mataram much earlier 
than did Palembang, and for many years this period was remembered 
as a time when all inhabitants ofJambi flourished. 
Nonetheless, the wealth derived from pepper production had a price. 
In both Jambi and Pal em bang the new prosperity that came to the 
downstream court was dependent on closer links between the ruler ~nd 
the interior pepper growers. Previously ·if had been uncferst~~~rthat 
force was of limited use in a situation wherein the ulu areas were cush-
ioned from the coast not merely by geography but by deep-seated·tridi-
tions that emphasized the differences between upstream and down-
stream. Following the Dutch and English arrival, however, the bonding 
created by the exchange of gifts, the acceptance of mutual obligations, 
and putative kinship ties was frequently undermined by the commercial 
tensions injected into the marketplace. These tensions were in turn 
exacerbated by competition among Europeans and their resistance to 
absorption into the familial network that lay at the heart of indigenous 
economic activity. In 1662 the vac established a pepper monopoly in 
Palembang, and the English withdrawal from Jambi in 1679 enabled 
the Dutch to assume the same dominance there. In a short time Jambi's 
relations with the Dutch deteriorated to such an extent that in 1687 Sul-
tan Ingalaga was banned. The installation of his elder son by the vac 
To Live as Brothers 245 
was never fully supported by Jambi people, and for thirty years an 
alternative center operated upstream under the direction of Ingalaga's 
younger son. 
Coinciding w,!!.h hostilities against J ohar and the decline of pepper 
prices in Eu~ope, thesedevdopmeritshit Jambi hard. Simultaneously, 
the relationship between its royal house and that of Palembang was also 
under strain as both vle01o-coilfforilcnpepper-growing"areas along 
their common border. The growing animosity between them was 
apparent in the increasing problems" surrounding royal marriages and 
in the recurring warfarediiiingthe f67()s and 1680s. Although Jambi 
was "unified" under Dutch auspices, the d()wnstream was never able to 
regain its earlier status. The ulu-ilir association was further weakened 
by the numbers of migrant Minangkabau who moved in to exploit the 
gold-bearing areas of the uplands. Setting up their own communities, 
they never saw themselves as full subjects of the Jambi king. By the 
early eighteenth century there was a growing feeling in Jambi that 
things were awry, and in ensuing years successive groups" attempted to 
recreate the past by solemnly concluding written contracts that would 
bring back "the time of Sultan Agung." Finally, the resentment so often 
directed against the king was turned against the Dutch themselves, and 
following an attack on the lodge in 1768, the vac closed the Jambi 
post. 
The economic deterioration of downstream J ambi was underscored 
by the prosperity of its neighbor Palembang, where the trading network 
was far wider and far more deeply entrenched. Although pepper grow-
ing developed more slowly here, Palembang rulers were able to take 
advantage of their very considerable human resources as they extended 
their overlordship into the Komering-Lampung districts and deeper 
into the highlands. While the death of Sultan Agung in 1679 was often 
evoked as signalling Jambi's decline, the reign of Palembang's Sultan 
Abdul Rahman (1662-1706)was remembered as a Good Time, when 
the foundations of culture and custom were laid down. Palembang was 
doubly favored because the income lost from the decline~inpepper 
prices was regained many times over by the opening of the tin mines on 
Bangka. Though control over the island was always subject to chal-
lenge,"its tin provided Palembang rulers with a wealth that became leg-
endary. In turn this prosperity promoted the prestige of the ilir court, 
making interior areas more receptive to closer association with a down-
stream king. In particular, Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin (1724-1757), 
whose career personifies the heroic ideal, came to be seen as an emer-
gent ancestor worthy of inclusion in communal genealogies from Rawas 
to Lampung. This development was significant because the uncertainty 
and increased pace of change that typified the latter part of the eigh-
teenth century placed considerable strain on the kind of kinship bond-
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ing that underlay Palembang's commercial success. The influx of out-
side groups made the maintenance of control over coa~i3j waters 
extremely difficult and at times impossible. Yet in their relations with 
the interior, the hold of PaIembang rulers was sustained and the pres-
tige of its capital affirmed. The contrasting genealogies of Jambi and 
Palembang collected by Europeans in the early nineteenth century, con-
stantly readjusted to reflect existing social and economic relations, thus 
spoke not so much to the past but to the realities of the present. 
This account of southeast Sumatra during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries has been based largely on European sources. The 
themes it has explored, howev'er, arose from the accounts of the people 
themselves, the legends and stories by which the past was recaIfe-d. It 
would be dangerous indeed to see in this material-episodic, frag-
mented, edited-evidence of an unchanging and ageless culture. Oral 
traditions are subject to continuous adaptation, and other supporting 
evidence is needed before one can assume that attitudes expressed in 
particular accounts are not just a response to some immediate deinand. 
Further, in the two hundred years covered by this study, the place of lit-
. eracy in these societies had itself changed. Documentation had become 
'an important prop to kingship, not just for its sacral connotations but 
for facilitating practical communication. By at least 1822 in Palembang 
the wise sayings and customary law associated with rulers like Cinde 
Balang were being written down, evidence of a weakening of t.p.e oral 
heritage. 2 Familiarity with written material was also growing among 
the population generally. In 1823 a Dutch commissioner commented 
that although education was verylimited, most Palembang traders kept 
notes regarding their affairs and sometimes journals during their trav-
els. Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin II (r. 1804-1812, 1813, 1818-1821), 
was even willing to lend books from his extensive private collection. 3 A 
revealing comment on the extent to which attitudes were changing is 
found in an account of Bangka compiled by a Palembang noble in 1861. 
He attributed the lack of any unified history of Bangka to the fact that 
its inhabitants were "dull and stupid" and that "to the present time 
they do not know how to write stories."4 Nonetheless, modern scholar-
ship has convincingly shown that increasing literate skills, although 
influential, do not by themselves produce a sudden break in patterns of 
thought or cultural values. 5 Written and spoken indigenous sources, 
though collected by different people at different times and in different 
forms, throw up similar concerns that have proved remarkably tena-
cious over time. As such they provide a unique complement to Euro-
pean archival records. 
",. One of these concerns is the upstream-downstream relationship, 
which has provided a continuing theme for this book and which is still 
evident in later times. In Palembang the death of Sultan Mahmud 
To Live as Brothers 247 
Baha'uddin in 18qi_ .. ~!l\\1 __ gr:owingconflict between his two sons as each 
sought to assume t4e position of ruler. The English and Dutch, compet-
ing for control over Palembang's rich resources, became drawn into 
these hostilities with each supporting a contending prince. The kind of 
rivalries so characteristic of the maritime world were now transposed to 
the interIor, and the vulnerability of even a rich and relatively powerful 
"state" was exposed. The apparent ulu-ilir unity collapsed, and Palem-
bang was divided into two, with an upstream king ruling in Rawas and) ! 
another in the downstream capital. In a manner reminiscent of earlier ,(, 
events in Jambi, the Dutch (who returned to Palembang in 1816 after 
the Napoleonic Wars), sought to assert their authority by exiling rulers 
they regarded as uncooperative and by installing others they considered 
would be more amenable to a reorganization of the Palembang admin-
istration. By 1825 their patience was exhausted. In that year the last sul-
tan of Palembang was deposed, and Batavia assumed direct control 
over his kingdom. But simple possession of the downstream capital, 
unquestionably the most prosperous and populous of all the east coast 
Sumatran states, did not by itself guarantee upstream loyalty.6 Despite 
Dutch promises to abide by "the laws of Cinde Balang" and efforts to 
retain symbols of past rule such as piagem, the ulu people of Rejang 
and Pasemah did not readily accept the new authority. The "poor 
brother-rich sister" conceptualization that had previously helped to 
link these districts to the ilir was fundamentally undermined by Euro-
pean ideas of downstream domination, and it was not until 1866 that 
they were brought under Dutch control. Their sense of a separate iden-
tity nonetheless remained, and twenty years later a Pasemah man could 
say categoricilly-thafin-many Important matters "we ulu meri do not 
follow the custom of the sea coast people." 7 
In Jambi the ulu-ilir juxtaposition is equally apparent as the divisions 
that had developed earlier resurfaced. About 1820 conflict within the 
royal family led the ruler to abandon the downstream port and flee 
upstream to Tembesi. In 1833 a Dutch expedition to Jambi resulted in 
the signing of an agreement placing the country under the protection of 
the Netherlands. The Dutch reestablished their post at Muara Kompeh 
but faced recurring resistance, which came to a head following the 
accession of Sultan Ratu Taha Safiuddin in 1855. Three years later his 
refusal to negotiate a new contract provided the rationale for the dis-
patch of another military force from Batavia. Sultan Taha was deposed 
and his old uncle installed as a Dutch leenman or vassal. For nearly half a 
century Sultan Taha continued his opposition from his upstream capital 
at Muara Tebo while the Dutch concluded contracts with successive 
downstream kings. In 1901 Sultan Taha led a full-scale revolt, and fol-
lowing his death during an attack on his headquarters three years later, 
the Dutch assumed full control over J ambi. In so doing they endowed 
.~. 
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the downstream capital with an administrative superiority over the inte-
rior that it had never possessed and that was essentially alien to indige-
nous conceptions of the ulu-ilir association. 
• A second theme infusing popular legend that has been a particular 
concern of this study is the relationship between king and subject, 
leader and follower. A comparison of the history of Jambi and Palem-
, bang shows clearly that wealth and. prosperity were always critical in 
attracting loyalty to the center, enabling the ruler to be seen as emulat-
ing the ideal king by acting as a generous patron and justifying the sub-
mission of tribute by his people. It is significant, for instance, that one 
of the rival princes in early-nineteenth-century Palembang gained a 
considerable following because of the largesse he could distribute. How-
ever, it was equally important for a leader to display the attributes of a 
wise and caring parent and to incorporate the extraordinary and heroic 
attributes that provided a link with the ancestors and ensured him or 
her a place in the collective memory. To recruit support Palembang's 
Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin II was willing to adopt as sons those 
upstream men who served him well, but he also knew itwas essential to 
demonstrate his legitimacy by gaining control of the country's regalia. 8 
In J ambi, stories attached to the great Sultan Taha still talk of his pos-
session of the kris Si Genjai, and although "deposed," he continued to 
be seen by villagers as the proper mediator in their disputes. Following 
independence Sultan Taha was named as one of Indonesia's pahlawan 
nasional (national heroes), a status that has since been awarded to Sultan 
Mahmud Badaruddin II as well. 
A third and fundamental theme has been the ~rs,istence with which 
political and economic relations in J ambi and Palembang (as elsewhere 
, in Indonesia) are perceived in terms of kinship connections. Formulaic 
. terms like "brother" and "father" were not just empty phrases; they 
. evoked certain emotions that were common across the society. Although 
incorporation of Europeans into this kin-infused environment was not 
easy, by the early nineteenth century a number of archipelago societies 
had reshaped stories about the origins of the world in order to trace a 
distant relationship. In 1823, for instance, a Dutch commissioner in 
Komering was told that in the beginning a garuda had come to earth 
and settled on a nearby mountain. In time the garuda perished through 
lack of food, but out of its body came seven parakeets. From these were 
descended the clans of the Lampung and upper Komering areas; the 
Javanese; those who lived along the Musi River; the Minangkabau; the 
Bugis; the Pasemah groups; and finally, white people. 9 ~f Europeans 
could somehow be transformed'into distant relatives, it should then be 
possible to hold them to the obligations of kindred, and in this mode a 
Jambi story explains Sultan Taha's conflict with the Dutch. "I cio not 
want to attack the government," the sultan says, "but I am complain-
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ing because long ago in the time of the old people, that is, in the time of 
Muhammad Fakaruddin [i.e., 1833-1841] I was taken as the governor 
general's child. According to adat, if we are angry with a child, we hit 
him with a rattan, and if we are angry with a grown child, we hit him 
with words. But now my father, Seri Paduka Governor General, hits 
me with bullets. That is why I am angry with his representative." 10 
In these kinship-ordered societies the relationship between political 
and cultural groupings, as between individuals, was conceptualized in 
terms of interaction between family members. When Europeans first 
arrived in southeast Sumatra they found the inherent rivalry in the 
"brotherhood" of Jambi and Palembang to be for the most part con-
tained by continuing marital alliances that bound their ruling families 
together. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the two 
courts were more distanced than at any point over the previous two 
hundred years, a development largely attributable to the effects of the 
European presence. During their conflicts with Palembang, the Dutch 
therefore had high hopes of recruiting support from Jambi, but in the 
end this was not forthcoming. Indeed, a later chronicler considered it 
important to record the occasion when the J ambi sultan had met his 
beleaguered relative to affirm the bonds of kindred. "The two kings 
met, taking each other by the hand and kissing each other, while they 
both wept. Then His Majesty [of Palembang] spoke, 'Uncle, this is the 
will of the Almighty.' His Majesty the sultan of Jambi answered, 'My 
son, this is your fate. You cannot change it. But I do not belong to 
another race.' "11 It is true that with the recasting of colonial and subse-
quently independent Indonesia this relationship has been substantially 
diminished. Yet still today J ambi villagers near the awe-inspiring Bukit 
Si Guntang on the Sumai River call up memories of a Palembang prin-
cess and her Jambi husband who lie buried together on the mountain 
slopes in the company of the ancestors. 12 And in the end, despite the 
voluminous European documentation, it is in such shifting, elusive, but 
revealing memories that the essence of southeast Sumatra's history has 
been retained. 
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NOTES 
Introduction 
1. It is worth remembering that the VaG records that have been preserved 
represent only part of the documentation that once existed. In 1617, for exam-
ple, all the papers in the Dutch lodge in J ambi were burned in a Portuguese 
attack. Other potentially valuable sources, like the maps, diagrams, and 
sketches that occasionally accompanied correspondence to Batavia, were rarely 
sent on to Amsterdam and have not survived. 
2. The literature on this subject is considerable. Some historians have seen 
exploitation of "folk tales" as a valuable means of gaining insights into the lives 
of "the people." For examples, see Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, 
p. 82, and Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre, pp. 13, 18. The problems involved 
in using such stories for historical reconstruction are discussed by Bottigheimer, 
"Fairy Tales, Folk Narrative Research and History," pp. 343-358. For tren-
chant criticisms of those who attempt to use transcribed folk stories as "oral 
tales," see Dundes, "Fairy Tales from a Folkloristic Perspective," pp. 258-269. 
In Indonesian societies, however, it does seem clear that popular stories were 
used in the moral education of children. S"iarah Pendidikan Daerah Sumatera Sela-
tan, p. 16; Amiruddin, Cerita-CeritaPurbaDariPulauBangka, p. 7. 
3. Vansina, Oral Tradition as History, pp. 196-199. In my understanding of the 
interplay between orality and literacy, I have been particularly influenced by 
the work of Walter Ong, especially Orality and Literacy. 
4. Hulme and Jordanova, "Introduction," p. 7. In Possessing Albany, Donna 
Merwick has argued that the Dutch and English were "essentially different" 
(p. 5), particularly in their approach to the land. In the sources I used, which 
dealt primarily with political and economic matters, I did not discern such dif-
ferences. 
5. Houston, Literacy in Early Modern Europe, pp. 7-8,29-30,97-99. 
Chapter One 
1. Malaisie-Insulinde (Portuguese Nautical Atlas). National Library of 
France, Ge. DD. 683, file II, V. About 1519. I am grateful to Professor Valerie 
Flint for bringing this map to my attention. 
2. Dion, "Sumatra through Portuguese Eyes," pp. 142, 145. It is also useful 
to remember that the famous Suma Oriental of Tome Pires, although written at 
the beginning of the sixteenth century, was not published until 1944. 
3. VaG 1911 Palembang to KingofJambi, 3 Nov. 1718, fo. 105; Wolters, 
Early Indonesian Commerce, p. 241; Goecies, The Indianized States of Southeast Asia, 
pp. 179, 240; Korn, "De oorsprong van het Djambische rijk," p. 170; KI Ms. 
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254 Notes to Pages 4-10 
Or. 76, "Sila-sila raja-raja didalam negeri Palembang," fols. 1-29; KI Hs. 
371a, "De kroniek van Palembang," n.f.; Boers, "Oud volksgebruik," p. 377. 
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to Batavia, 5 April 1709, fo. 20; 18Jan. 1710, fo. 10; 1794 Jambi to Batavia, 
21 Feb. 1710, fols. 6-9, 28, 40. 
6. VOC 1759 Jambi to Batavia, 5 April 1708, fo. 97; 1776 Jambi to Batavia, 
28 Feb. 1709, fols. 52-53; 14 March 1709, fols. 17-19,83-84; Pangeran Suta-
wijaya to Batavia, rec'd 25 March 1709, fols. 35-37; 1794 Jambi to Batavia, 
21 Feb. 1710, fols 7-9; 9 Aug. 1710, fo. 100. 
7. Corpus Diplomaticum, IV, p. 334. 
8. VOC 1794 Jambi to Batavia, 21 Feb. 1710, fols. 48-52. Syaban has only 
twenty-nine days, and the first day of the following month, Ramadhan, would 
be November 4. The lengthening of Syaban to thirty days may have been an 
error or it may have been deliberately done to avoid contracting business dur-
ing the fasting month. 
9. VOC 1759 Jambi to Batavia, 30 Jan. 1708, fo. 49; 5 March 1708, fo. 27; 
1776 Jambi to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1709, fols. 12-13; 1743 Jambi to Batavia, 
30 Oct. 1707, fo. 32; 1808 Jambi to Batavia, 25 Sept. 1711, fo. 19. 
10. VOC 1759 Jambi to Batavia, 19 Nov. 1709, fols. 42-43; 1794 Jambi to 
Batavia, 21 Feb. 1710, fo. 43. 
11. Korn, "De oorsprong van het Djambische rijk," pp. 185-186. 
12. Batujini has been identified as the Padang Lawas of more recent times. 
VOC 1794 Letter from Puteri Jamilan given to Patras, 28 Oct. 1709, fo. 44; 
1827 Yang Dipertuan Besar of Minangkabau to Jambi, rec'd 2 Jan. 1712, 
fo.19. 
13. VOC 1808 First Register, Jambi to Batavia, 5 March 1711, fols. 15-22; 
Kiai Gede to Governor General, rec' d 1 7 April 1 711 , fo. 51. 
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Nur'aini, formerly Pemilik Kebudayaan in Sungai Manau, Jambi, for arrang-
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the settlement of this area in the mid-eighteenth century, see Barnes, "Account 
of a Journey in 1818," p. 345. 
17. Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 165-168; Tideman, Djambi, p. 227; Dob-
bin, Islamic Revivalism, p. 27; vac 2029 Jambi to Batavia, 20 Nov. 1725, fo. 
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tavia, 19 Dec. 1689, fo. 150v; 1580Jambi to Batavia, 9 Oct. 1696, fo. 121. 
21. vac 1808 First Register, Jambi to Batavia, 28 March 1711, fols. 58-59; 
1827 Copies of letters from Yang Dipertuan Besar of Minangkabau and Raja 
Ibrahim, rec'd 2Jan. 1712, fols. 18-19. 
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Translated Malay contract between the King of J ambi and traders, rec'd at 
Batavia 26 Feb. 1717, fols. 13-17; Jambi to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1717, fo. 6. 
29. vac 1854 Jambi to Batavia, 15 July 1714, fo. 47; 11 Sept. 1714, fo. 68; 
1868 Pangeran Temenggung and Nattaningrat to Raja Muda ofJohor, rec'd at 
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Batavia 4 Feb. 1715, fo. 19; 1911 Jambi to Batavia, 19 Jan. 1718, fo. 31; 
Generale Missiven, VII, p. 422. 
30. VOC 1895 Jambi to Batavia, 13 Feb. 1717, fo. 5; 1911 Jambi to Batavia, 
15 Nov. 1718, fo. 4. 
31. VOV 1868 Jambi to Batavia, 11 Jan. 1716, fo. 4; 1911 Jambi to Batavia, 
15 Nov. 1718, fols. 3-4; 6 Feb. 1719, fols. 25-27. 
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3 Sept. 1720, fo. 4; 12 Dec. 1719, fo. 22; Generale Missiven, VII, p. 537; 1996 
Jambi to Batavia, 6 Sept. 1722, fo. 75. 
35. VOC 1945 Pangeran Nattaningrat and upstream heads to Jambi, rec'd 
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37. VOC 1996Jambi to Batavia, 30 June 1722, fo. 56. 
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Batavia, 28 March 1726, fo. 5. 
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26 May 1729, fo. 82; 16 June 1729, fo. 88; King of Jambi to King of Palem-
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p.28. 
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47. VOC 2193 King ofJambi to Jambi Resident, rec'd 6 March 1731, fo. 39; 
2383 Jambi to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1736, fols. 10-11; 2467 J ambi to Batavia, 
28 Feb. 1740, fo. 115. 
48. Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 320. 
49. VOC 1125 Jambi to Batavia, 5 Feb. 1637, fo. 510v; 1980 Jambi to Ba-
tavia, 16 March 1722, fo. 12. 
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Register, 20 Dec. 1732, fo. 165. 
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che rijk," p. 465; vac 2438Jambi to Batavia, 20 Nov. 1738, fo. 7; 2467 Jambi 
Daily Register, 3 Nov. 1740, fo. 125. 
54. vac 2239 Jambi Daily Register, 28 Feb. 1733, fo. 184; 1996 Baginda 
Ratu to Pangeran Nattaningrat, rec'd at Batavia 28June 1723, fo. 91. 
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56. vac 2534 Jambi to Batavia, 26 Dec. 1641, fo. 16. See Klerks, "Geo-
graphisch en ethnographisch opstel," p. 16. 
57. Such a piagem is that dated 15 Safar, Tuesday, the year Jim, 1117 (8June 
1705) from marga Pembarap (Bangko district) and described in Husin, 
"Marga Pembarap," pp. 10-11. The reading of this piagem in June 1970 was 
conducted with full ceremony, with the sacrifice of a goat and the offering of 
rice. The piagem, given by "Sultan Sri Ingalaga" to the dipati of Pembarap, 
lists the boundaries of the marga, noting that the territory has been received as 
a gift from the sultan. It is primarily concerned with regulations regarding the 
payment offines. 
58. vac 2438 Jambi to Batavia, 9 Jan. 1739, fo. 15; 2239 Jambi Daily Reg-
ister, 12 June 1732, fo. 39; 2193Jambi Daily Register, 5 act. 1731, fo. 113. 
59. vac 2286 Translated Malay Regulations, 1733, fols. 59-60. 
60. It seems fairly obvious that he was killed. vac 2346 Second Register, 
Jambi to Batavia, 13 Nov. 1735, fo. 2. 
61. vac 2467 Jambi Daily Register, 5 June 1739, fo. 58; 2534 Jambi Daily 
Register, 26 Aug. 1742, fols. 56, 73; 26 Nov. 1742, fo. 73; 2534 Jambi Daily 
Register, 12June 1741, fo. 40. 
62. vac 2286Jambi to Batavia, 7 Sept. 1733, fo. 18. 
63. She was the daughter of Sultan Anum, former ruler of Palembang and 
brother of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin (1724-1757). vac 2315 Retiring 
Report by Jacob Schouw to Jan Dinnies, 23 Nov. 1734, fo. 84; 2383 Jambi 
Daily Register, 5 March 1736, fo. 78; 2438 King of Jambi to King of Palem-
bang, rec'd in Jambi 30 Sept. 1738, fo. 19; 2438 Retiring Report by Jan Din-
nies to Pieter Jamin, 9 Jan. 1739, fo. 15. 
64. Corpus Diplomaticum, V, p. 345. 
65. vac 1996Jambi to Batavia, 23 March 1723, fo. 9 
66. vac King ofJambi to Jambi Resident, rec'd in Batavia 10 March 1732, 
fo. 21. 
67. vac 1911 Jambi to Batavia, 28 Nov. 1717, fo. 8; 2073 Assistant Resi-
dent ofJambi to Batavia, 11 Sept. 1727, fo. 9. 
68. vac 1945 Jambi to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1720, fo. 4; 1996 Jambi to Palem-
bang, 30 June 1722, fo. 59; 2029 Jambi to Batavia, 18 Feb. 1726, fo. 9; 2193 
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Jambi Daily Register, 29 July 1731, fo. 101; 2239 Jambi Daily Register, 
15 March 1732, fols. 28-29; 20 June 1732, fo. 41. 
69. vac 1794Jambi to Batavia, 17 March 1710, fo. 67; 1841 Jambi to Bata-
via, 12 Feb. 1713, fo. 7; 1926 Jambi to Batavia, Inventory of Kiai Gede's 
goods, 24 act. 1719, fo. 41; 1945 Jambi to Batavia, 3 Sept. 1721, fo. 6; 2315 
Jambi to Batavia, 23 Nov. 1734, fo. 94; 2383 Jambi to Batavia, 3 March 1736, 
fo.2. 
70. vac 1776 Jambi to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1719, fols. 67-68; 1996 Jambi to 
Batavia, 23 March 1723, fo. 9. 
71. vac 1794 Jambi to Batavia, 28 March 1710, fo. 62; Corpus Diplomati-
cum, IV, p. 525. 
72. For example, one of Kiai Gede's servants attacked four European sol-
diers who subsequently died from their wounds. According to Jambi law, such 
a death could be avenged through payment of wang bangun. Patras, however, 
was determined on a severe punishment which would deter such actions in the 
future. At his insistence the murderer was killed, dragged from his home by his 
feet, and the body thrown into the river with a stone around the neck. The 
whole affair was carried out on the king's side of the river and was supervised 
by one of the leading nobles. vac 1794 Jambi to Batavia, 21 Feb. 1710, fols. 
12-13. 
73. See, for example, the complaints regarding Willem Daems in vac 2013 
King ofJambi to Batavia, rec'd 24 March 1724, fo. 13. 
74. vac 2100 Declaration by H. T. Verbrugge and N. Martijn, 31 act. 
1728, fo. 93. 
75. vac 2674 Palembang to Batavia, 27 Feb. 1747, fols. 12-13; Jambi to 
Batavia, 29 April 1746, fo. 23; 2761 Jambi to Batavia, 23 Dec. 1747, fo. 13; 
2718Jambi to Batavia, 15 March 1750, fo. 81. 
76. A court servant walking through the capital made any public announce-
ments in a loud voice, at the same time beating on a gong or gum-gum. vac 
2674 Jambi to Batavia, 29 April 1746, fo. 23; 2718 Jambi to Batavia, 23 Dec. 
1747, fols. 7-8; 16 Feb. 1748, fols. 24-25. 
77. vac 2741 Jambi to Batavia, 9 March 1749, fols. 22-23; 28 Dec. 1741, 
fo. 11; 2761 Second Register, Jambi to Batavia, 3 Dec. 1749, fo. 11; Second 
Register, 31Jan. 1751, fols. 14-21. 
78. vac 2761 Acting Resident to Incoming Resident Jan Aalders, 3 Dec. 
1749, fols. 7-14; 2780 Jambi to Batavia, 26 March 1751, fo. 7; 2965 Jambi to 
Batavia, 18 Dec. 1758, fo. 16; 2991 Jambi to Batavia, 18 March 1760, fo. 63. 
79. vac 2467 Jambi Daily Register, 20 March 1739, fo. 50; 28 Dec. 1739, 
fo. 151; 2761 Acting Resident to Incoming Resident Jan Aalders, 3 Dec. 1749, 
fols. 9-11; Jambi to Batavia, 15 March 1750, fo. 72; 2761 Jambi to Batavia, 21 
Jan. 1750, fo. 60. 
80. vac 2761 Jambi to Batavia, 21 Jan. 1750, fo. 61; 2780 Jambi to Bata-
via, 29 Feb. 1752, fols. 7,39. 
81 .. Further details are in vac 2741 Jambi to Batavia, 28 Dec. 1748, fo. 12; 
2761 Acting Resident to Incoming Resident Jan Aalders, 3 Dec. 1749, fo. 25; 
2826 Batavia's Secret Resolutions, 19 March 1754, fols. 12-13; 2837 Palem-
bang to Batavia, 3 Feb. 1754, fo. 2; KI Hs. 456, A. F. Solms, "Memorie 
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Nagelaten," 27 April 1766, n.f.; de Kock, "Legenden van Djambi," p. 54; KI 
Ms. Or. 72, "Hikajat Negari Djambi," fols. 30-31. 
82. VOC 2844 Commissioner van der Werp to Batavia, 8 June 1754, fols. 
205-211; 15 July 1754, fols. 215-216; 2887 Palembang to Batavia, 2 June 
1 756, fo. 84; Corpus Diplomaticum, VI, pp. 85-87. 
83. Corpus Diplomaticum, V, p. 345. 
84. VOC Jambi to Batavia, 22 Nov. 1758, fols. 4-5; 2991 Jambi to Batavia, 
20Jan. 1760, fo. 28; 2965 Jambi to Batavia, 18 Dec. 1758, fo. 2. 
85. This had, of course, been Sultan Anum's own name before his accession. 
Raja Ali Haji, Tuhfat al-Nafis, pp. 118, 350; VOC 2991 Jambi to Batavia, 
18 March 1760, fo. 66; Second Register, 28 April 1760, fo. 6; 3089 Jambi to 
Batavia, 16Jan. 1764, fo. 10. 
86. VOC 2934 Palembang to Batavia, 20 April 1758, fo. 10; Palembang to 
Jambi, 10 Sept. 1758, fo. 70; 2965 Jambi to Batavia, 18 Dec. 1758, fo. 2. 
87. VOC 2965 Jambi to Batavia, 22 Nov. 1758, fo. 4; 3028 Secret Jambi to 
Batavia, 29 Aug. 1761, fo. 145. 
88. VOC 3059 J ambi to Batavia, 2 Dec. 1761, fo. 11; 3028 Secret J ambi to 
Batavia, 29 Aug. 1761, fo. 150. 
89. See Corpus Diplomaticum, VI, p. 232. 
90. VOC 3121 Jambi to Batavia, 12 May 1764, fo. 3; 3152Jambi to Batavia, 
30 Sept. 1765, fo. 12. 
91. VOC 3121 Jambi to Batavia, 12 May 1764, fo. 5; 3182 King ofJambi to 
Batavia, rec'd 11 July 1766, fo. 25; 3152 King of Jambi to Batavia, rec'd 
15 Nov.1765, fo. 30. 
92. VOC 3333 Second Register, King of Jambi to Palembang, rec'd at Ba-
tavia29July 1771, fo. 7. 
Chapter Six 
1. van Soest, "Het contract van 1755," p. 174. 
2. Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, p. 81; see also Vos, "Koopman en Kon-
ing," p. 30. 
3. VOC 1794 Palembang to Batavia, 20 Oct. 1710, fols. 56-57. Some 
accounts say Pangeran Purbaya was poisoned by a Jambi prince; other reports 
attribute his death to one of his brothers. See Generale Missiven, VI, p. 540. 
4. VOC 1854 Palembang to Batavia, 26 March 1714, fols. 31-32; 4 May 
1715, fo. 57; llJuly 1714, fols. 98-99. 
5. VOC 1854 Malay letters from Pangeran Dipati to Governor General, 
rec'd at Batavia 22 Dec. 1714, fo. 21; Report by Syahbandar C. Haaselaar, 
22 Dec. 1714, fo. 24. 
6. As above, n. 5; VOC 1868 Pangeran Dipati and his four brothers to Ba-
tavia, rec'd 22 July 1715, fo. 76. 
7. At the time Pangeran Anum said tharthis was because he had taken under 
his protection a European whom the king of Johor wanted to put to death. 
VOC 1895 Pangeran Dipati to Batavia, rec'd 26 April 1717 , fo. 43. According 
to the Tuhfat al-Nafis (which confuses Pangeran Dipati Anum and his brother 
Jayawikrama, later Sultan Lemabang), the Palembang prince fell from favor 
because he broke wind one day publicly at court. It was because of this display 
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of coarse manners that Sultan Abd al-Jalil refused to give his daughter in mar-
riage. Raja Ali Haji, The Precious Gift, p. 47. 
8. VOC 1868 Palembang to Batavia, 6 Feb. 1715, fols. 5-6; Third Register, 
13 Oct. 1715, fols. 9-14; 9 Dec; 1715, fo. 12; 1882 Palembang to Batavia, 
21 Feb. 1716, fols. 12-13; 13 April 1716, fo. 34; 1895 Palembang to Batavia, 
27 Jan. 1717, fols. 5-6; 1 Feb. 1717, fols. 15-16; 1911 Pangeran Dipati Anum 
to Batavia, rec'd 5 Sept. 1718, fo. 91. 
9. VOC 1868 Palembang to Batavia, 6 Feb. 1715, fo. 5; 4 Sept. 1715, fo. 
~87; 1882 Palembang to Batavia, 18 March 1716, fo. 33; 22 Sept. 1716, fo. 67; 
Third Register, 6 Dec. 1716, fols. 3-4. 
10. VOC 1895 Pangeran Dipati to Batavia, rec'd 26 April 1717, fo. 43; 
3 May 1717, fo. 44. 
11. VOC 1882 Palembang to Batavia, 7 June 1716, fols. 8-to, 20; 1895 
Pangeran Dipati Anum to King of Palembang, rec'd at Batavia 25 Sept. 1717, 
fo. 77; Palembang to Batavia, 27 Oct. 1717, fols. 92, 101; 1911 King of Pal em-
bang to Batavia, rec'd 5 Sept. 1718. 
12. 8 Haji 1129 corresponds to Thursday, 13 Nov. 1717; ARA Collectie 
Engelhard, Aanwinst 1916, no. 172, n.f.; VOC 1895 Palembang Daily Regis-
ter, 24-29 Oct. 1717, fols. 23-29; Palembang to Batavia, 14 Nov. 1717, fo.l09; 
29 Nov. 1717, fo. 44; 1911 Palembang to Batavia, 8June 1718, fo. 39; 24 May 
1718, fo. 50; King of Pal em bang to Batavia, rec'd 21 Jan. 1718, fo. 2. 
13. ARA Collectie Engelhard, Aanwinst 1916, no. 172, n.f.; VOC 1911 
Palembang to Batavia, 20 March 1718, fo. 25; 21 Oct. 1718, fols. 95-96; 30 
Jan. 1719, fo. 52; 1926 Palembang to Batavia, 18 March 1719, fo. 5; 1961 
Palembang to Batavia, 29 March 1721, fo. 11. 
14. ARA Collectie Engelhard, Aanwinst 1916, no. 172, n.f.; VOC 1961 
Palembang to Batavia, 18 Aug. 1721, fols. 57-58; 8 Aug. 1721, fols. 61-63; 
Sultan Ratu to Batavia, rec'd 16 Sept. 1721, fo. 65. 
15. VOC 2075 Sultan Anum to Batavia, rec'd 4 Nov. 1727, fo. 127; 1961 
Report by Patras, 27 Jan. 1722, fols. 84-90. 
16. VOC 1961 Palembang to Batavia, 18 Aug. 1721, fo. 38; ARA Collectie 
Engelhard, Aanwinst 1916, no. 172, n.f. 
17. VOC 1961 Palembang to Batavia, 3 Jan. 1722, fols. 58-60. 
18. VOC 1961 Jambi to Batavia, 4 Nov. 1721, fo. 25; 1961 Palembang to 
Batavia, 3 Jan. 1722, fo. 59; Report by Patras, 27 Jan. 1722, fo. 93; 1980 
Palembang to Batavia, 22 March 1722, fols. 7-14. 
19. Generale Missiven, VII, pp. 603, 614-615; VOC 1980 Palembang to Ba-
tavia, 29 April 1722, fo. 55; 8 May 1722, fols. 64-66; 19 May 1722, fo. 99. 
20. VOC 1980 Report by Carel Poppeljon on his trip to the interior, May 
1722, fols. 103-108; 1996 Palembang toJambi, 26 March 1722, fa. 30. 
21. VOC 1996 Palembang to Batavia, 29 March 1723, fo. 8; Corpus Diplo-
maticum, IV, pp. 536-543. 
22. Dysoxylon acutangulum, a rare but much desired timber, finely grained and 
found particularly on Bangka. 
23. van Soest, "Het contract van 1755," p. 185; VOC 2013 Palembang to 
Batavia, 15 March 1724, fo. 2; King of Palembang to Patras, rec'd 29 April 
1724, fo. 25; Generale Missiven, VII, p. 695; Horsfield, "Report on the Island of 
Banka," p. 306. 
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24. van Soest, "Het contract van 1755," p. 169; VOC 2699 Palembang to 
Batavia, 13 March 1747, fo. 48. 
25. VOC 2860 Extract from Heeren XVII to Batavia, 8 Oct. 1753, fols. 
80-8t. 
26. This date is given twice in VOC sources. VOC 1895 Palembang to Bata-
via, 9 March 1717, fo. 15; 1961 Second Register, Palembang to Batavia, 2 
Sept. 1721, fo. 10. Other sources suggest that mines began to be developed 
commercially by local people in 1711, a date widely found in the literature. See 
van cler Chijs, Nederlandsch-Indisch Plakaatboek, VII, p. 66. For an extended 
account of the history of tin mining on Bangka, see Heiclhues, Bangka Tin and 
Mentok Pepper. 
27. VOC 1945 Palembang to Batavia, 29 Dec. 1719, fo. 6; Heidhues, Bangka 
Tin and Mentok Pepper, pp. 3, 23n.23. 
28. VOC 2029 Palembang to Batavia, 10 Oct. 1725, fo. 57; Second Register, 
Palembang to Batavia, 4 Dec. 1725, fo. 3; 2073 King of Palembang to 
Syahbandar of Batavia, rec'd 13 Aug. 1727, fols. 30-31; 2133 Palembang to 
Batavia, 21 July 1729, fols. 59-60; King of Palembang to Batavia, rec'd 27 
Sept. 1729, fo. 122; 2865 Palembang to Batavia, 21 Sept. 1755, fo. 431. 
29. VOC 2133 Third Register, Palembang to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1729, fo. 3. 
30. VOC 2073 Palembang to Batavia, 15 Feb. 1728, fo. 22; 2100 Palembang 
to Batavia, 2 Sept. 1728, fo. 27. 
31. VOC Palembang to Batavia, 2 Dec. 1730, fo. 18. 
32. VOC 2193 J. Menut to A. Oostwalt, 14 June 1731, fols. 138-141; 
Palembang to Batavia, 17 Aug. 1731, fo. 134. 
33. VOC 2315 Palembang to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1734, fo. 44; 2345 Palembang 
to Batavia, 29 Nov. 1735, fo. 8. 
34. VOC 2534 Palembang to Batavia, 27 Dec. 1741, fols. 183-185; 27 Feb. 
1742, fo. 191; 2650 Palembang to Batavia, 16 Nov. 1745, fo. 47. 
35. VOC 2607 Palembang to Batavia, 30 Oct. 1743, fols. 5-12; 2630 Palem-
bang to Batavia, 11 March 1744, fols. 5-7; Palembang to Batavia, 14 April 
1746, fo. 55; 2674 Palembang to Batavia, 3 June 1746, fo. 46. 
36. The exchange rate was now sixteen small bundles, or five hundred picis, 
to one large bundle; one large bundle (eight thousand picis) was equivalent to 
one rial. For examples of royal accounts, see VOC 2761 King of Palembang to 
Batavia, rec'd 10 Feb. 1750, fo. 23; King of Palembang to Batavia, rec'd 
10 Oct. 1750, fo.131. 
37. Horsfield, "Report on the Island of Banka," p. 309. 
38. VOC 2837 Palembang to Batavia, 5 March 1754, fo. 29; 2865 Report on 
Bangka and Belitung, 21 Sept. 1755, fo. 430; Wang, "The Origins of Chinese 
Kongsi," p. 52. The word kongsi is first mentioned in VOC sources in 1783, 
but the type of cooperative organization with which it is associated appears to 
be much older. Initially the word appears to have been used by non-Chinese to 
refer only to the head, the scribe, but was then extended to the group as a 
whole. See VOC 3867 Palembang to Batavia, 23 Oct. 1783, fo. 905v, and a 
translated Malay report on Bangka, 17 Nov. 1783, fo. 988v; see also Chew, 
Chinese Pioneers on the Sarawak Frontier, p. 20; Heidhues, Bangka Tin and Mentok 
Pepper, p. 18. 
39. VOC 2934 Arriving and Departing Ships, 20 Oct. 1757, fo. 70 (from 
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Bangka); 2699 Palembang to Batavia, 13 March 1747, fo. 57; 2837 Palembang 
to Batavia, 5 March 1754, fo. 29; 2865 Report on Bangka and Belitung, 8 Oct. 
1755, fo. 430; Horsfield, "Report on the Island of Bank a," p. 310. 
40. VOC 2699 Palembang to Batavia, 13 March 1747, fo. 56. This descrip-
tion dates from 1783 (VOC 3867 Palembang to Batavia, 23 Dec. 1783, fols. 
904-905) and is reproduced in Vos, "Koopman en Koning," p. 220. 
41. Crawfurd, History of the Indian Archipelago, III, pp. 458-459; VOC 2865 
Report on Bangka and Belitung, 8 Oct. 1755, fo. 431. 
42. VOC 2674 Palembang to Batavia, 30 April 1747, fo. 38; 2741 Palem-
bang to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1749, fo. 43; 2818 Retiring Report by Gerrit Pan to 
J. A. van der Werp, 30 Dec. 1752, fo. 7; King of Palembang to Batavia, rec'd 
13 Aug. 1753, fo. 67; King of Pal em bang to Batavia, rec'd 17 Oct. 1753, fo. 
86; 2837 Palembang to Batavia, 5 March 1754, fo. 20; vac 2865 Report 
on Bangka and Belitung, 8 act. 1755, fo. 431. 
43. vac 2699PalembangtoBatavia, 1 Feb. 1747, fols.11-21. 
44. vac 2699 Palembang to Batavia, 13 March 1747, fo. 51; 2818 Palem-
bang to Batavia, 19 May 1753, fo. 53; 2908 Palembang to Batavia, 14 May 
1757, fo. 12. 
45. vac 2239 King of Palembang to Batavia, rec'd 13 March 1733, 
fols.6-8. 
46.2650 King and nobles of Pal em bang to Batavia, 12 Rabiawal1158, rec'd 
n.d. July 1745, fo. 27; Palembang to Batavia, 10 Aug. 1745, fo. 42; 2674 
Palembang to Batavia, 27 Feb. 1746, fols. 7-8; 2699 Palembang to Batavia, 13 
March 1747, fols. 40, 51; Vos, "Koopman en Koning," p. 42. 
47. vac 2718 Palembang to Batavia, 31 Jan. 1747, fo. 18; 2741 Palembang 
to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1749, fols. 29, 44; 2761 Palembang to Batavia, 17 April 
1750, fo. 71; Palembang to Batavia, 23 June 1750, fols. 99-108; 2799 King of 
Palembang to Batavia, rec'd 21 June 1752, fo. 10. 
48. van Soest, "Palembang in 1755," pp. 165-197, and Corpus Diplomaticum, 
VI, pp. 59-64. 
49. vac 2865 Paravicini's Report, 21 Sept. 1755, fo. 389; Woelders, Het 
Sultanaat Palembang, p. 81. 
50. vac 2239 Jambi Daily Register, 20 June 1731, fo. 40; 2051 Palembang 
to Batavia, 30Jan. 1727, fols. 15-16; 2699 Palembang to Batavia, 13 March 
1747, fo. 51. 
51. vac 2345 Palembang to Jambi, 7 Dec. 1735, fo. 80; Palembang to 
Batavia, 18Jan.1736, fo. 88; 2799 Palembangto Batavia, 20 April 1752, fo. 2. 
52. vac 2029 Palembang to Batavia, 10 act. 1725, fo. 62; 2467 Palembang 
to Batavia, 10 April 1739, fo. 96. 
53. I am grateful for the help of Dr. Stuart Robson in reconstructing the 
meaning of this phrase. 
54. vac 2569 Palembang to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1742, fo. 78; 2780 Palembang 
to Batavia, 30 Nov. 1751, fo. 90; 2650 Palembang to Batavia, 8 Jan. 1745, 
fo.17. 
55. vac 2534 Resident's comments on General Missive of 1738, fo. 202; 
2607 Palembang to Batavia, 31 Oct. 1743, fo. 8; 2780 Jambi to Batavia, 29 
Feb. 1752, fo. 9. 
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56. vac 2286 Palembang to Batavia, 31 July 1733, fols. 51-52; 2467 
Palembang to Batavia, 30 March 1739, fo. 58; 2502 Palembang to Batavia, 21 
Nov. 1740, fo. 59; 2607 Palembang to Batavia, 11 March 1743, fo. 8; 2630 
Resident's answer to Amsterdam's comments of28 Aug. 1742, fols. 16-17. 
57. vac 2286 Palembang to Batavia, 31 July 1733, fo. 23; Palembang to 
Jambi, 24 April 1733, fo. 73; 2502 Report by Seri Ibrahim and eight envoys, 
25 act. 1740, fols. 89-91. 
58. Kebon Gede is the name of one of the royal graveyards. Sultan Muham-
mad Mansur is known to be buried there. 
59. vac 2418 King of Banten to Batavia, rec'd 11 April 1737, fols. 34-40. 
60. vac 2383 Palembang to Batavia, 12 Dec. 1736, fo. 12. 
61. The others were Banyu Asin, Sungsang, Upang, Salih, Pidato, Peru-
gian, Putih, Nibong. Sultan Mahmud also named Bangka, Belitung, and 
Lepar as lying under Palembang authority. vac 2410 Palembang to Batavia, 
17 April 1737, fo. 7; GeneraleMissiven, IX, pp. 747,599,812. 
62. vac 2549 Instructions to Head of Tulang Bawang, 28 March 1741, fols. 
111-129. 
63. Hunne, "Weder een Javaansche inscriptie op Sumatra," pp. 363-369, 
and "Javaansche inscriptien," pp. 1-20; vac 2478 Report on Tulang 
Bawang, 23 Aug. 1739, fols. 191-219; 2549 Banten to Batavia, 29 Dec. 1741, 
fo. 397; 2634 Tulang Bawang to Batavia, 31 act. 1744, fo. 20; Forbes, A Natu-
ralist's Wanderings in the Eastern Archipelago, p. 144. 
64. vac 2589 Tulang Bawang to Batavia, 29 April 1742, fo. 193; Corpus 
Diplomaticum, V, pp. 270-274. 
65. vac 2478 Malay letter from Lampung heads to Banten, rec'd 2 July 
1739, fols. 100-105; 2499 Report on Tulang Bawang, 30 Dec. 1738, fols. 15-
31; deJonge, De Opkomst van het Nederlandse Gezag, IX, p. 276. 
66. An example of such a piagem is in van den Tuuk, "Brieven," p. 402. 
67. vac 2478 Report on Tulang Bawang, 30 Dec. 1738, fo. 237; 2534 
Palembang to Batavia, 13 March 1741, fo. 13; 2589 Tulang Bawang to Banten, 
31 Aug. 1742, fo. 256; 2611 Tulang Bawang to Batavia, 4 act. 1743, fo. 6. 
68. vac 2478 Report on Tulang Bawang, 30 Dec. 1738, fo. 219; 2502 
Palembang Envoys to Batavia, rec'd 10 June 1740, fols. 48-54; 2512 Banten to 
Tulang Bawang, 28 March 1740, fols. 13-15; Tulang Bawang to Banten, 
5 April 1740, fo. 19; Banten's Instructions to J. F. Somerfield, 18 May 1740, 
fo. 53; 2589 Report on Tulang Bawang, 20 May 1742, fols. 105-107. 
69. vac 2589 Report on Tulang Bawang, 29 April 1742, fo. 204; Tulang 
Bawang to Batavia, 19 Sept. 1742, fo. 274; Letter from envoys of King of Ban-
ten, rec'd 28 Dec. 1742, fols. 22-23; 2569 King of Palembang to Batavia, 
16 Syawal1144, rec'd n.d. Jan. 1743, fols. 63-64; 2611 Tulang Bawang to Ba-
tavia, 12 April 1742 , fols. 53-55. 
70. vac 2611 Tulang Bawang to Batavia, 28 June 1743, fo. 142; 2725 
Tulang Bawang to Batavia, 15 Dec. 1747, fo. 11; 2634 Lampung to Batavia, 
1 act. 1744, fols. 194-195; 2749 Tulang Bawang to Batavia, 27 Jan. 1749. 
fo.8. 
71. vac 2569 Report on Tulang Bawang, 20 May 1742, fols. 41-45; 2634 
Tulang Bawang to Banten, 31 act. 1744, fols. 17-20. 
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72. VOC 2589 Tulang Bawang to Batavia, 9 Aug. 1742, fo. 185. 
73. Francis, Herinneringen uit den levensloop van een Indisch' Ambtenaar, pp. 136-
139; Canne, "Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis der Lampungs," p. 507. 
74. Voorhoeve, "Some notes on South Sumatran epics," pp. 95-100. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, pp. 364, 378; KI Hs. 288 Boers, 
"Algemeen verslag der Residentie Palembang," n.r. 
77. Burke, Popular Culture in Early Modern Europe, p. 167. 
78. See further Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities, p. 67. 
79. This is equivalent to 17 September 1757 C.E. VOC 2908 Palembang to 
Batavia, 22 September 1757, fo. 31; Woelders, HetSultanaatPalembang, pp. 49-
50,442 nn. 51,81. A discrepancy of one or two days can occur in conversion to 
Christian dates because in Muslim countries the beginning of every month is 
determined by the sighting of the new moon and because the day is reckoned 
from sunrise, while the Christian calender begins the day at 1 A.M. in the morn-
ing. 
80. These dates are supported by Dutch sources. VOC 2383 Palembang to 
Batavia, 25 March 1736, fo. 11; 2741 Palembang to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1749, fo. 
54; Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, p. 81. 
81. See Wieringa, Carita Bangka, pp. 76-87. In this legend it is Wan Akub 
and his brothers who first realize the existence of tin on Bangka. See de Clercq, 
"Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Bangka," pp. 132-134; KI Hs. 400, Ullman, 
"Het eiland Banka en zijn uitwendige gesteldheid," fols. 9-20. 
82. Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, p. 77; VOC 1961 Palembang to Ba-
tavia, 20 Feb. 1722, fo. 119; de Kock, "Schetsen," p. 366; VOC 2345 Palem-
bang to Jambi, 7 Dec. 1735, fo. 80. The name of Raden Serdang, the border 
guard who captured Sultan Anum, is also remembered in local stories. I am 
indebted to Radin Husin of Palembang for sharing his material on Sultan 
Mahmud with me. 
83. The mention of Aria Damar as the founder of the Palembang dynasty is 
mentioned in several contemporary accounts. See Radermacher, "Beschryving 
van het eiland Sumatra," p. 88; van Sevenhoven, "Beschrijving van de hoofd-
plaats," p. 63. 
84. Campbell, The Power of Myth, p. 129. 
85. van Soest, "Het contract," p. 188. 
86. Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, pp. 37-38; KI Ms. Or. 531. KI Hs. 
184 is a poor translation of this work; Brown, "Sejarah Melayu ," p. 25ff. 
87. Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, p. 81; UB Cod. Or. 7653a, fols. 
101-115. 
88. de Koek, "Schetsen," p. 363; UB Cod. Or. 7653a, fo. 104; Poerbat-
jaraka, Pandji-Verhalen Onderling Vergeleken, pp. 164-166; KI Hs. 288 "Algemeen 
verslag der residentie Palembang," n.r. 
89. de Kock, "Schetsen," p. 365. A "milk brother" is one who has shared 
the same wet nurse. 
90. Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, pp. 75-76; VOC 2607 Palembang to 
Batavia, 20 April 1743, fo. 1; 2630 Palembang to Batavia, 11 March 1744, fo. 
14; de Kock, "Schetsen," p. 368; VOC 1011 Batavia to Makassar, 31 Dec. 
1757, fo. 27. 
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91. VOC 2073 Palembang to Batavia, 13 Jan. 1728, fo. 20; 25 Jan. 1728, fo. 
6; 15 Feb. 1728, fo. 23; Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, p. 81; de Kock, 
p. 368. Because of the death of the crown prince a second son, Pangeran Aria, 
married to a Jambi princess, was installed as the pangeran ratu. VOC 2133 
Jambi to Palembang, 10 March 1729, fo. 76; 2193 Palembang to Batavia, 54 
Sept. 1731, fo. 213. 
92. See further Sahlins, Islands of History and Mythical Realities, p. 79, and 
idem, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities, p. 24. 
93. Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, p. 76. 
94. van Soest, "Het contract van 1755," p. 174; VOC 2607 Palembang to 
Batavia, 31 Oct. 1743, fo. 5; 2883 Palembang to Batavia, 28 Feb. 1756, fols. 2-
3; VB Cod. Or. 7653a, fo. 115. The number forty has a particular place in 
Islam because forty Muslims are required to make up an Islamic community. 
95. van den Berg, "Oendang-oendang Simboer Tjahaja," p. 7. These cus-
toms were still thriving when the Dutch took over direct control of Palembang, 
and continuing legislation was directed toward eliminating them because of the 
obstacles they placed in the way of marriage. It is relevant to note here that the 
official perception of Sultan Mahmud Badaruddin I has now changed, for in 
contrast to his namesake he is seen as ruling in Dutch interests. See, for 
instance, Alfian et al., Sejarah Perlawanan Terhadap Imperialisme. 
96. Sahlins, "Other Times, Other Customs," p. 520. See further Wolters, 
History, Culture and Region, p. 7; Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, p. 41; 
Sahlins , Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities, p. 14. 
97. VOC 2438 J ambi Daily Register, 9 Oct. 1739, fo. 84; 2699 Palembang to 
Batavia, 13 March 1747, fo. 53; 2383 Palembang to Jambi, 22 Feb. 1736, 
fo.35. 
Chapter Seven 
1. See further McClellan, Science Reorganized, pp. 8-9. 
2. The and van der Veur, The Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap, pp. 
1-5; Eschels-Kroon, Beschreibung der Insel Sumatra; Radermacher, "Beschryving 
van het eiland Sumatra," pp. 3-144; Miller, "An Account of the Island of 
Sumatra," pp. 160-179; Marsden, History of Sumatra. Miller's article was 
translated into German in 1781; Eschel-Kroon's book appeared in a Dutch edi-
tion in 1783; Radermacher's article was republished in 1781; a second edition 
of The History of Sumatra came out in 1784, and a third expanded version was 
issued in 1811. 
3. Marsden, History of Sumatra, pp. vi-viii. His italics. The same remarks also 
appeared in the preface to the first edition. Miller too stressed the value of 
"authentic information," and Eschels-Kroon specifically criticised the descrip-
tion of Magindanao by the English country trader, Thomas Forrest, because it 
embellished the truth. Beschreibung der Insel Sumatra, p. xii; Miller, "An Account 
of the Island of Sumatra," p. 161. 
4. Marsden, History of Sumatra, p. 358. See Paulus, Encyclopaedia van 
Nederlandsch-Indie, I, p. 610, and also Tideman, Djambi, p. 30, for an illustration 
of the lack of historical material for the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies. 
5. For instance, Horsfield's "Report on the Island of Banka," written for 
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Stamford Raffles in 1812, and the account of Pal em bang by Major Court, Brit-
ish resident in Palembang in 1813. Court, An Exposition of the Relations of the Brit-
ish Government with the Sultaun and State of Palembang. In his third edition of 1811, 
Marsden also expanded the section on Palembang considerably, drawing heav-
ily from Radermacher's work. 
6. Dr. Reber has argued that Raffles independently formulated his theories 
regarding the decline of Malay states and the resultant rise in piracy, but he also 
stood in a long tradition of views on native "decay." See, for instance, Mars-
den, History of Sumatra, pp. 204, 207. Reber, "The Sulu World in the Eight-
eenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries," p. 6. 
7. See further Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585-1740, p. 392. There 
is some disagreement as to when the decline of the VOC should be identified. 
Vos, "Koopman en Koning," p. 11. 
8. VOC 1030 Batavia to Palembang, 26 June 1776, fo. 183. On Palembang's 
tin trade, see further Vos, "Koopman en Koning," pp. 21-55, 112. 
9. VOC 2934 Palembang to Batavia, 15Jan. 1758, fo. 21. 
10. VOC 3089 Retiring Report by H. J. de Heere to Isaac Mens, 27 June 
1763, fols. 103-104,108; 2991 PalembangtoBatavia, 24June 1760, fo. 145. 
11. VOC 2965 Third Register, Palembang to Batavia, 8 Oct. 1759, fo. 2. 
12. VOC 3674 Palembang to van Braam, 2 Sept. 1784, fo. 92. In the end he 
sent a letter wrapped in yellow doth; tin; and two rattans also wrapped in yel-
low doth. 
13. VOC 1035 Batavia to Palembang, 2 June 1781, fo. 364; 21 Aug. 1783, 
fo. 595; OIC 103 Secret, J. van Bogaart to First Commissioner General, 6 Feb. 
1797, n.r. 
14. "Country" trade was port-to-port trade east of the Cape of Good Hope. 
Although both private and East India Company traders independently partici-
pated in this commerce, the links between them were always dose. During the 
eighteenth century, British private country traders outnumbered all others from 
Europe, and by the end of that period their activities had become profess-
sionally organized and financed. 
15. VOC 3182 Palembang to Batavia, 18 Oct. 1764, fo. 17; Marsden, History 
of Sumatra, pp. 173, 187; Lewis, "The Growth ofthe Country Trade," pp. 114-
129. On the Malay addiction to opium, see B. Andaya, Perak, the Abode of Grace, 
p.327. 
16. VOC 3094 Secret, Palembang to Batavia, 29 Dec. 1762, fols. 2-4; a com-
parison of prices between contracted prices and those of the free market is found 
in Vos, "Koopman en Koning," p. 215. 
17. VOC 3628 Palembang to Batavia, 31 May 1782, fo. 106; Jones, "Two 
Malay Letters," pp. 24-35. 
18. VOC 3653 Secret, Melaka to Palembang, 6 April and 11 March 1783, 
fols. 91, 94; Lewis, "The Growth of the Country Trade," pp. 114-129. 
19. VOC 3333 Palembang to Batavia, 4 April 1771, fo. 29. Sultan Mahmud 
Baha'uddin described Raja Haji, the Bugis yang dipertuan muda, as a "bird of 
flight" and corresponded with him only through ministers. VOC 3628 Secret, 
Palembang to Batavia, 19 March 1781, n.£. 
20. One such person is Kiai Demang Teja, the Chinese captain, the son of a 
Chinese man and a Palembang noblewoman. He had his own private army and 
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a valuable tin district on Bangka and was described as "the king's oracle." 
vac 3674 Palembang to Batavia, 15 July 1784, fo. 77. 
21. vac 2965 Palembang to Batavia, 17 Feb. 1759, fo. 18; 3024 Palembang 
to Batavia, 15 Jan. 1761, fo. 5; 3124 Secret, Palembang to Batavia, 11 Sept. 
1764, fo. 39. 
22. vac 1023 Batavia to Palembang, 15 April 1769, fo. 106; 3867 Transla-
ted Malay Report on Bangka, 17 Nov. 1783, fo. 908v. 
23. Radermacher, "Beschryving van het eiland Sumatra," pp. 83-84; vac 
1032 Batavia to Palembang, 29 June 1778, fo. 396; 3535 Palembang to Bata-
via, 7 Jan. 1778, fo. 212. For a Malay account of private Chinese tin trade with 
Riau, see Wieringa, Carita Bangka, 103-104. 
24. Probably from the Hakka dialect, in which taigl (Mandarin dage) means 
"elder brother." The word was apparently used for all the Sultan's representa-
tives on Bangka, regardless of their ethnic origins. vac 3733 Palembang to 
Batavia, 28 Jan. 1786, fo. 73. 
25. vac 3535 Palembang to Batavia, 7 Jan. 1778, fo. 211; 3867 Malay 
Report on Bangka, 17 Nov. 1783, fols. 91Ov, 916; Palembang to Batavia, 
23 Dec. 1783, fo. 903v; Radermacher, "Beschryving van het eiland Sumatra," 
p.83. 
26. Knaap and Nagtegaal, "A Forgotten Trade," p. 155; Radermacher, 
"Beschryving van het eiland Sumatra," p. 96. vac 2965 Palembang to Bata-
via, 21 April 1759, fo. 35. I have come to this conclusion after examining all the 
shipping lists for the 1780s and 1790s. 
27. The sayids are said to have come to Palembang around the time of the 
Balinese attack on the crown prince in 1714. vac 2761 Jambi to Batavia, 
31 Jan. 1751, fo. 25; 2780 Jambi to Batavia, 21 March 1752, fo. 70; 2934 
Palembang to Batavia, 10 Sept. 1758, fo. 70; 2956 Jambi to Batavia, 22 
Nov. 1758, fo. 4; KI Hs. 456 A. F. van Solms, "Memorie Nagelaten, 27 April 
1766, n.f. 
28. Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam, p. 210; van den Berg, Le 
Hadhramout et les colonies arabes, p. 134 ff; Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka in the Latter 
Part of the Nineteenth Centuury, pp. 5, 96-97. For an example of sayid "bookkeep-
ing," see vac 3628 Enclosures in Palembang to Batavia, 19 March 1781, fols. 
1-7, and also Serjeant, "The Hadrami Network," p. 153, for a description of 
these complex interport transactions in modern times. 
29. Woelders, Het Sultanaat Palembang, p. 90. 
30. Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, I, p. 357 (translator's note). 
31. vac 3581 Palembang to Batavia, 20 Sept. 1779, n.f.; ARA Collectie 
Engelhard, Aanwinst 1916, no. 175, Walbeek's Retiring Report, 12 Nov. 
1794, n.f.; de Clercq, "Bijdrage tot de geschiedenis van Bangka," pp. 145-149. 
The Malay text is given in Wieringa, Carita Bangka, pp. 112-113. 
32. vac 2965 Palembang to Batavia, 20 April 1759, fo. 7; 3024, 13 July 
1761, fo. 39. She refused, and the party was banished to the interior. After two 
years, when the Company offered a reward of three hundred rials, they were 
recovered and returned. 
33. L. Andaya, "Man as Rare as Flowers," p. 55; vac 3412 Report by a 
native taken by pirates, 28 Jan. 1774, fols. 73-74. There is mention in the 
sources of "hooren" travelling to Palembang as passengers, while some Palem-
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bang captains had standing arrangements with procurers in Batavia who pro-
vided them with kidnapped women. See, for example, VOC 3333 Arriving 
ships in Palembang under 10 November 1771 and 3525 Slave Reports (M), 
16 Feb. 1778, n.f. 
34. VOC 3674 Palembang to Batavia, 16 July 1784, fo. 17; VOC 3906 
Palembang to Batavia, 13 April 1790, fo. 126. 
35. VOC 3089 Retiring Report by H. J. de Heere to Isaac Mens, 27 June 
1763, fo. 97; 3244 Palembang to Batavia, 18 April 1768, fo. 7; 3248 Secret, 
Palembang to Batavia, 29 Dec. 1767, fo. 636; 3303 Palembang to Batavia, 
17 Nov. 1769, fo. 22; VOC 3333 Palembang to Batavia, 25 February 1771, fo. 
10. Lengthy descriptions of attacks by Siak princes on Palembang shipping 
are found in UB Cod. Or. 7304, fols. 519-523. 
36. Warren, TheSuluZone, pp.149-153. 
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GLOSSARY 
The amounts given for weights, measures, and currency are the standardized 
forms that gradually became accepted during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. There could be considerable local variation. 
adat 
ambil anak 
arak 
ana 
arung 
atap 
bahara 
batang 
batin 
bovenlanders 
bukit 
bunga mas dan 
perak 
daeng 
dayang 
demang 
Dutch mile 
gantang 
garuda 
gundik 
ilir 
Imam 
;enang 
Jernang 
Custom, traditional law 
Literally, to adopt a child; the practice of adopting a man as 
a son-in-law in lieu of bride price 
Arrack; liquor distilled from rice and sugar or from coconut 
palm 
Javanese princely title 
A princely title in southwest Sulawesi 
Roofing thatch, usually of palm leaves 
Three piculs, or about 375 Dutch pounds (185 kilograms) 
Large river 
Indigenous title for headmen in Sumatra; also used for 
orang laut leaders 
Dutch term for upstream people 
Hill 
Small trees made of gold and silver, usually with birds and 
flowers attached and accompanied by other gifts, sent to 
Siamese kings by their vassals as tribute 
In southwest Sulawesi, a noble title for both men and 
women 
Term used for female court attendants; often attached to 
female figures oflegend 
Head of a district 
This varied, but was usually regarded as the equivalent of 
the English league (4.827 kilometers) 
Container for measure of capacity; variable, but about 5 kati 
Mythological creature with the head of a bird and the body 
ofahuman 
Secondary wife 
Also hilir; downstream 
Muslim elder who leads congregation in Friday prayers 
Javanesejeneng; supervisor or deputy; inJambi and Palem-
bang, the ruler's representive, usually entrusted with carry-
ing orders to the interior 
General term for a variety of rattans yielding red resins for 
dyeing and medicinal purposes, the most well known of 
which is Daemonorhops draco (dragon's blood) 
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JUJur 
kajir 
kajang 
kampung 
karaeng 
kati 
kongsi 
kota 
koyan 
kraton 
kris, keris 
kulak 
mangkubumi 
marga 
masayu 
muara 
negert 
nipa 
orangkaya 
orang kubu 
orang laut 
padi 
panembahan 
pangeran 
pangeran ratu 
penghulu 
perahu 
peranakan 
peroatin 
piagem 
pici 
Glossary 
Bride price 
Infidel, non-Muslim 
Palm fronds woven together and used for mats, sails, roofs, 
etc. 
Cluster of houses; neighborhood or village 
High-ranking Makassarese title, for both men and women 
Sixteen tahil or about six hundred grams 
Chinese term referring to a partnership or group of people 
engaged in a commercial activity 
Minangkabau village settlement, usually fortified 
Varied from 27 to 40 picul according to the area and the type 
of produce; commonly about 3,500 Dutch pounds or 1,700 
kilograms 
Royal palace, ruler's residence 
Malay or Javanese dagger 
A basket, a measure of weight; variable, but usually less 
than a gantang 
A prestigious title which could be given to the first minister 
in J ambi and Palembang courts, or used as an honorific in 
titles for princes 
Tribal or clan grouping 
Javanese title for high ranking women 
River mouth (also kuala) 
Settlement or state 
A palm, Nipafruticans; atap is thatching made from its leaves 
Literally, rich man; a term for nobles in Malay courts 
Proto-Malayan forest dwellers 
Proto-Malayan sea peoples, made up of numerous different 
groups with a distinctive maritime culture 
U nhusked rice 
InJambi and Palembang, a title given to senior (often 
retired) rulers, with connotations of religious knowledge 
Prince; a title for the ruler in seventeenth-century Jambi and 
Palembang, but gradually lessening in exclusiveness and 
later often given to interior heads 
In the seventeenth century, a title taken by kings; given to 
the foremost ranking prince after rulers began to take the 
title of sultan 
In Minangkabau areas ofJambi, the head of the lineage; 
also a head of a district 
General term for boats without decking; proa 
Person of mixed descent; in southeast Sumatra, usually a 
Muslim Chinese whose mother is local 
Community elders who collectively acted to settle disputes 
Royal orders, usually engraved in Javanese on copper or 
silver plates 
Coin, originally of Chinese origin but later struck locally as 
well; made of copper, lead, or tin 
picul 
poyang 
puteri jamilan 
raden 
raja 
rajamuda 
rantau 
ratu 
ratu mas 
rawa 
resident 
rial 
rijksdaalder 
sakti 
sayid 
silsilah 
sirih 
suku 
sungai 
susuhunan 
syahbandar 
tahil 
temenggung 
tolong-menolong 
ulu 
waz 
wayang 
yang dipertuan 
yang dipertuan 
sakti 
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A hundred kati; 122.5 Dutch pounds (about 60.5 kilograms) 
for pepper, 125 Dutch pounds (about 62 kilograms) for tin 
Literally, patriarch or grandfather; in Sumatra, ancestor of a 
clan or tribal group 
Title of queen mother in Pagaruyung who legitimized royal 
Minangkabau succession 
Aristocratic Javanese title used for both men and women 
King 
Literally, the young king; used in Malay states for the heir, 
usually eldest son or brother of ruler 
Minangkabau areas of settlement and migration outside the 
four central highland valleys 
King or queen 
Javanese title, usually used for principal wife of ruler 
Morass where river overflows; swamp forest that grows 
permanently in flooded areas 
Title of head ofVOC post; inJambi and Palembang he 
usually had the rank of merchant (koopman) or senior mer-
chant (opperkoopman) 
Spanish silver coin; converted at different rates during the 
seventeenth century but eventually set by the VOC at 60 
stuivers (one Dutch guilder = twenty stuivers) 
Dutch coin, valued by the VOC at forty-eight stuivers until 
1665, and thereafter at three guilders (sixty stuivers) 
Supernatural power 
Title for male descendants of the Prophet (Arab sayyid) 
Genealogy, line of descent 
Betel vine; also a quid consisting of betel nut, arecanut, 
gambir, and lime 
Lineage, tribal grouping 
River 
In Palembang, aJavanese title adopted by a semi-retired 
ruler who had surrendered responsibility for government to 
the heir apparent 
Harbormaster 
Chinese tael; a weight used for gold, roughly equivalent to 
two silver Spanish rials; about .0375 kilograms 
A title found in both Javanese and Malay courts; in south-
east Sumatra, bestowed on high ranking princes; recipients 
might be given an interior area to administer 
Helping one another 
Also hulu; upstream, headwaters of a river 
River in Lampung languages (Malay air) 
Shadow play, usually performed with flat leather puppets 
He who is made lord; the highest Malay title 
Term of address for the raja alam (king of the world), the 
supreme ruler of Minangkabau 
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panembahan, 168; hostility to, 159; 
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Minangkabau and, 160, 162-163; 
relations with ulu, 163, 165, 169; 
returns toJambi, 157; smokes opium, 
164, 166 
Bali/Balinese, 10,95,100,207,208 
Bangka, 31, 46, 78,179,191-192; Chi-
nese on, 188-191,201,218-219,225, 
228, 286n. 20; Makassarese on, 115, 
188; orang laut of, 95, 97, 125,222-
223; Palembang control of, 10,97-98, 
125-126; raids on, 224-226; smuggling 
from, 191, 193,219, 287n. 23; stories 
from, 204-205, 246; tiko on, 219, 
287n.24; tin on, 180, 183, 184-194, 
221,245,281 n. 26, 284n. 81; wom-
en from, 188,204-205; wood from, 
119 
Bangko,162,277n.57 
Banjarmasin: Bugis in, 186, 188 
Banten: attacks Palembang, 25, 26; Chi-
nese in, 53; hostile to Europeans, 46, 
47-48; Islam in, 241;Jambi and, 42, 
59,70-73,106,128,131; Lampung 
and, 146, 197, 198-201; rivalry with 
Palembang, 115, 198; slaves from, 95; 
trade to, 44, 80, 135, 146 
Banyu Asin River, 10, 121,234, 283n. 61 
Barros, Joao de, 1-2 
Batang Asai, 152, 164, 254n. 16 
Batang Hari River, 14, 18,47,49, 
254n.16; Minangkabau of, 92-94, 
133,140,143,149-151,165,244; 
pepper grown upstream, 44, 46, 48, 64, 
78,80 
Batang Leko, 254n. 16 
Batang Tiga, 149-150, 165 
Batavia, 53, 60-63, 149; attacked by 
Mataram, 65; Chinese in, 189; corre-
spondence with, 36, 235; envoys to, 90, 
173-174,179,181,201; Makassarese 
in, 105; opium in, 164; princes 
banished to, 153, 158, 159, 172; soci-
ety, 211-212; syahbandar of, 193; trade 
with, 55,118,121,123,191-192,196, 
199,214. See also Dutch East India 
Company 
Batin groups: inJambi, 14,89, 162 
Bela, 189 
Belambangan, 197,200 
Belida, 20, 77, 200, 234, 236 
Belitang River (Sungai Belitang), 228 
Beliti River, 234, 255n.16 
Belitung, 98,116,119,125-126,130,185, 
187,194,222-226 
Bengkalis, 128, 129 
Bengkulen, 19, 195,237; English in, 122, 
197,217,227; trade with, 133, 148, 
163, 164, 172, 194 
Berbak River (Sungai Berbak), 46, 
259n.23 
Berhala Island (Pulau Berhala), 46, 224 
Besai River (Wai Besai), 197 
Bezoar stones, 7, 34 
Bintan Island, 122-123. See also Riau 
Bookkeeping. See Accounts/accountancy 
Borneo, 40, 91,100,126,131,189 
Brotherhood:concepto~ 26-27, 39,104, 
107; Europeans and, 87,107,118,127; 
flouted in Jambi, 167-168; flouted in 
Palembang, 198; betweenJambi and 
Palembang, xii, 63-73,74,102-109, 
135,171,210,244,248-249; "milk" 
brothers, 35, 208, 237. See also Kinship 
Brunei, 258n. 2 
Buffalo horns, 6, 22, 75, 145, 149 
Bugis: alliance with Dutch, 104; attitudes 
to, 186,248; on Bangka, 186-187, 188-
190; in Banjarmasin, 188; inJambi, 
131, 141, 174-175; in Lampung, 201; 
in Malay Peninsula, 186-187; Palem-
bang and, 108, 180, 182, 186-187,239; 
raiding by, 223, 225; on Siantan, 124; 
slaves, 96, 97,103; as source of man-
power, 105; take Riau, 161,217; trade 
o~ 133, 217-218, 219, 221-222 
Bukit Si Guntang, 2, 7,10,30,34,41, 
202, 249, 254n.3,292n.12 
Bungo River, 151, 162, 254n. 16 
Buton, 96, 97 
Cambodia, 66, 95, 123, 189, 191. See also 
HaTien 
CandiBalang, 112,240 
Canton, 41, 191,214 
Cartography. See Maps 
Ceribon, 11, 191,241 
Children, 31; adoption of, 26; mortal-
ity of, 20-21,228; obligations of, 25-
26,60,68,132,138,140,141,167-
168 
Chinese: accounts of Sumatra, 2, 28, 41-
42; adopt Islam, 53-54; on Bangka, 
188-191,201, 218-219, 225, 287n.23; 
captain of the, 189; as creditors, 87; 
and Europeans, 55-56, 87,125; in 
Jambi, 41-42, 47, 53-56, 87, 93,105, 
129, 170; in kinship relations, 40-43, 
53,57,62, 188, 189,218,243; kongsis, 
189,281 n. 38; marry local women, 42, 
53,125,218; in Palembang, 41-42, 
107,115, 124-125, 218, 258n.8, 
259n.11, 286n.20; as royal wives, 103, 
188, 189,204,215; tin-mining and, 
189-191,214-219; tobacco from, 164; 
trade of, 2, 39-40, 44-45, 54, 64, 80, 
119,121,123,191,214,217-218,221, 
222; women, 87, 188, 189,204-205, 
265n.32 
Cinde Balang. See Abdul Rahman 
Cloth: Indian, 114, 129, 148, 149, 164, 
216, 271 n. 56; Javanese, 118, 135; as 
payment, 218; silk, 60, 239; special 
qualities of, 7, 149; as symbol, 166; 
trade in, 56, 93, 96, 104, 120, 122, 124, 
133, 134, 172, 196, 221, 233;\T()C 
monopoly of, 107 
Coen, Jan Pietersz, 47-48 
Coffee, 193 
Contracts: Chinese and, 54; dated, 111; 
European attitudes toward, xv-xvi, 
145-147; English propose, 217; indige-
nous, 137-138, 142-143, 145, 148, 
153, 155, 167; between \T()C and 
Bangka, 98; between \T()C andJambi, 
107-108,147,150-151,157,158,168, 
170, 172, 173-176; between \T()C and 
Palembang, 52, 68, 82,107-108,116, 
135,183, 193, 199,205,214-215,242 
Corvee, 76-77, 89; inJambi, 129-130, 
143,155,156,161,171; in Palembang, 
195, 196,233-234,236,237; resented, 
90,167,196,238 
Cotton, 79, 120, 161, 187, 191,214,239; 
planting forbidden, 156, 167, 193 
Danau Ranau, 14 
Dates, 5,110-111,235, 269n.l, 274nn. 
94,8, 284n. 79 
Datuk Berhala, 12, 259n. 13 
Debts: as cause of quarrels, 67, 229, 231-
232; of Chinese, 54, 56, 125; court and, 
58,85,87,215; European attitudes 
toward, 83-84; as link between rulers 
and subjects, 237,238; marriage and, 
22 
Demak, 14,41,241 
Demang Lebar Daun, 2, 254n. 3 
Dipakusuma, Pangeran, 117 
Index 317 
Dipanegara, Pangeran, 89,129,130, 140, 
268n.82 
Disease, 19-20, 134, 173. See also Goiter; 
Smallpox 
Downstream. See Ilir 
Dutch East India Company: Bangka and, 
98; Banten and, 199,201; capture 
Riau, 222; Chinese and, 55-56, 87, 
125; decline of, 213-214, 232, 286n. 7; 
English and, 50-53, 216-217, 253n.4; 
Jambiand, 2,47-48,51-53, 57-58, 
61-63,80,105-109,131,135-136, 
141-144,147-149,150-151,153-155, 
156, 168-176,242, 262n. 83; Lampung 
and, 198-201; Palembang and, 2, 52, 
68-71, 107-109, 113-115, 181-184, 
192-194, 214-216, 241-242;represen-
tativesof, 30, 57-58, 60,71,116,157, 
168-176,186,191,199,214-215,243; 
sources from, xii-xiii, 73, 74-75, 230; 
tin and, 185, 186, 190-191; trade of, 4, 
80-91, 114, 184; Tulang Bawang and, 
201. See also Europeans 
Dutch government, 232, 233, 247. See also 
Netherlands 
Elephants, 20; tusks of, 151, 166, 169, 
184, 194, 274n.16 
Empat Lawang, 16 
English, 172, 197,222,247; "country" 
traders, 216, 219, 286n.14; in eigh-
teenth century, 213-214; massacre of, 
at Ambon, 53, 260n. 43; sell gunpow-
der, 91, 134; trade in opium, 163,216; 
trade in tin, 193. See also English East 
India Company 
English East India Company, 243; Chi-
nese and, 53; Dutch and, 50-53, 173, 
213,215-216, 253n. 4; Jambi and, 2, 
47-48,58,61,105-106,141,142-143, 
174. See also Europeans 
Enim, 16; river, 230. See also Muara Enim 
Envoys, 49, 61,70,215; from Minangka-
bau, 152-153 
Europeans: adopted by local rulers, 60, 
217; contracts and, xv-xvi, 145-147, 
174,177; debts, xv, 83-85, 87; describe 
local societies, 31,213,226,232-237, 
242,244,246, 285nn. 2, 3, 289n. 56; 
genealogies and, xiv, 38-40; gifts and, 
61,63,215,234; kinship and, 4, 248-
249; literacy and, xiv-xvi, 1-2, 4-5, 37, 
172,211,243; local women and, 51, 
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58-60,171,193,215; maps and, 1,47, 
199,243; punishments inflicted by, 
155, 278n. 72; rivalry between, 50; 
scientific societies of, 211-213; see 
native states as decaying, 213, 226, 
232,242,244, 286n. 6; time and, xv, 
110-112; trade of, xiv, 4. See also Dutch 
East India Company; English East 
India Company 
Families, 21, 23-27, 35; in economy, 50, 
57; heads of, 234, 289n.58 
Fathers: attitudes toward, 25-26, 50, 132, 
138, 140, 248; governor generals as, 
167, 180,249; in ulu-ilir relationship, 
13. See also Kings; Kinship 
Fines, 28, 233, 278n. 72; wang bangun, 
32 
Folkstories, 13,32,199; from Belitung, 
226; express local attitudes, 24, 28, 40, 
151, 162,240,248,267 n. 69, 268n. 79, 
275n.19, 288n.45, 292n.12; ashistor-
ical sources, 253 n. 2; from Lampung, 
228,230,231,238; Sultan Mahmud 
Badaruddin and, 204-210; used in 
education, 27, 253n. 2,257 n. 60. See 
also Orality 
Forts, 69, 215, 236 
Fukien, 44, 53 
Gambier, 9,118,120,184,187,191,214 
Genealogies, xiv, 6, 36,143, 291n.83; in 
economics, 38-43, 73, 246; Jambi, 
275n. 27; Minangkabau, 149; Palem-
bang, 78, 262n. 76 
Gifts, 71, 72,136,141,145,164,169, 
187,199,215-216,227,233,237,244; 
magical, 23, 94; symbolic, 59, 136, 
156,182,193,240; in trading relations, 
57,61-63; as tribute, 76, 77 
Goens, Rijklofvan, 34 
Goiter, 19, 256n. 36 
Gold: in Borneo, 189; goldsmiths, 163; in 
Jambi, 94, 96, 133, 160, 161-163, 164, 
172,176; mining methods, 151-152, 
200-201; sold in Palembang, 196,200, 
239; in Tulang Bawang, 200; weighing 
of, 275n.18. See also Minangkabau 
Goyer, Pieterde, 60, 69, 90 
Graves, 13,20,22,31,35,203,283 n. 58; 
in Palembang, 209, 240, 283 n. 58 
Gresik,44 
Gunung Meru, 30, 34 
Ha Tien, 123,218,219 
H<\ii, R<\iaofRiau, 174-175, 286n.19 
Headhunting, 23, 92, 229 
Heroes, 8-13, 39,151,184,201; heroic 
ruler, xvi, 176, 177-178,203-210,245, 
248,253 n. 3; heroic time, 143. See also 
Ancestors; Mahmud Badaruddin 
Hikayat Banjar, 91 
Hitam, Raja: Minangkabau regent, 95, 
150,162-163 
Horses, 62-63, 67 
Horsfield, Thomas, 189,241 
Ibrahim, Raja, 153-155 
Ilanun, 224-226, 288n. 37 
Ilir(downstream), 13-20,75; relations 
with upstream, 75-86, 108, 161. See also 
Jambi; Palembang 
Incest, 28, 30,138,141,208 
Inderagiri, 24, 49, 70, 93, 99, 100, 133, 
136, 187;Jambi and, 29, 40 
India/Indians, 4, 40, 43, 45, 93, 95, 118 
Ingalaga, Sultan ofJambi (1679-1687): 
death of, 136; exiled, 132-133, 138, 
244; given title of sultan, 72; hostile to 
Palembang, 104-109, 115; marries 
Palembang princess, 102-104; memo-
ries of, 140, 141-142, 157; opposed to 
Dutch, 131-132; as Pangeran Anum 
Dipati, 59, 71, 87, 89, 95; poverty of, 
128; relations with ulu, 95, 129; suc-
ceeds as Sultan Anum Ingalaga, 105-
107 
Iron, 93, 94, 106, 194,222,233 
Iskandar Muda, Sultan of Aceh (1607-
1636), 51 
Iskandar Zulkarnain (Alexander the 
Great), 9,10,41,149,204, 255n. 18 
Islam, 25, 53, 67, 70, 222; Arabs and, 
218-219; calendar of, 111, 130 148, 
269n. 2; Chinese and, 53-54; imams, 
69,85,94,104,137, 138, 143, 148, 
174; mosque in Palembang, 204, 209; 
Palembang as center of, 241,291 nn. 
82,83 
Jambi: Chinese and, 41-42, 44, 47,53-
56,93,105,129,170; Dutch and, xiv, 
2-4,57-63,69,107,128,131-132, 
135,146,167-176,214,215,239,242, 
243,247-248; English and, 2, 47-48, 
58,61,105-106,141,142-143,174; 
European accounts of, 212, 285n. 4; 
Ilanun in, 224; Java and; 66-72, 93, 
244; Johor and, 48, 51, 99-101, 105-
107,128,136, 161, 267nn. 69, 75; 
legends from, 12-13; Minangkabau 
and, 12, 14,93,239-240; nine rivers 
of, 150, 254n.16; Palembang and, xv, 
2-3,29,51,65,68-72,91-92,102-
108,115,127,135,146,167-168,171-
175,179,184,210,238,243-249, 
292n.12; pepper in, 43-46, 80, 83, 86, 
127,141,156,161; piracy in, 239; 
population of, 262 n. 76; queens of, 
103, 104, 129; royal family of, 16,29, 
65; slaves in, 80, 95-97; in Tembesi, 
102; trade of, 44-46,101-102,119, 
127-129,135,141,156,161; ulu-ilir 
relations in, 15-20,86,93-95, 102, 
112,128-130,131-144,147-148,151-
162, 166-167, 169-173, 176, 195,239, 
243-245. See also Chinese; Dutch East 
India Company; Minangkabau 
Japara, 42, 54, 78, 97 
Java/Javanese, 53, 78, 95, 248, 255n.19; 
admired, 65-67, 78, 235; cloth from, 
107,114,118, 135; Jambi and, 21, 25, 
49,65-72,93,135,137; language of, 
235,240; Palembangand 10-11,14, 
16,35,41,65, 115, 239, 241, 259n. 10; 
slaves from, 222; Sumatra and, 7, 71; 
trade of, 66,119-120,123,135,137, 
161,185,191-192,228. See also 
Mataram 
Jayawikrama, Pangeran. See Mahmud 
Badaruddin 
Jenang,121,233,234,235,237 
Jewelry, 64, 81, 86, 151; special powers of 
rings, 34 
Jitan, 200-201 
Johor, 97, 150; Bugis control of, 161,224; 
as center of Malay culture, 14; conflicts 
withJambi, 25, 99,100, 105-106, 128, 
136, 138,267 nn. 69, 75; orang laut of, 
100, 107, 223-224; Palembang and, 
115, 123, 179, 180; Raja Kecil and, 
153,161,223; ruler's links withJambi, 
48,51,70,71,99,106-107; trade of, 
93,114,122-123,133,182; Tungkal 
and, 99, 136, 156. See also Riau 
Jujuhan, 94, 131, 150, 151 
Jujuhan River, 254n. 16 
Kanan River (Wai Kanan), 197 
Kecil, Raja, 25, 153,206,223 
Index 
Kedah, 122,216 
Kelabat Bay, 188, 189 . 
Kelingi River, 234, 255n.16 
Kembang Seri, 165, 167 
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Kerinci, 14,21, 151, 155, 166; lineage 
heads of, 162 
Ketalo River, 161. See also Muara Ketalo 
Kiai Gede, Sultan ofJambi (1687-1719): 
conflict with Pangeran Pringgabaya, 
133-137,147,150; death of, 157, 169; 
Dutch and, 131, 150, 169, 278n. 72; 
hostility towards, 138-141, 156-157, 
244; Minangkabau and, 155; poverty 
of, 135-137, 138; and reconciliation, 
137, 141-142; sexual misconduct of, 
139, 156; son born to, 144, 147; sup-
ported by Palembang, 117, 132, 175; 
wife of, 144, 158 
Kings, 29-31, 33, 35-37, 72-73,148,238; 
as creditors, 85-86; in Europe, 177-
178; as fathers, 30-31, 50, 68,72,91, 
116,132,135,154,170; as heroes, 
176-178,203,209-210,248; literacy 
of, 5, 60, 172,235; palaces and, 204, 
236,238,240; rights of, 231; succession 
of, 32-33; time and, 112, 117, 131, 
209; and wealth, 65, 184; and women, 
76-78. See also Ancestors 
Kinship, xiii, 2, 4, 23, 292n. 12; as basis 
for social organization, 17, 24; con-
tracts and, 145-147; intellectual, 242; 
language of, 29, 70; political system 
and, 30-37, 117-118,221-222,237, 
244,248-249; raiding and, 100-101, 
229,267 n. 74; royal alliances and, 29, 
109,220-221; tensions in, 91-92; trade 
and, 39-43, 50, 54, 57-58, 72, 237, 
243,244,245, 258n. 2; in ulu-ilir 
relations, 75-91. See also Adoption; 
Arabs; Chinese; Families; Genealogies; 
Women 
Kisam,16 
Komering: corvee in, 234; headhunting 
in, 19; Palembang overlordship in, 
198,202,233,245, 255n.16, 274n.l; 
pepper in, 80; raiding in, 228-230; 
stories from, 248; troops from, 132, 
195; women from, 237 
KomeringRiver, 16, 18,92,116,121, 
145,239 
Kompeh River, 131, 168, 175. See also 
Muara Kompeh 
Kuamang, 48, 56, 82, 87, 90, 93 
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kubu, 9, 14,20,82; inJambi, 89, 133, 137; 
in Palembang, 120, 126 
Kwangtung (Guangdong), 41 
Lahat,239 
Lakitan River, 234, 255n.16 
Lalang River, 106, 120, 121, 126, 130 
Lampung, 16, 19,22,115,146,197-203, 
248; epics from, 201-203, 238; Palem-
bang and, 201-202, 227-229, 245. See 
also Tulang Bawang River 
Lebar Daun, 30, 34 
Legends, 8-13, 26,30,76,99, 230.Seeauo 
F olkstories 
Lemabang: graves at, 240 
Lematang River, 16, 18,92,202,233, 
255n.16 
Leparlsland, 222, 223, 225 
Letters, 7, 26, 60-61, 94,137,193,227, 
233,235, 289n. 63; 290n. 65; reception 
of, 62. See also Seals 
Limun, 151, 152, 163-164, 165, 172, 175, 
195,196,227 
Limun River, 254n.16 
Lingga, 99, 225 
Literacy: Arabs and, 220; changing atti-
tudes toward, 246, 290n. 65, 292n. 4; 
Chinese and, 54,188-189; in Europe, 
4-5,37,177,243, 254n.4; numeracy 
and, 74, 110; inPaiembang, 204, 235, 
246; in southeast Sumatra, 5-6, 60, 
172,227,246, 274n.1. See also 
Accounts/accountancy; Contracts 
LongPasir, 100-101, 268n. 78 
Macao, 123, 129 
Madura, 118, 186, 191 
Mahmud Badaruddin, Sultan of Pal em-
bang(1724-1757): Bangkaand, 184-
194,204-205; Banten and, 197; builds 
mosque and palace, 204, 209; Chinese 
and, 188-190, 193; early career of, 
178-184; as heroic ruler, xvi, 178, 203-
210, 245; Jambi and, 160, 167-168, 
171,173,174; Lampungand, 197-203; 
memories of, 178,203,236-237, 
285 n. 95; niece of, 277 n. 63; powers of, 
208-209; wealth and, 184, 193-194, 
203; and wife Mas Ayu, 24, 188, 189; 
wives of 181, 187, 188,206-207 
Mahmud Badaruddin II, Sultan of Pal em-
bang (1804-1812,1813,1818-1821), 
246,248 
Mahmud Baha'uddin, Sultan of Pal em-
bang (1774-1804), 286n. 19; builds 
grave, 236; census by, 235; death of, 
242, 246;oranglautand, 222-223, 
224; reads, 235, 290n. 65; succeeds, 
215,241-242; women and, 238 
Mahmud Mansur, Sultan of Pal em bang 
(1706-1714): death of, 179; oral 
accounts of, 117, 206; as pangeran aria, 
103,106,115,116-117; as pangeran 
ratu, 117; succeeds, 117-118, 127 
Majapahit, 11, 12,25,41,77,79, 
255n.20 
Makakau,16 
Makassar: connections withJ ambi, 24, 
27,42,70,71,73,104; defeated by 
Dutch, 104; slaves from, 96-97 
Makassarese: on Bangka, 188; inJambi, 
27,42,104-107,131,141; in Lam-
pung, 201; led by Daeng Mangika, 
105-107,117, 268n.89; migrants, 104, 
186; in Palembang, 106-107, 130,239; 
queens inJambi, 104-105, 129, 
268n. 89; raiding, 115-116; on Sian-
tan, 124; as slaves, 95, 96-97; as trad-
ers, 96, 217 
Malay Peninsula, 1,7,51 
Malays, 49, 93,115,123,130,221,223, 
227, 239, 288 n. 42; culture and lan-
guage, 14,16,232; stories, 23, 25; 
writing and, 241, 254n.11 
Maluku, 45, 131 
Manau River (Sungai Manau), 20, 
274n.16 
MandariMandarese, 96, 181, 188,218, 
239 
Mangunjaya, 133, 136, 140, 147, 153, 
154-155. See also Muara Tebo 
Maps, 1,47,69,199,219,243, 253n.1 
Marga, 17,232, 277n.57 
Marriage customs, 9-10, 21, 59, 229, 230, 
256n.41; divorce, 103, 268n.82, 
285n.95 
Marsden, William, xvii, 21,22, 152,212-
213, 226, 243 
Mataram, 29, 65-72,115,244. See also 
Java 
Mats, 30-31,105,118-119,134,239 
Mecca, 241 
Melaka, 42,43, 50, 51, 53, 93,121,129, 
216, 258n. 2; conquered by Portu-
guese, 1, 45, 52; and Malay culture, 
14 
Men: as husbands, 24-25. See also Brother-
hood; Children; Fathers 
Menggrua, 198, 199,200 
Mentuk, 188, 189, 191, 221, 222, 223 
Merangin, 78, 89, 92, 128, 129, 130, 136, 
140, 148, 167 
Mesuji River, 227, 229 
Mesumai River, 254n.16 
Migration: from Minangkabau, 4, 92-95, 
104,131,133,151-153,162-166,240, 
244,245, 255n. 29; from Pasemah, 
229-231. See also Bugis; Chinese; 
Makassarese 
Miller, Charles, 226, 285n. 2 
Minangkabau: Batang Tiga regents of, 
94,95, 149-150, 154, 159, 160, 166, 
168,170; as gold miners, 151-152, 160, 
162-165,176,201; heroes of, 28, 151; 
intervene inJambi, 130-131, 137, 140, 
148-155,160,172-173,243; Islam 
and, 241; migration intoJambi, 14, 17, 
92-95,104,131,133,151-153,162-
166,240,244,245,253 n. 3; as opium 
traders, 164; Pruembang and, 93, 115, 
194-195,227; ofPassimpe, 155, 
275n. 27; as pepper growers, 43, 48-
49,56,80,87,89; powers of, 152, 
275n.19; as raiders, 223; rebellion, 
152-155; rulers of, 93-94,153,165; on 
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